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Abstract
This thesis argues that socio-technica! systems (STS) mediate between governance 
and the vulnerability o f households.
A STS approach enhances the analytical categories o f the sustainable livelihoods 
framework: by conceptualising STS as the groups through which risk is shared, 
household hsk, infrastructure and governance to be brought into a single conceptual 
space. The thesis develops a methodology, based on the sustainable livelihoods 
framework and the World Health Organisation's water system indicators, that captures 
the features o f STS which help households to buffer vulnerability. These methods are 
applied to an empihcal study o f Cusco, Pern and three urban case studies: San Bias, 
near to the city's main plaza and served by the provincial water company; Angostura, a 
pen-urban settlement with its own water system: and Manco Capac, with a dilapidated, 
independent supply.
Livelihoods were vulnerable to seasonal, local and global cycles with San Bias linked to 
tourism: Angostura exposed to annual flooding: and Manco Capac constrained by low, 
seasonal incomes. Diversity and complexity in livelihoods -  exposure to different risks 
at different times -  enhanced the ability o f people in San Bias and Angostura to 
mitigate risks, while, in more homogeneous Manco Capac, existing vulnerability was 
interacting with poor water, sanitation and other services to compound the risks faced  
by those with weak household assets. The physical hardware and institutional software 
o f water systems contributed to differences in household vulnerability. Their modes o f 
organisation, categorised as privileging, bypassing, resisting and networking, were 
driven both by governance, through policy frameworks and local institutions, and  
livelihoods, where socio-technicaI systems react to the perceived hsks and returns o f 
livelihoods and groups o f livelihoods.
Sustainable livelihoods, which enhance rather than damage livelihoods o f others, are 
undemvned by bypass but bolstered where assets are complex and diverse and 
modes o f organisation serve to network users and providers, citizens and government 
and contaminators and contaminated.
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Chapter 1 Water in cities
12
Usually whenever Owen reflected upon the gross injustices, and inhumanity of 
the existing social disorder. he became convinced that it could not possibly last; 
it was bound to fall to pieces because o f its own rottenness. It was not just, it 
was not common sense, and therefore it could not endure. But always after one 
of these arguments -  or, rather, disputes -  with his fellow workmen, he almost 
relapsed into hopelessness and despondency, for then he realized how vast 
and how strong are the fortifications that surround the present system; the great 
barriers and ramparts o f invincible ignorance, apathy and self-contempt, which 
will have to be broken down before the system of society of which they are the 
defences, can be swept away.
The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists, Robert Tressel, 1913
If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?
Gifford Lectures, G. A. Cohen, 1996
1.1 The Research Question
How do socio-technical systems mediate between governance 
arrangements and household infrastructure vulnerability?
The response to this question is navigated through a series of sub-questions 
and an empirical study of livelihoods and water and waste infrastructure in 
Cusco, Peru.
The sub-questions are as follows:
a) How does a socio-technical systems approach resonate and dissonate 
conceptually with governance and sustainable livelihoods frameworks?
b) How can one develop a methodology for understanding socio-technical 
systems as they mediate between governance and livelihoods in the 
empirical case study of Cusco?
c) What are the wider conceptual and policy implications of the empirical 
analysis when it is analysed through the framework developed in A and 
B?
1.2 Water and development: the governance challenge of delivering urban 
infrastructure and sustainable livelihoods
1.2.1 Global Trends in Urban Water
Water transcends political jurisdictions and spheres of governance. Its 
management is critical in supporting human life, sustaining agriculture and 
ecosystems and feeding international markets with food, flowers and fibre. In its 
guise as a human right or as an economic good, water is not always in the 
condition or place to be useful.
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With more than half the world’s population living in towns and cities1, 
water has to be treated and distributed in a way that provides for human 
consumption, hygiene and industry as well as replenishing natural and artificial 
reservoirs, assimilating other sorts of waste and preventing the degradation of 
valuable ecosystems.
Some commentators suggest that thirty percent of the urban population 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, some 120 million people, lack adequate 
water with forty percent lack adequate sanitation (UN-HABITAT 2003). In 
addition, the evidence is increasingly showing that human development goals 
concerned with child health and malnutrition, currently, for example, the 
Millennium Development Goals, are highly correlated with the provision of what 
is often expensive water and sanitation infrastructure. In their 2003 World Bank 
paper, Leipziger et al. concluded that.
...this is good news because presumably it is easier to aim for universal access 
to water, sanitation, and electricity than for universal wealth. But it poses a 
daunting development challenge in the sense that the efforts required are still 
huge -  significantly improving child health outcomes will require enormous 
increases in water and sanitation coverage of the poorer populations.
(Leipziger 2003): 14
One might legitimately ask whether the development aim of ‘universal 
access’ is in any sense easy given the messy governance of wealth, water, 
sanitation and the environment that seems to thwart it. The delivery of urban 
infrastructure, then, merits an altogether closer examination (Satterthwaite 
2003):186.
The research question has thus emerged from the political and conceptual 
complexity of growing urban populations, patchy water and sanitation provision 
and the environmental, economic and spatial dimensions of deprivation.
1.2.2 Urban Water and An Idealistic Engineer
At the turn of the millennium, it was impossible for me to be oblivious to 
these trends from either a personal or professional perspective. I felt that these 
were the problems I was being trained to solve.
In 2001, I returned to London after a year at an elite engineering school 
in France, courtesy of the Cinquieme Republic. That period in Paris and
1 (UN-HABITAT & DFID 2002):4
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Toulouse had been a charge into the disused wastelands of my brain: a 
different language, almost an art, forcing a new identity; encounters with my 
father’s Trotskyite ‘contacts’ from the sixties and their cultish, clandestine 
political descendents; and, tasting the cosseted culture of French higher 
education still sired indulgently by papa: a clan of globalised, industrial 
engineers. What a mess. How could I possibly navigate my profession’s ‘evil 
dam-building ways’ and lead a good and flourishing life after all that?
I responded to my confused, middle-class conscience by going ‘green’, 
reverting to the conditioning of my school days: Blue Peter and the ozone hole, 
the Rio Earth Summit, Naomi Klein’s No Logo and burgeoning panic about 
climate change. I tried to make sense of it all, first by rejecting the corporate 
milk round, and then by joining a small-is-beautiful engineering consultancy 
specialising in sustainable master planning, building-integrated renewables and 
zero carbon developments. All things verdant.
Then came a chance to work on the regeneration of the Thames 
Gateway and develop showcase master plans for Z-squared: a zero carbon, 
zero waste development of two thousand homes. But the excitement gradually 
gave way to unease, prompted by a visit to a friend in Deptford. He had recently 
moved into a shiny, gated development: lots of glass, a concierge, a gym, a 
hefty service charge and a view up and over its dilapidated neighbourhood 
across to the city of London. I started to get nervous: would I be Frankenstein to 
my monstrous sustainable master plan: imposing a ‘community’, not just gated 
by CCTV and a fence, but disconnected from the pipes and wires that it might 
once have shared with shabbier neighbours? I worried about a strange 
autonomy of infrastructure where a common interest in maintenance and 
investment would wane and what had begun as a lifestyle choice would become 
self-reinforcing, technological segregation where the impacts of rising gas, 
electricity and water costs would be felt asymmetrically for generations. What 
would this mean for our right to roam the city? What is a community anyway? 
And what exactly were engineers helping to sustain? Was my notion that 
universal and equitable infrastructure coverage could exist in any millennial city 
just plain naive?
My boss at the time had cut his teeth as a services engineer in Sweden. 
He loved to dazzle us with stories of students and bankers living side by side,
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sharing a basement laundry room and obeying a rota. He cited Scandinavian 
efficiency in ‘community’ heating: combined heat and power distributing hot 
water across housing estates in insulated underground pipes. The consensus in 
our office was that if only the British equivalent of the sixties had not been 
allowed to fall into disrepair, such systems would have much to offer the fight 
against climate change today. At the same time, to the east, tit for tat energy 
disputes in the Caucuses brought newspaper stories of horrific winters in 
Soviet-era housing projects, where collective heating installations were jammed 
by rust, frozen investment and vicious price hikes. Meanwhile, ten years after 
the deregulation and privatisation of utilities in the UK, new infrastructure 
markets in Europe’s accession countries were being prised open with injections 
of investment in offices and luxury housing in concentrated pockets of Warsaw 
and Riga. Venturing outside Europe, water companies from the Home Counties 
were taking on concessions as far afield as Dar-es-Salaam, in what was starting 
to describe a global trend.
All this was to the rhetorical backdrop of decentralisation, in both 
economic and environmental reportage, and privatisation in various guises on 
the international policy agenda. To my untrained eye, extrapolating from these 
positions seemed to lead inexorably to fragmentation: a world of privileged 
enclaves and excluded swathes. First, I asked myself, was this simply collateral 
damage in the rational pursuit of efficiency? I thought of Haussmann’s Paris and 
the present day contrast between my very civil engineering counterparts at the 
Ecole Centrale and Mathieu Kassovitz’s disturbing 1996 film La Haine set in the 
bleak and violent banlieues of the same city. Then I resorted to conspiracies: 
was it all some kind of plot? I thought of my furtive friends from Workers’ Fight 
and remembered the press coverage from Seattle in 1999 -  a messy anti­
globalisation coalition of left, green, faithful and anarchic standing against a 
common enemy, the global forces of capitalism, in solidarity with its victims: 
ecosystems and the poor.
Water, in particular, seemed to have fuelled the polemic, it was 
apparently naturally free and clean, part of a common treasury, but the 
dastardly proposition was to buy and sell it for private gain. It caught the popular 
imagination with the inherent tension between its visceral incarnation as a right 
and its nature, as the Machiavellians would have it, as an economic good.
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In conceptual terms, I was left torn between an unattainable, universal 
and egalitarian model of urban infrastructure and the practical delivery of 
hardware, guided by rational economic choices and the real cost of water. 
Fortunately, these positions had also been of considerable concern to policy 
makers, academics and development institutions long before I started to puzzle 
over them.
1.2.3 The Policy Response: Concepts of Governance, Vulnerability and
Sustainable Livelihoods
A key policy framework that emerged in response to the challenges of 
international development after the Cold War was that of governance. The 
framework addressed competing critiques of development and gave balance to 
a discourse that had by turns favoured governments over markets, undermined 
governments in favour of free trade and in both cases overlooked the 
importance of civil society in tackling human development and social justice.
In this scheme, the institutions and activities of the state, the market and 
civil society are arranged into three overlapping categories, shown in Figure 1. 
Such a framework can be deployed as an analytical tool for examining the 
activities of each set of actors and as a normative prescription for growth- 
promoting ‘good governance’. In its normative guise the relationships between 
elected government, a market-oriented private sector and an amorphous civil 
society of citizens and non-governmental organisations are balanced, 
transparent and co-operative.
The framework is obviously useful since it is generic enough to be 
applied at various scales: at the global level, for example, to frame negotiations 
on international trade, security or the environment; at a national or city level in 
terms of participation or efforts to decentralise; and in describing the 
governance of water provision and the activities of parastatal companies, 
private investors and grass-roots movements.
The main caveat is that, just as development theorists tussle over the 
relative importance of state, market and civil society, so the neat balance 
suggested by the diagram may not reflect practical imbalances of power playing 
out on the ground. Indeed, as we shall see, the tidy divisions cannot always do 
justice to organisations that fall outside the framework (Van Rooy 2002).
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Figure 1 Adapted from (Van Rooy 2002):491
MARKET STATE
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SOCIETY
In relation to urban water and waste water infrastructure, governance is 
an established framework through which International Financial Institutions, 
governments, academics and development practitioners continue to thrash out 
controversies and competing priorities. The World Bank’s governance 
framework for the provision of services, for example, evolved from one that 
favoured privatisation in the early nineties, to, by 2004, a triangle of state, 
clients and service providers that closely mirrors the diagram in Fig. 1.
Meanwhile, with the reformulation of systems of governance at one end 
of the theoretical spectrum, at the other, Robert Chambers and others working 
with those on the receiving end of exclusion were calling for a more 
sophisticated understanding of deprivation that considered vulnerability as 
social, spatial and environmental:
The realities of poor people are local, complex, diverse and dynamic. Income- 
poverty, though important, is only one aspect of deprivation... In addition to 
poverty, these include social inferiority, isolation, physical weakness, 
vulnerability, seasonal deprivation, powerlessness and humiliation.
(Chambers 1995): 173
This idea formed the conceptual basis of a sustainable livelihoods model: 
an analytical structure for understanding the strategies of households in relation 
to their assets and activities. Livelihoods are understood in terms of the 
governance environment in which households find themselves (Policies, 
Institutions and Process), access to Infrastructure and Services; vulnerability to 
shocks and trends; and a portfolio of household assets as shown in Figure 2.
Following on from concepts of sustainable development, which aim to 
maintain economic, social and environmental assets to meet the needs of 
people now and into the future, household assets fall into similar categories of
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economic (financial and physical capital), social (social and human capital) and 
environmental (natural capital).
Figure 2 The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework Adapted from (Rakodi 2002a)
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The SL framework’s underlying assumption is that whether a household 
can achieve a sustainable livelihood or not will depend on how well it is able to 
buffer and mitigate risks and shocks. By going further than the generalised 
Vulnerability Context, the framework not only takes account of the ability of 
individual households to insulate themselves against shocks using their own 
assets but also allows for the possibility that household risks are also buffered 
through collective assets like infrastructure and services as well as the 
institutional and policy environment in which they find themselves.
This thesis examines the role that collective infrastructure plays in 
mediating between systems of governance and household vulnerability.
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1.3 Socio-technical systems mediating between governance and 
vulnerability: an empirical response to the research question
The thesis tackles the conceptual and theoretical, methodological and 
empirical implications of using the sustainable livelihoods framework to 
understand the mediating role of socio-technical systems in vulnerability.
1.3.1 Critical Interrogation of Frameworks
Despite the World Bank’s optimistic rhetoric, moving from theory to 
implementation of new governance arrangements has been slow and 
problematic. The governance perspective -  and certainly governance as a 
normative prescription -  is appealing because it is easy to apply at different 
institutional scales and because it claims to offer pragmatism as opposed to 
partisan or ideological debate. In fact, the approach is often seen as part of a 
neo-liberal package: deceptive for appearing to take a bland, managerial 
approach to development while deliberately ignoring what other observers see 
as more adversarial social relations, vested interests and injustice.
In this connection, reviewing the state of water and sanitation in cities in 
2006, Adriana Allen, Julio Davila and Pascale Hofmann observe that:
There now seems to be widespread agreement that in low- and middle-income 
countries the state alone will be unable to meet the internationally agreed 
targets for reducing the number of people in cities with no access to clean water 
and adequate sanitation. This is partly a legacy of decades of supply-led 
engineering approaches with high operating costs and under-utilized 
investment, unrealistically high standards of per capita service to formal areas 
of cities and a general disregard for the needs of unregulated or “illegal” urban 
and peri-urban settlements. Recent attempts to involve private investors in 
water supply have not yielded the desired results of expanding network 
coverage to low-income urban and peri-urban settlements, which are regarded 
as much less profitable than wealthier and more central areas of cities.
(Allen etal. 2006):333
The authors point out that certain governance models overlook low- 
income and peri-urban patches of cities, prioritising the privileged rather than 
producing equitable or universal infrastructures.
Arguably, a governance framework with its rational and responsive trinity 
of actors -  an atomised electorate, representative government and a market -  
does not have sufficient explanatory power to uncover the processes that are 
producing patchy distribution of infrastructure within and between jurisdictions. 
This is explored by Erik Swyngedouw and Nikolas Heynen who conclude that:
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...there is no such thing as an unsustainable city in general. Rather, there are a 
series of urban and environmental processes that negatively affect some social 
groups while benefiting others. A just urban socio-environmental perspective, 
therefore, always needs to consider the question of who gains and who pays 
and to ask serious questions about the multiple power relations—and the scalar 
geometry of these relations—through which deeply unjust socio-environmental 
conditions are produced and maintained.
(Swyngedouw & Heynen 2003): 901
The notion that differential access to infrastructure has environmental as 
well as social components can be useful in situations where infrastructure and 
environmental assets, like rivers, weave through jurisdictions and connect 
groups of urban people that are not immediate spatial neighbours.
Beyond the social and environmental, the concept of Socio-Technical 
Systems has emerged from recent studies of globalisation, splintering urbanism 
and research into the links between infrastructure and sustainable household 
consumption. A STS approach expects an examination of the ways in which the 
history, institutional arrangements and spatial layout of infrastructure can 
embed the power relations to which Swyngedouw and Heynen refer.
The subject of entrenched biases in access has also been broached in 
critiques of sustainable development. Just as Swyngedouw and Heynen hint 
that blithe labelling of cities as sustainable or unsustainable can mask certain 
injustices, Robert Chambers insists that development professionals should 
strive to avoid practices that entrench sustainable privilege for ‘us’ rather than 
sustainable well-being for ‘them’ (Chambers 1995)204. Building on the empirical, 
participatory heritage of the SL approach, Chambers’ also applies this thinking 
to sustainability in the context of livelihoods and argues for the interdependence 
of livelihoods with the channels connecting ‘us’ to ‘them’ seen as both physical 
and institutional or social and technical:
...a sustainable livelihood should not damage but enhance the livelihoods of 
others (whether through claims, access, international trade, environmental 
effects or in other ways) now and/or in the future.
(Chambers 2005):202
This brief summary has built on a critical interrogation of the governance, SL 
and STS frameworks and it leads to the following propositions. Firstly, the SL 
framework recognises that vulnerability -  or the inability of households to buffer 
the risks that destabilise their livelihoods -  is not just a fleeting function of 
deprivation. It acknowledges the powerful influence of governance in terms of 
policies, institutions and processes, and it conceptualises the role of
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infrastructure in terms of household access to services at a certain moment and 
in a certain place. From here, the framework cannot get any closer to an 
analysis of how vulnerability is embedded through infrastructure systems which, 
on one hand, present differential risks (and vulnerability) to households and, on 
the other, are shaped by high level governance prescriptions which can result in 
processes that privilege and bypass certain groups.
Secondly, although a governance framework can go some way towards 
untangling the institutional factors which link livelihoods together, it is 
deliberately blind to the inherent power imbalances that shape the negotiated 
and incremental development which might enhance or damage livelihoods.
Thirdly, a STS approach serves as a useful conceptual bridge between 
vulnerability and governance. The framework developed in Chapter 2 deals with 
a) the political blandness of the governance framework, b) the importance of the 
spatial and collective arrangements of urban infrastructure that are missing from 
the livelihoods framework, c) examines urban risk-sharing beyond vague 
assumptions about urban “communities” that are implied by the governance 
frameworks conceptions of civil society and the livelihoods conceptions of social 
capital.
1.3.2 Formulation of an interdisciplinary methodology
Despite the limitations of a governance lens, it remains a useful way to 
link critiques of development and navigate the sometimes messy patterns of 
urban governance. In this research, it frames an analysis of historical accounts, 
water sector reports and primary interview data and is used to identify the 
important players and events in the Peruvian context.
The analytical categories offered by the livelihoods framework have 
shaped the research design from the use of case studies and the structure of 
household and key informant interviews through to the analysis of secondary 
data. This methodology encourages an analysis that understands the links 
between the livelihoods of the best and worst off and, since in parts of Cusco 
the juxtaposition of privileged and poor is superimposed onto a common, 
proximate stake in such things as water supply infrastructure, this research is 
based on three case studies which take in a variety of the household strategies 
and vulnerabilities at play in the city.
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The STS concept is used to unpick the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of water and sanitation infrastructure that affect household vulnerability. 
Three socio-technical indicators are invoked for this purpose: the socio- 
technical scale of the water system, the performance of the water system and 
the quality of the household connection to the system.
Socio-technical scale describes the system’s links into the environment: 
to water sources, pollution sinks, energy resources or other infrastructure 
networks. At the same time, it looks at the number of users, the geographical 
extent of the system and the wider social and technical systems into which 
infrastructure can tap. In this way, the socio-technical scale of a small, 
independent peri-urban piped water supply may not be limited to just its users 
but networked to support from international NGOs, local government, training 
from the municipal water company and equipment sourced from a great 
distance.
System performance is understood in terms of water quality, water 
quantity and the continuity, accessibility and affordability of the water service. 
Evaluating this performance is based on the World Health Organisation’s 
guidelines for assessing sanitary risk and the institutions with responsibility for 
the system.
Household connections obviously depend on the performance of the 
system to which they are able to connect themselves but also on the condition 
of household taps, patio drainage, domestic water treatment and hygiene 
practices. In addition, when water runs out, households may have recourse to 
alternative sources from less profligate neighbours, relatives in other places, 
local markets or other institutions. These interactions are understood as part of 
the lived experience of infrastructure and are assembled through the 
sustainable livelihoods framework.
1.3.3 Case Studies, Data Acquisition and Processing of Empirical Data
Where better to look for answers to questions about urban infrastructure 
than the continent famous for its barrios cerrados, its cities made legendary by 
their disparities of wealth and, more recently, the nexus of closely watched 
struggles over water privatisation in Bolivia, Argentina and Chile. In this 
connection, Peru is particularly interesting because, although the country
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experienced several important regional shocks and trends during the eighties 
and nineties including a debt crisis, violent civil unrest and political turmoil that 
gave rise to a partial rollout of decentralisation, Peruvian reform of governance 
in the water sector, at least until now, has seen a move towards 
commercialisation of parastatal companies rather than privatisation.
Peru is the third largest country in Latin America, covering some 1.3 
million square kilometres and taking in the lush, Amazon basin to the east (la 
selva), rising over the spectacular Andean mountain range running north to 
south (la sierra) to its flat, arid coastal strip bordering the pacific (la costa) 
(Figure 2). The population, recorded by the 2005 census at just over 27million 
people, is multilingual and multiethnic and is still economically polarised by a 
concentration of prosperity in the coastal region around the capital, Lima, and 
incredible poverty in its mountainous hinterland.
Figure 3 Latin America with Peru highlighted
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Peruvian political traditions of authoritarian rule from the centre, populism 
in the regions and disparities of wealth along geographic lines have fomented 
an intense rivalry between Lima and important regional cities. In 1992, finally 
acknowledging its cultural significance, Peru’s colonial and modern capital Lima 
granted the city of Cusco, perched 3,300m above sea level in the Andes, the 
title of “historic capital".
Figure 4J_ocation of the Department of Cusco in Peru 
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To the Inca, the name Cusco meant navel: the city was the central focus 
of their empire and was of strong spiritual and strategic importance (Figure 3). 
Surrounded by craggy peaks, Cusco nestles at the head of the Valle Sur, or 
Southern Valley, which gradually spreads into a broad, fertile flood plain as it 
descends from the city. On the valley floor is the River Huatanay, the main 
watercourse, fed by springs and the violent, seasonal surface water which 
charges down from the micro-catchments on either side. Eventually, the 
Huatanay meets the River Vilcanota and then the Amazon before the water 
finally wends its way to the Atlantic.
These days, Cusco is the name of the administrative department, the 
province and a district in the city. In its historic centre, the oft snapped heritage 
architecture is typified by Inca foundations -  enormous hunks of stone and 
flawless masonry -  supporting rougher, colonial buildings erected by the 
Spanish on whatever remained after their destructive conquest in 1532. It is the 
Inca legacy, however, which has put the city on international heritage maps and 
it has become a major tourist hub and the gathering point for the “Inca Trail” to 
the “lost” city of Machu Picchu.
The contemporary actors enrolled in governance of the city’s water 
include the provincial water company, focused on cost recovery; this company’s 
elected masters, the district mayors; the people that remember sweating to 
build their own independent infrastructure and are struggling to maintain it; their 
offspring who suffer from water shortages brought on by depleted sources and 
decrepit distribution systems; and those working on water and sanitation with 
non-governmental organisations.
Settlement patterns in Cusco have been shaped by topography, 
hydrology, earthquakes, the fads of international tourists, guerrilla insurgency, 
property speculation and prejudiced mythology about certain groups of people. 
The result is a heterogeneous jumble of prosperity and hardship, a process that 
has splintered the city into enclaves where investment and development 
happen and other places where they do not. The tendency for urban water 
systems to be patchy or fragmented is intimately linked to these other patterns 
of urban development and is technical and spatial as well as institutional.
Each case study holds a unique place in the development of Cusco. As 
the city has spilled down into the valley, Angostura, once a rural settlement, has
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found itself on the edge of town while Manco Capac, close to the centre, is yet 
to be incorporated into the provincial water system. In the historic centre, for 
example, San Bias has only recently seen its colonial era stone drains replaced 
and connected to provincial system.
In each location, “best o ff’, “worst off’ and “typical” households were 
identified with local gatekeepers and key informants, household interviews were 
conducted and water samples were taken in the rainy season and dry season. 
Interviews were conducted with key informants in local government and water 
provider organisations. The water systems in each location were evaluated with 
key informants and water samples taken at source, storage and treatment. 
Participatory exercises were also organised with the householders and gate 
keepers.
Data was analysed through the categories of the livelihoods framework 
and the qualitative and quantitative indicators offered by the World Health 
Organisation for evaluating water systems.
1.3.4 Comparative Analysis, obtaining key indicators and drawing 
conclusions
The role played by STS in mediating between governance and 
vulnerability in each case study is understood through a comparative analysis of 
the livelihoods and STS in each location. This leads in to a wider analysis of the 
ways in which the policies, processes and institutions of governance in Cusco 
influence and are influenced by livelihood vulnerability across the city. These 
patterns are then explored using the conceptual framework developed early on 
in the thesis to map the relationship between governance, livelihoods and 
infrastructure.
The key indicators in the study relate to household vulnerability, water and 
sanitation infrastructure and institutions of governance. In terms of household 
vulnerability, I use livelihood assets, presented along five axes of human, social, 
physical, financial and natural capital, a thematic analysis of livelihood 
strategies and sanitary risk scores in each household. Sanitary risk scores are a 
composite indicator of the presence of faecal contamination and a visual 
inspection of sanitary risks. Livelihoods are understood as diverse -  stretching
27
to take in different activities and locations -  and complex -  connecting to hubs 
of resources, knowledge and capacity.
Water and sanitation infrastructure is evaluated using the quality, quantity, 
continuity, accessibility and affordability indicators established by the World 
Health Organisation. In addition to these, I explore each system’s socio- 
technical mode of organisation as a function of engagement with other entities 
in the governance framework including providers, municipal authorities, NGOs 
and communities; the number of users; the rate of drinking water production 
and; the spatial extent of the system. Systems are then classified as modes that 
privilege, bypass, resist or network.
Using these indicators, I argue that households face risks to their 
livelihoods that are differentiated by their access to assets, infrastructure and 
influence. Modes of organisation of water and sanitation infrastructure are a 
response to the governance imperatives of providers and their perceptions of 
livelihoods but they also tend to interact with household vulnerability to amplify 
risk for those least able to buffer it. The potential for urban households to 
mitigate risk in a sustainable way is undermined by bypass, weak assets and 
homogeneity in livelihood strategies. This potential is enhanced where assets 
are strong or livelihood strategies are mixed but also where socio-technical 
infrastructures create complex and diverse networks of people, knowledge, 
assets and institutions that link powerful and vulnerable livelihoods.
1.4 Mapping the thesis: structuring the argument
The research question has been tackled in four parts beginning, in 
Chapter 2, with a critique of sustainable livelihoods and the ways in which this 
framework understands governance, infrastructure and livelihoods. This critique 
then goes forward by introducing and developing concepts that help to illustrate 
the mediating role played by infrastructure in household vulnerability. This 
answers the first sub-question.
Next, in Chapter 3, the thesis argues for a research methodology and a 
set of tools that allow governance, livelihoods and socio-technical systems to be 
evaluated on the ground. This offers qualitative and quantitative methods, visual 
and graphical tools and the use of case studies for analysis of results from an 
empirical study in Cusco. This answers the second sub-question.
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The third part of the document is a presentation of the data collected in 
Cusco. This begins with an introduction to Peruvian governance and 
infrastructure, in Chapter 4, and is followed by three chapters describing the 
livelihoods in three urban case studies: Chapters 5, 6 and 7. These descriptions 
follow the analytical categories set out by the livelihoods framework and set the 
scene for responding to the research question by describing the links between 
household assets, strategy and vulnerability in an urban context.
The fourth part of the thesis uses the foregoing analysis to answer the 
research question. In Chapter 8, I bring together the livelihoods analysis and a 
socio-technical analysis of the infrastructure in each case study to argue that 
household vulnerability is mediated by socio-technical systems. This part of the 
thesis is then concluded in Chapter 9 with a broader view of the relationship 
between socio-technical systems and governance in Cusco. This chapter 
argues that socio-technical systems mediate vulnerability because they become 
configured as modes of organisation that either allow households to buffer risk 
or that leave households more exposed. These modes of organization act to 
privilege, bypass, resist splintering and network and they are driven by 
governance, governance of provision and a series of reactions to the reality of 
or assumptions about livelihood vulnerability.
The document concludes by answering the third sub-question, by summing 
up and outlining the contribution and implications of the research.
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Chapter 2 Unwrapping the research question: 
interrogation of the frameworks
critical
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The core aim of this thesis is an exploration of household vulnerability and 
its relationship with governance; a relationship which I hypothesise is mediated 
through infrastructure. In arguing for this relationship, I respond to the first sub­
question posed in Chapter 1 and examine the conceptual ways in which a 
socio-technical systems approach resonates with each component of the 
sustainable livelihoods framework.
This chapter begins, in Section 1.1, with an introduction to Sustainable 
Livelihoods (SL), a framework which has already brought together concepts of 
vulnerability, infrastructure and governance. This framework is also, 
fundamentally, a manifesto for participatory development that is focused on the 
activities of households and communities.
Notwithstanding this participatory emphasis, development practitioners 
have been quick to warn that, while involving the least powerful is critical to 
understanding and mitigating vulnerability, this activity should not be to the 
exclusion of a critique of governance. With this in mind, Section 1.2 moves 
immediately to the context of development and a critical examination of the twin 
shifts in theoretical and political attitudes to the state, the market and civil 
society.
Section 1.3 then offers a critical analysis of the governance discourse 
applied to infrastructure provision and the difficulty in handling within a 
governance framework the anomalies of non-homogeneous urban infrastructure. 
This section concludes by arguing for a perspective that understands the social 
and technical dimensions of infrastructure.
In Section 1.4, I argue for socio-technical systems as a useful conceptual 
bridge between household vulnerability and governance. The first stage of this 
argument relates infrastructure and governance. By building on studies of cities 
and globalisation, splintering urbanism and the role played by local institutions, 
the STS approach is shown to offer an enhanced set of concepts for 
understanding the mediating role that infrastructure plays in shaping cities and 
services. The second step is to demonstrate that the relationship between 
household livelihoods and infrastructure is usefully described by categorising 
socio-technical systems by their modes of production and consumption.
Finally, in Section 1.5, I return to the SL framework for a closer look at 
vulnerability, arguing that household assets and collective infrastructure are
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intimately linked to each other and to vulnerability. This critique then allows me 
to introduce my framework for understanding vulnerability and governance in 
terms of the collective sharing of risk through infrastructure.
2.1 Sustainable Livelihoods: an analytical framework linking vulnerability, 
infrastructure and governance
How much should a rational plan of life allow for elements such as friendship, 
love, political activity, attachments to property or possessions, all of which, 
being themselves vulnerable, make the person who stakes his or her good to 
them similarly open to chance?
The Fragility o f Goodness, Martha Nussbaum
The sustainable livelihoods2 (SL) framework3 builds on participatory 
approaches to development and first emerged as an analytical framework for 
understanding rural livelihoods in the late nineties (Scoones 1998). The need 
for participation was recognised by Robert Chambers in his work Whose Reality 
Counts? (Chambers 1997) in which he argued that the world’s unequal power 
relationships are replicated in bureaucracies and systems which exclude local 
people and local knowledge. His plea was that we move away from ideas of 
better planning and integration, towards a vocabulary that emphasises civil 
society, governance, livelihoods and sustainability4.
The basis of the SL framework is that households manage a range of 
assets in a context of vulnerability and in response to a set of policies, 
institutions and processes. In Section 2.5, I will examine assets and vulnerability 
in more detail but at this stage it is sufficient to understand that maintenance of 
these assets is based on the concept of sustainable development -  formulated 
twenty-years ago by the Bruntland Commission -  and the oft cited statement 
that development ought to meet “the needs of the present without compromising
2 Early use of this can be found in the 1995 Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development 
(http://www.un.org/esaysocdev/wssd/index.html).
Also promoted by the UK Department for International Development (DFID 1999)
4 His stance is that in a highly polarised world, as the educated elites and specialists become 
modernized’, they are drawn from periphery to core, from rural to urban and their power 
becomes concentrated in places far away from the peripheries. Their collective reaction is then 
to try to standardise indicators and tools to allow comparisons and performance to be monitored 
from a distance. Chambers proposes a shift from conventional epistemologies to the idea that 
there are multiple and complementary types of knowledge and that we must adopt holistic, 
participatory methodologies in order to unearth reality (Chambers 1997).
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the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” 5 (World Commission 
on Environment and Development 1987):43. The version of the framework 
shown in Figure 11 is adapted from Tony Lloyd-Jones’ diagram in work on 
urban livelihoods edited with Carole Rakodi.
Figure 5 Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
Human
Capital
Social
Capital
Natural
Capital Livelihood
Assets
Financial
Capital
Physical
Capital
\ 7
Livelihood Strategies
Infrastructure and 
Services
Livelihood
Opportunities
Policies,
Institutions,
Processes
Structures and 
Organizations
Government and 
Private Sector
Processes
Laws
Policies
Culture
Institutions
Vulnerability
Context
Shocks
Trends
Seasons
Just as confusion has raged over how sustainable development might meet 
the unknown “needs of future generations” 6 , so there are different 
interpretations of a sustainable livelihood. In its most demanding incarnation, a 
sustainable livelihood is explained by Robert Chambers as a way of life that:
...should not damage but enhance the livelihoods of others (whether through 
claims, access, international trade, environmental effects or in other ways) now 
and/or in the future. This, of course, applies most to the rich and powerful, to 
their lifestyles, and to their impacts both on the livelihoods of others and on the 
environment through pollution, climate change and resource depletion. A 
worldwide campaign for awareness and abstinence was implied.. .The concept 
of sustainable livelihoods has, however, been applied selectively only to the 
poor. As with so much of development research, discourse and action, the 
searchlight is not directed at 'us'. We' so not have to look at ourselves, only at 
‘them’: those whom we seek to do good to, help and empower.
(Chambers 2005):202
5 A politically palatable a scheme in which social development and environmental stewardship 
are compatible with economic growth (Haughton 1999):64.
6 Future generations have “unknowable lifestyles (livelihoods and consumption patterns)." 
(Woodhouse):159. Hardoy et al. point out that sustainability is regularly understood as a byword 
for long-term financial viability6 and that such a broad definition risks sustaining the status quo in 
the social, political or economic arenas and are not in the spirit of change that these authors 
would like to see (Hardoy et al. 2001):353.
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The interconnection that Robert Chambers sees between the livelihoods 
of groups, that he essentially polarises in much of his writing into the powerful 
and the disempowered, is of particular importance with respect to shared and 
geographically stretched resources such as infrastructure and ecosystems. This 
importance is expressed clearly by de Haan et al. in their analysis of methods 
for understanding urban poverty:
Contextual factors place the household and community into a situated 
perspective. Chiefly it is factors around governance, government and policies; 
markets and macro-economic linkages; and civil society and broader support 
networks that are analysed -  the policies, institutions and processes' which 
mediate access to the resources and assets required to sustain a livelihood.
(de Haan et al. 2002):4
Similarly, Carole Rakodi, in her work on urban livelihoods, recognises 
that using households as the unit of analysis may mean a neglect of policy, 
governance and other macro and structural factors reinforcing “unequal access 
to and control over resources” (Rakodi 2002b):293. In David Satterthwaite’s 
contribution to Rakodi’s collection of essays on urban livelihoods, he makes this 
point forcefully, noting that “the most powerful policies” which affect the urban 
poor are “national economic and social policies” (Satherthwaite 2002):256. 
Farrington et. al. go so far as to assert that urban livelihoods are in fact “[m]ore 
vulnerable to ‘bad’ governance” than their rural7 counterparts (Farrington et al. 
2002) :8 .
Building sustainable urban livelihoods goes beyond the household, 
through various infrastructures and environmental resources to spheres of 
governance8 and it is with this concept that I begin the argument for socio- 
technical systems as an enhanced way of understanding the mediating between 
governance and livelihoods.
2.2 Governance: policies, institutions and processes
I wanna be the leader 
I wanna be the leader
' The urban-rural divide is more recently understood as a continuum (Rakodi 2002b;UN- 
HABITAT & DFID 2002).
8 “sustainable development is about developing systems of governance” that ensure “the needs 
of city dwellers are met while keeping to a minimum the environmental costs passed on by city- 
dwellers’ consumption and city-based enterprises' production to other people, other ecosystems 
and global ‘life-support’ cycles, both now and into the future."(Hardoy et al. 2001):338.
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Can I be the leader?
Can I? I can?
Promise? Promise?
Yippee I'm the leader 
I'm the leader
OK what shall we do?
The Leader, Roger McGough
A governance framework usually refers to an analysis of three important 
groups of actors in development: the state, the market and civil society. To 
uncover what this analysis can overlook, it is important to look at its origins and 
the historical shifts towards greater emphasis on one or other of these groups of 
actors. This section looks at each in turn, beginning with the state and then 
moving to the market and civil society.
2.2.1 Development and the State
MARKET STATE
CIVIL
SOCIETY
Mainstream views on the role of the state tend to respond to the prevailing 
political and economic mood. As John Martinussen explains, the need for 
economic recovery in Western Europe and the USA after World War II spurred 
a move away from the classical focus on short-term, market equilibrium and 
comparative advantage and towards a distinction between economic growth as 
a naturally occurring cure-all and “development as a structural transformation 
process” (Martinussen 1997):50. Theorists came to the view that:
[the economy] consists of hard, specific pieces of capital goods and individuals 
trained in specific skills and located in specific areas... [it] cannot easily be 
changed just through the accumulation of capital and growth in production and 
consumption
(Martinussen 1997):51
Although the emphasis here is on the structures which might inhibit growth, 
the modernist view maintained that, with the odd structural tweak, all nations
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could develop on a similar trajectory towards homogenous modern9, rational 
and orderly societies and economies, as opposed to their more untidy, 
traditional arrangements.
During the nineteen-fifties and sixties, observing that inequality between 
countries was not automatically resolved by international trade as theories of 
comparative advantage predicted10, important theoretical advances were made 
in Latin America. Colin Clarke, writing on The Latin American Structuralists, 
splits the ideas that emerged into theories of structuralism (industrial versus 
agrarian structures), marginality (capital-intensive industrialization and the 
social groups it marginalized), internal colonialism (metropolis-satellite domestic 
relationships) and dependency which articulated a world of peripheral 
developing nations that depended on core industrialised states wherein:
developed countries had an endogenous capacity for growth and were 
dominant, while underdeveloped countries lacked that dynamic and were 
dependent on foreign investment and technology.
(Clarke 2002):94
For developing countries, an early strategic implication of these theories 
was to disconnect themselves from industrialized nations and rely on state 
intervention to drive domestic industrialization and co-ordinate self-reinforcing 
growth (Martinussen 1997).
The structuralists brought attention to polarized patterns of development 
but faced a challenge over the function of nation states and whether these 
entities were bureaucratically and politically capable of tackling this polarization. 
In this connection, Peter Evans argues that one should not assume that just 
“because the state is necessary it will therefore have the inclination and 
capacity to fill the required role” (Evans 1985):46. Ultimately, for Evans, 
governments should only do what they are good at doing.
This view leaves open the question of what the state might be ‘good’ at 
but economists of the early seventies began to wonder whether governments
9 Classical modernisation theory (1940s and 50s) presented social development as the gradual 
replacement of traditional social phenomena by the modern. Economic theory characterised 
modernisation as the appearance of economic artefacts: division of labour, specialisation, high 
productivity, industrialisation and growth. Political artefacts included elites, a benign and active 
state, democratic government and equality before the law.
10 After World War II, industrialised countries did not pass on gains of hosting the most 
advantageous, highly productive industries to less developed countries through investment and 
trade. Instead, prices of raw materials fell relative to manufactured goods: productivity gains 
were absorbed by industrialised countries (Martinussen 1997)
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were ‘good’ at anything: particularly at managing an economy. David Simon, 
writing on “Neo-liberalism, Structural Adjustment and Poverty Reduction 
Strategies”, notes that:
Profound disillusionment in the North with the record of state involvement in 
economic and social life led to a simplistic and rather naive belief in the ‘magic 
of the market’ as the most efficient economic regulator.
(Simon 2002):87
For Latin America, this Northern disillusionment, borne out of rising fuel 
prices and a cycle of recession, laid the foundations for a debt crisis that would 
cripple the region’s economies for at least a decade. In 1973 oil prices spiked 
and inflated oil revenues were deposited in US banks. These banks were eager 
to lend to developing countries, which were at that time willing and able to pay 
interest premiums11. Latin American governments increased their borrowing, 
enthusiastically backing loans taken out by their domestic private sectors. 
Meanwhile, in oil-importing developed countries, oil price rises were fuelling 
inflation. Governments responded by raising interest rates to restrict the supply 
of money and this in turn triggered a worldwide slump as northern consumption 
slowed and the markets for goods from developing countries contracted 
(Corbridge 2002):478.
These events gave succour to the creeping popular dominance of neo­
liberal ideas and the demise of state-led attempts at economic transformation. 
Colin Clarke, although he observes that neo-liberalism took another decade to 
take root in Latin America, concludes that:
These variegated structuralist approaches by Latin American social scientists 
have been marginalized by the hegemony of the economic orthodoxy 
emanating from the World Bank since the 1970s. ..
(Clarke 2002):94
There remain differences in opinion over the extent to which the state 
should intervene in procurement, regulation and production but, as an example 
of one such World Bank ‘emanation’, the bank’s analysis of The State in a 
Changing World frames the state as:
...central to economic and social development, not as a direct provider of 
growth but as a partner, catalyst, and facilitator.
11 2% more than US government bonds
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(World Bank 1997): 1
In summary, despite being in thrall to the powerful interests of Northern 
consumers, governments and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the state 
became the scapegoat for various economic crises of the late seventies and 
early eighties. This carved out space for the idea that the role of the state 
should be qualified by its own internal competence and legitimacy.
2.2.2 Development and Free Markets
MARKET STATE
CIVIL
SOCIETY
With the state out of favour, neo-liberal development thinking took hold. 
Its twin assumptions are that economic growth is development and, given this, 
that an unfettered market offers the most efficient mechanism for allocating 
goods and services as economies grow. Free markets were seen as the 
antidote to inept economic meddling by governments, taking on particular 
momentum at the University of Chicago.
For Peru and the rest of Latin America, 1982 was a landmark year: 
Mexico defaulted on its mounting debt and became the first of many countries 
forced to adopt the IMF and World Bank’s favoured two stage liberalisation 
package of stabilisation followed by structural adjustment. In the short-term, 
domestic currencies had to be devalued to allow export expansion and with this 
came complementary measures to control inflation by cutting social spending 
and shelving public investment projects. This had a particularly crippling impact 
on education, health and nutrition programmes (Simon 2002):88.
The regional effect of prioritising exports in the short-term and running 
down infrastructure, otherwise so important to productivity, tended to be that 
longer term export growth was stymied by poor transport, communications, 
energy and water systems. Governments were no longer able to muster
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revenue and polices that favoured inward investment had to be relinquished, 
opening the way for investment to be farmed out to the international private 
sector (Flindell Klaren 2000).
Meanwhile on the global stage, as Bjom Hettne points out, after a 
decade of neo-liberal reforms driven by the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs), it was convenient in the early 1990s to attribute any remaining 
‘development problems’ to “’rent-seeking’ bureaucrats and corrupt politicians, 
with no blame at all put on the ‘world system’” (Hettne 2002):8. On this basis, 
the IFIs were able to conclude in their ‘Washington Consensus’ that the only 
obstacle to development was political reform12 which favoured “liberal market 
capitalism” and “liberal democracy” (Potter 2000):375. An important policy 
implication of the push for ‘good governance’ was that financial aid from IFIs 
and rich governments, which formerly had been subject to the economic 
conditionality of structural adjustment, would now also be wrapped up in 
“political conditionality” (Jenkins 2002):487.
Criticism of the painful social consequences of structural adjustment 
presaged a fresh emphasis on ‘governance’, as distinct from ‘government’ . It 
prompted a new interest in a functioning civil society as a counterweight to both 
state and market.
The governance framework thus gained institutional and linguistic 
momentum in part because it was both compatible with the neo-liberal agenda 
and appealing to some of this agenda’s dissenters. Although those measuring 
economic growth still point to the positive influence of liberalisation in the 
aggregate, the jarring impact of neo-liberal policies on the poor did led to a re­
examination of economic reform and calls for checks and balances by 
government and civil society. Civil society is the final element of the governance 
framework.
12 Using the example of Nigeria, Paul Collier argues in The Bottom Billion (Collier 2007) that 
economic reforms imposed at the onset of the debt crisis are wrongly associated with economic 
hardship and they actually maintained growth in the face of a recession that would have 
happened anyway but, in the popular consciousness, the government responsible for economic 
reform remains associated with economic collapse.
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2.2.3 Development and Civil Society
MARKET STATE
CIVIL
SOCIETY
In his influential work Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen argues 
that development is more than economic growth, more than economic 
transformation and more than access to ideally functioning markets. Instead, he 
inverts the relationship: rather than extrapolating from these three economic 
concepts to explain the shape of social life, he argues that these three are 
manifestations of another aspect of development which he calls freedom:
...in the context of narrower views of development in terms of [Gross National 
Product] growth or industrialization, it is often asked whether certain political or 
social freedoms, such as the liberty of political participation and dissent, or 
opportunities to receive basic education, are or are not “conducive to 
development.” In the light of the more foundational view of development as 
freedom, this way of posing the question tends to miss the important 
understanding that these substantive freedoms...are among the constituent 
components of development. Their relevance for development does not have to 
be freshly established through their indirect contribution to the growth of GNP or 
the promotion of industrialization. As it happens, these freedoms and rights are 
also very effective in contributing to economic progress...
(Sen 1999):5
With Sen’s ‘freedom’ seen as a metric of development that challenges 
the status quo, the somewhat more compromising and less radical concept of 
civil society has gained ground. Two aspects of civil society are useful to throw 
light on the Peruvian case in Chapter 4: non-government organisations and 
notions of participation.
2.2.3.1 Non-governmental organisations: representation, constitution and 
legitimacy
Alan Fowler’s analysis of non-governmental development organizations 
(NGDOs) in the Latin American context shows the diversity of such a category:
NGDOs in Latin America have early origins in alliance with unions, peasant 
associations, popular movements and their responses to military dictatorship. 
They were often protected by links to the Catholic Church and informed by 
radical theology. At the same time, military regimes created their own NGDOs to 
show that they had a ‘human face’. This intentionally complicated the NGDO
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landscape. In this era, much NGDO finance came from private sources in the 
North. Later NGDO evolution has capitalized on the space created by the 
inauguration of civilian regimes and democratic governance. Their growth was, 
until recently, further spurred by aid flows designed to ‘consolidate democracy’ 
and by including NGDOs in development initiatives, such as ‘social funds’ 
intended to mitigate the social costs of structural adjustment programmes.
(Fowler 2000):8
Jenkins sounds a similar cautionary note when he identifies a gap 
between the idealistic, theoretical construction of civil society and its slippery 
reality:
By seeking to recreate a badly flawed vision of how functional’ civil societies in 
the West actually operate -  or, even worse, operated at an earlier stage in their 
developmental trajectories -  both social theorists and development practitioners 
have betrayed an instinctive reluctance to face up to civil society’s inherently 
precarious condition and sometimes ugly character, or to let democracy do its 
unpredictable work.
(Jenkins 2002):488
Despite the pitfalls of assuming that non-governmental organisations are 
benign, neutral or incorruptible, the presence of NGOs is still considered an 
important indicator of an active civil society. Vandana Desai, for example, offers 
an optimistic view of the normative role played by civil society in terms of both 
the representation of citizens and scrutiny of government when she correlates 
more numerous civic actors with opportunities for voice, autonomous regulation 
of the state and networked alliances to pressure the state (Desai 2002):497. 
Her assumption is that civil society is more effective when it builds as many 
organisations as possible.
Turning to Jenny Pearce’s reflections on the position of big international 
non-governmental organisations vis-a-vis the state and the market, a bland 
bums-on-seats’ view of civil society rather overlooks the changed role of NGOs. 
Pearce argues that various pressures have pushed NGOs away from social 
development when she surmises that:
Indeed, it might be said that 20 years of economic liberalisation have damaged 
the NGO sector, fragmenting it and fomenting competition in which, as the free- 
market model argues, only the most effective survive. The rush to efficiency, as 
if it were a discrete and neutral outcome of technical decisions, appears to have 
been at the cost of the time-consuming and messy business of debating other 
values, such as how greater efficiency could be pursued without a cost to 
social-change objectives.
(Pearce 2000):23
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To make matters more complex, John Clark grappling with the issue of 
NGO legitimacy notes that it is bound up in mass membership and spending 
power but also in the “usefulness” of NGOs to the public, the media and 
parliamentarians (Clark 2002):505. On this view ‘voice’ is channelled through 
organisations that are not only constituted by individual citizens but also by 
other layers of congealed interests, a symbiosis which Clark sees as positive in 
a democratic context but which highlights ambiguities in the motivation and 
function of NGOs.
As we shall see, in the debate over service delivery, NGOs are considered 
legitimate service providers where markets and governments are failing to 
deliver and, if we are to accept the case of Fowler and Pearce that the neo­
liberal agenda has forced NGOs to pick up service provision at the expensive of 
addressing social change, then we start to see the argument that a heavy push 
for what might be seen as an ‘apolitical’ governance framework is indeed the 
perfect complement to neo-liberalism.
2.2.3.2 Decentralisation: globalisation and local participation
The normative ‘good governance’ agenda takes liberal democracy as its 
reference point with legitimacy bestowed on government through citizen 
participation in elections. Bjorn Hettne, raising the issue of the state’s legitimacy, 
identifies a tendency for the state to become alienated from civil society as 
globalisation encourages it to roll back or “unbundle” its traditional functions 
(Hettne 2002): 10. Adding to this at a national level, Nick Devas notes that 
adversarial relationships between central and local tiers of government have not 
just alienated civil society but have undermined local authorities (Devas 
2005):353.
In response, proponents of good governance have promoted the 
decentralization of national administration and, less often, the devolution of 
national power to regional and local authorities. Similarly, advocates of 
sustainable development produced Local Agenda 21 (UNCED 1993) a 
document which sought the renewal of democracy “through an increased stress 
on participation” (Felling 2002):288.
The archetypal, neo-liberal attitude to decentralization is highly optimistic 
with Montgomery et. al., painting a picture of market efficiency in local 
government:
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In decentralized systems, local governments acquire a stake in local economic 
prosperity. They can arrange the menu of local public goods to suit local 
preferences, although the quantities supplied will be constrained by local 
revenue-raising capacities and transfers from other levels of government. In 
such systems, local consumers can express their preferences for bundles of 
public goods by voting or moving to other jurisdictions. Under ideal conditions, 
local politics can then achieve something of the efficiency of markets.
(Montgomery et al. 2004):65
In its most benign incarnation, then, the political motivation for re­
structuring a centralized state is to improve the access of citizens to decision­
making processes. In practice, of course, Bjom Hettne’s “alienation” can 
manifest itself in anything from an unwillingness to pay tax to separatist violence 
and it is often these fiscal and strategic concerns that drive re-structuring.
Decentralized government is also subject to Evans’ caveats in his analysis 
of the state’s competence (or lack thereof): if local governments do not have the 
technical capacity to devise appropriate regulation or mobilise finance, local 
configurations of power may be just as exclusive as national ones (Evans 1985). 
In this connection, John Farrington, Tamsin Ramasut and Julian Walker claim 
that what follows from undermining these intermediate institutions is the inability 
of local governments to include or reach the poor.
Diana Mitlin also suggests that participation has sometimes been 
“welcomed as a new opportunity for cost recovery” (Mitlin 2001): 152 by the 
private sector and, as we will see in Cusco’s Santiago District, by the public 
sector. Farrington et al. also make this point, concluding that participation is:
...linked both to democracy for its own sake and to state attempts to devolve 
responsibility to the poor to pay for their own infrastructure and services.
(Farrington et al. 2002):32
Pointing to the twin dynamics of domestic decentralization and global 
integration, Richard Batley (Batley 1997):343, Anthony McGrew (McGrew 
2000):352 and Farrington et al. are all concerned with the delicate balancing act 
between giving people the power to make decisions locally and leaving them to 
fend for themselves in a globalized world. In his essay on participatory 
development, Giles Mohan notes that these issues cannot be overlooked in an 
analysis of local development:
...many processes affecting their (or our own) lives are often not readily tackled
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at the local level...The emphasis on grassroots civil society can leave important 
structures untouched and do nothing to strengthen states and make them more 
effective and accountable to their citizens.
(Mohan 2002):53
As we shall see in Chapter 4, applying the terminology of 
decentralisation and participation to the Peruvian context of military and civilian 
dictatorships highlights some of the difficulties in interpreting the success of 
such a prescription. These ‘good governance’ ideals depend, in practice, on the 
fiscal capacity, human resources and legitimacy of the decentralised 
government or civil society entities to which responsibility is passed. These 
capacities have to be understood in relation not just to central government but 
also to the international private sector as we will see in the particular case of 
water and sanitation infrastructure.
2.3 Infrastructure and Services: moving from a governance framework to a 
socio-technical systems perspective to conceptualise the provision 
of urban water and sanitation provision
Who's zoomin’ who?
Aretha Franklin album title, produced by Narada Michael Walden, 1985
The urban poor are linked into structures of governance through their 
dependence on the delivery of infrastructure and services by city institutions, as 
well as through the impact of meso- and macrolevel policies.
(Farrington et al. 2002):30
The second analytical category of the SL framework deals with collective 
assets beyond individual households. By treating these separately from 
household assets, the SL framework acknowledges that what happens to be 
lying around, buried in the ground or hovering in the social ether near 
households is not automatically accessible to householders. Instead, there is a 
distinction between assets, which depend on the quality of the connection at the 
level of the individual household, and infrastructure and services, which depend 
on the quality of the networks of markets, services, infrastructures, ecosystems 
or institutions to which households can potentially connect themselves.
At the macro level also, infrastructure plays an important and complex 
role in development: important because economic growth turns on efficient 
production and consumption and complex because the institutional
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arrangements which support its provision are not simply economic but also of a 
strongly socio-political and technical character. As such, debates over the 
governance of infrastructure and its links to human development and the 
environment have paralleled the thinking on more general jostling between the 
activities of the state, the market and civil society.
2.3.1 Governance of provision: the international context
While President Alberto Fujimori was consolidating his position in Peru13, 
the World Bank was publishing its 1994 World Development Report, 
“Infrastructure for Development”, a road map for overcoming underinvestment in 
infrastructure (World Bank 1994). At this document’s heart was the conviction 
that water was an economic good14 and that the systems for delivering it should 
recover their costs and generate returns for the private sector players good 
enough to invest in them15. This report went along with the neo-liberal caricature 
of the public sector as pathologically unreliable, corrupt and, because of chronic 
underinvestment, unable to provide enough connections to meet consumer 
demand (Johnstone & Wood 2001).
Significantly, the 1994 World Development Report was still lumping 
electricity, telecommunications and water and sanitation together under the 
single heading ‘infrastructure’. By contrast, the 2004 World Development Report, 
this time in a curly, pastel font and entitled “Making Services Work for Poor 
People”, was bundling water and sanitation and electricity together with the 
health and education sectors (World Bank 2004). This softening in the title and 
graphic design reflected what had been real and serious challenges to the 
World Bank’s 1994 prescription.
The sea change came at the end of the nineteen nineties after several 
disastrous attempts to privatize water infrastructure in developing countries,
1' See C hapter 4
14 Lending institutions like the World Bank held that water should be regarded as a commodity, 
following the Dublin Principles, and cost-recovery and self-financing became the priorities for 
internationally funded water projects. The main tenets of this approach were: “to take 
environmental issues more seriously [integrated water resource management], to favour 
markets over government provisioning, and to favour decentralized over centralized 
governance.” (UN-HABITAT 2003): 158.
The World Bank’s 1994 infrastructure ownership models: A: public ownership, operation by 
enterprise or department; B: public ownership, operation contracted to private sector; C: private 
ownership and operation “often [all though not always!] with regulation"; D: community and user 
provision: “local, small-scale infrastructure” which “complements central or provincial services”. 
Options B and C given the most attention (World Bank 1994)
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perhaps most notoriously in Cochabamba, Bolivia16. These high profile failures, 
combined with stubbornly persistent gaps in provision, brought the World Bank 
to a recognition that, regardless of whether utilities were privately or publicly 
owned, a key policy objective ought to be ‘organizational strengthening’. This 
also gave way to an admission, even among die hard neo-liberals, that there 
might be value in understanding different socio-cultural circumstances before 
rolling out a generalised set of operational models for water and sanitation 
infrastructure (Nickson 1997): 184.
Just ahead of the publication of the 2004 World Development Report, 
Jessica Budds and Gordon McGranaham gave a damning assessment of the 
state of the sector in a paper entitled “Are the debates on water privatization 
missing the point?”. Using case studies and empirical evidence from Africa, 
Asia and Latin America, these authors made the following comments:
In practice, shifting international opinions regarding the appropriate roles of the 
public and private sectors in water and sanitation provision respond to broad 
political trends far more closely than they respond to evidence emerging from 
experiences in the water and sanitation sector... It would be a serious mistake 
to assume that private sector participation will attract sufficient finance to play a 
major role in providing adequate water and sanitation to deprived 
neighbourhoods.
(Budds & McGranahan 2003): 111
Budds and McGranaham also forcefully pointed out that classifying 
providers as either public or private (and all that those terms have come to 
mean) neglects civil society organizations and any other model of provision that 
might fall between the floorboards of definition.
The limits of the public versus private dichotomy are further exemplified by 
the work of Hardoy et. al. in Moreno, Buenos Aires, when they argue that better 
governance17must appreciate the organizational, physical, technical and socio­
economic challenges of urban infrastructure management. The authors 
poignantly conclude that “none of these barriers [to infrastructure management] 
can be overcome by the sole actions of any one of the actors involved” (Hardoy 
et al. 2005):199.
16 Complex failure of concession contract attributed to macro-economic context in Bolivia, anti­
imperialist rhetoric and exclusivity of contract which sidelined those with autonomous systems: 
the better off and small independent private providers (Nickson & Vargas 2002).
1' David Satterthwaite scales urban governance by proximate factors (neighbourhood levels of 
capacity and tenure security), contributory factors (weak local utilities/government at city or 
municipal level) and underlying factors as the regional, national and international levels (UN­
HABITAT 2003).
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By 2004, then, with even World Bank economists confessing that “the 
increased role of the private sector in infrastructure is producing secondary 
distributional effects that have been too often underestimated or ignored by 
policy-makers” (Estache et al. 2001):1180, the debate had to become more 
intelligent, critical and nuanced. This meant a shift from the World Bank 
emphasis on privatisation towards the framework shown in Figure 7, a form that 
is by now suspiciously familiar to the reader. Essentially this is the good 
governance framework applied to service delivery but with the important 
modification that the ‘market’ space for providers includes public, private and 
the not-for-profit sector like communities and NGOs.
In this model, tying citizens to the state is “voice"18, a mechanism by which 
the state communicates with service providers through jointly negotiated 
compacts19. Circumventing this ‘long route to accountability’ is the notion of 
client power or the ability of clients to communicate directly with providers via 
their day to day transactions. Terms like partnership20 and participation pepper 
the World Bank report and participation is used interchangeably to refer both to 
private investment and political participation21.
Figure 6 World Bank Framework for Governance of Services
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18 “voting and electoral politics, lobbying and propaganda, patronage and clientelism, media 
activities, access to information, and so on.” (World Bank 1994):47
19 “broad, long-term relationship of accountability connecting policymakers to organizational 
providers. This is usually not as specific or legally enforceable as a contract. But an explicit, 
verifiable contract can be one form of a compact.” (World Bank 2004):47
20 Budds and McGranaham point out that this term “tends to be used to refer to contractual 
arrangements in which private companies assume greater responsibility and/or risk, it can also 
imply that actors share objectives, outside a contract when they do not” (Budds & McGranahan 
2003) 89. Fowler suggests that it can disguise inequitable power relationships between entities, 
especially northern and southern NGOs and that it has forgotten its original meaning which was 
“humanitarian, moral, political, ideological or spiritual solidarity between NGDOs in the North 
and South that joined together to pursue a common cause of social change.” (Fowler 2000):25
21 Finance is direct from clients (cost recovery); altruistic NGOs (or their altruistic donors); 
citizens via taxation; from other governments with their own complex interests; and from the 
private sector seeking to generate a return.
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The World Bank triangle is neat and tidy, allowing different arrangements 
to be labelled and analysed, but it is also simplistic. In Chapter 4, for example, 
we will see Peruvian provision arrangements which persistently fall outside the 
national policy framework and blur many of these accountability relationships.
In fact, there is a wealth of research on the provision of water and 
sanitation in the patches of cities that fall outside the reach of “formal” systems; 
variously described as informal, peripheral and marginal22 (geographically, 
economically or both). A general picture of what is meant by this is given by UN- 
Habitat:
In most low- and middle-income nations, unplanned and uncontrolled city 
expansion produces a patchwork of different developments... [Consequences] 
include segregation of low-income groups in the worst located and often the 
most dangerous areas, to which it is difficult and expensive to provide water, 
sanitation and drainage. The haphazard expansion of settlements generally 
builds into the urban fabric greatly increased costs for providing infrastructure 
as new developments that need connection to networks of water mains and 
sewerage and drainage systems spring up far from existing networks
(UN-HABITAT 2003): 145
The work of Ana Hardoy and Ricardo Schusterman on the privatization of 
water infrastructure in the informal settlements of Buenos Aires, presents four 
models23 for operating in low-income areas shown in Figure 8. They are working 
in a context of concessions -  one of the key components of the World Bank’s 
1994 policy advice -  and conclude that the models most likely to succeed over 
time are those that have built-in participation mechanisms after observing that a 
chief obstacle to provision in low-income settlements is the “lack of capacity of 
private operators to work in a participatory way” (Hardoy & Schusterman 
2000):75.
22 “Marginality was the term initially used to refer to dwellings on the periphery of the city 
generated by the rapid process of urbanization experienced in Latin America during the 1950s 
and 1960s.” Later it became synonymous with “those who were marginal to the process of 
capital-intensive industrialization associated with ISI” with different schools coming to different 
conclusions as to whether these margins were in transition towards full integration or were an 
inevitable consequence of capitalism, giving rise to notions of the formal versus the informal 
economy (Clarke 2002):93. Clarke concludes that “As the state has retreated, the changing 
nature of urban economies has increased the reliance of the labour force on precarious 
employment ...The vast urban populations in Latin America are currently more marginal from the 
formal economy than at any time for half a century.” (Clarke 2002):95.
23 In Model I private concessionaires have no special arrangements for informal settlements. In 
Model II, (the one adopted in Buenos Aires) the concessionaire can treat informal settlements 
separately. In practice, this has meant limited coverage because negotiations have to take place 
on a neighbourhood by neighbourhood basis rather than through a formally agreed framework. 
Models III and IV both have participatory mechanisms built in (the first within the concessionaire 
and the second in a separate provider). Model IV proved controversial with the respondents 
because it risked leading to the designation (or perpetuation) of informal neighbourhoods as 
“second-class”.
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Figure 7 Four model governance square (Hardoy & Schusterman 2000)
Model I
Model HI Model IV
admkitstration
U r *  tor
These authors see the key ingredients for successful provision in low 
income areas as political will, funds dedicated to low-income settlements and a 
community -  “even if it has difficulty organising” -  that is supported by NGOs or 
universities (Hardoy & Schusterman 2000):75. In addition, they cite a need for 
more open attitudes to “differentiated” levels of service (and price) which, 
Hardoy et. al. argue, a private operator can justify more easily.
Moving North to Bolivia, Rocio Bustamente reports not on the immediate 
possibilities for privatization, but on the need to support community-managed 
systems24:
There is a clear gap in policy, and lack of support, to these community- 
managed systems. This is illustrated by the widespread assumption that 
improving sustainability is partly analogous with getting people to pay more for 
water and sanitation services, undervaluing the huge non-monetary 
contributions that many communities make in developing, operating and 
maintaining these systems.
(Bustamente et al. 2004):2
Researchers at the Development Planning Unit, University College London 
also identify the need for providers to engage with communities and their 
systems, with reference to a detailed Venezuelan case study. In this example, 
the lack of capacity for participation in Caracas’ unwieldy water entity,
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Hidrocapital, has been successfully institutionalized by developing community 
relationships through innovative Water Forums:
This cultural change undertaken by HIDROCAPITAL ... was a key step toward 
resolution of conflicts over water, especially in the lower-income communities. 
Frequent breakdowns of service were settled by activating growing protest 
mechanisms that ranged from blocking roads and highways to violent 
occupation of water company facilities. A reactive management model which 
sought only to keep problems under control was replaced by a mechanism -  
now a formal one -  of public action: the Water Forums (Mesas T6cnicas de 
Agua). Through that mechanism, HIDROCAPITAL and the communities 
articulate responses to solve service problems and anticipate new demands 
and solutions. The success of this experience, without precedent in the country, 
has turned these water tables into forums for negotiation and resolution of 
disputes, not only on provision of water service (construction, maintenance of 
facilities, management of the service) but also regarding other problems 
involving community life.
(Development Planning Unit 2008):47
Giving a regional perspective, the 2003 publication Independent Water 
Providers in Latin America, demonstrated that small, entrepreneurial water 
providers coexisted alongside overstretched utility companies, offering more 
mobile alternatives such as tanked and bottled water (Solo 2003): 1225
These examples and other detailed case studies and workshops have 
contributed to an expanded analytical framework for understanding water and 
sanitation provision in the peri-urban context. The ‘circle’ put forward by Adriana 
Allen is shown in
25 This ties in with another variation on Hardoy et. al.'s Model IV is micro-privatization: “Local 
authorities, or national governments, with or without subsidy from national or international 
sources, can employ micro-enterprises to deliver urban public services which are presently 
costly, ineffective and inequitably distributed” (Rutherford et al. 2002): 123.
50
Figure 8 (Allen et al. 2006):339. It can accommodate the 1994 World Bank 
prescription in a limited, bottom left slice. The 2004 World Bank ‘triangle’ spans 
the policy-driven semi-circle, while Hardoy and Schusterman’s models straddle 
both halves. Bustamente et al.’s community management sits in the upper most 
segment.
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Figure 8 The DPU Circle: from an unpublished 2006 paper by Adriana Allen
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The divergence of policy and practice in water provision is by no means 
unique to these examples and in Chapter 4, I will argue for similar patterns in 
Peru. Neither is this divergence completely framed by a governance perspective 
that depends on the explanatory power of civil society, government and market 
activity since, on the ground, patchy policy implementation is reflected in the 
spatial incoherence of cities; heterogeneity in terms of livelihoods, infrastructure 
and investment, which is in turn shaped by social life and by pieces of 
infrastructure that, once established, may resist the influence of governments, 
markets and civil societies.
To take this analysis to the next stage, I turn now to the concept of socio- 
technical systems as one way of understanding the complex interaction 
between governance and livelihoods.
2.4 Soclo-technical systems: dissonance and resonance with urban 
governance
...globalization expresses the widening scope, deepening impact and speeding 
up of inter-regional flows and networks of interaction within all realms of social 
activity from the cultural to the criminal.
(McGrew 2000): 345
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This section argues for socio-technical systems as a lens through which to 
examine the configuration of the infrastructure that binds cities. I begin by 
reviewing some of the recent discourse on cities and globalisation; both the role 
that cities play in the global economy and the effect of global economic trends 
on the shape of cities. The argument that emerges is that sophisticated and 
connected global networks of information bring with them economic polarisation 
and segregation in cities. Taking this argument further, I turn to recent work on 
Socio-Technical Systems which conceptualises the ‘splintering’ heterogeneity of 
cities not just in terms of information networks and binary economic poles but as 
the interaction of all entrenched, physical hardware -  pipes, wires, roads, 
rivers -  and people and their social institutions.
Building on the STS critique of the tendency to attribute urban processes 
to global economic trends, I reflect next on the relative influence of local 
governance in shaping cities. This resonates with the analytical link that the SL 
framework expects between governance, infrastructure and households.
Finally, to give STS a more tangible form in relation to the infrastructure 
and services element of the SL framework, I look at attempts to categorise and 
describe socio-technical infrastructure systems in terms their modes of 
production and household consumption.
2.4.1 Privilege and bypass
Urban governance is an arena in which local and global influences 
routinely spar. One influential body of thought argues that globalisation is the 
dominant influence shaping the internal structure of cities. Jodi Borja and 
Manuel Castells in their work on “The Management of Cities in the Information 
Age”, start from the premise that mega cities are established around a 
connection to a global network. Borja and Castells describe cities by turns as 
the protagonists, the economic and political agents and the “complex and 
multidimensional social agents” (Borja & Castells 1997):90 which form the 
nodes in global economic and infrastructural networks. In the same way, 
Montgomery et al. think that a city is defined by its position in these networks:
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...the multiple strands of economic and social interchange that are knit together 
in cities. These strands also reach to rural areas, and they have links that 
extend to the international arena. But they intertwine in cities, and from the 
many knots and nodes there emanates a quality that might be described as 
urbaness.
(Montgomery et al. 2004):67
Montgomery et. al. laud the inter-connection of all these strands as if they 
offer some sort of coherence but, while strong global connections may give a 
sense of internal integration, global cities tend towards both social and spatial 
segregation (UN-HABITAT 2003): 145.
Borja and Castells, for example, view the global economy -  markets 
exchanging capital and skilled labour -  as striving to include valued people and 
places all over the world while excluding what is devalued or undervalued. They 
paint an economy so uncertain that it “limits strong economic initiatives which 
lend cohesion to the social fabric” (Borja & Castells 1997):92. So although there 
may be a network of urban nodes where skills, power and capital are 
concentrated, between these nodes and potentially within the same city, is an 
economy characterised by productivity and dynamism on one hand and social 
exclusion on the other. With examples from Asia and Latin America, the pair 
shows that cities are hubs of information with the most successful urban hubs 
able to adapt their structures and form networks which merge the city’s 
economic and urban fabrics. According to these authors, persistent and 
increasing inequality, poverty, exclusion and a crisis in the provision of housing 
and urban services are driven by a new “logic” borne out of capital accumulation, 
segmented production and high-speed communication.
Castells and Borja conclude that social cohesion, as opposed to 
fragmented ghettos of rich and poor, can only be achieved by reversing past 
attempts to create socially homogenous districts:
...large projects of ambitious, socially heterogeneous housing programmes is 
the best guarantee of urban integration...basic education and basic health 
services should be accessible and free to the entire population. There is no 
citizenship without access to the education and culture of the city, without 
continuous training, without accessible health services or without collective 
services such as water and the treating and ecological conditioning of waste.
(Borja & Castells 1997):253
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Saskia Sassen also sees this segregation as part of an economic 
polarization which she observes within typical ‘global cities’26. She sees an 
almost binary split in income and occupations with high-end, financial sector 
earners creating demand for low-wage services through the residential and 
commercial gentrification that they stimulate. On Sassen’s view, the “expansion 
of low-wage jobs” is “a function of growth” (Sassen 2001): 10.
This connection between local exclusion and global connection is also 
picked up by Stephen Graham:
With many contemporary infrastructural investments focusing on linking certain 
urban spaces across international boundaries, such ‘infinite’ local 
disconnections often rest cheek-by-jowl with glamorous infrastructures 
connecting the ‘local’ with the global' scales.
(Graham 2000): 116
In a wide-ranging examination of urban heterogeneity, Simon Marvin and 
Stephen Graham make a case for the ‘splintering’ of cities: a process of 
‘bypass’ whereby the strengthening of connections between the most valued 
people and places, (i.e. those judged to be lucrative and profitable to the 
infrastructure service providers), leads to a weakening of the connections 
between the least valued users and places (Marvin & Graham 2001):288. The 
authors build on actor-network theory and the theory of Large Technical 
Systems (LTS) which proposes that the formation of technological, 
infrastructural networks takes place when interrelated clusters of innovation 
cohere. In addition, the authors do not ignore political economy as a shaping 
force and consider the flows of people, capital and goods as well as the aspects 
of these which are fixed and embedded in the fabric of cities. Lastly, relational 
theories occupy a prominent place in the analysis -  the importance of dynamic 
social relations and the idea that social coherence is accidental and unstable. 
These all conspire to create enclaves of investment while raising the logistical 
costs of everyday life for swathes of marginalised city dwellers whose proximity 
to infrastructure does not equate to access.
In recognition of the fact that enclaves of wealth and swathes of poverty 
are so interspersed that they should be examined within the same theoretical 
framework, the authors deliberately mix examples from ‘north’ and ‘south’. 
Arguing that the configuration of networked infrastructure is highly biased and
26 London, New York and Tokyo
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reinforces existing biases leaving “network ghettoes”, described as “unmoved” 
(without public transport), “unwired”, “unwatered” and “unwarmed” (Marvin & 
Graham 2001)289:297. This splintering of cities is paralleled by the ‘unbundling’ 
of infrastructure which fragments or segments networks to serve a market 
sector or a preferred territory.
Splintering is part of a theoretical approach which sees “modern urbanism 
as a socio-technical process” with infrastructure networks bringing 
“heterogeneous places, people, buildings and urban elements into dynamic 
articulation and exchange” in a way that is “necessarily both social and 
technical” (Graham 2000): 115. Similarly, in a paper entitled “Fetishising the 
Modern City”, Kaika & Swyngedouw, also see the city “as a process of flows” 
and “technological networks” (Kaika & Swyngedouw 2000): 120. For them, the 
city is “a ‘hybrid’ of the natural and cultural, the environmental and the social” 
(Kaika & Swyngedouw 2000): 121. The hybrid idea is invoked to describe the 
mixture of modern and traditional artefacts that continue to coexist in spite of 
efforts to modernise27. Kaika & Swyngedouw remark that:
Despite efforts to manage and control the city, it remains a realm carved out of 
the dialectics between clean and dirty, justice and injustice, underworld and 
high society, basements and lofts, Hell and Heaven.
(Kaika & Swyngedouw 2000): 136
Similarly, with examples of unorthodox organisational arrangements for 
running local services in Karachi, Pakistan, Joshi and Moore observe that they 
are so “’mixed, or ‘ ‘hybrid’, that they seem almost to defy categorisation.” (Joshi 
& Moore 2004):34. The authors use the term institutionalised co-production to 
describe these phenomena to argue that:
We cannot sensibly treat such ambiguous’ organisational arrangements as 
hangovers from some non-democratic or economically backward past, that will 
shrink further when fully exposed to the forces of modern, democratic 
rationality, and be replaced by an ever more Weberian state where the lines 
between public and private are drawn ever more clearly and sharply.
(Joshi & Moore 2004):44
Bruno Latour, in his essay We have never been modern (Latour 1993), 
tackles this theme by advancing an idea of actors in networks as combinations
21 “Due to its primary origins in engineering and architecture, ‘order’, ‘integration’, 'balance',
unity’ were always among the primary goals of master plans directed at the construction of a
well-defined and controllable spatial organisation." (Balbo 1993):24.
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of people and things. For Latour, the aspects of our development that look 
stable and ubiquitous only seem that way because they are set in robust 
networks of ideas, individuals, collectives of people and “technological artefacts” 
that persist for a while. Latour insists that when we bandy about the word 
‘modern’, we are making all sorts of outdated assumptions about progress and 
science. We think unquestioningly, for example, that there is something 
homogenous and universally accessible about our ‘modern’ infrastructure28 but 
Latour tells us:
Between the lines of the network there is, strictly speaking, nothing at all: no 
train, no telephone, no intake pipe, no television set. Technological networks, as 
the name indicates, are nets thrown over spaces, and they retain only a few 
scattered elements of those spaces. Thev are connected lines, not surfaces.
They are by no means comprehensive, global or systematic, even though they 
embrace surfaces without covering them and extend a very long way.
(Latour 1993):118
The splintering processes of privilege and bypass are driven in part by 
the global economic forces described by Borja, Castells and Sassen. They are 
also shaped by an interaction between people and technology, framed by 
Latour as a network of actors and by Swyngedouw and Kaika as hybrids. What 
is interesting to this urban research is that the myth of homogenous, universal 
infrastructure seems to persist in spite of divisive globalisation and disobliging 
local messiness.
2.4.2 Local resistance
Saskia Sassen’s rather deterministic views of globalisation are criticised by 
Richard Batley who argues for the influence of local governance above 
globalization in shaping cities.
While elsewhere Batley is very concerned with fragmentation and 
recognises that it is “at the city level, where proximity of the dynamic and 
marginalised sectors of the economy is most obvious...” (Batley 1997):339, he 
argues that on Sassen’s deterministic view of cities in a global economy, few 
cities end up with any social agency. In contrast, Batley’s idea is that the destiny 
of cities “is not determined just at the global level, or by their inherited starting
28 This modern, homogenous vision of cities is”[d]ue to its primary origins in engineering and 
architecture, ‘order’, ‘integration’, ‘balance’, ‘unity’ were always among the primary goals of 
master plans directed at the construction of a well-defined and controllable spatial organisation." 
(Balbo 1993):24
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point: local agents can also be influential” (Batley 1997):341. He claims that 
different cities come up with different responses to common pressures and that 
this puts paid to any ideas of inevitability about the impact of globalisation on 
cities.
In part, the power of Batley’s argument is that it comes from case studies 
in developing world cities. He claims, for example, that “the level of inequality 
within and between Latin American cities is greater than can be explained by 
globalisation” (Batley 1997):337. He goes on to argue that although the 
globalisation model of Sassen and Borja and Castells does predict an increase 
in inequality with income growth, in Latin America the gulf between rich and 
poor has been higher than in East Asia and Europe (where growth rates have 
been higher) and higher than Sub-Saharan Africa (where growth has been 
much slower). Bately thinks that this came about during the nineteen-nineties 
because the Latin American middle classes had been so battered by structural 
adjustment that there was no strong social grouping to lobby for urban policies 
that might allow for some redistribution of wealth. For Batley, then, Latin 
America’s distinctive urban inequalities are “products of policy, not of 
globalisation” and he singles out residential segregation as something that has 
become an “administratively consolidated fact” in some Latin American 
countries because of tight municipal boundaries and the lack of cross-subsidy 
between municipalities (Batley 1997):338.
Batley’s second culprit in the persistence of urban fragmentation, is the 
lack of state-led social expenditure, not just in terms of tax and spend but also 
in creating an enabling environment for private investment. Indeed, as 
Montgomery et al. argue with reference to the social dimensions of this spatial 
marginality:
Spatial segregation can have the effect of enforcing homogeneity in local social 
network ties and resources, suppressing some of the diversity in social relations 
that can benefit the poor.
(Montgomery et al. 2004):43
Resources cannot simply be expected to materialize, as if by spontaneous 
generation, in the personal social networks and local associations of poor city 
residents. Links are needed to the powerful actors and institutions that generate 
resources and influence how they are distributed.
(Montgomery et al. 2004):47
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Bately also describes the quest for resources as a networking process, 
which he asserts is a commonplace approach to urban management in Latin 
America:
Social agents, including local politicians, officials, economic groups, firms and 
households, have some capacity to build economic links, to ‘navigate’ 
opportunistically, to advocate and lobby for local interests, to mobilise local 
resources, to apply and redistribute resources so as to improve the local quality 
of life...
(Batley 1997): 344
Batley admits, however, that the urban economic ‘winners’ will only be 
persuaded to petition governments to change such policies when they are 
facing critical political instability, environmental degradation or when the city 
becomes unattractive to investors: “a recognition by the socially ‘included’ that 
exclusive cities do not provide stable conditions for local or global investors” 
(Batley 1997):345.
There is, then, an alternative to deterministic and divisive globalisation in 
shaping cities but the prospects for local agency are uncertain and depend on 
whether coalitions of winners and losers are able to foment change in response 
to urban crises and whether such coalitions endure. These conditions are 
embodied in the coexistence of attempts at universal provision, splintering, 
community management and disobliging local messiness: the socio-technical 
configuration of water and sanitation infrastructure.
2.4.3 Networking between socio-technical scales
As well as local political resistance to splintering, Marvin and Graham 
insist that ‘perfect’ splintering is ultimately scuppered by the technical 
impossibility of insulating privileged enclaves from urban or regional services 
such as power and water. They conclude with a plea for the development of 
more modest, local networks and argue that these should be accompanied by 
the exposure and regulation of inequalities in infrastructure connections, 
perhaps lest the modest and local encourage insulation.
The first of these, the technical barriers to insulation, when combined 
with Batley’s local agents begin to tell a complex story of tension between 
abandoning the ideal of universal provision and finding ways to fill the gaps. 
This is examined by Bas van Vliet, Heather Chappells and Elizabeth Shove in 
their work on Infrastructures of Consumption. These authors suggest that:
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Although the general trend is assumed to be one of a shift [away] from a 
‘universal’ mode of provision, the reality is a more complex situation in which 
private and public priorities coexist and in which networks are both converging 
globally and fragmenting locally.
(van Vliet et al. 2005):38
The second proposal for resisting splintering is the adoption of more 
modest or small-scale technologies. This comes up elsewhere in Marvin’s work 
when the notion of socio-technical systems is applied to formal and informal 
water systems in Bolivia. Here, Marvin and Laurie find ‘two circuits’ of provision 
and conclude that these are:
...intimately related to each other in that the continued existence of the formal 
sector requires large numbers of potential users to join the informal sector.
Although networks of formalised and informal supply are powerfully 
disconnected from each in technical terms, their continued existence is 
supported by social relations that institutionalise the unequal access to water 
resources....meshing the incorporation of informal circuits with the formal water 
network will require the development of new types of knowledge no longer 
monopolised by engineers: innovative and more complex social relations with 
users: and a social context for the use of smaller-scale water management 
technologies.
(Marvin & Laurie 1999):344
Small-scale networks, however, are not the only possibility for van Vliet 
et al. In fact, these authors compare sustainability of infrastructure by its degree 
of social and technical connection to other infrastructures rather than allowing 
themselves to be sidetracked by the debate over ‘small-scale’ versus ‘large- 
scale’ configurations. They make an important point in this connection:
The technological scale of a system is too easily assumed to be managed by a 
social organisation of a similar scale.
(van Vliet et al. 2005):64
These authors go on to devise a framework to describe the coexisting, and 
not necessarily sequential, phases of infrastructure development based on 
patterns observed in the UK and The Netherlands. These configurations of 
infrastructure shape not only the technical systems but also users’ experiences 
of infrastructure services. More interestingly, they give an idea of the 
configurations that fall between privilege and bypass:
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Table 1 van Vliet’s modes of organisation
Autonomous Co-providers, localized resources, local stand-alone, self-managed and responsive grids
Piecemeal Customers and suppliers, patchwork of grids, unregulated, non-standard, designed for peak loads with idle spare capacity
Integrated
Consumers and promoters of diversified demand, semi-integrated local and 
regional grids, designed for diverse loads to exploit spare capacity and smooth 
demand profiles
Universal
Passive beneficiaries and public providers, uniform services, highly integrated 
national and regional super grids, demand not differentiated just met by 
extending networks
Marketed Purchasers and promoters of differentiated products and services, partially fragmented grids matched to diverse, monitored and manipulated needs
Reproduced from Table 3.1 (van Vliet et al. 2005):33
To look at what is happening at the two extremes of van Vliet et al.’s 
modes of organisation, two final perspectives are introduced . When Marvin and 
Graham’s call for the exposure and regulation of inequalities or Batley’s 
coalitions of winners and losers are not spontaneously erupting in response to 
urban crises, users in autonomous modes of organisation have responded to 
stretch their configurations of infrastructure. One example of this is described in 
Arjun Appadurai’s brilliant account of an alliance of slum dwellers in Mumbai. 
Through what are essentially participatory events such as “housing exhibitions” 
and “toilet festivals” (Appadurai 2002):34, he describes how slum dwellers 
demonstrate to each other techniques and possibilities for improving housing 
and sanitary systems. The author coins the term “horizontal, global networking” 
(Appadurai 2002):25 to describe encounters with slum dwellers in other 
countries which allow “exposure, exploration” (Appadurai 2002):39 and 
exchange through face-to-face meetings. This ability to tap into grass-roots 
knowledge and experience from elsewhere stretches the socio-technical scale 
of infrastructure and sees it transition between configurations. Appadurai 
describes the arrangement as one based on partnership, “politics without 
parties”(Appadurai 2002):29 and a “complex political vision” which seems to 
emerge from “a logic of patience, of cumulative victories and long-term asset 
building” (Appadurai 2002):30. Echoing this, Celine d’Cruz of Slum Dwellers 
International, India when challenged about the scaling-up of grass-roots 
organisations, explained that sustained management was about building a 
bridge between political leadership and bureaucratic administration; what she 
termed “institutionalising charismatic leadership” (N-AERUS Conference, 6th-8th 
September 2007, University College London).
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At the opposite extreme, this last example presents sustainable 
infrastructure configured as a ‘marketed’ mode of organisation. Arjan van 
Timmeren, Jon Kristinsson and Wiek Roling develop a proposal for sustainable 
configurations of infrastructure using a comparison between two classes of 
complex system: homogenous and non-homogenous networks (Albert et al. 
2000):37929. In homogeneous networks every node has the same number of 
connections but in non-homogenous networks some nodes have many more 
connections than average. The nodes in these non-homogeneous systems form 
‘hubs’ of connectivity, similar to Borja and Castells city nodes.
Van Timmeren and his team then provocatively rename homogeneous 
and non-homogeneous networks as ‘egalitarian’ and ‘aristocratic’ and conclude 
that an ‘egalitarian’ network is less resilient to the random failures that happen 
as infrastructures age or are not properly maintained. The high degree of 
interconnectedness in an ‘aristocratic’ system is said to reduce the typical time, 
distance and associated losses needed to transport information, energy and 
materials around the network and is, hence, a more sustainable configuration.
Using these assumptions, they conclude that sustainable development 
demands decentralised but connected, autonomous clusters, rather than a 
tendency to absorb sub-systems into highly centralised infrastructure. Their 
process of transforming our existing, unsustainable infrastructure starts with the 
strengthening of weak nodes and the introduction of additional connections 
between interconnected, international infrastructures. Large-scale, centralised 
networks may persist but alongside local organisation with reduced central 
administration, “more exact attribution of use of network costs to certain 
customers” (van Timmeren et al. 2004):5, smaller investments, lower risks, 
more efficient treatment of flows and the ability to unbundle and tailor the 
system to the user. Although they accept that such networks are complex to 
organise, maintain and inspect, they claims that:
Differentiation and urban flexibility are pre-conditions for anticipating long-term 
uncertainties, due to actual liberalisation processes, rising complexities and 
even sabotage
(van Timmeren et al. 2004):6
29 The characteristics of these two complex systems are related to their ‘connectivity’: a 
probability function giving the likelihood that each node in the network will have a certain 
number of connections to other nodes. Homogeneous networks have a probability function that 
decays exponentially while non-homogeneous networks have a probability function that decays 
as a power law.
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This more abstract view, in an attempt to model infrastructure configurations 
which stretch, transition and interconnect, highlights the tendency for the best 
connections to reinforce themselves. It goes further, however, by suggesting 
that the homogenous, universal model is ultimately more fragile and vulnerable 
to neglect and that it is networking between the ‘hubs’ that offer stability. In the 
following section, I will examine the vulnerability of collective infrastructures in 
the context of governance, physical infrastructure and household livelihoods.
To conclude, the World Bank “triangle”, Hardoy’s “square”, the DPU’s 
“circle”, van Vliet’s “coexisting modes” and “co-provision” as well as the more 
amorphous ‘hybrids’ and “co-production” give some idea of the governance 
challenges of sustainable water provision in the ‘splinters’ of cities summarised 
by Marvin and Graham:
The 'messy' practices of embedding, building and maintaining infrastructure 
networks beneath, through and above the fabric of cities thus infuses the 
politics of metropolitan areas, requiring complex regulatory articulations 
between markets and national and local states
(Marvin & Graham 2001):12
Socio-technical systems offer a bridge between global and local governance 
and layers of interconnecting infrastructure that meld them together. Socio- 
technical systems are configured by global processes, local coalitions and 
sometimes by modes of organisation which find unconventional routes or 
subvert idealistic governance structures. The point is that the configuration of 
systems that might reach out to the edges of Latin American cities is bound up 
in complex arrangements of differentiated provision and differentiated 
consumption: tampering with one, shapes the other and vice versa. Socio- 
technical systems are therefore mediating between governance and households. 
In the final section of this review, I propose a framework to bring together the 
notions of risk and vulnerability at the heart of the SL analysis and the role of 
infrastructure in mediating between households and governance.
2.5 Assets and Vulnerability: enhancing the sustainable livelihoods 
framework using socio-technical systems
Individuals and groups differ markedly in their power to influence these 
processes [of market regulation]; indeed, they differ even in their capacity to 
aspire to such influence.
(World Bank 2006a):28
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At the centre of the livelihoods framework is a pentagon of assets that 
householders must manage in order to mitigate both run of the mill and out of 
the ordinary change. The extent to which individual households are able to 
mitigate the risks associated with these changes is understood in terms of a 
vulnerability context, their access to infrastructure and the prevailing 
governance arrangements for the city and its systems.
In this final section, I argue, firstly, that the notion of vulnerability - the 
different degree to which households are able to buffer risk - resonates with the 
heterogeneous distribution of infrastructure and patterns of consumption that 
are conceptualised by the STS approach. Secondly, I claim that an 
understanding of the complex relationship between household assets and 
collective assets beyond the household can be enhanced through an STS lens.
2.5.1 Vulnerability: resonance between sustainable livelihoods and socio- 
technical systems
Caroline Moser, whose groundbreaking work on urban livelihoods in Latin 
America has had an enormous influence on World Bank policy in relation to 
poverty, describes vulnerability as:
...insecurity and sensitivity in the well-being of individuals, households and 
communities in the face of a changing environment, and implicit in this, their 
responsiveness and resilience to risks that they face during such negative 
changes. Environmental changes that threaten welfare can be ecological, 
economic, social and political, and they can take the form of sudden shocks, 
long-term trends, or seasonal cycles.
(Moser 1998): 3
Moser was writing in 1998 to a backdrop of urban crises and a wealth of 
debate on the limitations of conventional poverty reduction strategies. She thus 
argues for a better appreciation of the poor as managers of complex asset 
portfolios, seen as the strategic juggling of household assets to buffer risk and 
reduce vulnerability.
In this way, the SL framework understands vulnerability as more than just 
an incomplete indicator of poverty, like income. Vulnerability acknowledges a 
spectrum of deprivation that is both temporal and chronic (Ray 1998):252, 
linked to the environment (Hardoy et al. 2001):346 and which affects access to
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resources and influence and even the ability to aspire to influence (Wratten 
1995): 14.
On this last point, even the World Bank now regards these differences or 
inequalities in access as not just of intrinsic interest but as factors that in 
themselves act “to curtail economic dynamism” (World Bank 2006a):28. In its 
2006 World Development Report on Equity and Development, the Bank 
concedes that inequalities tend to “combine, interact, and are reproduced 
through interlinked economic, political, and sociocultural processes.” (World 
Bank 2006a):28.
This idea resonates with the dynamics of globalisation and urban 
splintering described in Section 1.4, particularly the processes of privilege and 
bypass through which inequalities are embedded in the biased configuration of 
socio-technical systems.
In addition, the interdependence implied by a socio-technical systems 
approach to privilege and bypass finds an important echo in Robert Chambers’ 
call for sustainable livelihoods that enhance rather than damage the livelihoods 
of others. Next, I look at the socio-technical content of livelihood assets 
themselves.
2.5.2 Livelihood assets
At the centre of the framework are household assets. Acknowledging if 
not accepting academic criticism30 of the asset concept, Robert Chambers 
reminds us that the things householders value as assets are neither universal 
nor immutable:
...the asset, seen by some academic critics as a liability, of a portmanteau 
character of commodious imprecision...has the advantage of inviting many 
interpreters to give their own meanings, and provides space for many definitions 
and dimensions.
(Chambers 2005):201
With this encouragement, and in light of my fieldwork and other 
livelihoods research (DFID 1999), in this section I review each household asset 
category, arguing that physical, natural and social capitals are particularly 
relevant to the socio-technical configuration of infrastructure. In this way, I argue
30 Academics are part of the concentrations of elite power that he so disparages so using the 
term ‘academic critics’ is to dismiss their technocratic hunger for precise definitions.
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that a socio-technical systems approach helps to understand the relationships 
between household assets and collective assets.
Financial Capital might include salaries, wages, security of income, 
rental income, the surplus from selling food, crafts or livestock produced in the 
home, savings, debts and, particularly in urban areas, utility and food bills. 
Human Capital includes levels of education and training and the market value 
of these assets in a given context.
Physical Capital includes housing and security of tenure31, additional 
rooms to let or space to undertake home-based production as well as elements 
of water, waste water, solid waste disposal and energy infrastructures which 
can sit far outside the households themselves. The quality of the household 
level connection to water infrastructure is an important component of its value 
as an asset and can be quantified using various indicators from the number of 
taps and presence of patio drainage to domestic arrangements for maintenance. 
Access to water as an asset, however, also depends on the supply network. 
Water is seen through the livelihoods lens not as a commodity but as a 
productive asset which, along with other infrastructures, arguably straddles the 
categories of Physical and Natural Capital.
Households tap into Natural Capital to support their livelihoods through 
a range of activities from growing crops to using fuel to cook food32, and from 
rearing animals to disposing of household waste. Like Physical Capital, the 
Natural Capital33 on which households depend is not necessarily local. Broadly, 
for example, Natural Capital can be understood as “[t]he services derived from 
air, water, soil, biological diversity, and recreation” (Woodhouse 2000): 158. 
Hardoy et al. in Environmental Problems in an Urbanizing World include in 
these ‘services’ “the waste-assimilation capacities of ecosystems and of the 
whole planet” (Hardoy et al. 2001):348.
Hardoy et al. go on to make the point that the environmental impact of 
low-income urban dwellers tends to be small in terms of natural resource use
31 Farrington et. al. note the link between exclusion from city institutions and “irregular, illegal or 
informal” (Farrington et al. 2002):32. Alan Gilbert -  on the basis of Latin American research -  
notes that, often, “housing is illegal only in the sense that it offends the planning regulations." 
(Gilbert 2002):259.
In this study, the more “processed" the energy source, the greater the natural capital -  access 
to electricity supplies means access to distant fossil fuels, arguably more valuable than locally 
gathered firewood. See Chapter 3.
The other controversy with natural capital is whether or not it is “substitutable” for other 
capitals i.e. can worn out environmental assets be replaced with cash (Hardoy et al. 2001)?
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and generation of waste (Hardoy et al. 2001):346. Similarly, Peter Newman 
writing on cities and the environment make the point that:
[The urban poor] may live in settlements that offend the sensibilities of wealthy 
people and sometimes they have serious environmental health problems. But 
this is not the same as having an environmental impact -  either global or local.
(Newman 2006)::280
This leads back to Robert Chambers’ argument that a preoccupation with 
the sustainable livelihoods of the poor avoids scrutiny of the unsustainable 
livelihoods of the powerful. McGranahan et al. reinforce this when they note that:
The most serious problem with broad definitions of sustainability34 is that they 
tend to marginalize the primary environmental concerns of the poor ...The 
environmental priorities of the affluent clearly relate to sustainability: it is not so 
much the present as the future of the world’s affluent minority that is at risk...
(McGranahan et al. 1999):108
McGranahan et al.’s idea that the concerns of the poor and the priorities 
of the affluent may be at odds is a powerful argument for examining the 
livelihoods of both the urban poor and non-poor before dealing with what may or 
may not be sustainable35.
The infrastructures and environmental concerns that link powerful and 
marginalised city-dwellers are thus a crucial entry point for understanding 
vulnerability and participatory, sustainable development. Access to these assets 
varies with household factors such as land ownership, income and rights to 
water resources. More importantly, beyond the household, the fertility of land 
and capacity for local ecosystems, river basins or the atmosphere to assimilate
34 “To say that sanitation systems in [low-income] cities are unsustainable...could mean that the 
infrastructure or facilities cannot be maintained... could mean that nutrient cycles are being 
disrupted...could mean that the cities are under threat from devastating epidemics...” 
(McGranahan et al. 1999):108
5 This tension between the environmental priorities of the rich and the priorities of the poor 
played out at a global level at the 1992 Rio Summit, an event widely acknowledged to have 
catalysed an agenda for sustainable development (UNCED 1993). The summit came at the end 
of a decade dominated by neo-liberal policies promoting liberalized, international trade, cuts in 
public spending and the promotion of commodity exports. This led, in many cases, to more 
intense environmental degradation and severely reduced possibilities for national environmental 
regulation (Woodhouse 2000): 161. This context, according to Mark Felling, played out as a 
struggle between Northern industrialised nations pushing for technological solutions to 
environmental problems, and developing countries calling for solutions targeting the 
“international economy, debt, structural adjustment programmes and the role of transnational 
corporations” (Felling 2002):285. These were global negotiations which highlighted rather than 
resolved tension between “national sovereignty and international obligations” or “government 
accountability to the electorate” and “interest politics” (Felling 2002):288.
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waste will all have an impact on households. Importantly, these impacts may 
well be determined by collective arrangements to which households have 
differential access.
Social Capital, despite its catchy title, is a semantic minefield of a term, 
simultaneously politically loaded and obfuscating in its imprecision. The crucial 
power of the social capital discourse, Caroline Moser reasons, is its appeal to 
economists as a “determinant of the feasibility and productivity of economic 
activity” (Moser 1998):4. For Robert Chambers, revisiting the changes in 
development language through the 1990s, this power is less benign36:
It gave non-economist social scientists a credible means of persuading 
economists of the significance of social factors in development...it was a means 
of depoliticizing development, evading questions of inequalities of power and 
wealth... it justified working with civil society rather than local government...
(Chambers 2005):200
Social capital has thus been invoked when economists are forced to 
explain practices like non-monetary exchange or behaviour that is not entirely 
self-interested. It is often identified with the ‘traditional’ rural sector where 
people living at close quarters provide mutual social support in contrast to a 
more anonymous urban sector. As I will demonstrate in the next sub-section, 
the development economist, Debraj Ray deals with the concept of social capital 
by jamming it into an orthodox economic framework with recourse to theories of 
rational risk mitigation that rely on information flow and low mobility in 
communities (Ray 1998):601.
In a more recent analysis, reviewing the early social capital debates in 
the introduction to Democracies in Flux (Putnam 2002):9, Robert Putnam 
juxtaposes various concepts of social capital: formal versus informal; thick, 
interwoven relations versus thin, fragile relations; inward-looking, self-serving 
versus outward-looking and concerned with public goods; and bridging between 
different groups versus bonding within homogeneous groups37.
Meanwhile, as the arguments of Moser and Chambers predict, the World 
Bank’s presentation of Social Capital conceives it as more than horizontal or
36 Hardoy et. al. warn that social capital should not be confused with “social sustainability” which 
has undertones of maintaining a particular social order (Hardoy et al. 2001 ):351. Carole Rakodi 
notes: “The role of social networks and the ways in which local political processes determine 
access by the poor to resources and assets are less well understood.’’(Rakodi 2002c):256.
37 Putnam concludes that “we are still far from a canonical account” (Putnam 2002)9.
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vertical ties but as a piece of governance critical to prosperity and sustainable 
development, that enables collective action by encompassing:
...institutions, relationships, and customs that shape the quality and quantity of 
a society's social interactions.
(World Bank 2008)
From Debraj Ray’s community-based definition to Moser’s notions of 
cohesion and the World Bank’s social interactions, it is clear that social capital 
has the potential to be spatially fluid. A household’s social community is rarely 
so localised that it is limited only to geographic neighbours. For Montgomery et. 
al. in their essay Why Location Matters, “place is a spatial concept, whereas 
community is a social concept’ and the community aspect of neighbourhood is 
important only when ‘spatially proximate individuals’ are involved in ‘social 
learning’ (Montgomery et al. 2004):31. Otherwise, city dwellers are linked to 
social networks which tend to override the spatial. These authors go on to 
articulate the relationship between networks and social capital:
The term “network” is often employed when the focus is on mechanisms of 
information exchange and diffusion dynamics, or when specific linkages to 
resources are being highlighted. The phrase “social capital” is used when 
networks and local associations are being described as structures that might 
support collective action, enforce norms, generate expectations of reciprocity, or 
foster feelings of mutual trust. Because it places emphasis on the more durable 
features of networks and assigns prominent roles to associations and 
institutions, social capital is often invoked in discussions of civil society and 
governance.
(Montgomery et al. 2004):41
The notion that more permanent or embedded social assets are 
somehow automatically positive is interesting in relation to the discourse of 
socio-technical systems. It overlooks the possibility that institutions -  having 
ceded their capacity to network between people -  might not be accessible to 
everyone. In other words, there is a fine line between wholesome community 
and excluded ghetto. An established neighbourhood support system might exist 
but could still fail to incorporate new arrivals or tenants: one person’s social 
capital might be another person’s exclusion (Mitlin 2001): 157. McAslan makes a 
similar point:
...a community may participate regularly in informal social interactions, yet still 
be socially isolated from the valuable resources of the wider city or region.
(McAslan 2002): 141
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As with the two preceding capitals, then, a household’s stock of social 
capital is linked to, but not necessarily determined by, an active civil society and 
strong social and political institutions.
A socio-technical systems perspective, then, expects an analysis of 
household assets that goes beyond just the presence or absence of a 
connection and addresses the extent, quality and physical components of 
infrastructure as well as the links to infrastructure’s governing institutions and 
the broader context of urban and national governance. In the next section, I 
propose a set of concepts that brings vulnerability, infrastructure and 
governance into a socio-technical systems framework.
2.5.3 Mitigating vulnerability: sharing risk through socio-technical 
systems
Robert Chambers sees one way of reducing vulnerability as the adoption 
of a diverse range of livelihoods, accompanied by complex adaptive responses:
diversity spreads risks by adding species, enterprises, linkages and activities; 
complexity reduces risks through redundancy
(Chambers 1997): 172
Expanding for a moment on this idea, it is useful to look at a simple model of 
this diversity and complexity. Debraj Ray’s text on development economics 
reproduces a classic model of social insurance which is helpful. He explains 
that two conditions must prevail for a social insurance arrangement to function: 
the incident must be verifiable; and it must not be subject to moral hazard38.
Ray imagines a community that faces two sorts of independent risk; a 
localised, “idiosyncratic” risk that might affect a few people and an “aggregate” 
risk that affects everybody in the same way (Ray 1998):597. Even in a large 
group of people, no mutual insurance is possible against a random event that 
affects everybody. Insurance would be useless if two farmers with adjoining 
fields tried mutually to insure each other because, if one farmer suffered pest 
damage, the other is also likely to and the risks are not independent. The best 
insurance groups are subject to risks that are independent of each other.
38 This is the probability of the incident occurring cannot be influenced by the actions of the 
insured individual.
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To optimise mutual insurance, households and communities might choose 
strategies which mitigate exposure to the same set of aggregate shocks. For 
instance, if all members of a family participate in a similar activity and this 
principal economic activity is disrupted for some reason, every family member is 
hit in a similar way. A group with many sources of income, where each source 
of income is subject to independent risks is less sensitive to those risks and 
economists would:
expect, then, that families will attempt to diversify their activities or spatial 
locations to lower the correlation between the incomes of family members
(Ray 1998):605
Obviously, with a large enough -  diverse and complex -  group, all 
uncertainty is theoretically idiosyncratic and independent such that smoothing 
can be achieved but the larger the group, the worse the flow and reliability of 
information and the harder it is to verify incidents and avoid moral hazard: as 
Ray puts it, an “informational barrier kicks in and precludes insurance over very 
large anonymous groups or spatial distance” (Ray 1998):601.
By contrast, in a small, less mobile and geographically close group, 
neighbours might have better information about how damage has occurred and 
would be able to distinguish bad luck from deliberate sabotage:
Village members have access to far better information, and therefore can self- 
insure as a group in a way that no formal company can replicate
(Ray 1998): 271
Continuing this information argument, Ray raises the problem of highly 
segmented social structures which also restrict the introduction of insurance 
simply because segregation is a barrier to the flow of information.
Bringing together Moser’s argument that households should be supported in 
their attempts to buffer vulnerability and build resilient livelihoods; Chambers’ 
observations about the biased power relations in development and the need to 
have complex and diverse livelihoods; and Ray’s orthodox economic 
perspectives on risk and information flow, I will now review some of these 
concepts from a socio-technical systems perspective in a way that will be useful 
in the final analysis.
Vulnerability to risk is understood as the inability to smooth the impact of 
sudden changes. These risks might be idiosyncratic or aggregate. Idiosyncratic
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risks affect only one place, one activity or one connection, while aggregate risks 
affect all places and by extension all activities and connections.
Chambers and Ray both suggest that households with ‘diversity’ are better 
able to buffer risk. For Chambers, diversity is the spreading of risk, a concept 
that Ray describes as having two dimensions: diversity in activity and diversity 
in geographic reach. A group or household that contains diversity will see all 
risks as idiosyncratic whereas a group which contains no diversity will 
experience all risks as aggregate risk.
Chambers also calls for complexity in livelihoods to reduce risk. Complexity, 
for Chambers, can be conceived, in its simplest form, as multiple, occasionally 
unnecessary, connections that create redundancy such that if a connection is 
broken there are back up options. Another way of understanding this, and 
distinguishing it from diversity, is as follows: my household buys oranges (only 
one, non-diverse activity) from one farmer (only one, non-diverse place). 
Oranges can be delivered by road, by train or by plane (multiple connections) 
so that even if the road is blocked or the train breaks down, oranges can still be 
delivered to me.
It is the difficult concept of “connection” that I consider critical to the socio- 
technical systems discourse. The connections that link activities and places 
could have any number of qualities from strength and length to density and 
reliability. Above, the ‘length’ component is incorporated into the geographic 
spread of diversity. Similarly, strength, density and reliability, for the purposes of 
this analysis, could all be understood as a function of the number of 
connections: a strong connection is just one way of understanding many, tightly 
packed identical connections.
What is missing from this description is the proposition that is raised by 
Borja and Castells’ concept of urban hubs; Marvin and Graham’s splintering 
process; Chambers’ preoccupation with the tendency for power to reinforce 
itself; and van Timmeren’s aristocratic networks. In all these ideas there is a 
possibility for the well connected preferentially to connect (or preferentially to be 
connected by service providers) with those that are already well connected, 
while the least connected remain much less well connected.
This configuration, sometimes described as clustered or non-homogenous, 
is an abstraction of a group in which a few members are much more connected 
than the rest. Returning to the earlier example of the orange supplier, this
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tendency could be understood as follows: my supplier of oranges observes that 
I always pay my bills on time or that my orange farmer has always been reliable 
in the past so he arranges two trains (rather than one) to make sure oranges 
are delivered to me. This response takes account of three past trends: I am 
reliable, the farmer is reliable and the train breaks down. Farmers or orange 
buyers that are not reliable do not get an extra train so, even when other 
farmers can reliably supply oranges, their connections to consumers are 
unreliable. And even when other consumers urgently need to buy oranges, their 
connections to farmers remain unreliable.
Now, to relate notions of diversity and complexity to the notions of local and 
global that were introduced in Section 2.4 as part of the globalisation and cities 
discourse, I argue that the concept of a local group is analogous to a group 
without complexity and diversity: it experiences risk in the aggregate. The 
concept of a global group, by contrast, is a group that has diversity or 
complexity or both and can buffer risks, which it either experiences as 
idiosyncratic risks or as failures which it can tolerate through backup 
connections39, in other words, by having the option to use a train, car or plane.
For urban hubs and privileged splinters to connect preferentially to each 
other or to be connected preferentially by service providers, the connection 
process must be in response to some quality or perceived quality of the hub. In 
its simplest, small world40 form this quality might be the number of connections 
it already has: many connections are attractive. In a much more complicated 
socio-technical system made up of livelihood asset bundles, infrastructure 
connections and the potential to influence governance, I argue that this 
“attractiveness” is related to the perceived riskiness of the livelihood or system 
to be connected. If it is seen to be vulnerable, it is bypassed. This becomes self­
reinforcing because in the absence of information, it is safer to assume 
riskiness than not. Where there is no knowledge about the bypassed, the 
tendency is to avoid connecting. The well connected, however, produce 
information about themselves through the fact of being connected. The more 
connected, the better able service providers are to understand their responses 
to risk.
39 This is what van Timmeren et al. argue: their 'aristocratic’ networks are more resilient to random failures than the 
egalitarian' network without hubs or clusters. This will depend on how clustered the clusters are: if they cluster to the 
point that connections to other clusters disappear, they will lose diversity and become vulnerable to random risks again. 
On the other hand, the aristocratic’ networks are more vulnerable to deliberate attack: all their eggs are in only a few 
baskets and if the basket is sabotaged, the damage is severe.
40 (Albert et al. 2000):379
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The final points to make here are that, firstly, the more knowledge service 
providers have about those they serve, the more sophisticated their response to 
risk, including the ability to forecast and pre-empt changes in the future. 
Secondly, the embedded socio-technical configurations of infrastructure and 
livelihoods that emerge from these responses will, to some extent, reflect past 
risks. The sustained ability to buffer new risks in the future, then, will probably 
require some sort of reconfiguration. Thirdly, if livelihoods are to enhance rather 
than damage the livelihoods of others, this places even more onerous 
requirements on a system that balances risk: there is a need to mutualise risk in 
new ways.
My key proposition is that these abstract concepts can be unified within a 
socio-technical systems perspective. My framework is constructed around two 
axes (Figure 12). The horizontal axis is labelled “what the powerful know” and it 
represents the degree to which the risks faced by individuals have been 
correctly quantified by the most powerful: at one end the most powerful know 
everything, and, at the other, they know nothing and in between they make 
assumptions which become more conservative when less is known. At the right 
hand extreme, risk cannot be quantified -  the right hand space is not complex. 
At the left hand extreme, risk can be quantified and the response is to buffer 
risks by forming hubs or clusters -  the left hand space is complex.
The vertical axis is labelled “how the risk is shared” and is one way of 
looking at the degree to which one livelihood might damage or enhance another: 
from risk that is individualised to risk that is mutualised. At the bottom end of the 
axis, risk is buffered only by a single individual with limited capacity to mitigate 
risk: without much diversity, each person is more vulnerable. Moving up the axis, 
however, individuals coalesce into households (with livelihood strategies), 
settlements connected by shared infrastructure and institutions and cities (within 
a context of shared policies, institutions and processes) until the point at which 
it is impossible to have a livelihood that damages the livelihoods of others. The 
risk sharing space can be conceived as not diverse (bottom) and diverse (top). 
Where risk sharing is neither diverse, nor complex, livelihoods are vulnerable 
(bottom right quadrant).
The axes intersect at a hypothetical point where the risk sharing group 
moves from only being able to buffer local, “idiosyncratic” risks to being able to 
mitigate “aggregate” risks. In the terminology of the previous section this can be
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viewed as a shift from a local group (a population with everyone vulnerable to 
the same risks) to a global group (a population with different people vulnerable 
to different risks).
In Debraj Ray’s “village communities”, for example, where local knowledge 
about each household may be very sophisticated but is inaccessible to large, 
formal service providers that are, for example, unable to work in a participatory 
way, systems may be in place to share “idiosyncratic risks” but may not stretch 
across a large enough group to mitigate “aggregate” risks.
This is an abstract way of conceiving the links between risk sharing, modes 
of organising collective infrastructure and governance: it acknowledges the 
vulnerability context of the livelihoods framework and, at the same time, the 
potential power imbalance between providers and consumers of infrastructure 
and services, where power is understood as having both access to information 
and the capacity to transform it into useful knowledge for making decisions.
Figure 9 Socio-technical conceptual space: vulnerability, infrastructure and governance 
(Crawford 2008)
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This can also be explored with reference to van Vliet et al.’s modes of 
organisation. Each mode can be placed in its hypothetical location in the 
framework as shown in Figure 10 and described in
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Table 1. In addition, the framework also allows for hybrid modes or, rather, the 
co-existence of many different modes across the same space and the possibility 
of moving between spaces.
Figure 10 Socio-technical conceptual space: plotting van Vliet’s modes of organisation 
(Crawford 2008)
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Table 2 van Vliet’s modes of organisation described in relation to their position on my 
framework
Autonomous
(A) _
mode links small, homogeneous groups and rely on local resources but do not 
have redundancy or room to buffer big changes (bottom right quadrant)
Piecemeal
(P)
mode links up different groups and can deal with bigger swings in demand by 
building in redundancy and spare capacity but without regulation and 
standardisation, providers are not obliged to ensure that all consumers have 
uniform access (bottom right quadrant but moving up and left to take in more 
groups and use more information)
Integrated
(I) V
mode stretches to take in just enough homogeneous groups to create Ray's 
‘large group’ or Chambers’ diversity and complexity and achieve heterogeneous 
consumption patterns which optimise spare capacity and smooth aggregate 
demand profiles (in the hypothetical centre of the framework, just achieving 
heterogeneity with enough information to balance supply and demand)
Universal
(U)
mode stretches to take in such a large group of consumers that the socio- 
technical system has more than enough redundancy to cope with any 
idiosyncratic risk and consumers neither object to paying more to maintain all the 
extra-to-optimal infrastructure nor to tariffs that do not bother to distinguish 
between the consumption (and payment) habits of consumers (top right 
quadrant)
Marketed
(A)
mode differentiates products and services and monitors, manipulates and 
matches diverse consumption habits, fragmenting socio-technical systems to 
meet demand and responding to savvy consumers that will pay only for what 
they use (bottom left quadrant)
At the bottom of the framework, whatever the mode of infrastructure 
provision, individuals without access to sufficiently diverse and complex asset 
portfolios are extremely vulnerable, while individuals with sufficiently complex
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asset portfolios are in a position where they need not share risk with the 
vulnerable and pay only to mitigate their own risk.
So, for example, with the example of a water provider, there might be, at 
one exaggerated extreme, a provider that knows exactly how much each 
household is able to pay for water, how timely payment will be and exactly when 
and how much water will be consumed. Pricing can be highly differentiated to 
optimise cost recovery across a network, with risk (or costs) worked out for 
each person and, potentially, with the riskiest individuals paying more. This 
system would be placed in the bottom left quadrant of the plot (M).
Where a service provider cannot track any of these things, risk (or costs) will 
be averaged out or shared across the system with a bit of cross-subsidy here 
and there. This moves us up into the top right quadrant of the plot (U).
In conceptual terms, the argument is that infrastructures mediate 
between household vulnerability and governance by setting up the group 
through which risk is shared. The boundaries of this group are drawn both 
socially, through a negotiated agreement or refusal to share risk or through 
unwitting and involuntary sharing, and technically, through the quality and 
extent of infrastructure. I argue, therefore, that risk is shared through what I 
have already described as socio-technical systems.
Critically, this framework also permits a re-examination of the socio- 
technical systems perspective in terms of vulnerability and governance. The 
processes of privilege and bypass described in Marvin & Graham’s splintering 
urbanism thesis can be hypothesised in relation to the framework as shown in 
Figure 11.
Figure 11 Socio-technical conceptual space: plotting Marvin and Graham’s splintering 
(Crawford 2008)
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Privilege is part of the dynamic that moves towards a marketed mode of 
organisation in the bottom left quadrant, with powerful service providers 
motivated (arguably by powerful consumers) to apportion provision and costs 
according to the risks presented by individual livelihoods. Although risk is 
individualised for everyone, the privileged, understood as people with complex 
(interconnected) livelihood assets, are still able to buffer risk. Meanwhile, as the 
process of privilege consolidates itself, the groups that are left without services 
find themselves with modes of organisation in the bottom right quadrant, 
bypassed by the socio-technical systems that would allow them to buffer risk. 
Service providers continue to collect information, and information about 
privileged or connected users becomes continuously better than information 
about the bypassed; service providers continue to quantify risk based on this 
information, thus the riskiness is higher for those already bypassed or in places 
where lack of information makes risk harder to quantify.
The key point here is the interaction of livelihood assets and vulnerability. 
The diverse and complex livelihood portfolios that allow the privileged to buffer 
risk or make the bypassed vulnerable cannot be understood as something 
contained within an individual or a household as the livelihoods framework 
starts to suggest. Diversity is seen, in this thesis, as a stretched socio-technical 
system that connects a household’s assets to other places, while complexity is 
seen as the link between household assets and other highly interconnected 
livelihoods, pieces of infrastructure or institutions.
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A socio-technical systems perspective thus allows the livelihoods of the 
privileged and the bypassed to be considered within the same analysis. This is 
essential if we are to respond to Chambers’ call for sustainable livelihoods that 
enhance rather than damage the livelihoods of others.
2.6 Conclusions: a theoretical response to the research question
This chapter is a conceptual and theoretical response to the research 
question. It argues for the mediating role of infrastructure in the relationship 
between governance and livelihood vulnerability.
This argument treats each element of the livelihoods framework in turn -  
governance, infrastructure and vulnerability -  identifying where they are both 
useful and insufficient for examining urban livelihoods.
In conceptual terms, the governance framework identifies three groups of 
actors but overlooks the tendency for access to power and infrastructure to 
frame the activities of each of these groups. Next, the provision of infrastructure 
in cities is understood in terms of the governance framework. Since this does 
not explain well the patchy provision of infrastructure in cities, I turn to the 
argument that the global economic and telecommunications connections of 
cities are instrumental in shaping the social and spatial distribution of urban 
services. Build on this perspective but challenging the tendency to attribute all 
urban activity to a city’s place in a global system, I turn to a more 
interconnected socio-technical systems perspective. This conceives 
infrastructures in cities as a relationship between physical and environmental 
hardware and institutional social, economic and political: these relationships as 
we have configured them for this century are giving rise to a splintering process.
Finally, livelihood vulnerability and the mitigation of risk are explored in 
light of the governance and infrastructure discourse. I bring these ideas together 
in a framework which explores how all three interact to influence vulnerability, 
the mode of organisation through which infrastructure is produced and 
consumed and splintering. I argue that to use the Sustainable Livelihoods 
framework to describe livelihoods which enhance rather than damage the 
livelihoods of others means sliding between the different quadrants in my model. 
More importantly, to attain the Sustainable Livelihoods conceived by Robert 
Chambers, will imply an informed and willing reconfiguration of infrastructures 
that allows negotiated and institutionalised mutuality.
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In the next chapter, I tackle the second stage of the thesis: developing a 
methodological approach which can capture the socio-technical systems 
operating in Cusco.
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Chapter 3 Formulating a Research Methodology
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This chapter responds to the second sub-question posed in the 
introduction by developing a methodological approach. Following on from the 
concepts introduced in Chapter 2, the methodology is designed to unpick the 
role of socio-technical systems as a mediator between governance and 
vulnerability through the empirical case study of Cusco.
Just as the conceptual starting point of the thesis was the sustainable 
livelihoods framework, so the methodological basis of the research is this 
framework’s analytical categories and research techniques. This chapter 
describes the application of qualitative and quantitative methods to each 
component of the livelihoods framework and develops mixed and visual tools for 
conceptualising socio-technical systems as they play out in the household 
experience of Cusco’s water and sanitation infrastructure.
It is worth remembering that the framework’s categories and techniques 
are the outcome of many years of participatory and action-oriented research 
and are not intended to be prescriptive. With this in mind, this research is 
founded on participation and the use of carefully selected case studies to 
explore the rich interconnections between livelihoods, governance and 
infrastructure.
Leading on from this methodological outline, Chapter 4 begins with a 
short introduction to Peruvian policies, institutions and processes by offering a 
discursive analysis of the country’s national and local governance. Similarly, the 
infrastructure and services component of the sustainable livelihoods framework 
is first introduced in terms of the role of the Peruvian state, markets and civil 
society.
This analysis guides the selection of three case studies in Cusco which 
represent different aspects of urban water and sanitation provision in Peru: San 
Bias, in Cusco’s historic centre, served by the provincial water authority; 
Angostura, a settlement on the edge of the city served by a community- 
managed system; and Manco Capac, a zone, in the heart of the city, served by 
a separate community-built, committee-managed water provider.
The livelihoods and vulnerability of households in these three places are 
then analysed case by case in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. This part of the thesis 
concludes with Chapter 8, a final, comparative summary of all three case 
studies in terms of access to household assets, infrastructure and influence.
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Chapter 9 then returns to the configuration of socio-technical systems in 
Cusco, using the governance and vulnerability context to explain the qualitative 
and quantitative features of water and sanitation, its distribution across the city 
and its role in mediating vulnerability. This brings the argument back to the 
socio-technical conceptual space developed in Chapter 2.
3.1 Applying the Sustainable Livelihoods framework
The research question concerns relationships between and within 
households as well as between and within infrastructure systems and 
institutions, it lends itself, therefore, to a methodology that is able to capture rich 
and sometimes unanticipated data. In these situations it is necessary to adopt 
approaches which allow participation between householders or community 
groups, open-ended interview techniques and qualitative and interpretive 
accounts of what is happening. Add to this the practical constraints of time, 
money and climate41 and it is clear that the research methodology must be 
pragmatic, in that it makes some initial empirical assumptions, as well as 
flexible and adaptable to the context in Cusco. The sustainable livelihoods 
framework has emerged from participatory studies that have faced these 
challenges again and again and it thus provides a practical starting point.
The sustainable livelihoods approach offers a range of tools including the 
use of case studies, key informant interviews, workshops, household interviews, 
profiling, participatory mapping techniques and analysis of secondary sources 
(DFID 1999;Rakodi 2002b;Rakodi 2002c). The methodology is necessarily 
mixed and calls for the use of research techniques from different disciplines, 
combining qualitative and quantitative methods, thematic analysis of primary 
and secondary sources and processes of triangulation or cross-referencing as a 
check on validity42. The data analysis in the following chapters adopts the 
framework’s analytical categories to organize themes and findings beginning 
with policies, institutions and processes in Peru and Cusco and then moving to
41 The fieldwork took place over the course of 2006-7 with key informant interviews taking place 
throughout. The first quarter was taken up with a local literature review, field visits and 
preliminary interviews. The second quarter saw the dry season water sampling programme 
followed by in-depth household interviews in the third quarter and wet season water sampling in 
the final quarter.
42 Robert Chambers offers two tests for validity as trustworthiness, the quality of being 
believable as a representation of reality, and relevance, the practical utility for learning and 
action. For guidance on what is expected see the writers who have grappled with this theme 
(Boyatzis 1998) (Chambers 1997) (Durrheim & Terre Blanche 1999) (Gill 1993)
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livelihood assets, strategies, vulnerability context and governance in three case 
studies. These categories were fleshed out using the following qualitative and 
quantitative techniques.
3.2 Data collection I: understanding livelihoods
The process of identifying key informants and case studies was part of a 
broader Peruvian literature review -  outlined in the following chapter - and 
accompanied by preliminary meetings and interviews in Lima and Cusco. 
Through this research, institutions and actors in Cusco’s governance and 
infrastructure were gradually identified.
Key informant interviews were conducted with the individuals and groups 
listed in the tables below (Tables 2 and 3). I conducted all interviews in Spanish 
and the structure was based on a SWOT analysis. The basic tool is reproduced 
in Appendix B. These were supplemented by observation and participation in 
workshops and meetings throughout the research.
Table 3 Key Informants: whole city
Case Study Organisation Position Name Date
All SEDACusco CEO David Valenzuela 24-4-2006
All SEDACusco Operations Lita Allende 2-6-2006
All SEDACusco Santa Ana Plant 
Manager
Ing. Franklin Perez Ruibel 
Rodriguez
15-12-2006
All SEDACusco San Jeronimo 
Plant Team
Rocio Venero 20-12-2006
All SEDACusco Operations Ing. Flores Gorky 12-2-2007
All SUNASS Director Patricia Concha Flores 5-4-2006
All Centro Guaman 
Poma de Ayala
Team Leader Justo Pastor Vargas Sota 12-4-2006
All Centro Guaman 
Poma de Ayala
Team Leader Justo Pastor Vargas Sota 6-62006
All Centro Guaman 
Poma de Ayala
Southern Valley 
Team
Justo Pastor Vargas Sota, 
Gustavo Salazar, Oscar 
Casas
14-6-2006
All Centro Guaman 
Poma de Ayala
GIHR Team Rinske Warner, Lizardo 
Holgado, Oscar Casas
8-7-2006
All Centro Guaman 
Poma de Ayala
O&M Workshop The Southern Valley 
Fontaneros, Justo Pastor 
Vargas Sota, Lizardo 
Holgado, Oscar Casas
25-7-2006
All Centro Guaman 
Poma de Ayala
Historic Centre 
Team
Sachenca Ardiles 26-7-2006
All Centro Guaman 
Poma de Ayala
Directors Nicole Bernex; Jose Maria 
Gomez
4-4-2006
All IMA Vilcanota
Committee
Jos6 Castefiada, Luis 
Jimenez, Amelia del Mar
26-6-2006
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Table 4 Key Informants: case studies
Case Study Organisation Position Name Date
Angostura Angostura
Committee
Angostura
Committee
President
Olimpia
Carpio
24-11-2006
Manco Capac ASAPASC Administrator Nemecio
Calsino
30-6-2006
Manco Capac ASAPASC Maintenance
Team
Anon. 30-6-2006
Manco Capac ASAPASC Board Meeting Board
Members
10-6-2006
Manco Capac Centro de Salud 
Manco Capac
Physician Dr Eduardo 
Cosme
6-6-2006
San Bias Centro Guaman 
Poma de Ayala
Southern Valley 
Public Workshop
Nicole
Bernex
4-4-2006
Manco Capac Municipality of 
Santiago
Mayor of 
Santiago
Jose Luis
Aguirre
Navarro
14-2-2007
Angostura Municipality of 
Saylla
Mayor of Saylla Edwin David
Cahuana
Kana
19-2-2006
Manco Capac World Vision Team Leader Fidel
Guzman
6-6-2006
Participatory exercises43, listed in Table 5, were organised in each case 
study site with the help of local committees. Since there was no funded “project” 
behind the participation sessions, the meetings were ostensibly convened to 
present the results of water sampling, thank households and solicit the views of 
community members outside the sampled groups. This exercise was extremely 
successful in Angostura. By contrast, after two formal attempts in Manco Capac, 
I resorted to setting up a stand on a main street corner to talk to residents.
Table 5 Participatory sessions
Case Study Position Date
Angostura Angostura Community Meeting 18-2-2007
Manco Capac Manco Capac Community Meeting 10-2-2007, 14-2-2007, 17-2-2007
San Bias San Bias Community Meeting 17-2-2007
Household sampling was purposive with the intention of representing the 
“best o ff, the “worst o ff and the “typical” households in the zone, as 
understood by gate keepers and key informants. The households were also
43 The SL framework is used to engage people in their own development through participation. 
This is an academic research project not a development project and this highlights a tension 
between “extractive" post-graduate research and genuine participation. To overcome this 
problem, the proposal of Anna Lawrence, writing on participatory research on biodiversity in 
Latin America and elsewhere, has been to avoid splitting research into the “pure” participation 
favoured by Robert Chambers, and other, more mixed modes of research from the 
“instrumental” to the “transformative" (Lawrence 2006)283:287. In my research, the SL 
framework is instrumental in guiding ‘extractive’ research -  populating the analytical categories 
with data -  while the participatory, ‘transformative’ content of the livelihoods approach is built in 
to every encounter with participants and key informants using formal and informal opportunities 
to build trust
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selected so that they were distributed across the zone’s water network rather 
than clustered around a single node or water main. Several visits were made to 
households before and after the main interviews to arrange appointments for 
subsequent meetings, to take water samples and to get past the initial barrier of 
being a stranger. Each formal meeting then took between forty minutes and an 
hour and forty-five minutes and although the questions were principally 
designed to probe the household’s livelihood assets, strategies and surrounding 
governance structures, they were open-ended. The responses were used to 
develop an account of livelihoods that would be both useful for comparison 
beyond the household and unconstrained enough to allow the particular and 
personal perceptions of householders to come through. Within the skeletal 
category headings of the livelihoods framework there is room to manoeuvre and 
describe, allowing a treatment of data that can evoke and frame each case 
study and give qualitative views alongside simple, quantitative graphical and 
visual representations. The in-depth interviews thus lie somewhere between a 
household biography and a questionnaire. I conducted Interviews in Spanish in 
fifteen44 households in each case study area. Interview formats were built 
around the analytical categories set out in the Sustainable Livelihoods 
framework shown in Figure 11.
The final tool, held in Appendix C, was trialled with colleagues from the 
University San Antonio of Abad Cusco (UNSAAC), specialists from the Centro 
Guaman Poma de Ayala and World Vision, laboratory assistants and two 
Spanish teachers. This led to a significant re-ordering of the format away from a 
sequence that followed the livelihood categories and towards an order that 
proved much more intuitive during testing. This format -  but not the substance 
of the questions -  was modified once more after initial interviews so that the 
conversations with participants flowed more smoothly. The final design included 
an opening section that was taken directly from the Peruvian census. This was 
done to locate each household in the context of secondary census data and 
because it seemed to put people at ease, perhaps because the questions were
44 Small, purposive samples are the appropriate choice for this qualitative livelihoods 
methodology. Non-probability sampling for case studies and households was applied according 
to criteria of accessibility and convenience : travel times between each location and the 
laboratory less than an hour in order to get samples back to the lab in reasonable time and 
ensure personal safety by returning to the lab before dark; locations accessible by public 
transport or taxi; and locations safe for me to work alone based on the advice from local 
contacts, personal judgement and the availability of mobile phone reception.
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seen as ‘easy’ to answer since they had been rehearsed during the national 
census in 2005.
The following tables offer definitions of each analytical category and the 
tools and sources used to probe them (Rakodi 2002b). The data generated 
include a mixture of quantitative indicators and qualitative characteristics that go 
towards building up a picture of livelihoods.
Households are referred to by a number between 1 and 45. The 
households sampled in San Bias cover HH16 to HH30, in Angostura HH1-HH15 
and in Manco Capac, HH31-HH45.
Table 6 Examples of Livelihood Assets and Strategies, Tools and Data Generated_______
Livelihood Assets: access to assets
Tools and 
Sources Data Produced
Human
Capital
number of household 
members, time for income- 
earning activities, levels of 
educations, skills and health 
status
Household
interviews
sex, age, job, education level and 
relationship to head of household, 
household repairs, illness related to 
water, household treatment of water
Natural
Capital
Natural resource stocks 
useful to livelihoods: land, 
water, common pool 
resources
Household
interviews
land and livestock ownership, irrigation 
sources, alternative sources of 
drinking water, household fuel sources
Financial
Capital
Available financial 
resources for livelihoods 
(credit, savings, pensions, 
remittances, rental income)
Household
interviews
wage of each person per 
day/month/harvest, tendency of wages 
to vary, cost of alternative water 
sources, utility bills
Physical
Capital
Basic infrastructure 
(transport, shelter, water, 
energy, communications) 
and production equipment 
for livelihoods.
Household
interviews,
observation
house ownership, number of rooms, 
number of bedrooms, type of water 
connection, number of taps, patio 
drainage, type of WC connection, 
predominant material in roof, external 
walls, flooring, patio, photograph of 
tap, sanitary risk assessment
Social
Capital
Social networks, 
membership of groups, 
relationships of trust and 
reciprocity, access to wider 
institutions of society 
exploited in pursuit of 
livelihoods
Household
interviews
number of years in 
neighbourhood/present house, 
alternative sources of water and help 
when services fail, sources of help in 
the face of hazards
Livelihood strategies and opportunities
Interaction of household assets and 
context; activities; responses to risk; 
investment in assets; substitution of 
assets; livelihood decisions
Household
interviews,
workshops
land cultivation, livestock rearing for 
sale/domestic consumption, reasons 
for variation in incomes, uses of 
household water supplies, household 
storage, response to hazards, 
response to insecurity_____________
87
Table 7 Examples of Vulnerability Context, Tools and Data Generated
Vulnerability Context
Location of with respect to 
topography, flood prone areas; 
slopes and hillsides; 
contaminated areas; dump sites; 
access to green space; traffic 
and safety.
Occurrence, intensity and 
duration of hazards (flooding, 
earthquakes, crime, power cuts).
Nature and origin of 
neighbourhood associations;
External assistance and relief 
activities;
Impact of external shocks on 
households;
Coping mechanisms 
(diversification of livelihood 
strategies, migration);
Composition of households, 
population density;
Macro-economic trends;
Urban economic base and 
activity mix; employment and 
cost of living (inflation) trends;
Policies and attitudes towards 
informal sector activity; micro 
finance practices_____________
Tools and Sources Data Produced
Household
interviews,
workshops
natural hazards (frequency and 
duration), power cuts (frequency and 
duration), insecurity, priorities for 
change
Secondary data 
(census)
sex, age, education level and 
relationship to head of household, 
illness related to water
Secondary data 
(census)
predominant material in roof, external 
walls, flooring, type of household 
connection
Key informant 
interviews
people helping when services fail or 
hazards occur
Secondary sources 
(government and 
company reports, 
research, 
documentation)
Shocks, Trends and Seasonality:
climate, environmental data, local 
economy
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Table 8 Examples of Infrastructure and Services, Tools and Data Generated 
Infrastructure and Services: access to infrastructure
Tools and Sources Data Produced
Adequate water and sanitation 
infrastructure (coverage, 
continuity, quality, quantity, 
affordability);
Roads and transport;
Markets;
Energy infrastructure; 
Education, health and social 
services;
Household
interviews,
workshops
interruptions in services, household 
views on services (availability, costs 
and meters), changes in services over 
time, waste services, disposal of 
waste and waste water, nearest 
schools, health posts, bus stops
Key informant 
interviews
Secondary sources 
and institutional 
analysis
(government and 
company reports, 
research, 
documentation)
interruptions in services, providers' 
views on services (availability, costs 
and meters), changes in services over 
time, waste services, disposal of 
waste and waste water, Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats, 
vision, funding, costs
roles of key actors in service provision, 
municipalities, regulators, NGOs, 
organigrams and constitutions; legal 
frameworks, remit, extent, scope, 
scale;
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Table 9 Examples of Governance, Tools and Data Generated
Policies, institutions and processes: access to influence
Tools and 
Sources Data Produced
Governance: Structures,
Organisations, Processes (laws, 
policies, cultures, institutions); actors 
from government, civil society and 
market;
Presence and importance of 
community level institutions;
Interaction of population with external 
organizations;
Control of resources by organizations;
Formal versus informal institutions 
and organizations;
Ethnicity; religion and gender;
Urbanisation patterns;
Political parties; access to voting;
Feelings of insecurity/uncertainty at 
household and community level;
Informal controls through 
gangs/’mafias’ etc;
Police harassment; other harassment 
by state or informal structures.
Impact of rules, regulations and 
policies on households, and 
communities;
Access to identification documents; 
taxation (formal and informal); tenancy 
laws; regulations on hawking;’ 
influence of zoning_________________
Household
interviews,
workshops
Key informant 
interviews
active NGOs, membership of 
organisations, level of participation 
(board member, attendance at 
meetings and work days, voting, 
payment), organisations providing 
services, organisations helping when 
services fail or hazards occur, 
attitudes to municipal, regional and 
national government, private sector 
organizations
organisations providing services or 
linkages to governance entities 
(aggregate Social Capital)
Secondary
sources and
institutional
analysis
(government
and company
reports,
research,
documentation)
roles of key actors from government, 
civil society and government, NGOs, 
organigrams and constitutions; legal 
frameworks, remit, extent, scope, 
scale;
3.3 Data analysis I: visualising livelihoods
In the chapters that follow, households are grouped according to their 
livelihood strategies and outcomes. The first stage of this categorisation is 
supported by graphical asset pentagons. To construct these diagrams, proxy 
indicators for each capital were developed from the interview framework above 
and are summarised45 in Table 9.
45 Based on early key informant interviews and field visits in Cusco as well as the body of work 
referenced in Chapter 2
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Table 10 Summary of Indicators used to quantify assets
Strong Asset 0.75 0.50 0.25 Weak Asset
Score: 1.00 Score: 0.00
% household 81-100% 61-80% 41-60% 21-40% 0-20%
economically
active
c
10 Education level Completed univ/higher secondary secondary primary or
E of head of university or incomplete complete incomplete less
3
X household tertiary
highest Completed univ/higher secondary secondary primary or
education level university or incomplete complete incomplete less
in household tertiary
land ownership Owned land rented land none
Irrigation type Rain/spring Huatanay
water
none
fuel type used Elect riaty Gas Other wood
15l. for cooking
3 household for sale and household none
ro
Z production
(livestock)
household
consumption
consumption
only
household high growing high and low low only grass only none
production only
(crops)
most secure Monthly weekly Daily or by daily or by
household harvest harvest
15 salary type
o Income bracket 400+ 300-399 200-299 100-199 0-99
c
(0 rental income 150+ 100-149 50-99 1-49 0
c water service 0-2% 3-5% 6-8% 9-11% 11+%
u_ cost as a % of
income per
capita
Home bought or By occupation mortgaged rented
ownership inherited
Occupants per >2 2-4 4-6 6-8 8+
room
Roofing reinforced
concrete
Tiles CGI wood straw/mud
Walling brick or block stone + adobe stone mud straw/mud
n cement mortar mortar
m Flooring parquet or linoleum flags/tiles cement earth>* polished wood
0_ Patio surface Cement and cement no earth + earth no
drainage drainage drainage drainage
Tap drainage Concrete sink stone sink direct onto 
drained patio
direct
undrained
patio
Tap type Encased standpipe
Tap condition v good good reasonable poor bad
Hose condition v good good reasonable poor bad
Time in barrio >10 years 10-19 99 20-29 99 30-39.99 40+ years
Level of membership, membership no
15 participation attendance, or voting or membership,
<5n voting attendance or voting oru
(O combo attendance
Payment of fines Fines subs Nothing
or subscriptions
These indicators were scored between 0, a weak asset, and 1, a strong 
asset. An average asset score was worked out for each category of household 
capital: human, natural, financial, physical and social. These scores were then 
used to plot an asset pentagon as a visual summary for each case study 
(Figure 22). The plots offer a comparison between zones as well as a picture of
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the differences within zones and between households. Since the sampling 
method deliberately sought out the best and worst off in each case study area, 
the spread of households on each axis of the plot is not to be understood as a 
statistical range but as a way of understanding the heterogeneity of households 
and the relationship between this and their vulnerability.
Figure 12 Sustainable Livelihoods Asset Pentagon
Human
Social Natural
Physical Financial
As an example, the asset base for a single household is interpreted 
below in Figure 21.
Figure 13 Examples of asset pentagon forms
Household assets, Household assets, consistent Asset bundle with only one
consistently strong along all but weak across capitals strong asset (in this case
axes for all capitals Human Capital)
Figure 14 Asset Pentagons for San Bias, Angostura and Manco Capac
San Bias Angostura Manco Capac
The second stage of the process, designed to capture the similarities and 
differences between household livelihoods within the same case study site, was
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to group households according to their livelihood assets, strategies and 
outcomes. This process of profiling is essentially a painstaking qualitative and 
thematic analysis of the household interview results, devised to extract the 
dominant strategies and outcomes in each location. It groups households with 
similar strategies and outcomes and splits them into three groups according to 
the tendencies which differentiate them. The analysis looks for patterns in 
household asset bundles, livelihood activities which affect the ability to buffer 
shocks and stresses and interaction with the institutions and processes of 
governance.
In the historical centre of San Bias, this thematic analysis generated 
categories that have been labelled ‘establishment’, ‘entrepreneurial’ and 
‘excluded’ livelihoods. In peri-urban Angostura, the labels are ‘urbane’, 
‘traditional’ and ‘diversified’. In Manco Capac, much closer to the centre, the 
households have been grouped as ‘tenacious’, ‘homebound’ and ‘landlord’ 
livelihoods.
By examining households according to these groups, it is also possible to 
look at the interdependence of their livelihoods. Establishment livelihoods in 
San Bias tend to derive income from formal sector, professional jobs while 
households in the entrepreneurial group serve tourists or look towards markets 
abroad. In the excluded category, livelihoods are linked to local food markets, 
street selling or seasonal construction work.
In Angostura, families with traditional livelihoods produce their own food 
and also supply food back to markets in the city. Others with diversified 
livelihoods are involved in urban transport, going between the centre and the 
edge of town. The urbane livelihoods are connected to government projects, 
local politics and consultancy but also tend to keep livestock and organise local 
activities.
Back towards the centre in Manco Capac, families with tenacious 
livelihoods are providing public and private sector services to the wider city 
often in precarious industries like construction. Households with homebound 
livelihoods run businesses serving the neighbourhood and the landlords 
stabilise their family incomes by letting rooms.
In each case study, the importance of water and sanitation services to 
livelihoods is tested through questions on family health, the volumes of water 
consumed at home and the household uses of water, the irrigation of land, the
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cost of water, alternative water sources and broader questions on water and 
waste in the environment.
Vulnerability Context, Infrastructure and Services and Governance are 
analysed with reference to the livelihood profiles established for each case 
study. This analysis allows and examination of aspects of vulnerability that are 
‘blind’ to livelihood or that impact on certain livelihoods more than others. A 
good example in Cusco is the solid waste collection service. This is the 
responsibility of district municipalities but when the service is inadequate, it is 
often worse in certain patches of the district -  perhaps those furthest from main 
roads -  such that all households in that patch tend to be affected in similar ways, 
regardless of individual household assets and strategies.
Throughout the case study chapters, there is a strong emphasis on the 
assets and vulnerability that are related to water and sanitation infrastructure.
3.4 Data collection II: understanding Socio-Technical Systems using the 
WHO indicators
A picture of socio-technical configuration is built up in two stages starting 
with an evaluation both of household connections and whole water systems in 
each case study. This evaluation is based on the World Health Organisation’s 
guidelines for the safety of drinking water supplies. The second component of 
the analysis is a discussion of the interaction of governance an infrastructure 
through a description of each provider’s mode of organisation and an 
assessment of socio-technical scale in the context of neighbouring providers 
(see Table 1).
After van Vliet et al., scale is seen in this research as both social and 
technical: a function of engagement with other entities in the governance 
framework including providers, municipal authorities, NGOs and communities; 
the number of users; the rate of drinking water production and; the spatial 
extent of the system.
The WHO methodology comes with a valuable toolkit of tests, surveys 
and a quantitative diagnostic summary of five water-supply service parameters: 
quality, quantity, continuity, affordability, accessibility (summarised in Table 10). 
In addition to these parameters, a further indicator, disposal method, has been 
added to describe what happens to waste water once it leaves households.
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Table 11 WHO service parameters (summarised from World Health Organization 2006) 
Quality: based on a sanitary risk assessment
Quantity: the proportion of the population using water from different levels of drinking-water 
supply (e.g., no access, basic access, intermediate access and optimal access) as a function of 
service level and quantity of water collected_____________________________________________
Service Distance/time Likely Public health risk Intervention
level volumes of 
water 
collected
from poor hygiene priority and 
actions
More than 1 km Very high: hygiene practice 
compromised; 
basic consumption 
may be compromised
Very high 
Provision of
No access or more than 30 min round- 
trip
Very low - 
51/capita/day
basic level of 
service 
Hygiene 
education
Basic
access
Within 1km or 
within 30min 
round-trip
Average
approximately
201/capita/day
High: hygiene may be 
compromised; 
laundry may occur 
off-plot
High 
Hygiene 
education 
Provision of 
improved level of 
service
Intermediate
access
Water provided 
on-plot through 
at least one tap 
(yard level)
Average
approximately
501/capita/day
Low: hygiene should 
not be compromised, 
laundry likely to occur 
on-plot
Low: hygiene 
promotion still 
yields health 
gains, encourage 
optimal access
Optimal
access
Supply of water 
through 
multiple taps 
within the 
house
Average 100- 
200l/capita/day
Very low: hygiene 
should not be 
compromised; 
laundry will occur on- 
plot
Very low. 
hygiene 
promotion still 
yields health 
gains
Accessibility: the percentage of the population that has reasonable access to an improved 
drinking-water supply, where improved water supply technologies include a household 
connection; public standpipe; borehole; protected dug well; protected spring; rainwater 
collection. On this scheme unimproved supplies originate at an unprotected well; unprotected 
spring; vendor-provided water; bottled water; tanker truck provision of water.
Continuity: the percentage of the time during which drinking-water is available (daily, weekly 
and seasonally). Types and causes of discontinuity are graded by their increasing severity as
shown below._______________________________________________________________________
Type of continuity_______________________________________________________________
1 Year-round service from a reliable source with no interruption of flow at the tap or source
2 Year-round service with frequent (daily or weekly) interruptions
3 Seasonal service variation resulting from source fluctuation
4 Compounded frequent and seasonal discontinuity.___________________________________
Affordability, the tariff paid by domestic consumers.______________________________________
In this research, the WHO approach has been applied to the household 
connection as well as to the whole system. Applying the service parameters to 
household connections is one way of valuing the elements of infrastructure that 
appear in household asset bundles. The socio-technical configuration of 
infrastructure affects the value of household assets and, particularly in the case 
of Physical and Social Capital, these household assets feedback and affect 
configuration. For example, poor physical assets, like a muddy, un-drained patio,
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increase sanitary risk and indicate low quality, while weak social capital may 
reduce the potential to “borrow” water from elsewhere thus affecting quantity. 
Table 11 shows how the WHO indicators are implicated across the livelihood 
capitals.
Table 12 Mapping WHO Indicators to household capital assets (Crawford 2008)
Capital WHOIndicator
Possible impact of capital 
on indicators OR indicators 
on capital
Related interview questions
Human Capital
quality
quantity
continuity
accessibility
affordability
health and the ability to work 
or study
Has your family ever had an 
illness because of the water? 
Do you drink water direct from 
the tap/boiled/other?
Natural Capital
quantity
continuity
disposal
home-based income 
generation like plants and 
livestock
What do you use water for 
apart from drinking, cooking, 
washing, cleaning and family 
laundry?
Do you get water from 
anywhere else apart from 
your own tap?
Financial
Capital
quality
quantity
continuity
accessibility
affordability
household expenditure on 
bills or other water sources, 
home-based income 
generation like food 
production, laundry and letting 
rooms
Do you get water from 
anywhere else apart from 
your own tap?
What do you use water for 
apart from drinking, cooking, 
washing, cleaning and family 
laundry?
Bills as a % of income
Physical Capital
continuity
accessibility
disposal
improved household 
connections and value of 
home as an asset
sanitary risk assessment, 
water sampling, photographs 
of installations
Social Capital
quality
quantity
continuity
accessibility
affordability
interaction with neighbours to 
borrow/buy water or act 
collectively to improve water 
system
Do you get water from 
anywhere else apart from 
your own tap?
What do you do and who 
helps if the water stops?
The quantity indicator is defined with reference to a household’s “access 
level”: a function of the distance to water points, likely volumes of water 
collected and public health risks from poor hygiene. As shown in Table 10, the 
guidelines suggest a range from no access, a 30 minute round trip to collect 
water and a daily consumption of less than 5 litres per capita, to optimal access, 
multiple household taps and a corresponding water consumption of 100 to 200 
litres per capita per day.
In the livelihoods chapters that follow, these categories are useful for 
showing that levels of household access and consumption vary even when 
households are ostensibly connected to the same piped systems. At the same
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time, the livelihood interviews provide an opportunity to ask householders 
directly how much water they think they use.
Continuity and affordability are perhaps the most straightforward of the 
indicators and can be cross-checked between households, key informant 
interviews and direct observation. The water tariff in isolation, however, does 
not indicate affordability. It has to be seen in the context of household 
livelihoods and is shown in a comparison of income and bills in Chapters 4 to 6 
and again in an overall cost comparison in Chapter 7.
Accessibility is concerned with whether household access is “improved” 
where a piped household connection is considered to be “improved”. In the 
case studies, because of intermittent supply, several households are forced to 
collect water from “unimproved” sources. Accessibility is captured using a 
sanitary risk assessment, accounts of alternative water sources and 
photographs of household connections: “improved” principal taps and their 
surrounding unimproved paraphernalia.
3.5 Data analysis II: visualising Socio-Technical Systems
What makes the WHO tools useful for understanding water quality is 
that they are based on managing risk; a concept invoked to cope with 
unknowns that cannot be easily, routinely or pre-emptively measured. With by 
now familiar resonance with the Socio-Technical Systems approach, this risk 
has a social dimension (the foibles of the water governance arrangement) and a 
technical dimension (the state of the pipes and plant). High quality water, for 
example, would be expected from a provider that had in place a Water Safety 
Plan and audits that had been approved and validated according to WHO 
requirements. In the absence of this documentation, quality at the whole system 
level is based on sanitary risks scores for the source and supply systems and a 
system inventory which identifies potential hazards: the points in a system that 
are susceptible to faecal contamination.
In this study, the inventories and risk scores and disposal characteristics 
are fused into a colour-coded flow chart that shows the highest thermotolerant 
coliform counts identified during sampling. Household level quality complements 
the system analysis with sanitary risk assessments comparing the levels of
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residual chlorine and thermotolerant conforms in households across the case 
studies.
Water sampling was conducted in the same fifteen households as the 
interviews in order to relate the water in individual houses to each livelihood 
assessment (not as a network monitoring exercise). The aim was to generate a 
reliable snapshot of drinking water in the morning, at midday and in the 
afternoon on a single day46. To achieve this within the timeframe, samples were 
taken from 2-3 houses each day, once during the wet season (July and August 
2006) and once during the dry season (January and February 2007)47. The 
combined results of bacteriological tests and sanitary risk assessments have 
been plotted for each household and each system as part of a comparative 
analysis of quality and are presented in the case study chapters and Chapter 7, 
the configuration chapter.
The system for scoring sanitary risk uses a checklist of ten appropriate 
questions. Answering “yes” to any of the questions scores 1. The score is 
summed and given out of ten, with 0 representing low risk and 10 representing 
a high risk. An example is shown in Table 13 and the remaining checklists are 
held in Appendix D.
Table 13 Checklist for a protected spring source (Angostura and Manco Capac)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
Is the spring source unprotected by masonry or concrete wall or spring box and therefore 
open to surface contamination?
Is the masonry protecting the spring source faulty?
If there is a spring box, is there an unsanitary inspection cover in the masonry?
Is the area around the spring unfenced?
Can animals have access to within 10 m of the spring source?
Are there any latrines uphill of the spring?
Is spring water combined with surface sources before treatment?
If there is a filter, is it functioning badly?
Is the flow uncontrolled?
Is chlorination unavailable or unreliable?
The classification of sanitary risk scores is shown in Table 13. These 
scores are then plotted against the highest thermotolerant coliform counts found
46 Sampling in the purposive household sample and at the source, storage and treatment 
systems during the Andean seasons of abundant and scarce rainfall were designed to catch the 
worst moments of contamination: “Verification of microbial quality of water in supply must be 
designed to ensure the best possible chance of detecting contamination. Sampling should 
therefore account for potential variations of water quality in distribution. This will normally mean 
taking account of locations and of times of increased likelihood of contamination.” (World Health 
Organization 2006):72.
47 Where tap water was not available, samples of water stored were taken. Where water was 
extremely scarce, single samples were taken from buckets because it became obvious that 
householders were anxious about losing water to the research process.
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the system, sampled at its most risk prone points. This classification of coliform 
counts is shown in Table 15. The final plot locates each household or whole 
system on a grid like the one in Figure 23 below.
Table 14 Risk classification of sanitary scores
Sanitary risk score Risk* Classification
0 No observed risk
1 to 3 Low risk
4 to 6 Intermediate risk
7 to 10 High risk
* Where “(t]he term “risk" as used here indicates potential danger to human health from a water 
source or supply.” Adapted from Table 5.1 (World Health Organization 2006):77.
Table 15 Classification of thermotolerant coliform counts
TTC count Colour Code
0 W E M
1 to 10 B
10 to 100 C
100 to 1000 D
>1000 E
TTC = Thermotolerant Coliform
Adapted from Table 5.2 (World Health Organization 2006):78
Figure 15 Plot of sanitary risk against thermotolerant conforms
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Finally, Figure 24 shows an example of the resulting colour-coded 
system inventory flow chart. The flowchart uses classic process flow symbols 
reproduced in Table 15 and the points at which risks enter the system are 
highlighted in red, indicating high sanitary risk scores and high thermotolerant 
coliform counts.
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Figure 16 Flow chart showing system inventory and coliform presence
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Table 16 Flow chart symbols
Symbol Definition of Symbol
o Operation: operations resulting in an intentional change in water
□ Inspection: examination or test
V Storage: water is stored
3 Transport: water is moved
Combined activity
Adapted from Table 3.1 Process flow diagram symbols and WHO Water Safety Plan 
documentation (Davison et al. 2005;Davison & Deere 2006)
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These socio-technical characteristics are pulled together in system 
descriptions for each case study which integrate the WHO indicators for a 
comparative analysis of water and sanitation in the three locations.
3.6 Answering the research question
This multi-stage methodology is designed for the analysis of livelihoods 
in three different case studies. It pulls together a picture of household 
livelihoods and vulnerability within each case study. At the same time, it allows 
the overall vulnerability in each location to be distinguished in terms of 
differential access to infrastructure and differential access to institutions of 
governance. The methodology is therefore able to explore the role of water and 
sanitation infrastructure in mediating vulnerability.
The socio-technical configuration of the water systems weaving through 
each case study is evaluated using standard water supply indicators; the 
governance framework; and a discussion of the socio-technical scale and mode 
of organisation for each system. This stage of the methodology, in combination 
with the livelihoods analysis, allows an examination of household vulnerability 
using STS concepts: messy modes of organisation, splintering, local resistance 
and networking.
The next chapter introduces governance in Peru and Cusco. This is 
followed by an in depth analysis of livelihoods in San Bias, Angostura and 
Manco Capac. Chapter 8 then relates vulnerability and differential access to 
infrastructure and institutions to the socio-technical mechanisms that drive 
splintering, local resistance and networking.
This then leads back to the research question in Chapter 9 and my 
concluding argument for the mediating role played by infrastructure and the 
socio-technical nature of this role.
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Chapter 4 Peruvian governance shaping infrastructure and 
livelihoods in Cusco
1 0 2
This chapter introduces Peru and the three case studies in Cusco. Each 
case has been chosen to exemplify key aspects of the relationship between the 
vulnerability of urban livelihoods, governance and the mediating role of water 
and sanitation infrastructure. This is the first step in formulating an empirical 
response to the research question.
Each section presents the historical and political context using the state, 
market and civil society categories of the governance framework. It reflects the 
structure of Section 2.2 by looking at dilemmas over the role of the state and the 
impact of changing development theories on Peru in the nineteen-sixties and 
seventies. Attention then shifts to the neo-liberal, market oriented Peruvian 
policies of the early nineteen-eighties and the decade’s debt crisis. With 
renewed global attention on the human impact of macroeconomic adjustment 
which followed the debt crisis, the civil society component of governance is re­
examined with a focus on the rhetoric of participation and decentralisation as it 
has played out in Peru.
This is followed by a closer look at Peruvian water governance and the 
divergence, in Cusco, of idealised governance structures and day to day 
provision as discussed in Section 2.3.
In order to place each case study in context, I then apply the governance 
framework to urban Cusco. This gives an interesting picture that parallels the 
national Peruvian story and is useful for explaining some of the triggers for 
greater intervention of the state in the provision of housing and services in the 
fifties and sixties and the mixed results of highly centralised land reform and 
interference in urban politics.
I then argue that the activities of private and civic actors shaped and often 
compromised the development of urban services, as the private sector 
speculated, on one hand, while, on the other, rival urban and rural civil society 
groups vied for, and eventually cooperated to make, territorial claims. I describe 
the clashes between local civil society associations and central government and 
then the regional opposition to central government that gathered pace in the 
mid-eighties and launched local government as an important protagonist in 
Cusco’s development.
Bringing the review up to the present, what we find in Cusco is a city 
shaped by the political turmoil of the seventies and the economic crisis of the 
eighties and early nineties, with three case studies experiencing very different
103
levels of vulnerability, access to water and sanitation and potential to influence 
governance.
4.1 State versus market: governance and economic shocks in Peru
Peru’s fate since its independence from Spain in the 1820s has been tied 
to the vagaries of the global economy48; to an oscillating and tumultuous 
struggle between dictatorship and democracy; and tensions between 
centralisation and regional identity. It is useful to briefly track some of these 
dramatic swings since they frame both the governance of water and the 
activities of civil society.
By 1960, the population of Peru was almost 10 million and migration from 
the mountains to the cities was on the rise. It was a time of urban growth 
characterised by land invasions, self-help associations and collective action to 
demand basic infrastructure (Flindell Klaren 2000). Pressure was mounting on 
the state to industrialise and create employment.
In 1968, Peru’s civilian government was overturned in a military coup led 
by the charismatic and impatient Juan Francisco Velasco Alvarado who swept 
to power promising land reform and economic independence49 (Koonings & 
Kruijt 2007). As Velasco was trying to consolidate his position in the 1970s, 
however, Peru, like many countries in the region, was hit by a painful recession 
brought on by the oil crisis that was crippling the economies of the north50. 
Interest rates spiralled and Peru was persuaded to renegotiate its loans on 
condition that it adopt the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) austerity 
measures, including wage freezes and cuts in public spending.
48 first, to feeding Europe’s industrial revolution with the export of fertilizers and, then, to the 
fortunes of the USA with booms during World War II, the Korean War and Castro’s revolution, 
and interim slumps which coincided with Europe’s post-war recovery, periods of cotton dumping 
and the imposition of mineral tariffs by the US
4lThe influence of the Latin American structuralists -  described in Section 2.2.1 -  permeated 
President Velasco’s rule with the regime instituting an agrarian reform programme, a massive 
expansion of the state, the nationalisation of mining, fishing and steel and the formation of pacts 
with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Japan, Western Europe and China in an attempt to 
diversify away from a dependence on the United States (Koonings & Kruijt 2007).
50 This led to drop in demand for exports and triggered a painful recession and increased 
borrowing from international lending bodies. The USA used this moment of weakness to force 
Velasco’s government into settling a sixty year dispute over oil rights before credit would be 
released to Peru. Additional lending to service growing national debt ensure and, by 1976, 
Peruvian foreign debt was more than four times its 1970 level and twice what it had been in 
1974, standing at more than $4bn. To finance interest on these debts, many governments in the 
region released bonds, which raised real rates of interest, and resorted to printing money, which 
pushed up inflation. Anyone with any capital in the domestic currency changed it into a safer 
foreign currency and sent it out of the region as fast as possible.
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This crisis eventually forced President Velasco to step down amid 
allegations of corruption and a series of massive general strikes. The country 
then saw a return to civilian rule with former president, Fernando Belaunde51 
Terry, returning from exile in the United States, accompanied, by a retinue of 
Chicago Boys, schooled in the latest neo-liberal economic ideas. Together they 
formed a government which championed neo-liberalism, dismantling and selling 
off state run institutions52 and preparing the ground for even more potent neo­
liberal interventions a decade later.
To add to this upheaval, in 1983 the fabled El Nino effect failed to 
materialise leading to flooding in the north of Peru and drought in the south. The 
price of basic staples soared and, compounded by the global recession, Peru’s 
economy sank once more into depression53. Meanwhile, an anti-government 
guerrilla movement, known as Shining Path, was gaining power on the back of 
proceeds from the coca trade.
Like the rest of Peru, Cusco was suffering economically as Belaunde 
came to power in 1980. New migrants were arriving in the city, either fleeing 
Shining Path’s violent revolutionary campaign or gravitating towards better 
services and opportunities. They began to settle in peripheral areas where they 
also encountered the poorest city dwellers, displaced from Cusco’s historic 
centre by the burgeoning tourism of the 1970s and its hunger for space to 
establish hotels, restaurants and travel agencies. These marginal areas were 
territorially and politically excluded by their lack of facilities, information and 
access to life in the city. By the mid-eighties only about 20% of houses had 
adequate access to public services, described by Pino Zambrano as pequerias 
islas en medio de un mar de carencias: little islands in a sea of want (Pino 
Zambrano 2004). The situation for everybody else was pretty dire:
Services like water, sewerage and electricity were very inadequate. Only 50% 
of the population had domestic connections, 15% had access to public 
standpipes and the rest of the population, especially in marginal urban areas,
Velasco's predecessor, first elected as president in 1963
Employment in government fell by 70%, Peruvian exports declined, imports rose 
"  The country's wealthiest converted their currency into dollars and moved it out o f  the 
region. Formal sector employment dropped, informal markets expanded and tax 
revenues continued to slump. Rural famine encouraged migration to cities where 
m alnutrition dram atically increased and the farmers left behind turned to the more
lucrative cultivation o f  coca for export and cocaine production. By the late eighties, h a lf  
o f  world coca paste supply came from Peru and amounted to twice the value o f  Peru's 
copper exports.
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went without this fundamental service. In terms of other services, 30% of people 
were connected to the sewer network, 60% had a domestic electricity 
connection and only 20% of families had a telephone service.
(Pino Zambrano 2004):34
The next national election in 1985 saw a young Alan Garcia begin his 
first term as president. His response to the continuing debt crisis54 failed to 
garner enough support and the IMF finally declared Peru’s credit status 
“impaired”. In 1987, Garcia made an abortive attempt to nationalise Peru’s 
private banking system and in 1988 inflation soared to 7,000% bringing the 
government to the brink of collapse (Figure 5). Malnutrition, poverty and 
unemployment ensued. Then, in 1991, Cusco suffered an outbreak of Cholera 
for the first time since the nineteenth century. Two and a half thousand people 
died (Flindell Klaren 2000).
By this time, Alan Garcia had ceded control to incoming president, 
Alberto Fujimori. The messy power struggle which followed saw Fujimori stage 
an auto-coup and shut down the Peruvian Congress. Incredibly, this return to 
dictatorship reduced Peru’s international credit risk rating since Congress could 
no longer oppose privatisation plans55. These plans went ahead and gave GDP 
a temporary boost in the run up to the 1995 general election. Fujimori, who had 
also managed to consolidate his control over social spending and strategic, 
vote-winning improvement programmes, was democratically re-elected (Flindell 
Klaren 2000).
M Principally, to lim it loan repayments and lobby business to reinvest in Peru.
In 1994 the state sold off its airports, telecommunications and airline industries to Spanish 
and Chinese companies
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Figure 17 Peruvian inflation (National Institute for Statistics (INEI 2008a))
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With the end of Fujimori’s regime nearly 10 years later, the incoming 
president, Alejandro Toledo, brought with him a raft of legislation concerned 
with decentralization and the strengthening of local government.
In 2002, Peru held its first regional elections. As we will see in the 
following section, this brought about what is framed by the World Bank as an 
important change in emphasis. Client power, the direct participation of users in 
service provision, had apparently been nurtured to a point which could give way 
to a more sophisticated and profound participation in policy-making: the 
engagement of citizens and government in policy-level dialogue, or enhanced 
“voice” in the language of the World Bank (Reuben 2006):832.
In 2006, and in spite of his disastrous first term as president in the 
eighties, Alan Garcia won the presidential election. He is now presiding over 
one of the highest, continuous growth rates the since the 1950s at 8% in 2006 
and projected at 7.5% for 2007-8, shown in Figure 6.
Figure 18 Variation in gross national product (National Institute of Statistics (INEI 2008b))
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What is clear, however, is that the benefits of this growth are still not 
being felt symmetrically with the proportion of people living on $1 per day 
increasing from 44% to 46.5% between 2004 and 2006. There is also a distinct 
geographical split: Lima and the coastal regions play host to shiny, new 
shopping plazas while the remote highlands remain without even the most basic 
infrastructure (Weitzman 2007).
4.2 Peruvian Civil Society: NGOs and Decentralisation
Peru has an established tradition of development organisations. This is 
pertinent to the research question since these organisations have been 
particularly active in winning land rights and installing infrastructure services. 
The shifting sands of civil society in Cusco track the struggle for space and 
services that began in earnest after a massive earthquake in 1950 and 
continued unabated into the seventies as recession and agrarian reform began 
to accelerate rural migration to cities. As in many countries, however, the 
vocabulary of decentralization and participation in Peru has to be seen in the 
context of inequality and instability.
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4.2.1 Civil and not-so-civil society
Out of what were often squalid and insecure living conditions in the 
Cusco of the sixties, came a new form of civil society organisation known as 
Asociaciones Pro-Vivienda (APVs), these were urban movements constituted to 
win land rights through collective purchase and then to build housing. APVs 
were successful although, as a local development plan acknowledged much 
later, such “functional organisations tended to be temporary” (Municipalidad de 
Saylla 2002):97.
Worker co-operatives and syndicates were also leading similar activities 
forming Pueblos Jovenes (young towns)56, Cooperativas de Vivienda (housing 
cooperatives) 57 and Asentamientos Urbano Marginales, known as 
Asentamientos Humanos or human settlements, which were all established so 
that their inhabitants could set about solving their own housing problems and 
improving quality of life. The idea was that people would join together in a single 
urban community that could then lobby collectively for a package of demands. 
Official recognition of these organisations was essential as Frias et al. point out:
The procedure for organising the plots of land is a collective exercise which 
takes place when circumstances or needs demand, so it is only once barrios 
and associations are properly recognised that they can get access to water, 
sewerage, electricity and other services, as well as the titles to the land.
(Frias et el. 1992):59
Peru was still under civilian rule at this time and in 1966 a federation58 
was formed to bring all the APVs together. This federated model was based on 
a nationwide movement which had emerged from a Christian political tradition in 
Arequipa, another Peruvian city (Gomez Garcia 1989). The federation united 
nearly half of Cusco’s disparate housing developments to lobby the region’s 
deputies and senators for schools, services and waste collection and to support 
housing construction through a system of mutual aid.
The growth of these settlements in the late sixties and early seventies 
coincided with a new period of military rule under President Velasco. In 
response to this, the federation of APVs turned its efforts in the seventies
56 Settlements based on land invasions within the city limits which used legal means to win land 
rights.
Cooperatives set up so to buy land legally before occupying it.
58 Known as the Federation of Social Urbanisation Circles- Cusco or in Spanish la Federacion 
de Circulos Sociales Urbanizaciones-Cusco
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towards countering local land speculation and confronting SINAMOS, the 
pseudo-NGDO established as the ‘human face’ of Velasco’s military regime.
SINAMOS was born out of President Velasco’s drive to build a unified 
sense of nationhood and his concomitant reluctance to cede any power away 
from the centre. He formed this manipulative, pseudo-governmental 
bureaucracy to tap into potentially unruly urban movements and maintain the 
momentum of land reforms. This organisation -  resonating with the dependency 
rhetoric of the time -  was named the Sistema Nacional de Movilizacion Social, 
giving it the acronym SINAMOS, or sin amos meaning without masters. 
SINAMOS was mentioned several times during interviews so was influential 
enough to have left its mark on the popular consciousness thirty years on.
SINAMOS, ostensibly set up to implement urban policies and land reform, 
became a powerful tool in quelling civil unrest in Peruvian cities. The 
federation’s resistance to SINAMOS was seen as “counter-revolutionary” and 
after a clash in 1973 the federation more or less disappeared. SINAMOS 
proceeded to create and dissolve various social organizations in an effort to get 
services into the poorest barrios. Frias et al. conclude in their 1992 analysis that 
SINAMOS was flawed in democratic and participatory terms but had at least 
acknowledged the importance of an integrated approach rather than localised or 
“parcelised” action (Frias et al. 1992): 14. SINAMOS began the process of 
formally recognising urban settlements and although it was accused of offering 
technical assistance to communities for political ends, it was instrumental in 
awarding land rights:
In 1971-72 ... SINAMOS legally recognized marginal urban settlements. The 
government of Velasco Alvarado recognized 80% of marginal urban 
settlements, and in the [first] period of Alan Garcia Perez’s government, this 
process was completed so that currently 97.2% of the settlements hold the titles 
to their plots.
(Ministerio de la Presidencia 1998): 1
Part of the critique of the politically bland governance framework outlined 
in Section 2.2.3, was the assertion that: “not all civic groups are ‘civil’ in their 
behaviour” (Fowler 2000):6. This is exemplified in Peru under Velasco’s regime, 
when a small group of civilian radicals based in a provincial university town 
managed to spawn Sendero Luminoso, otherwise known as the Shining Path 
guerrilla movement. By the following decade, eighty-five percent of Peru’s 
Ayacucho Province, between Lima and Cusco, had been taken over by the
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guerrillas. In 1982, the movement had become so violent and destabilising that 
incoming civilian president, Belaunde, declared a state of emergency and 
placed Ayacucho under military control.
4.2.2 The long road to decentralisation
At the start of his first term in office in 1963, President Belaunde, had 
held the first municipal elections for local authorities. This tentative 
decentralisation process came to a halt with the deposition of Belaunde’s 
civilian government in 1968 and what proved to be highly centralising 
tendencies of Velasco’s incoming military government. It was thus not until the 
transition to democracy at the end of the seventies that a new constitution was 
drafted which split the country into twelve regions.
During Belaunde’s second presidential term and in spite of the violent 
unrest and inflation of the 1980s, Peru managed to hold its first municipal 
elections since Belaunde’s abortive attempts in the sixties. By 1988, however, 
only five of the twelve regional governments foreseen by the 1979 constitution 
were up and running. This process was set back again when, in the early 1990s 
Fujimori -  a popular president without a regional party political infrastructure -  
staged his “auto-coup”. He dissolved the nascent and obstreperous regional 
assemblies and installed Transitional Regional Administration Commissions 
which he nominated from the centre.
According to Michaela Hordijk, whose research on Participatory 
Budgeting in Peru identifies authoritarianism and populism as long-running 
characteristics of Peruvian political life, these changes were typical of the 
country’s populist political tradition. She notes that ten years of Fujimori re­
centralized power and resources to his Ministry of the Presidency.
Regional governments had been abolished and replaced with appointed 
regional administration transitory commissions. The resource base of local 
governments (municipalities) had been cut through, curtailing some of the 
municipal rights to collect taxes; also, several important responsibilities that 
made local government visible to its citizens (such as providing land titles, and 
responsibility for social programmes) had been brought under the umbrella of 
the Ministry of the Presidency.
(Hordijk 2005):222
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The Ministry of the Presidency also controlled Fujimori’s special social 
fund for rural projects, FONCODES59. Schady argues that between 1991 and 
1995 this fund was used as a blatant electioneering tool, albeit one that had a 
slight redistributive function (Schady 2000).
This chimes with the tensions identified by Hordijk between populism (of 
the poorest) and authoritarianism (of the centre), simultaneously boosting the 
popularity of the central government, providing direct social assistance across a 
wide geographic area and circumventing any entrenched political interests in 
the regions. As we saw in the previous section, this led World Bank economists 
writing in 2006 to conclude that the channelling of social assistance in the 
Peruvian political environment of the 1990s actually took on a participatory 
flavour. These authors argue that in rolling out a proliferation of vaso de leche 
(glass of milk) committees -  a scheme to provide nutrition to children -  mother’s 
clubs and other local associations, Fujimori’s government encouraged the direct 
participation of beneficiaries in their own services.
In Peru, then, it has been possible for centralization and a popular brand 
of participation to coexist. Over the last fifty years the country has also seen 
strong municipal civil society, regional partisan activity, deep penetration of 
central government bureaucracy into urban life and violent regional rebellion. It 
was also possible for the apparent stability of centralized and dictatorial 
systems to be favoured by global governance structures: markets were able to 
invest safely in Peruvian infrastructure and the World Bank praised direct 
popular participation even though it subverted regional politics.
4.3 Peruvian water and sanitation infrastructure
It is to this backdrop that several important ideological and practical 
changes have played out in Peru’s country’s water and sanitation sector 
(illustrated graphically in Appendix A). This narrative is critical to the selection of 
case studies and gives crucial context to the socio-technical systems discourse 
as it will be applied to Cusco. It also demonstrates the overarching importance 
of governance in shaping urban services.
Before 1970, official responsibility for the development of water and 
sanitation was almost exclusively centralised in the Ministry for Public Works.
59 Fondo Nacional de Compensacidn y Desarrollo Social, this fund is behind the Coredor Puno- 
Cuso Project local development initiative that is mentioned in Chapter 5 (Guasch 2006).
1 1 2
Under the military dictatorship of Velasco and in response to rapid urbanisation, 
responsibilities for water were split between the central ministries of housing 
(urban areas) and health (rural areas). According to the 1969 General Water 
Law passed by Velasco and consistent with his nationalistic rhetoric, water 
resources were considered the property of the state with licensed water 
companies obliged to supply the population before any commercial users (BID 
1997)6.
This arrangement stayed in place until Belaunde returned to power in 
1980 and, though Belaunde took steps to decentralise some administrative and 
operational functions, most technical and financial control remained centralised 
under a newly created National Water and Sanitation Service (SENAPA60). With 
the exception of three large urban centres, Lima, Arequipa and Trujillo, which 
retained independent control of water, SENAPA was structured into regional 
subsidiary companies and operational units61 with tariff setting62 and investment 
controlled by the centre63. By this time, the combined coverage of SENAPA 
and the three largest city systems amounted to 55% of Peru’s urban population. 
A further 20% of the urban population was covered by parallel organisations 
controlled directly by provincial or district municipalities, while rural supplies 
remained in the hands of the Ministry of Health.
The structure of the sector did not change again until Belaunde’s 
successor, Alan Garcia, was coming to the end of his disastrous presidential 
term amidst the turmoil of horrific inflationary shocks. In the run up to the 1990 
presidential election, Alan Garcia’s party, APRA, despite his plummeting 
personal popularity, still had one of the oldest and best established political 
infrastructures on the ground, much more so than either of the potential 
presidential candidates, Mario Vargas Llosa and Alberto Fujimori. In a last ditch 
attempt to farm power out to his party’s local representatives, Garcia passed 
legislation in early 199064 which stipulated that the companies and operational 
units of SENAPA be transferred to provincial municipalities in places where a
60 Servicio Nacional de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado
61 eleven regional subsidiary companies with administrative autonomy and fourteen operational 
units which remained dependent on direct management from the centre
62 by the Regulatory Commission for Tariffs of Drinking Water and Sanitation (CORTAPA)
63 SENAPA collected a 3% income levy from all the decentralised agencies.
64 Ley de Organizacion y Funciones del Ministerio de Vivienda y el Decreto Legislative 601
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regional government had already been set up: a calculated and blatant political 
manipulation of the water sector (BID 1997):7.
In a surprise result Alberto Fujimori then won the 1990 presidential 
election and between 1990 and 1992 immediately went against his own pre­
election rhetoric by instigating “Fujishock”, a draconian and orthodox 
stabilisation package. The effect was to push up petrol prices by 3,000%, 
foodstuffs by 500%, electricity by 500% and water rates by 800%. As this was 
happening, his government continued the process of hurriedly handing over the 
SENAPA water companies to municipalities. This time decentralisation was 
calculated to pre-empt opposition to central government by forcing the 
responsibility for rapidly rising water tariffs onto the provinces where Fujimori 
had no real power base that could be damaged by such a move. In less than 6 
months, 19 of the 25 companies and operational units had been transferred to 
municipalities with no proper period of transition and no co-ordination with other 
processes of decentralization (BID 1997):8.
The 1991 cholera outbreak saw Fujimori re-centralise control of SENAPA 
and prepare for legislation that would open the way for private sector 
participation in the Peruvian water sector. In 1994, he passed a new General 
Water Law . This allowed for water companies known as Entidades Prestadora 
de Servicios de Saneamiento, or EPS, to be constituted at a provincial level 
bringing provincial and district water systems under a single umbrella. This 
concessionary model stipulated that EPS companies could be publicly, privately 
or jointly owned65. In practice, the model overlaid a devolved Peruvian context 
which meant that district municipalities became EPS shareholders holding the 
right to grant the concession. On this municipal ownership model shares were 
apportioned according to the number of connections in each district.
In terms of regulation, water quality and environmental protection, seen 
as public health functions, were overseen by the Ministry of Health’s Office for 
Environmental Health (DIGESA66). This body monitors drinking water quality, 
waste water and solid waste disposal and sets standards and indicators for the 
sector. It is the sector watchdog, SUNASS that regulates tariffs and the
65 with total or partial exploitation rights
66 Direccion General de Salud Ambiental
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operations of all the regional EPS water supply companies67 and rural water 
committees, Junta Administradora de Servicios de Saneamiento (JASS). An 
EPS has to include one provincial jurisdiction in order to be formally recognised 
and regulated by the sector watchdog (SUNASS) and is obliged to serve 
everyone within its boundaries whether they are defined as rural68 or urban69 
(CEPIS 2000):2.
Notwithstanding the decentralisation of water and sanitation to provinces, 
the technology arm70 of the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO), found a 
patchy sector in 2000 without clearly defined institutional roles and with water 
systems performing badly because of high volumes of unaccounted for water, 
low coverage of water meters and lack of maintenance71:
The lack of service continuity and the coverage of water disinfection are risk 
factors to health which principally affect urban and rural zones with the least 
resources.
(CEPIS 2000):5
By 2000, of Peru’s 30 rural and 164 urban provinces, only 94 came 
under the remit of one of the country’s 45 official EPS. This left 70 provinces 
served by unregulated water companies with management by district 
municipalities, committees or some other informal community arrangement. 
These figures had shifted again by 2006, when the World Bank reported that 
62% of Peru’s population was served by 53 EPSs, 29% of the population by 
11,800 formally constituted JASSs and the remaining 9% by 490 small 
municipal providers (Guasch 2006):329.
The picture of water provision on the ground was messy for two reasons. 
Firstly, some district level municipalities managed to hang on to their water 
companies rather than give them over to a provincial EPS. This suited both the 
district authorities, wanting to retain political control over services, and the 
nascent provincial EPS water companies, which were thus excused the
b Including the independent water company in Lima
68 Less than 2000 inhabitants according to 1995 Water Law
69 In theory, an EPS could be formed once it has 1,000 domestic connections across 6,000 
inhabitants in a concentrated area.
0 Centro Panamericano de Ingenieria Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente
,1 Peru had been split into 26 regions each with a regional government. Peru had 1,832 
municipalities, of which 194 were provincial -  the level at which an EPS was to be constituted -  
and 1,638 were at district level.
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expensive responsibility of incorporating into their networks dilapidated systems 
built on challenging terrain. It also meant that these “parallel” systems remained 
completely unregulated. Secondly, the EPSs were intended to serve urban 
provinces and give technical support to more dispersed populations. Rural 
areas were frequently neglected under this model and provision remains a 
patchwork of water committees, some a legacy of nineteen-sixties regulation by 
the Ministry of Health or a hangover from FONCODES, the Peruvian Social 
Fund in the nineteen-nineties; some committees have been supported by NGOs 
and many have been formally registered as JASSs, or water committees 
(CEPIS 2000) 2.
As per the provisions for private sector participation in water that had 
been set out by Fujimori in 1991, the first water concession granted to the 
private sector began operating in October 2005 serving Tumbes, a city of
94,000 in the far north of Peru. Several other schemes have been scheduled by 
the government’s investment promotion unit and the Ministry of Housing, 
Construction and Sanitation, although municipal reluctance and poor systems 
for communication with the population remain important obstacles (Marmanillo 
2006): 176.
The original funding model for water and sanitation had the Ministry of 
the Presidency (PRES) as the governing institution able to channel funding into 
the sector via various special projects72. Figure 10 shows the breakdown of 
funding by source with central government funding and EPS investment in 
urban water supplies peaking between 1996 and 1998 when the last of the 
water authorities were passed over to decentralised, municipal control. This was 
also a peak time for rural investment from central government which had begun 
in the early 1990s. Urban water investment between 2000 and 2004 was split 
between regional and local government, the EPS companies and central 
government funding which began to pick up again in late 2004.
2 Programa Nacional de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado (PRONAP) to support new water supply 
companies and Proyecto de Apoyo al Saneamiento Basico (PASSB) for basic sanitation
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Figure 19 Breakdown of water sector funding (1985-1989 data from (BID 1997), 1990-2005 
data from (Ministerio de Vivienda 2006))
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So what we find in Peru as we launch into this research is a state that 
has only recently begun to devolve power to its regions and local governments. 
Its water sector, previously highly centralised and prone to political manipulation, 
has also experienced a very recent decentralisation process which is yet to 
incorporate and regulate the messy systems that fall between the institutional 
categories of provincial, regulated EPSs, rural JASS and self-regulated water 
committees. The distinction between urban, rural and actual jurisdictional 
boundaries is blurred and the teeth of the regulator and environmental and 
health monitoring are not as sharp as they might be.
The three case studies on which this research is based reflect these 
institutional arrangements. San Bias, in Cusco’s historic centre, is served by 
SEDACusco the provincial EPS. Angostura, further down the valley, has its own 
independent water committee, or JASS. Manco Capac, which lies within the 
urban EPS jurisdiction, still relies on its own system built by the zone’s 
inhabitants and managed by a local committee.
4.4 Governance shaping the city: state intervention, market speculation 
and civil society
The first photograph in Figure 13 was taken in 1963 and gives a rough 
idea of the city’s limits and the cultivation which was still going on close to the
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centre on the valley floor. The 1997 photograph in Figure 14 shows how the city 
rapidly swallowed up farmland in the valley as it expanded to the South and 
East. It also indicates growth to the south west and north east of the centre 
where housing was built on steep, inaccessible peripheral land. The shape of 
this expansion was affected by land reform, private sector speculation and civil 
society efforts to make land claims. It has also been influenced by the valley’s 
topography and seismology.
Figure 20 Cusco: extent of city in 1963 (Source: ING)
Figure 21 Cusco: extent of city in 1997 (Source: ING)
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On the 23rd May 1950, a massive earthquake hit the city of Cusco. Three 
thousand houses were destroyed and thirty or forty thousand people were left 
homeless. This disaster hit the city at a time when it was already bursting at the 
seams: it had seen significant growth since the beginning of the twentieth 
century with the boom of rubber and alpaca wool and the arrival of the railway. 
By the 1940s the city could boast an urban transport system (animal drawn), 
sealed roads, street lighting, a small-scale water service, limited telephony and 
a large central market. These changes were accompanied by a massive rise in 
the demand for housing and a quadrupling of the city’s population from 20,000 
in 1930 to 80,000 in 1950. In 1940, 78% of the city’s inhabitants were renting, 
with the working classes living in old colonial houses or converted granaries and 
stables (Marco Cortez 1989). Rents were extortionate and sanitation practically 
non-existent. Overcrowding, sometimes with up to 30 families in a single house, 
forced the local government to begin a house building programme.
When the earthquake struck, at least fifteen thousand people were 
displaced to the east of the city centre and into temporary camps. Some were 
still living in informal settlements in and around the university stadium four years 
later. This event precipitated two trends of interest: the rise of community 
associations and more organised state intervention in housing and urban 
development.
4.4.1 State intervention
Faced with the pre-existing problems of urban expansion and the need to 
reconstruct after the earthquake, the state was forced to intervene and national 
and international organisations began to get involved in development. The city 
started to expand to the east and between the state (as the main developer of 
social housing) and to a lesser degree the private sector, the valley floor was 
developed as far as San Sebastian, shown to the South West of the city centre 
in Figure 16 above. This process tended to favour the middle and upper classes 
and was paralleled by unplanned and informal growth in lower income groups 
which complicated the issue of deeds and disrupted other aspects of urban 
planning particularly road networks. The city started to encroach onto 
agricultural land that was privately owned by the church and hacendados 
(feudal landlords).
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Then came the military ruler Velasco’s land reform programme in the late 
1960s which forced the sale of rural, hacienda land around Cusco. At this time 
landless families made up about 25% of Peru’s rural population (Flindell Klaren 
2000) and large hacienda holdings were still run on a feudal basis by individual 
families.
4.4.2 Multiple civil societies: the blurred reality of private and civic
The hacienda land had been both home and livelihood to the 
campesino73 communities who had occupied it. When landowners tried to evict 
campesinos after selling or leasing the land to urban workers with marginally 
higher cash incomes, conflicts erupted between the campesinos and the 
landowning hacendados. As more and more land was sold off these conflicts 
shifted focus and it was the campesinos and new urban settlers’ APVs which 
found themselves at loggerheads (Marco Cortez 1989).
As the effects of the 1972 agrarian reform kicked in, campesino co­
operatives gained strength and were able to claim rights to agricultural land that 
had been confiscated by powerful landowners or hacendados. The campesino 
groups then tended to follow the precedent that had been set by the big 
landowners in the 1960s and turned their land over to urban use without formal 
permission. One way for these groups to circumvent the legislation was to 
incorporate landless urban settlers and campesinos into a single association 
and make a claim together. On government owned land, the approach was less 
subtle and associations invaded and occupied land particularly on the banks of 
the River Huatanay. Key players within the community associations often 
became illegal developers themselves, selling land at extortionate prices with 
the promise of services and then delivering nothing: a reminder that urban 
community organisations are not necessarily coherent, unified actors.
4.4.3 Nascent local government
By 1984, after four years under the neoliberal national leader Belaunde 
and with the guerrilla movement Shining Path spreading, inflation mounting and
' 3 Campesinos are agricultural workers but the word has the same slightly ambiguous and 
derogatory connotations as “peasant” in English. Often these groups were landless, exploited 
tenant farmers.
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devaluation imminent, Cusco responded by electing a new, leftist provincial 
mayor.
Daniel Estrada came to office at a time when local government in Peru 
was still in early adolescence and Pino Zambrano’s retrospective of his tenure 
describes the poor public perception of the institution that he was to lead. Pino 
Zambrano’s view is that municipal government at the time was seen purely as a 
forum for destructive confrontation between central government and local 
powers (Pino Zambrano 2004):34 and as an intimidating and incompetent 
service provider:
To the population, the figure of the [provincial] Municipality was a symbol of 
abuse and arbitrariness, linked to fife’s three important moments: births, 
marriages and deaths.
(Pino Zambrano 2004):33
Estrada’s strategic approach was to encourage the municipal authorities 
to recognise and respect the citizenry, bolster the capacity of local government 
and local people and to improve basic services. In response to the economic 
crisis and the long queues for basic foodstuffs that it had precipitated, Cusco’s 
municipalities participated actively in the “glass of milk” ( vaso de leche) 
programme and collective kitchens (comedores populares). With international 
support, the municipality was also able to help barrios to launch tambos 
comunales: distribution points for stockpiling and selling essential products like 
sugar, milk, oil and flour.
Estrada also attempted to enhance participation, moving, as Pino 
Zambrano sees it, from reactionary popular activism to the “construction of 
citizenry” and a scrupulous effort to maintain the political independence of the 
municipalities:
[construction of citizenry meant] the mobilisation of all sorts of local 
organisations (“living forces”) which represented different forms of local, 
territorial, functional, professional and syndicate-based identities.
(Pino Zambrano 2004):35
Behind the improvement of public services was one of Estrada’s most 
spectacular contributions: an increase in municipal investment from $352,000 in 
1982 to $9,000,000 by 1992. This was achieved by levying several local taxes. 
The first of these was to introduce a fee for groundwater abstracted by the
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brewery. The second was the introduction of a tourist ticket which gave visitors 
access to important historical sites. Estrada had to coax local cultural and 
administrative institutions and the church into uncharacteristic cooperation by 
negotiating a mutually beneficial division of the ticket revenues. The third was 
an airport embarkation tax which also targeted tourists and diverted revenue 
from Peru’s international airport in Lima to the regional hub of Cusco. Behind all 
this was a simultaneous change in national legislation which enabled small 
municipalities to borrow (Pino Zambrano 2004): 13.
After three consecutive terms as mayor, Estrada’s administration had 
facilitated the set up of a municipal company for waste collection and street 
cleaning and had negotiated an agreement with the regional electricity company 
for 90% electrification. In 1995, the stage was also set for a massive expansion 
of the drinking water infrastructure with SEDACusco, the provincial water 
company, in a position to finance a $35m project to tap into an important aquifer.
Following changes the legal framework for the provision of water and 
sanitation initiated by Fujimori’s central government, by March 1997, 
SEDACusco had had its shares distributed among the district municipalities of 
Cusco and was granted the legal status of Municipal Company for Provision of 
Sanitation Services in Cusco, otherwise known as EPS74 SEDACusco S.A. 
(SedaCusco 2008). Over the following decade, Cusco’s economic growth and 
tourism crept up and efforts to increase investment and bolster the tax base, 
which had begun with Daniel Estrada, continued.
The growth of Cusco’s population is plotted in
74 Entidad Municipal Prestadora de Servicios de Saneamiento del Cusco
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Figure 22 and tracks the city’s expansion since through these periods.
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Figure 22 Population growth in Cusco Province (1930 (Marco Cortez 1989); 1961 (Estrada 
2002), 1972-1993 (Municipalidad Provincial del Cusco 2006), remaining data (INEI 2005)) 
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4.4.4 Cusco now: governance and the environment
These days urban Cusco produces 10.4 million cubic metres of waste 
water per year or 330 litres per second of which only 30% is treated in the San 
Jeronimo treatment plant (Gomez Villasante 2003): 19. The remaining 70% is 
discharged directly into the River Huatanay and this includes hospital waste, 
waste from the famous local brewery and untreated liquid waste from abattoirs. 
In terms of solid waste, the city produces between 240 and 310 metric tonnes of 
solid waste each day. Of the 70% that is collected by companies in each district, 
most is deposited in unlined landfill sites. The rest goes directly into the 
environment (SedaCusco 2005).
In response to this, over the last decade, several civil society and local 
government actors have launched development projects across the catchment 
area of the River Huatanay. Large scale environmental management has 
tended to fall to the regional authorities overlooking the different municipal 
jurisdictions that they straddle (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 3 
2006).
The Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala (CGPdA) is a local NGO that has 
played a prominent role in development of the Southern Valley and the Historic 
Centre of Cusco. It sees its role as that of facilitator bringing together the 
municipalities, the regional government, trade bodies, the churches and
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community groups (Municipalidad de Saylla 2002). CGPdA has established 
Integrated Water Resource Management across the river basin (GIRH75). This 
programme is designed to co-ordinate management of the catchment with the 
use of water in the food chain, environment and for human consumption (Centro 
Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 5 2006). CGPdA is also involved in capacity 
building with an emphasis on participation and families as the key actors 
(Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala 2006b). As part of this initiative it convenes 
local round tables (mesas de consultacion), training workshops and continues 
to support an inter-district development committee (CID76) (Centro Guaman 
Poma de Ayala Interview 3 2006).
The Institute of Water and Environmental Management (IMA77) is an 
entity of regional government which is overseeing a major project to clean up 
the catchment of the River Vilcanota, of which the River Huatanay is a major 
tributary. IMA works on capacity building in 22 micro-catchments and has 
founded the Vilcanota Management Committee78, with a remarkably similar 
remit to CGPdA’s integrated water management project (IMA Interview 1 2006).
SEDACusco sits on both the GIHR and the Vilcanota management 
committee but again the director of CGPdA commented that SEDACusco was 
difficult and had some influence over press reporting of environmental issues 
(Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 1 2006).
Regional environmental activities are underway and are linked in to local 
development projects but as we shall see the impact of these interventions is 
not always felt by or disseminated across Cusco’s various districts.
4.5 Configuration of infrastructures
With the development of urban land outpacing investment in the provision 
of basic services for much of Cusco’s history, a detailed 1992 study of Cusco’s 
north-eastern sector, published by a local NGO, found a grim picture in areas 
where the land had been occupied by human settlements and APVs (Frias et al. 
1992). The original invasions were usually characterised by the subdivision of 
the site into plots, their allocation was by community lottery followed by a phase 
of rough and ready construction. With only this basic level of planning, the NGO
5 Gestion Integral de Hidricos Recursos
76 Comite Interdistrital de Desarrollo
77 Instituto de Manejo de Agua y Medio Ambiente
8 Comite de Gestion de la Cuenca del Vilcanota
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found that 80% of housing was poor to the point of being dangerous. It had 
been built on unstable land, predominantly by the communities themselves, and 
was without any basic services. In some cases, in the historic centre, a single 
tap or toilet would serve two households.
Frias et al. also took a closer look at Cusco’s highly fragmented services 
and identified a number of reasons for the lack of integrated services. One 
explanation was that once a rudimentary system was in place, the impetus of 
the local social movement faded:
Just as in other cities, community management is not an integrated activity, co­
ordinated between different organisations. It is common to find diffused 
activities and scopes both within each neighbourhood and across the whole 
zone. Many projects to install urban settlements have been carried out by 
individual associations in their own particular way. The fact that they share 
common problems has not translated into different settlements coming together 
to make claims or undertake activities. As soon as the settlements have got 
hold of some basic urban services, they are no longer interested in a centralised 
organisation at zone level and this has led to the dis-activation of various 
housing organisations.
(Frias et al. 1992):13
The authors conclude that there is an underlying sense of identity that is 
linked to a very local settlement rather than a larger area of the city.
Only when there is a sense of identity at zone level is it possible to see 
participation in management and the transformation of the city as a whole.
(Frias et al. 1992): 14
Again, reflecting back to the DPU’s examples of anarchic community 
organisation settling into formal structures, community organisations are not 
always durable actors in the provision of infrastructure.
Two comments from the research complete the picture:
As one moves further away from the urban core, these settlements are more 
precarious, with the obvious deficit of basic services and located predominantly 
in ravines, on slopes and other places unsuitable for habitation.
(Frias et al. 1992):43
These contradictions in the city create spaces that are disconnected and 
segregated socially and physically with a consistent reduction in quality of life 
for the population.
(Frias et al. 1992):45
What we find in Cusco is a city shaped by the political turmoil of the 
seventies and the economic crisis of the eighties and early nineties. Although its
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tradition of social organisation and the strident, political leadership of Daniel 
Estrada in the eighties and nineties helped to build a foundation for participatory 
local development, underinvestment in basic services meant that by 1994, 
fundamental services in the city had practically collapsed -  especially the 
provision of drinking water and drainage, street cleaning, electrification and 
transport (Pino Zambrano 2004):40.
In terms of water governance, arrangements across the city vary with 
SEDACusco, the EPS, covering a large part of the urban centre but with hybrid 
organisations covering splinters of the city and peri-urban zones. The rural 
JASS model for provision, operates in the southern valley and in the rural areas 
of each municipality.
4.6 The Lived Experience of infrastructure in San Bias, Angostura and
Manco Capac
This thesis is based on research in three case studies, in-depth 
interviews with householders79, key informant interviews80, household water 
sampling, river sampling and community workshops. The choice of case studies 
was designed to unpick the relationship between livelihoods and the 
governance and configuration of infrastructure. The sites are in different 
municipalities, with different governance models and configurations of water 
infrastructure, they all lie within the Province of Cusco and in the same basin of 
the River Huatanay.
The first case study, San Bias, is one of Cusco’s oldest barrios and is 
served by the provincial water authority. Angostura, in a peri-urban municipality, 
runs its own water system, an untreated spring supply. Manco Capac, close to 
Cusco’s main bus terminal and thriving markets, ought to be served by the 
provincial authority but is still using a system built and managed by the zone’s 
inhabitants.
9 The focus of a livelihoods analysis is the household. While this method does recognise that 
vulnerability and assets may not be evenly distributed within a household and that strategies 
may be contested between people living under the same roof, the analysis effectively treats the 
household as a coherent unit. In the Peruvian census, household surveys distinguish between 
“lotes”, "casas” and “hogares" CGPdA interview 6: un lote can have 2 patios, and several 
houses
80 Key informant interviews were modified to ensure questions were relevant to the particular 
interviewee. An open-ended dialogue was allowed to sit around the more formal, comparative 
structure of Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats. Interviews were recorded and 
transcribed.
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The next section locates and reconnoitres each case study beginning 
with San Bias in the district of Cusco, Angostura in the district of Saylla and 
Manco Capac in district of Santiago.
Figure 23 Location of the Districts of Cusco
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4.6.1 Locating the cases
Cusco Province originally comprised three districts based loosely on 
nineteenth century parish boundaries: Cusco, San Sebastian and San Jeronimo. 
In the early 40s, three more districts were formally recognised: Saylla and 
Ccorca in 1942 and Poroy in 1941. At the same time, house building for workers 
clustered around the city’s new factories had begun in Wanchaq and Santiago 
which both became districts 1955. That brought to seven the number of districts 
in the province of Cusco, all but two of which meet within the urban scene 
(Marco Cortez 1989). Figure 16 locates each district and then looks at the 
spread of urbanisation.
The valley of the River Huatanay, which runs through the city of Cusco, 
drops from North West to South East, as do the district capitals (see line graph 
in Figure 18 for an altitude plot of district capitals). All the districts except for 
Wanchaq still include both urban and rural populations81 and urban and rural 
areas (Figure 17) with population concentrated in the central districts (Figure 
18).
Figure 24 Classification of land use by district in 2004
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81 National Institute of Statistics’ (INEI) definition of rural.
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Figure 25 Population in each district of Cusco and the altitude of district capitals
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The locations of each case study are shown below in Figure 19. San 
Bias, the first of the case studies, is perched on a steep hillside overlooking the 
city and the valley below. It is riddled with narrow, cobbled streets and steep 
stone steps and is the original artisan quarter of Cusco city. It is the most 
central of the case studies, five minutes on foot from the city’s main plaza and a 
popular haunt for the tourists brave enough to take on the short but sharp climb 
while they are still adjusting to the altitude. The zone is regarded as part of 
Cusco’s historic centre and buildings are monitored by the National Institute of 
Culture so that they remain in keeping with the terracotta tiled vistas that visitors 
have come to expect. Overcrowding and the expense of improving housing for 
some of the neighbourhood’s longest serving residents have attracted the 
interest of the externally funded NGO, the Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala 
(CGPdA). Other civil society activity includes a longstanding neighbourhood 
committee and a handful of home grown community-based organisations. 
Water and sanitation services are provided by the provincial company 
SEDACusco.
Further away from the centre of town is the settlement of Angostura in 
the outlying district of Saylla. A handful of residents formed an association to 
acquire the land in the early 1980s and since then it has grown into a
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community of 147 families. It sits on the valley floor, with dwellings on both 
sides of the River Huatanay and is just a few hundred metres after the city’s 
waste water treatment plant discharges its noxious load into the watercourse.
Until 2002 only a few houses had piped water and a sewerage 
connection while others collected water from nearby springs and used latrines 
or open fields. In 2002, the local NGO, CGPdA assisted with the extension of 
the piped water system, providing funds for a reservoir, additional water sources 
and, a bit later, waste water connections and a small primary treatment plant. 
These systems are now managed by the community’s own water committee or 
JASS.
On the right bank of the River Huatanay, back up towards the city centre 
sits Manco Capac, the third of the case study sites, these days incorporated into 
the jurisdiction of Santiago District. It was occupied in 1965 and the newly 
arrived inhabitants formed a number of organisations to come together and 
build services for the community including a piped water supply and foul water 
drainage which was built at weekends and on public holidays over a five year 
period between 1985 and 1990. This water system is now administered by a 
community-based organisation called ASAPASC. Other environmental services 
are the responsibility of the municipality but this cash-strapped district authority 
is unreliable and unpopular. The international NGO World Vision is active in the 
area running a child sponsorship programme and health workshops and two 
other local organisations run a small primary school and a nursery.
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Figure 26 Case study locations in Cusco Province
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This chapter takes the first steps in an empirical response to the research 
question. The governance framework is applied methodically to the context of 
national, local and infrastructure governance in Peru.
I argue not only that Peru’s volatile political and economic history has been 
pivotal in shaping infrastructure provision but that controversy over 
infrastructure has also driven political change. This gives a first insight into the 
links between remote but powerful government policy, the practical organisation 
of infrastructure and urban vulnerability.
With rapid urban growth, social action to install infrastructure and a 
divergence between idealised modes of governance and the reality of water 
provision on the ground, Cusco is an excellent test case for my hypothesis that 
socio-technical systems mediate between vulnerability and governance.
The three case studies have been selected to illustrate different 
relationships between households, water providers and wider structures of 
governance in order to characterise the mediating role and interaction of STS.
The three chapters that follow present detailed studies of livelihood 
strategies, vulnerability and local governance in San Bias, Angostura and 
Manco Capac.
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Chapter 5 San Bias: ‘agua matinal’
134
This chapter examines the livelihoods of households in the San Bias 
neighbourhood of Cusco District. The chapter is structured according to the four 
analytical categories offered by the Sustainable Livelihoods framework. The first 
of these focuses on livelihoods, gathering households into three thematic 
groups characterised by similar asset bundles and livelihood strategies and 
based on the results of household interviews and sanitary surveys. In San Bias, 
the groups have been given the following titles: ‘establishment’, ‘entrepreneurial’ 
and ‘excluded’ livelihoods.
Figure 27 Location of San Bias
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The second analytical category, Vulnerability Context, situates the 
neighbourhood in its municipality, describing aggregate economic life, 
demographics and risks, shocks and stresses faced by households.
The third section presents a discussion of policies, institutions and 
processes under the heading paths to influence. This describes the roles of 
neighbourhood and civil society organisations, the municipality, central 
government and the private sector.
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San Bias is the oldest barrio of Cusco city, built on a steep outcrop of rock 
on the northern slopes of the town (Figure 25). It was created as a parish 
between 1559 and 1562 (Municipalidad del Cusco & Instituto Nacional de 
Cultura 2006): 14 to house indigenous Inca families that had been forced out of 
the new colonial city by the Spanish. San Bias overlaid an older Inca barrio 
called Tococachi, translated by its modern day inhabitants as “Salty Hollow” 
(San Bias Community Meeting 2007).
5.1 San Bias Pentagon Plots
At the centre of the Sustainable Livelihoods framework is the pentagon of 
assets, designed to represent the household asset bundle as a portfolio of 
Human, Natural, Financial, Physical and Social Capitals.
Pentagons for each household in this case study area are overlaid such 
that a first glance over the plots for the sample of households in San Bias allows 
some preliminary comments.
The first feature of interest is the high absolute level of Human, Physical 
and Financial capital in this urban setting. The second related feature is that 
these capitals are not only absolutely strong, they are relatively much stronger 
than Natural and Social capital, yielding a dominant, triangular pattern in the 
distribution. In fact, only one household appears to have strong natural capital 
and only a few have social capital that stands out. Finally, looking along each 
axis, there is a spread in the strength of each asset class: heterogeneity in 
livelihoods especially in terms of Human and Financial Capital. What follows is 
richer analysis of household and group interviews to explore the origins of these 
patterns.
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Figure 28 San Bias Asset Pentagons_____
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5.1.1 Establishment Livelihoods: education and stable employment
In this section, Households 17, 22, 24 and 27 have been grouped under 
the heading Establishment Livelihoods, characterized by high levels of 
education and stable employment. One of the features that emerged during the 
interviews in San Bias was the apparent ability of these households to capitalise 
on their education and training. This meant a smoother and more predictable 
monthly income, often from formal sector, professional employment.
This was true for Household 17 with the head of household, working as an 
accountant, his wife based in the home and his eldest daughter, employed as a 
teacher with her siblings still at school or university. The father’s monthly 
income was described as “stable” at 800 soles (£137) per month while the 
daughter had short-term contracts and was paid around 500 soles (£86) per 
month. For this situation to arise, university level education was necessary 
across both generations. Household 17 was an owner occupier and even with 
14 years in their current house and 26 years in San Bias, this family had arrived 
more recently than some others. Certainly, in terms of physical assets, this 
professional household was at the top end. Home ownership served to stabilise 
monthly outgoings since there was no rent to be paid and the house
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construction was reinforced concrete with a tiled roof, the patio was concrete 
with a drainage point and the principal tap, although it was outside the house, 
was built into the wall and discharged into a concrete basin. All in all, Household 
17 had a resilient bundle of human, financial and physical assets which reflects 
what is happening in several other households in San Bias.
The head of household 27 was also an accountant but, at 70, almost a 
generation older than the head of Household 17. He and his wife, a teacher, 
were both university graduates, as were the other inhabitants: the couple’s 
daughter and her husband, a shop owner. The household income was around 
3000 soles (£515) per month, with half of this brought in by the head of 
household, a quarter by his wife and a quarter by his son-in-law. This included 
rental income from letting out two commercial spaces that gave onto the street 
at the front of their property. The house was of adobe but the wood flooring 
inside the house and drained, concrete patio outside, placed it among the best 
off in terms of physical assets. The demographic in this household changed as 
family members came and went during the year but at the time of the interview, 
apart from a very new baby, the only other child was the “ trabajadora del hogar” \ 
a 14 year old, live-in domestic help.
In Household 22, the female head of household was also a teacher on a 
salary of about 900 soles (£155) per month. She was a relative newcomer and 
had only lived in San Bias for 8 years. In some ways, she fits between the 
establishment and the enterprising livelihood groups because she 
supplemented her income by letting rooms to two local artisans and was not a 
long-time resident but her income security has persuaded me to place her here. 
Again the house was adobe construction but inside the flooring and installations 
were at the top end and although the patio was unsealed, it was drained.
Household 24 was exceptional in the San Bias sample in that the retired 
teachers who lived there had been renting the same state-owned house for 34 
years, since their marriage. They paid a nominal rent, which hardly dented their 
teachers’ pensions, and occupied themselves in retirement with their own small 
NGO and the husband’s work as an artist. Their grown-up daughters, lived 
abroad with European spouses and this links to the story behind their NGO. 
This couple had made a deal with a capricious, local nun, the owner of a 
decrepit colonial house. They restored the house and then rented out rooms to 
local students, artisans or tourists and set aside a small room for their own
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domestic helper. The project seemed to be under constant threat of eviction, at 
the whim of the nun, but its rental income was designed to fund the main activity 
in the remaining rooms: a workshop for young, deaf seamstresses, making 
clothes to order for export to Austria, where Household 24 had offspring. The 
workshop specialised in costumes and sports strips and the head of household 
admitted that:
I sometimes earn a little from my project and I also have a little HH22 
business in the centre, a cafe. But the income from the tenants 
goes back into the project. The difficult months are November,
October and December because, for example, we have sent 
clothes to Europe for Christmas and we still haven’t received the 
payment.
This enterprising activity might have shifted Household 24 out of the 
established livelihoods and in with the entrepreneurial but I have kept it here 
because it had such a stable main income source and the extra-mural activity 
had more than a profit motive attached to it.
To pull together the picture of assets and make the first links between 
livelihoods and water: Table 16 and Figure 27 present household assets linked 
to water.
The combination of low sanitary risk scores and the absence of 
thermotolerant coliforms indicated low overall risk in these households82.
Table 17 Households and Taps in Establishment Group, San Bias
Household 17 
accountant and 
family’
5 people, 2 taps 
■
Household 22 
‘teacher and 
lodgers’
3 people
3 people, 1 tap
Household 24 
‘upstanding, retired 
teachers’
2 people
2 people, 2 taps
Household 27 
‘old-timer accountant’ 
6 people
6 people, 6 taps
82 Household 22 had a faulty tap which sprayed out horizontally and was contained using a 
wrap of clear plastic. Samples were taken with and without this improvised hose and results 
showed the presence of TTCs in samples taken with the hose.
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Figure 29 Sanitary risk score in Establishment Group, San Bias
Sanitary Risk Score
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 >9
-
•
_
c
B
22
1 * 17,24
No
ac
tio
n
re
qu
ire
d
Low risk: low action priority Intermediate to high risk: higher 
action priority
Very high risk: urgent action
Incomes in this group were stable but slightly lower in Households 17 
and 22 and more variable but higher on average in 22 and 24. Gas was the 
cooking fuel of choice and expenditure on energy and water was higher than in 
the other case study sites and than in the Excluded Livelihood group in San 
Bias.
Figure 30 Monthly income levels and utility expenditure per person in Establishment 
Group, San Bias
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Although all the households in this group had water meters and received 
regular bills showing their water consumption graphically and by volume, with 
the exception of the accountant in HH27, their estimates for the amount of water 
consumed were still vague and low. Household 27 estimated water 
consumption at 1701/p/d which was above the billed volume at 1101/p/d. The 
others estimated consumption at less than 15litres/person/day, where billed 
volumes ranged from 70 to 1401/p/d.
Looking at water-related income, none of the households is using water 
for anything other than domestic purposes. Households 24 and 27 commented 
on this:
We water the plants and once a month hose down the patio HH24
Domestic use only, we water the plants but they’re not for sale HH27
Human capital is examined in terms of the attempts of households to 
treat drinking water and any reported links to health. All households in this 
group boil drinking water before consuming it and none reported what they saw 
as water-related illnesses in their families:
Just to be on the safe side, we boil the water HH27
Social capital was probed by asking what sort of help was available in 
the event of household water shortages and the tendency for people to lodge 
complaints. In this group, all householders said that no organizations helped 
them out. Households 17, 22, and 27 would not hesitate to complain:
We go to complain at the water company if the sen/ice is bad HH17
Unfortunately we are in the system, so we’d complain to the HH27
institution
Household 24 with reference to her childhood outside the city took a 
more tangential view to this line of questioning. Rather than complain, she 
proposed another solution, along the lines of an independent, communal 
system:
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[if there was a problem,] first I’d buy bottled water but there is 
water in the subsoil, we would have to get together to do 
something. I know how to filter water. When I was a child, my HH27 
father mate a “canasta" (literally translates as a “basket” but 
more like a tub or barrel judging by her description) with gravel 
on the bottom and sand and coal on top and my father is 82!
Only HH24 and HH27 reported using alternative sources of water. I use 
this information as a proxy for a natural capital linked to water.
We send the domestic to “el perro” or, in the past, to the “los HH27 
sapos". There’s also the beer company’s exclusive source, 
there’s a tank
A couple of households (HH27 in this group and HH29 in the final group) 
referred to “el perro”, the dog, and “los sapos”, the toads. It turned out that 
these were public fountains. “Los sapos" is dry but “el perro" still runs 
continuously into a stone channel next to a flight of steps. The households that 
referred to “el perro" were both local and level with it83.
Figure 31 “los sapos?’: means “the toads” and if you look closely you will see them
' >untain.
83 The provenance of the water was not clear but it was sampled for completeness and had no 
residual chlorine, incredibly high hardness values and showed the presence of thermotolerant 
conforms. I saw it being used to fill buckets most days and I regularly saw one particular choclo 
vendor (a street seller who hawks boiled corn on the cob) filling her cooking pots for preparing 
her wares.
I have to buy bottled water HH24
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Figure 32 “el perro”: at a stretch you can make out a dog’s face in the left image and, on 
the right, drainage drops in a channel to Choquechaka below -  this street follows one of 
Cusco’s old water courses, a tributary of t'
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Some of the factors behind the stability of these livelihoods seem to be 
having at least one generation’s worth of higher education (human capital), 
home-ownership or low rent to stabilise outgoings and access to urban labour 
markets, including a high concentration of schools and the demand for financial 
services. In the case of Household 24, there was the potential for remittances 
and access to markets outside Peru.
5.1.2 Entrepreneurial Livelihoods: tourism and diversification
In this section, Households 18, 19, 23, 26, 28 and 30 are characterized 
as entrepreneurial. People here still have high levels of education, though not 
exclusively university degrees. What makes their livelihoods potentially more 
unpredictable is that they rely, in part, on businesses related to seasonal 
tourism such as letting rooms or handicrafts. It is more difficult to generalize in 
this category because the livelihoods are diverse and so each household merits 
some attention.
Household 28 houses the president of the neighbourhood committee: 
born and bred in San Bias. Although he is a trained lawyer and his wife a nurse, 
their main livelihood activity is making jewellery for export in a small home- 
based workshop. The income from this trade was described by the head of
143
household as “de acuerdo al mercado" or dependent on the market but it must 
have been lucrative enough, at around 6,000 soles (£1,030) a month, to entice 
him and his wife away from more predictable incomes in the professions for 
which they had trained. Their wares were for export which partly explains the 
profit margin. Their physical assets were correspondingly impressive with a 
multi-storey, brick house, wooden floors and the principal tap inside the house.
Households 18 had seven members with a completed tertiary but non­
university education and three more in the process of completing their studies. 
The two home owners were brothers, living with their spouses and children. 
With this “adult” demographic, the household was able to have six family 
members working as teachers and one as an engineer, bringing in a steady 
1600 soles (£275) per month. This has obvious overlaps with the first 
livelihoods category of stable and high level education in San Bias but what I 
want to highlight in this case is their supplementary income which came from 
running an internet cafe from their property. The house nestled next to a steep 
pedestrianised street, between a number of tourist hostels. This was a typical 
tiled, adobe house with a drained flagstone patio but the indoor floors were still 
earth.
Neither the head of household 19, nor his spouse had completed their 
university education. He classified his work as “professional”, but emphasized 
that it was “eventual or casual and that his monthly income of 800 soles (£137) 
was what was coming in “at the moment”. His wife also had a variable income 
that peaked during the tourist season at about 20 soles (£3.40) per day selling 
goods in the market. This couple had two school age children and they said that 
their income went down with tourist numbers in January and February and 
when the children went back to school in April because of the cost of buying 
uniforms and books. The other family member was the elderly mother. At 76 
this woman was the oldest participant and she described her education as “sin 
nivel” or without any formal schooling. This household generated supplementary 
income from renting rooms in their colonial era house to a middle-aged couple 
(both described as artisans) and a younger university student. The rental 
income amounted to 70 soles (£12) per month from both the couple and from 
the student.
Household 30 was headed by another university educated woman. She 
moved to San Bias in 2002 and began building her house on what had been a
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steep and slightly precarious vacant lot. Each time I visited her, the living space 
had expanded and she used these new spaces to supplement her income by 
letting rooms to local and international tenants. The foreign tenants paid in 
dollars and contributed between USD300-500 per month. She estimated her net 
income, after deducting the expensive electricity bill, at about 1000 soles (£170) 
per month. She lived with one school age child and her older, graduate son 
who worked as a tour guide bringing in about 600 soles (£103) per month.
In Household 23, one source of income was from the head of household 
who earned around 1000 soles (£170) a month as a farmer and market 
stallholder. What marks this family out was that they owned land in the 
neighbouring province, Urubamba. This agricultural income varied and the head 
of household explained that it went up during the harvest period but that, the 
rest of the time between January and April he was “pateando latas”, this 
translates roughly as “stoney broke”. With this fluctuating agricultural income, 
the household strategy was to use supplementary income from the head of 
household’s grown up children. Of these, one owned a shop and two other 
professionals were involved in tourism and industry They all had university 
degrees and brought in about 500 soles (£86) per month. The fourth sibling was 
still at university and the other junior members of the family were two 
grandchildren of primary school age. As well as this, five young, male tenants 
rented rooms in the house and paid 80 soles (£13.70) a month each from the 
money they made selling handicrafts to tourists in San Bias. Another tenant 
couple also lived in, with the woman working as a domestic help for the home 
owners and her partner working in a restaurant. Clearly, the main physical asset 
in this case was the sheer capacity of the house to accommodate paying 
tenants and adult family members. It also ranked high on other indicators with 
concrete floors inside the house, a drained concrete patio and a mixture of tiles 
and corrugated iron roofing.
Last in this category, the female head of Household 26 had not 
completed her university education and did casual work selling street food. She 
was based at home and relied on income from other adults living in the house: 
two siblings (teachers) and two grown up children (a technician and a student 
working in a restaurant) all of whom brought in about 500 soles (£86) per month. 
In this case, the asset value of the house was a bit lower: it was older, built of 
stone with a corrugated iron roof and an un-drained and unsealed patio.
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The sanitary risk scoring exercise placed all the households in this group 
in the same cell on the chart, classifying them as representing an intermediate 
risk because thermotolerant coliforms were present in stored water samples.
Table 18 Households and Taps in Entrepreneurial Group, San B i a s ___________ ____
HH 18 
'houseful of 
teachers’
HH 19 
market seller 
and elderly 
mother’
13 people, 1 tap 8 people, 1 tap
HH 23 
landowner- 
landlord’
16 people, 
4 taps
HH 26 
‘street 
seller and 
teachers’
6 people, 2 
taps
HH 28 
‘jeweller’
4 people, 2 taps
HH 30 
‘landlady’
9 people, 9 
taps
0
Figure 33 Sanitary risk score in Entrepreneurial Group, San Bias
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One of the characteristics of this group is the income insecurity 
associated with their livelihoods. This was most evident in Household 23, whose 
income varied seasonally because of dependence on agriculture, and in 
Household 30, where the income was tied to tourism. By letting rooms to 
foreigners, the head of household 30 was able to bring in income but this 
activity appeared to bring with it extremely high electricity bills84. This bill was 
only exceeded by Household 28 where the supply was used to run three phase 
grinding and polishing equipment for jewellery making. Household 28 generated 
income by selling specialised, “manufactured” goods to foreign markets. This
84 Water bills in this household are not correspondingly high because the water is not metered
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income fluctuated but it was buffered by not relying only on the local economy. 
The lowest household income per person in this group was reported in 
Household 18 where monthly earnings were stable, derived from the formal 
public sector by the adults working as teachers but divided among many of the 
young offspring.
Although households reported income instability, the average monthly 
incomes that they reported were relatively high, peaking well above those in 
either of the other San Bias livelihood categories or case study sites.
Figure 34 Monthly income levels and utility expenditure per person in Entrepreneurial 
Group, San Bias
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Household 30 paid a fixed monthly bill which assumed a fixed 
consumption of 20m3. She based her estimates on the volume of her water tank 
and the number of containers used for laundry, which matched up with mine 
made on the same basis. Other households, despite regular volumetric billing, 
underestimated water consumption. Daily billed consumption per person ranged 
between 45 litres to 140 litres with only unmetered Household 30 prepared to 
make an estimate at 190 litres.
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Households 28 and 30 distinguish themselves again in their use of water. 
While other households in this group used water for domestic purposes only, 
HH28 used a small amount for cleaning stones and machinery in the workshop 
(estimated by the head of household at an 18 litre bucket per day and 3 glasses 
per week respectively). Household 30 used water for making adobe bricks and 
mixing cement but “only for our own house”. It is true that these building 
materials were not sold on but they were used to expand the house, which 
changed from week to week, to accommodate extra income-generating tenants. 
Indirectly, this use of water was linked to important livelihood activities.
Households 18, 23, 26 and 28 all claimed to boil their tap water for 
drinking. The elderly mother of the head of household 19 confessed to drinking 
straight from the tap when she had worked up a thirst walking up the hill to the 
house. In Household 30 the entrepreneurial landlady was much more blase and 
said that she drank water directly from the tap and that “nothing bad happens".
Household 23 said that the two primary school age grandchildren had 
had stomach upsets and the female head of household in HH26 said that her 
father has had giardia and blamed the tap water, adding that it was from 
brushing their teeth with untreated tap water.
In this group, all the householders interviewed were prepared to 
complain to their service provider (HH18, 19, 23, 26, 28, 30). Household 26 
added that complaining was pointless as the company paid no attention. 
Household 30, one of the newest arrivals to the barrio, called on neighbours 
when she ran short but expressed frustration that some refused to help her.
I would have to call the service HH28
I have to go to all the neighbours to ask for water but some won’t HH30 
give it! I would have to complain to Seda[Cusco]
Three of the households in this group used water from alternative 
sources to supplement their formal supply:
If we are desperate, we use dirty water to flush the toilet: there is HH19 
a pool in the plaza
We collect water in the rainy season to wash clothes HH23
I have to go to all the neighbours to ask for water but some won’t HH30 
give it! Sometimes I go by car to get some from somewhere 
else, (from a house in the industrial park, it was mine but I sold it 
to buy this place and now friends live there)
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Household 23 was collecting rainwater from the corrugated iron section 
of their roof.
Binding these enterprising livelihoods were slightly precarious financial 
assets but strong or developing human capital with extended, well-trained adult 
households or younger families still involved in education, a strong physical 
asset in terms of space that could be rented, filled with capable adult relatives 
or used as workshop space.
5.1.3 Excluded Livelihoods: precariousness
Although the households in the Entrepreneurial Livelihoods group 
suggest that a precarious primary income is linked to a more diverse set of 
livelihood strategies, what we have not seen so far in San Bias are the families 
that are unable to capitalize on their assets or simply have fewer to count on. In 
San Bias Households 16, 25 and 29 fall into this Excluded Livelihoods category.
For these households, human capital is palpably weaker. The education 
levels of the economically active household members were no higher than a 
completed secondary education. Although in Households 16 and 25 the children 
of the next generation were enrolled in full-time tertiary or university education.
The breadwinners in Household 16 were both on the margins of formal 
employment. The head of household depended on insecure seasonal work in 
construction and said ruefully that at that time of year (the rainy season) it was a 
case of “cas/ propina" or “practically begging”. His wife worked on a casual 
basis in the local fruit and vegetable market85. When business was good, they 
could both expect daily earnings of about 15 soles (£2.60). This was a large 
family with 8 children and 2 grandchildren living crowded together and though 
the family owned their tiled, adobe house and had lived in it for 36 years, it still 
had earth floors and an earth patio with only rudimentary drainage. The 
principal tap was a rickety standpipe which gave directly onto the yard rather 
than into a sink. Unlike the households in other livelihood groups, Household 16 
was using kerosene for cooking rather than bottled gas.
In Household 25, the widowed head of household was not working and 
relied on letting out space at the front of the house to a third party who had 
converted and ran it as an internet cafe. This yielded 180 soles (£40) a month
85 Specifically, not used by tourists but aimed at residents
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with other sources of income coming from her children -  both employed in the 
tourism sector, one in a restaurant and one as a guide -  who gave her “a bit 
every day”. She had lived in the area for 27 years since marrying.
The family in Household 29 moved between Cusco and Puerto 
Maldonado86 where the head of household worked as a taxi driver earning 
about 400 soles (£69) a month. The house itself was shared and split up into 
separate households for nuclear units of the extended family. This generation of 
occupants had been born in the house. It was a tiled, adobe house with wooden 
floors and the principal tap was built in and gave into a cement basin. As with 
Household 16, this family chose a cheaper alternative fuel for cooking but in this 
case firewood.
Sanitary risk scores ranged from zero in HH25 to four in HH29 but no 
thermotolerant conforms were recorded in any of the water samples so overall 
risks varied from very low to intermediate. Household 16 had the most rickety 
standpipe in the group with a small earth patio with no drainage.
Table 19 Households and Taps in Excluded Group, San Bias__________________________
Household 16 Household 25 Household 29
‘practically begging’ ‘letting internet space’ ‘moto-taxi in Puerto
Maldonado’
12 people, 2 taps 5 people, 2 taps 6 people, 1 tap
in Excluded Group, San Bias 
Sanitary Risk Score
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Figure 35 Sanitary risk score
86 In a neighbouring province to the east in the rainforest.
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Household 25 reported income stability but the other households said 
their earnings were not stable through the year. What is significant though is the 
low level of earnings compared with the best-off households in the 
Entrepreneurial and Establishment Livelihoods. Incomes per capita in this group 
are markedly lower than in either the established or entrepreneurial livelihood 
categories. To make matters worse, there is also seasonal variation either 
because of a dependence on work in construction, which grinds to a halt in the 
rainy season, or the vagaries of tourism.
The high electricity bill in Household 25 is because the supply to the 
adjoining internet cafe is included. Household 16 has a low cooking fuel bill 
because the family does not use bottled gas but the cheaper alternative 
kerosene.
Figure 36 Monthly income levels and utility expenditure per person in Excluded Group, 
San Bias
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Household 25 was the only household in San Bias to give an extremely 
high estimate for water consumption, at 2,000l/p/d, and even when the question 
was rephrased and we worked it out together, the water volume concept was
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not relevant to this elderly interviewee. The other households underestimated 
consumption at less than 51/p/d compared to 551/p/d (HH16) and 1751/p/d 
(HH29).
The use of water for livelihood activities is also limited. Only in 
Household 29 did any householders describe other uses:
We water plants but with water from the “perro” HH29
The three heads of household in this group all boiled water before 
drinking but in spite of this extra precaution, Households 16 and 29 reported 
water related illnesses. In HH16 this was the occasional stomach upset and in 
HH29 the head of household reported salmonella, although attributing this 
directly to the water supply is tenuous.
Household 25 said that they would complain to the water company but 
the other two households thought that complaining would have been fruitless:
Only the neighbours help us out and we have to go to them if we HH16 
run out.
Nobody helps us. The mayor robs us! We don’t complain; they HH29 
are arrogant.
The alternative sources of water used by Household 16 arguably straddle 
the social and natural capital categories since it is a matter of borrowing from 
organisations that regularly store water. Household 29 reports using the “perro”: 
this family lives closest to the fountain.
We go to the neighbours, for example to the hostel, they have a HH16 
storage tank. The brewery also gives us a couple of bucketfuls.
They know us.
We get water from the “perro”. HH29
It is more difficult to map binding livelihoods and attitudes in this group 
because the participants were much less verbose. With households earning 
insecure wages, there was also much less clarity on what the daily or monthly 
rate might amount to. However, it is clear that these households did not have 
the human or financial capital of the others and although Household 25 was 
letting out space and using a physical asset, operation of this business was left 
to another entrepreneur.
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5.2 Vulnerability Context
San Bias is considered an important barrio in Cusco’s heritage and it is 
included with two other zones, Santa Ana and San Cristobal, in the provincial 
municipality’s plan for the historic centre (Municipalidad del Cusco & Instituto 
Nacional de Cultura 2006). It is still known as the artisan quarter and is popular 
with tourists because of its cobbled, pedestrianised streets and colonial 
buildings. Indeed 70% of the artists living in the historic centre have what are 
known as “viviendas talleres” where they still live and undertake their craft 
(Municipalidad del Cusco & Instituto Nacional de Cultura 2006):52.
San Bias was one of several barrios identified as vulnerable by the local 
NGO “Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala” in their 2002 Estudio Catastro (Estrada 
2002).
The vulnerable groups and those exhibiting the highest levels of social and 
physical deterioration in the historic centre -  such as overcrowding, physical 
insecurity, inadequate or obsolete services, as well as poverty and a lack of 
economic resources amongst the population -  are found in the traditional 
sectors at the edge of the city centre and correspond to the barrios we refer to 
[among which is San Bias]
(Estrada 2002)
CGPdA’s conclusions were based on a series of surveys and an 
enumeration of slum dwellings. Nearly a third of slums in the historic centre 
were found in San Bias and of a population of 6,739 people (based on 1993 
census) 3,513 were living in slum conditions87. The aggregate figures across 
the historic centre for the type of tenancy are also revealing, with 33% owner 
occupied, 53% rented and a further 10% insecure in some way and used as 
either guest houses or squats. The report also estimates that in 1997 about two 
thirds of the population had adequate services and of the remaining third:
87 CGPdA has helped 35 families in San Bias (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 6 
2006). Despite being in the historic centre and a tourist hub, there can be as many as 3 families 
sharing a latrine and standpipe. CGPdA’s interventions to ease overcrowding are hampered by 
the fact that the INC has aesthetic requirements in this urban zone. During household interviews 
and the group session, the community identified lack of water during the afternoon, competition 
for water between residential and commercial users and dilapidated buildings and installations. 
The constrained access to the zone because of the steep, narrow steps, described nicely as 
“accidentado” (HH24 Household Interviews).
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15.2% have communal water and waste water, 10% have only one of these 
services and 10% have neither88.
The Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala treats San Bias as a zone delimited 
by Quiskapata, Choquechaka (to the right, to the left is San Cristobel), 
Tulluymayo, Quollacalle, Pumaccpampa 89. This is shown on the aerial 
photograph below in yellow. The area is identified on the risk maps developed 
for the 2006 urban development plan (Municipalidad Provincial del Cusco 2006) 
as prone to flooding during heavy rain.
In San Bias, none of the households themselves had much to say about 
natural hazards90. Household 24, in the Establishment Livelihood group, was 
alone in mentioning earthquakes and she attributed her awareness to training 
courses on classroom evacuation that she had been sent on as a school 
teacher. She dismissed the local risk by claiming that “San Bias was built on 
rock and felt earthquakes a bit less”.
88 On the basis of this survey, CGPdA went on to intervene in 35 households in San Bias. 
CGPdA also reported up to three families sharing a silo (latrine) and a single tap (Centro 
Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 3 2006).
89 The parish boundaries still seem to have a place in people’s hearts and it was clear during the 
group session that some of the older residents were unhappy that CGPdA and I had delineated 
San Bias as just a small zone in the historic centre. The president of the neighbourhood 
committee said that the real San Bias extended to Pisaq in the North, the Rio Huatanay in the 
South, to the Salineras de San Sebastian in the East and Siete Moragitos in the West. (San 
Bias Community Meeting 2007)
90 A few households mentioned lightning but this was at the front of people’s minds because the 
interviews were conducted in the same week that lightening struck the bell tower of the church 
in San Bias Plaza bringing down its stone cross.
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Figure 37 Location and risk map of San Bias
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5.2.1 Security and tourism
A variety of vulnerabilities came up in the interviews. The first set of 
concerns was linked to tourism. Several households in the Establishment and 
Entrepreneurial Livelihoods categories were unhappy about the boom in tourism 
that had taken place over the previous 10 years. Household 17 claimed that it 
had forced people to sell up and move out and argued that San Bias ought to 
have been kept residential since it was no longer as "tranquilo" as it once had 
been. Household 24 made the link between tourism and the pressure on traffic, 
making a case for access to the plaza to be limited to authorized vehicles only.
Similarly, in the Entrepreneurial Livelihoods group, Household 28 and 
Household 26, whose head of household had born in the zone, wanted the 
tourists to leave rather than displace long-time residents.
Lots of foreigners force us out, I’d like them out HH28
These households either worked outside San Bias or, in the case of 
HH28, sold their wares to dealers abroad and not on the street or in the local 
artisan markets, in other words, their livelihoods were less dependent on 
tourism perhaps justifying the hostility to tourists. Yet even households in the 
entrepreneuric?.5(§.*oup with a strong livelihood link to tourism, through tenants 
(HH18) or an internet cafe (HH23), were concerned about the tourist influx and 
the local inflation it precipitated.
3400
The problem for me is that it is completely touristy, it’s “’’full”, it HH23
should be controlled so that the plaza doesn’t get congested
Only the ‘establishment’ female head of Household 22, whose livelihood 
was linked to tourism via her tenants, was concerned about tourists being 
discouraged from coming to San Bias. She was worried about street crime:
[Crime] gives a bad impression where tourists walk around HH22
In fact, crime was a second important source of stress in San Bias, with 
households in the Entrepreneurial and Excluded Livelihoods groups reporting 
that they had been victims of crime:
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We have [problems]! They have already broken into the house HH23
We’ve already been robbed! HH29
Rather than worrying about tourists avoiding San Bias, entrepreneurial 
Households 18 and 26, explicitly blamed crime on the presence of tourists:
Because it’s a tourist zone, sometimes there are lots of assaults HH26
It’s a problem, there are lots of thieves and criminals because of HH18 
all the tourism. Too much tourism, it is worse and things cost 
more
In the Excluded Livelihoods category, the main stress on household 
livelihoods is insecure, seasonal income and this affected their ability to 
participate in collective efforts against crime:
It’s not that safe, I don’t pay and they [private guards] don’t come HH16
Beyond tourism and crime, the expense of renovating colonial houses in 
the zone was mentioned by entrepreneurial Households 18 and 23, as well the 
excluded Household 25, who worried about the annual rain damage to her 
adobe house and the expense of fixing it:
I’d like it if we got help to rebuild the houses, we can’t fix up our HH18 
own houses
We are still only half finished, we have a loan to do it HH25
Other stresses such as poor services like transport, the police, waste 
collection and the distance to the nearest health post were flagged up by 
Household 23. For HH23’s only adult family member without a tertiary education, 
the transport priority was linked to making schools more accessible and she 
emphasised the need for better education services by saying that she would 
spend money on a good nursery school for a solid “education iniciar. Transport 
related stress was also mentioned by Household 2991 in the excluded category.
91 This family lived in a house which gave onto a narrow cobbled street with a thin strip of 
pavement not wide enough for people to pass each other. The street is a thoroughfare and 
traffic races down it.
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For this couple, parents of school aged children, the priority was to “go back to 
a pedestrianised street".
Regardless of livelihood group, householders expressed concerns about 
tourism, crime and traffic. Those expressing concern at the annual rain damage 
to their houses tended to have weak physical assets, earth patios without 
adequate drainage but the impact of overflowing drains in the street depended 
on location rather than livelihood.
5.3 Infrastructure and Services
For the district of Cusco as a whole, the dominant fuel for cooking in the 
2005 census was gas at 60%, with kerosene and firewood at 13% and 17% 
respectively. In the sampled households in San Bias, two households in the 
Excluded Livelihoods group reported using these cheaper alternatives, 
otherwise bottled gas dominated.
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5.3.1 Energy
In both the Establishment and Excluded Livelihood groups, interruptions 
in the electricity supply were accepted patiently with householders simply 
waiting them out. Household 27 claimed that the electricity company was more 
likely to deal first with problems in the main plaza or the wealthier Wanchaq 
District, taking longer to get to places outside the centre of town. He also said 
that: “before we used to have power cuts all the time in the dry season because 
there wasn’t enough water to run the generators, now it’s really rare. ”
By contrast, in the Entrepreneurial Livelihood group, a number of 
householders said that faced with service interruptions they would go to the 
electricity company or complain. These people had a livelihood interest in an 
uninterrupted supply: HH28 the jeweller who had paid for a 3-phase connection 
for his machinery, HH30 the entrepreneurial landlady, HH19 with two tenants 
and HH18 which ran an adjoining internet cafe.
5.3.2 Solid Waste
The system for collecting household waste in San Bias is set up so that 
people deposit their rubbish early on Monday, Wednesday and Friday mornings. 
In some areas of the city, household waste is brought to containers but in San 
Bias it is left exposed and although the piles of festering rubbish are usually 
collected before 10am, by that time dogs and vermin have already had time to 
raid and spread it. There are certain locations (shown on Fig), at the bottom of 
the steepest streets, that are accessible by a nimble waste collection vehicle: 
sacrificing capacity for manoeuvrability.
In the Establishment Livelihood group, Households 22, 24 and 27 were 
frustrated by fly-tipping which they blamed on outsiders. In the Entrepreneurial 
Livelihoods group (HH18, 23, 26), the culprit was more explicitly the inadequate 
waste collection service:
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Cusquenos never used to do this kind of thing, it’s a habit from HH24
Lima
[Rubbish trucks] should come every day because there’s a big HH27
population and tourism. It’s a tourist zone and it’s crowded
People bring rubbish from other places and dump it HH22
There is no fixed timetable [for collection] HH18
The rubbish trucks are only small and they can’t collect HH23
everything people put out so they leave it behind at the corner, 
the rubbish gets left behind
Households in the Excluded Livelihood category expressed much less 
dissatisfaction with the service and also claimed that they did not generate 
much rubbish:
The trucks come and we wrap rubbish in plastic bags, otherwise HH16 
we would be causing pollution. If the trucks don’t come, we go to 
the containers up the hill. No problem.
The trucks come regularly. We collect all the rubbish but there HH25 
isn’t much
In the Establishment and Entrepreneurial Livelihoods groups, a number 
of households were concerned that waste was not separated (HH24, HH27, 
HH28).
It goes in the truck, all mixed up: solids, organics, plastics 
It should be sorted and recovered
HH24
HH28
The households with experience of burying, burning or making use of 
household waste as compost were those with access to suitable space 
elsewhere; a large, unsealed yard; or a rural upbringing:
Before, we used to burn it in the garden because the service HH26 
came less often
Before, I used to sort it out and then after that I buried it in the HH30
ground. If the trucks don’t come we go to the big containers on 
Lucrepata and Titicaca [nearby streets].
In the country, we had a pit for organic waste, to make compost. HH24
With the plastics, I don’t know, there’s no way to deal with it.
They cause pollution
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Independent of livelihood category, none of the households interviewed 
in San Bias knew where their solid waste ended up. In all categories, there were 
households that identified “places in the hills” or “the country” (HH17, HH27 and 
HH29). While in the Establishment and Entrepreneurial Livelihoods categories a 
few households mentioned the municipal tip (HH22, HH18, 26, 28 and 30). The 
rest, in the Entrepreneurial (HH19, 23) and Excluded (HH16, HH29) categories, 
said that they had no idea where their rubbish went.
5.3.3 Waste Water and Storm Water
When it came to the destination of waste water, Household 24 in the 
Establishment Livelihoods category, was the only person in the San Bias 
interviews to acknowledge that waste water ended up in the River Vilcanota and 
to express dismay at this. This may have been linked to her oft cited youth in 
the countryside and subsequent migration to the city on marrying:
[it goes] into the street [and then?] to the River Choquechaka HH24 
and then the River Huatanay and then after that the Vilcanota.
Well, my view is that it’s completely awful. It shouldn’t go into 
the river.
Otherwise, whether or not households mentioned the River Huatanay as 
the final destination of their waste water was not linked to their livelihood 
group92. Household 16 in Excluded category was the only one to mention the 
treatment plant.
Several households reported localized problems with foul water and the 
overflow hazard caused by heavy rain and blockages in the system, including 
HH17 and HH22 with Establishment Livelihoods, HH19 in the entrepreneurial 
group and HH25 in the excluded category. The impact on these last households 
was made more acute by their location at the bottom of a steep cobbled street, 
with only a shallow, open drainage channel in the street to convey water into 
storm drains93. The effect of the torrential rainwater that “comes from up the 
hill"(HH25) was compounded in these households by their adobe construction:
92 The River Huatanay was mentioned by all except established HH 17, entrepreneurial HH26, 
27 and 30, excluded HH25.
93 The run-off has an incredible flow rate and just getting patios to drain fast enough can be a 
battle
16 1
It is really bad, we get flooded, it overflows, gets blocked by soil HH17 
and rubbish. The street is a river, it stinks. The manhole comes 
off and it stinks.
The manholes fill up with rubbish and waste water comes out. HH22 
And the manholes get stolen.
Sometimes they get blocked up in the street. When it rains we HH19 
get flooded out. Last year a wall fell down and we had to move 
into a different room.
Again location rather than livelihood group was behind the households 
that thought larger diameter sewage pipes ought to be installed (establishment 
HH24, HH27, entrepreneurial HH18, HH30 and excluded HH29). Household 30 
had water and sanitation high on her priority list: her livelihood depended on 
letting rooms to water-guzzling foreigners and her multi-storey house had 
problems with drain blockages.
Because we are higher up, we need bigger pipes. They get HH30 
blocked
SEDACusco’s maintenance of the system was criticized by Households 
22 and 16 in the establishment and excluded groups respectively.
5.3.4 Water
Across the District of Cusco, the percentage of households with a water 
supply connection inside their house stayed at 47% between 1993 and 2005. 
The percentage with connections within the demise increased from 32% in 1993 
to 40% in 2005: an overall increase in coverage from 79% to 87%. The increase 
in coverage of sanitation was similar with the percentage of households 
connected to the sewage system increasing from 81% to 92%. These figures do 
not reveal anything about drinking water or waste water treatment, the service 
provider or the quality of service.
The daily water service experienced by households in San Bias is 
characterised by regular afternoon interruptions regardless of livelihood 
category with households with continuity located in the water company’s 
neighbouring pressure zone (HH 22 and 27).
Household 30 reported the shortest period of daily water provision and 
was the highest household in the sample and thus at the limit of the water
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company’s pressure zone. The water company had agreed not to install a meter 
in this household94.
Table 20 Continuity o f water service
Midnight
6am
Midday
6pm
Midnight
As for “irregular” interruptions -  extra to the everyday cuts expected by 
residents -  various households across the groups did not report any irregular 
interruptions (HH22 and 17, HH 18. 19, 23 and 26 and HH25). Estimates 
among households reporting interruptions ranged from 20 times a year in 
establishment Household 24 to between 4 and 6 (HH27, HH30 and HH16). 
Excluded Household 16 did not know how many times the service stopped:
There are cuts about 20 times a year, maybe for a day. 20 days HH24 
ago there wasn’t any water for 3 days but we still pay the same 
even when the service breaks down, I buy water for washing 
hands.
From time to time there are interruptions, the last one was the HH29 
other week but I don’t know how many times a year, maybe for 
two days each time.
94 Partly because of the poor supply pressure and, according to the head of household, the fact 
that air was whistling through the meter when the water was off. HH30 installed a storage tank 
and paid a fixed fee regardless of consumption.
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Excluded LivelihoodsEstablishment Livelihoods Entrepreneurial Livelihoods
When views about the lack of water were sounded, location was 
perceived to be a factor. Household 17 linked the interruptions to the source 
and the treatment plants and acknowledged the central location of San Bias as 
a factor:
I don’t know. There’s a lack of supply from the plants, it depends HH17 
on the rains and it’s worse in August. The service is fine though.
They probably don’t cut us off because we’re central
This idea of privileged location is echoed by Household 22, which is 
located in a separate, lower altitude pressure zone and has an uninterrupted 
service. This time the location factor is linked to economic activity in the zone: 
tourism is a reason not to cut off supplies: the implication being that tourists are 
privileged over locals.
I’ve heard people in other barrios complain that “they don’t serve HH22 
us, they don’t do the repairs to our system” but here it’s ok 
because it is so touristy. The pressure is the thing that’s 
inconvenient. There’s so much pressure it can break the pipes 
and it makes you scared to take a shower, it’s so strong in make 
the solder pop off
Location and economic activity are linked to the service again by 
Household 2795. For the head of household in this case, the tourist centre will 
be prioritised over the peripheral areas. This view was shared by two 
households in the Excluded Livelihoods group:
Within the centre, in the hotels, it doesn’t suit them to have their HH27 
water turned off but on the edges there aren’t any hotels. Those 
in the centre should collaborate with those at the edges but I’ll 
pay a bit more so that the others pay less; it suits me, that’s all. I 
had to pay myself to mend the valve because they break down 
every 2 or 3 months -  the quality is so poor.
There is a shortage because of excessive consumption in the HH16 
centre.
It depends on the rain. There should be a [separate] system. It HH29 
shouldn’t supply the [central] Cusco system. Because it’s an 
archaeological zone it’s really expensive. Straight away they cut 
you off and make you pay for it.
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In contrast, the establishment Household 24 in the higher altitude 
pressure zone, blamed tourism for the shortages a change which this 
household had been able to observe over many years:
Before, it wasn’t like this: there was never a shortage of water. HH24 
Ever since it’s been more crowded, there hasn’t been water 
because of the tourism and the restaurants. I think that there are 
lots of hotels with cisterns and tanks, it gets used up. I heard that 
there are at least seventy [hostels] in San Bias but that’s 
unofficial information (“datos extraoificales"). It is a problem: 
sometimes you’re having a shower and it cuts out in the morning 
when you’re covered in soap. As two people we find it tough but 
it must be worse when you have children. The service is terrible 
for something so important.
Households 18 and 19 identified population growth as the reason for the 
rationing.
There are more people, that’s why there’s no water. I don’t HH19
know. They shouldn’t cut us off: in my view, no water means no
life
The sen/ice has got worse. Before it never ran dry but there is HH18 
rationing and population growth
Across groups, households noted that service restrictions had been 
introduced (HH17, HH18, 26, 28, 30, HH25, 16). In the establishment group, 
Household 17, fairly new arrivals to San Bias, reminisced about the untreated 
(and, by the sounds of it, unimproved) water sources that he used in the 1980s:
Twenty years ago, we went to las pacchas9*5... ages ago. There HH17 
was a stream in the alley when I was really tiny. Now with the 
restrictions... before they didn’t restrict it
Household 30 pinned down the timing to a deterioration in service that 
had begun 5 months before. This coincides with work on the main line into San 
Bias (but also with seasonal changes):
It changed 5 months ago, it was on all day but now it’s not HH30
96 "paccha" translates from Quechua as “cataract” or a source or spring.
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Outright hostility to the water company was expressed by Households 
19, 23 but otherwise the heads of household were resigned to the fact that there 
was not enough water to go round:
[SEDACusco] doesn’t explain anything to us! In the past it never HH23 
ran dry. Three years ago a pipe burst in Tandapata and since 
then there have been problems. It’s a terrible service. We can’t 
wash ourselves very early in the morning because it's so cold. It 
never used to run dry. Before we paid 9 to 12 soles (£1.50 - 
£2.00) and now we pay 26 to 29 (£4.50-£5) even though we 
don't have water
In the excluded group, Household 25 shrugged that the service was “muy 
buena” despite being furious about it informally and outside the interview 
setting. He did concede though that:
Before, there was more water. I don’t know why. HH25
In the Establishment Livelihood group, household water storage was not 
considered necessary (HH17, HH22 and HH27) except in Household 24 where 
the head of household admitted that recently she had begun to store water.
Since we have water every day, not much [is stored] HH17
All other households in the Entrepreneurial and Excluded Livelihood
groups, admitted to storing water for 24hours (HH18, HH19, HH23), 48hours
(HH16) and 72 hours (HH26, 28). Stored water was used for laundry (HH18,
HH30) and toilet flushing (HH18, HH16) and, where it was stored in covered
containers, it was used for cooking (HH26 and HH16). Households reported
using open containers (HH18, HH19) and covered containers (HH23, HH26,
HH28, HH16).
Yes we store because the supply dries up. On a daily basis, we HH30 
use drums, a storage tank designed for water storage and when 
we do the washing we use buckets and “tinas” (containers made 
out of old tyres). These are filled with a hose
We store because the tap runs dry. Every day we use a 50-601 HH23 
drum with a lid and another without a lid and we have a 40I 
container on the roof to collect rain water. We fill them every day 
with a hose and keep the water for a day
Just in case we store water in buckets with lids but we don’t use HH28 
it for drinking water unless it’s fresh. We store it for 3 days.
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Household 29, in the Excluded Livelihood category, mentioned storing 
water from “el perro”:
Sometimes, when it goes off, we use water from the “perro” and HH29 
store it for a few days in an 18 litre bucket with a lid.
Opinions over the cost of service were divided. Some households were 
happy with the cost and interestingly they spanned the livelihood groupings 
(establishment HH17, entrepreneurial HH18, HH30 and excluded HH25):
Since it’s metered, it is exact. HH17
Yes I am okay with the price since there are several families HH18 
living here. If we don’t pay, they cut us off within 2 months
Yes I agree with the cost. Since it is indirect [there is no meter], HH30 
Because the water isn’t on all day and the air makes the meter 
run. The engineer from SEDACusco said that I didn’t have to 
have a meter.
Household 24, in the Establishment Livelihood group, agreed with the 
cost on her own behalf but railed against it on behalf of the worst off:
I agree with the cost, an amount like this, given that the service HH24 
is irregular, it’s vital, it has to be affordable. They cut us off 
automatically in the second month, they fine you 29 soles (£5).
It’s an attack on our poverty, a punishment. If they don’t pay, it’s 
because they can’t!
Two other households in the Establishment Livelihoods group objected to 
the cost because they claimed that their water meters were miscounting and 
charging them when air rather than water raced through the pipework (HH22, 
HH27). Household 22 which had the highest monthly water bill per person in 
this group was unhappy about the service cost:
No way. It’s too much. The air makes the meter run. HH22
It’s a lot to ask, it works out very expensive for me. And it isn’t HH27 
exact: sometimes air runs through the pipes, it whistles, sounds 
horrible. [The cost] doesn’t match up with the real consumption.
If we consume more, they charge us more. When there are 
babies, we use lots of water to do laundry all the time. Here it is 
the SEDA system and they’d cut off my water [if I didn’t pay]
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In the entrepreneurial and excluded group, households felt that the price 
was high (HH19, HH16), or too much for the amount of water they actually used 
(HH23, HH28) and that the prices had gone up (HH26). Household 28 even 
compared the costs to the parallel administration further up the hill:
I’m not that happy about the cost of water because we don’t HH28 
consume much. For example in Villa San Bias, up the hill, they 
pay 2 soles (35p) per month for water from a spring.
There were also comments on the cost related to the water quality from 
the Establishment and Excluded Livelihoods groups:
It’s really expensive, it’s essential and it leaves a lot to be HH29 
desired. For example, better treatment... Let me explain it to 
you: in the morning during the rainy season, the water is turbid, 
dark. In the dry season, it is “bianco” [clear] and it has chlorine 
in it. It gets worse all the time: they help people with money, 
the big businessmen...
What emerged from the interviews is that householders perceived their 
location in the SEDACusco system to be important and related to their quality of 
service. There was the sense that central, tourist areas were privileged and that 
heritage areas were more expensive for the water company to service. 
Householders expressed the idea that there might be competition for water 
within the SEDACusco system, higher demand created by population growth 
and tourism and consequently rationing and restrictions imposed by the water 
company.
Householders turned to household storage, rainwater collection and 
public fountains, like ‘el perro’ in the face of water shortages. They also 
objected to what they perceived to be high water costs because they felt their 
consumption was low, their meters gave faulty readings and the water quality 
was poor.
5.4 Paths to Influence
In the district of Cusco the state remains involved in the provision of 
education, healthcare and policing. The national government’s Instituto 
Nacional de la Cultura (INC), charged with safeguarding heritage sites, is also 
an important actor with its aesthetic requirements imposing significant extra
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costs on the repairs to old colonial houses (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala 
Interview 6 2006).
The nearest primary and secondary schools were at the foot of San Bias, 
seven to eight blocks away for the highest residents and a block or two for 
those lower down the hill. The nearest health centre was much further away. 
Although there was a private clinic just next to the plaza in San Bias, the 
nearest health centre was in the Wanchaq District, ten to fifteen blocks away 
and more than 25 minutes by foot. The tight road network meant that the 
nearest bus stops were at the base of the hill.
CGPdA makes a general comment about the prospects for development 
reaching those most in need when Enrique Estrada notes that:
The current, centralised political context, is still not good at getting resources to 
an integrated programme of recovery and rehabilitation of the historic centre 
that might improve living conditions for the traditional, resident population.
(Estrada 2002)
5.4.1 Central Government
The household interviews brought out various attitudes to the state. The 
INC was mentioned by HH17 in the Establishment Livelihoods group. Even for 
this relatively income-stable household, potentially with the resources to 
upgrade their dwelling, restoring a colonial house within the constraints set out 
by the INC was an expensive and intimidating undertaking. In the Establishment 
Livelihoods group, whether they were satisfied with it or not, was a residual 
expectation of the state.
Common across the livelihoods group was a disappointment with the 
police service. In the Establishment Livelihoods group, householders’ 
expectations of the state had been moderated by the practical reality, where, at 
least in terms of security, the neighbourhood had taken matters into its own 
hands. Making reference to the very local efforts to tackle crime, Household 17 
reflected popular cynicism and HH24 explained that:
The police come but they don’t exactly rush HH17
We have agreed that we have to pay a subscription for security HH24 
guards... although in theory it is the responsibility of the state
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In the Entrepreneurial Livelihoods group, only the newcomer, Household 
30, seemed confident that the police would come if called. Other households 
were adamant that the police would not help them (HH18 and HH19):
They don’t come, they don’t take any notice HH19
A distinction was also made between the regular police and the tourist 
police, the latter being highly visible in San Bias:
The tourist police have started coming... we demanded a HH23 
service but the tourist police is just for tourists!
For the Excluded Livelihoods group, apart from Household 25, located 
closest to the plaza and within clear sight of the parking spot used by the tourist 
police at night, who said that “these days [the police] come”, the other 
households were dismissive of this state support (HH16, HH29):
We reported [being robbed] but they [the police] haven’t done HH29 
anything
Education, another nationally delivered service, was brought up by the 
old-timer accountant in the Establishment Livelihoods group (HH27). This 
comment followed the activist theme that wove in and out of most of his 
answers: that there was “lots of ignorance” and that people needed to 
understand political ideas because "the mind changes first”, "values have not 
been cultivated" adding that people also needed “ food to fight’. As we shall see, 
the almost revolutionary language of this man’s responses recurred and 
together build an account of suspicion and cynicism directed at the authorities. 
His daughter, nursing her tiny baby, put more weight on “physical things”: uthat 
they might get rid of factories” because of the pollution they caused and instead 
provide places for creative activities and parks.
5.4.2 Municipality of Cusco
It was two households in the Establishment Livelihoods category, the old- 
timer accountant and the teacher, who had the most to say about the
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municipality. Both were dismissive about the results they saw from their local 
tax contributions:
The authorities that we’ve got in Cusco are not bothered about HH27 
public health. They promise miracles at election time but they 
don’t care, right. This master plan, we don’t know whether it’s 
just a fiction or not
The municipality is practically obliged to be doing something with HH22 
the autovalor [local council tax]. We don’t benefit from any of the 
municipality’s public works. The householders face enough 
obstacles in trying to repair their own houses because it’s 
expensive and the homeowners don’t have any cash
For the households with Excluded Livelihoods, the role of the 
municipality did not come up. In the Entrepreneurial Livelihoods group, little 
mention was made of the municipality except in Household 23 -  with its 
livelihood interest in agriculture and markets for fresh produce -  where the head 
of household commented that:
Daniel Estrada was the best mayor we’ve had HH23
This was a reference to the tenure of Daniel Estrada, examined in 
Chapter 3, whose office spearheaded the regeneration of several of Cusco’s 
markets and the plaza in San Bias.
In San Bias the dominant preoccupation is with crime. There is also a 
perception that they were not prioritised by their service providers. In the 
establishment group, residual high expectations of the state were disappointed 
and supplanted in the entrepreneurial group by local development initiatives.
5.4.3 The Neighbourhood Committee
The San Bias Junta de Vecinos, or neighbourhood committee, has been 
around for at least fifty years97. It is now legally recognized and, at least in 
theory, brings together several groups including the “association of new artisans 
in San Bias”; the parish (which already plays a part in neighbourhood 
integration); and representatives from various housing associations. The history 
of this organization is summed up in Enrique Estrada’s study:
97 During the group session, the president of the neighbourhood committee said that he 
remembered having meetings as a child in the house of one of the older residents and that the 
barrio had always been well organised.
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In San Bias the neighbourhood committee has been formally constituted for a 
long time. Generally, it used to be run according to the personal interests of the 
board members. Today, one senses a degree of apathy among them and an 
indifferent attitude to working collectively, although there is concern and interest 
amongst members of the community who strongly identify themselves with the
barrio even if there really are leaders, the power to bring people together
remains limited by the lack of integration of the population.
(Estrada 2002)
Estrada’s observations were reinforced during household interviews and 
the final group session (San Bias Community Meeting 2007). Participants in the 
group session questioned whether the committee was really a “strong” 
organization and explained that public meetings were held about five times a 
year but they were poorly attended, especially by the young. They also cited a 
history of long presidential terms and not much evidence that the budget ends 
up in community assets. The focus of much of the committee’s energy is the 
Casa de Cultura which is being refurbished “to set an example to the rest of the 
city as a place that people can go to appreciate culture”. As a priority for the 
barrio, however, this did not chime with the ideas that emerged from household 
interviews.
The level of engagement with the neighbourhood committee was patchy 
in the Establishment and Entrepreneurial Livelihood groups. In the 
Establishment Livelihood group, for example, Household 24 had a prominent 
role on the committee and stressed that the committee was needed to address 
problems of crime and bring together the municipality and the police. Other 
households in this group, however, were more sceptical with Household 17 
feeling excluded and describing it as:
...just a group of mates, a closed shop HH17
Household 27 had been a long-time participant in the neighbourhood 
committee98 but even he was dubious about the committee’s efforts to tackle 
crime and had opted out of the neighbourhood strategy. His comments are 
consistent with his suspicious attitude to the authorities:
98 During the group session, he was remembered by another Sanbleno as having hosted 
committee meetings in his house thirty or forty years.
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I don’t pay because [the security guards] check out who has HH27
“resources” and pass on the information to third parties. You
can’t trust them. They’re ex-Army and they inform on people
The president of the committee, grouped in Entrepreneurial Livelihoods, 
emphasised that the committee had led the local response to crime and was 
keen to get across that the committee did not exist to burden people but rather 
“so that people would feel better”. He described the spontaneous local reaction
to crime and then outlined the committee’s official strategy to employ private
security guards:
We have had [robberies]. All the neighbours ran out with sticks! HH28
This strategy was confirmed by other households in the Entrepreneurial 
Livelihoods group (HH18 and 19) who said that there were occasional 
committee meetings:
There are robberies in San Bias. We are trying to sort it out HH19 
through the neighbourhood committee
Meanwhile, in the Excluded Livelihoods group, engagement was almost 
non-existent. The interview with HH16, a household close to the bottom of the 
pile in this zone, painted a picture of exclusion from both the neighbourhood 
committee and formal employment. The plea from the head of household was 
for a “more united people, so we can do something”. When asked what this 
“something” ought to be, he said “something economic: services and 
businesses".
Household 25 had not heard of the neighbourhood committee and 
Household 29 was dismissive of it:
They don’t call us to meetings. There is a neighbourhood HH16 
committee but I don’t know anything about it. We participate in 
the elections but not in the activities because there aren’t any 
meetings. There just aren’t. The people are really...they don’t 
take us into account.
The committee: it’s really disorganized. HH29
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The neighbourhood committee continued to be built around the 
involvement of a few core people, with exclusion felt by individual households in 
all groups but complete disengagement in the Excluded Livelihoods category.
5.4.4 Civil Society: NGOs and CBOs
There are other Civil Society organizations operating in San Bias. These 
are distinct from the neighbourhood committee either because their 
geographical reach goes beyond San Bias or because they focus on a specific 
sector or cause.
The CGPdA has been involved in the restoration of colonial houses and 
improvement of sanitation in households that were still using pit latrines and 
flagstone channels. By 2006, all the families interviewed had a WC with sewer 
connection inside their demise, although the date of installation varied by 
livelihood group. The CGPdA targeted their projects at those least able to afford 
improvements and this meant that the households in the Establishment 
Livelihood group had not been beneficiaries. All these households reported that 
they had had waste water connections for as long as they could remember 
(HH24, HH27, HH17, HH22) but they were still all aware of this NGO’s work. 
Households 22 and 24 were positive, calling CGPdA a “great NGO” and 
elaborating that:
They are restoring old colonial houses and they come highly HH24 
recommended. They are saving the heritage
The accountant in Household 27 expressed his by now familiar cynicism 
on the intervention of NGOs which he felt should be directed at the most 
marginal, the poorest families, and he deliberately excluded himself from this 
category.
They don’t do what they’re supposed to do. It’s something else, HH27 
it’s camouflaged, an institution that’s doing deals with the 
municipality
In contrast with the Establishment Livelihoods group, a number of 
households in the Entrepreneurial Livelihoods group had been helped by 
CGPdA. In particular, Households 19 and 26 were favourably disposed towards 
the NGO because they had been given help to renovate their stone drainage
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channels and install waste water connections. Others who had not been 
assisted occasionally knew about the CGPdA projects (HH18, HH23) but the 
prosperous president of the neighbourhood committee -  obviously not a 
beneficiary -  said of CGPdA that:
They don’t do much, only research and training and promoting HH28 
their own centre
In the Excluded Livelihoods category, Households 25 and 29 were aware 
of CGPdA because they both had been supported to renovate their WC 
connections. Otherwise they were not aware of or participating in any 
organisations working in the barrio and said that they didn’t know or hadn’t seen 
any (HH16, HH29) or were not up to date (HH25).
Beyond the physical upgrades, the CGPdA was intervening in broader 
development activities and attempting to open channels for participation. 
Household 22 in the Establishment Livelihood group reporting that -  despite 
being a relative newcomer to the area -  she was the nominated representative 
for her street. Her job was to help “get people involved” by going door to door 
encouraging people to meet with CGPdA, although she admitted that it was a 
struggle to get people engaged. She mentioned that CGPdA was promoting 
ideas on ways to rent out rooms to foreigners and set up "casas hospedajes" or 
guest houses.
In the Entrepreneurial Livelihoods group, Household 26 mentioned the 
capacity building efforts of the CGPdA and the support to home-based 
enterprise, in this case urban agriculture:
Well, I think they coordinate women in the zone via HH26 
COMUZONE, they run workshops and helped me with my 
garden
CGPdA’s influence was not regarded as universally benign, with 
Household 28 reporting that San Bias residents had wanted additional 
containers for solid waste but that CGPdA had objected for aesthetic reasons 
and this had discouraged the municipality from providing them. This highlights 
the tension between tourism, the amenity and cultural value of Cusco’s heritage 
and the provision of municipal services.
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In three cases, Household 24 with an Establishment Livelihood and 
Households 28 and 30 in the Entrepreneurial Livelihoods group, the households 
had set up their own, home-grown NGOs. For Household 24 this was the 
workshop for young, deaf women and although it had profit-making features that 
were difficult to pin down, capacity-building was a fundamental part of the 
exercise. Household 28, the jeweller and neighbourhood committee president, 
devoted his spare time to a group in Villa San Bias (a comunidad campesina, 
settled informally higher up the hill) called Sons of the House of the Sun (los 
hijos de la casa del sol). He worked as a ‘motivator’ or facilitator:
We train people to work with machines as silversmiths and HH28 
artisans in workshops
This role and his neighbourhood committee position mean that he had 
meetings with craftsmen, the municipality, the junta and the local NGO -  all this 
took up so much time that to keep his own jewellery business running, his wife 
and children had to help in his workshop.
Household 30 was a founding member of an organisation for women 
called “Hands Together”, which she helped to set up in Magisterio, one of the 
new, wealthy suburbs of Cusco in Wanchaq District.
The aim is to sell our handicrafts in our shop. We bring together HH30 
new ideas and each member has their particular skill. Me, I knit 
and I’m going to train people in that too
These pockets of collective action and training combined the capacity 
building aspirations of a development NGO with a role that could be described 
as “business development”, straddling the Market and Civil Society spheres of 
governance.
The oldest householder in the sample, talked repeatedly about local and 
state institutions that were consistently cynical to the point of paranoia. This 
man was born in 1936 and would have been a professional with a young family 
on the eve of President Velasco’s 12 year period of military rule. His responses 
have to be seen in the context of this upheaval and the attempts of the state to 
infiltrate and undermine Civil Society.
The Establishment Livelihoods were outside the intervention of CGPdA. 
The picture in the entrepreneurial group was more mixed with some households
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getting assistance and others not. All the those in the excluded group were 
helped by CGPdA. CGPdA activities ranged from physical interventions in 
infrastructure and assets to building capacity for collective action and home- 
based entrepreneurial activities.
Outside the national or municipal state entities and the large, local 
development NGO were home-grown organisations focused on capacity 
building and business development but targeting certain vulnerable groups 
(young, deaf women, informal campesino communities). These organisations 
had aspects which straddled the market and civil society categories of the 
governance framework with their pseudo-profit-making character.
5.5 Livelihood Vulnerability: diversity and complexity in San Bias
As a reminder of what has been developed in this chapter, the livelihood 
groups can be characterised briefly as the Establishment Livelihoods group, 
the teacher-landlady (HH22); the comfortably-off young accountant with his 
teacher daughter (HH17); the upstanding retirees (HH24) with their ambiguous 
NGO sideline; and the verbose ‘old-timer’ with revolutionary tendencies (HH27). 
Their livelihoods were characterised by higher education (human capital), 
owner-occupancy (or low state rent) and access to urban labour markets. The 
range of activities was narrow, limited to public sector teachers and private 
sector accountants. This group was by-passed by the local NGO, Centro 
Guaman Poma de Ayala, and shared a residual expectation of the state, 
whether or not it had been met.
In the Entrepreneurial Livelihoods group, a much more diverse range 
of activities was introduced with the jeweller and committee president (HH28); 
the expansionist landlady renting ever more numerous rooms to foreigners 
(HH30); the multiple occupancy landlords and only farmers in the sample 
(HH23); the teachers with the internet cafe (HH18); the professional and 
market-seller couple with their elderly mother (HH19); and the street-food seller 
and her semi-professional children in (HH26). The themes of these livelihoods 
were more precarious financial assets and either developing human capital in 
the next generation or multiple adult professionals in the same household. One 
important physical asset was sufficient living space to rent or fill with capable 
relatives. Some households in this group had been beneficiaries of the CGPdA
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upgrade project but those that had not had initiated their own local NGOs that 
concentrated not on poverty alleviation but enterprise development.
Those in the Excluded Livelihood category were the casual workers 
that were ‘practically begging’ (HH16); the moto-taxi driver working in Puerto 
Maldonado (HH29); and the elderly widow renting out space for another 
entrepreneur to run an internet cafe (HH25). These households faced insecure 
wages, low human or financial capital and, despite clocking up impressive 
periods as residents of San Bias, low social capital and exclusion from 
neighbourhood organisations. The neighbourhood committee had been 
established for just as long as these households, perhaps allowing very 
longstanding patterns of exclusion to become entrenched. Expectations of the 
state and the neighbourhood committee were low but they had all been 
beneficiaries of the CGPdA works to improve sanitation. The neighbourhood 
committee had been established for just as long as these households, perhaps 
allowing very longstanding patterns of exclusion to become entrenched.
Plotted as asset pentagons (Figure 36), the Establishment Livelihoods 
have assets concentrated in the human, physical and financial axes. The 
Entrepreneurial Livelihoods have, in some cases, slightly weaker human and 
financial capital but have a broader range of assets with social and natural 
capital balancing out the pentagon. The Excluded Livelihoods have a weaker all 
round asset base particularly in social, human and financial terms.
Figure 38 Disaggregated pentagon plots
Establishment Livelihoods Entrepreneurial Livelihoods Excluded Livelihoods
There was a perception that location and economic activity were factors 
in the continuity and cost of water supply. First, there was a sense that certain 
users in the central tourist zones were prioritized but also that it was more 
expensive to supply water to the heritage sites where demand was high.
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Tourism, population growth and excessive demand were blamed for forcing 
water restrictions on the population. The objections to the cost of water were 
bound up in the belief that the water meters were faulty and kept turning over 
even when pipes were running empty, the perception that household water 
consumption was low and the poor perceived quality of the water. In times of 
scarcity, inhabitants turned to public fountains or springs (el perro), rainwater 
harvesting, borrowing from neighbours or buying bottled water.
The links between households and the environment were limited, with 
low natural capital and geographic and psychological separation from the River 
Huatanay, waste disposal sites and water sources. Livelihoods were linked to 
tourism and the urban service sector but these strategies operated without the 
need to interlink within San Bias.
During the group meetings, older residents felt that San Bias should not 
be considered only the small area delimited by the Centro Guaman Poma de 
Ayala but as the much larger parish that it covered. There was a perception that 
different parts of the city were treated differently by the water company. In San 
Bias this was attributed to its central location, heritage value and tourism.
Only a handful of key people in the Establishment and Entrepreneurial 
Livelihood groups were involved in the neighbourhood committee. Residents 
anticipated using the private sector to improve their personal security. An 
external NGO, CGPdA, was active in upgrading network infrastructure and 
individual assets, building capacity for collective action and promoting home- 
based enterprise. CGPdA’s help was targeted at the households with the most 
precarious livelihoods: CGPdA subsidised the excluded and some
entrepreneurs but expected the most established to make full contributions to 
network improvements. Those who did not benefit from NGO intervention and 
had low expectations of the state founded their own home-grown organisations, 
geared towards enterprise development and sometimes with a pseudo-profit- 
making character. Apart from a sense that the water company privileged certain 
geographic and economic sectors, the activities of SEDACusco were largely 
mysterious.
Provincial intervention in San Bias focused on its being part of the 
‘historic centre ’. The water provider was the provincial water company, 
SEDACusco, whose relationship with users was formalised through monthly 
water bills and a formal complaints procedure. CGPdA was involved in
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sanitation and waste water connections with wide technical and social reach 
and worked through the neighbourhood committee and with individual 
householders. Community-based organisations had not been set up to tackle 
development of infrastructure with broad technical and social reach but focused 
instead on a particular cause or sector often straddling governance categories 
of civil society and market.
As a partial response to the research question, this chapter builds up a 
picture of the different livelihoods that co-exist in San Bias and compares the 
diversity and complexity of household assets that exist across a group that is 
ostensibly connected to the same water and sanitation system. Regardless of 
livelihood group, households were affected by insecurity, traffic congestion and 
competition with tourists for living space, peace and quiet and water resources.
While the impact of overflowing drains mapped closely to localised risk, 
vulnerability to flooding and heavy rainfall was linked to weak physical assets 
such as poor adobe construction and inadequate patio drainage. Limited 
financial capital meant that repairs and upgrades were a serious burden on 
household budgets. Poor storm water drainage was not entirely blind to 
livelihood but generally there was no escaping the combination of inadequate 
infrastructure, steep gradient and impermeable surfaces during the rains.
1 8 0
Chapter 6 Angostura: ‘agua dulce’
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Our next case study takes us South East from the centre of Cusco, down 
the valley of the River Huatanay, to the district of Saylla. This district was 
founded on the 14th January 1942 under the presidency of Manuel Prado and 
lies about 14km away from the centre of Cusco city. Saylla District takes in 
peaks of up to 4,350m as well as swathes of the valley floor at 3,050m. It is 
here in the floodplain that we find Angostura, the first settlement in the district 
as we head away from Cusco.
Figure 39 Location of Angostura
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This chapter examines the livelihoods of households in the Angostura 
settlement. Again, the chapter is structured according to the four analytical 
categories offered by the Sustainable Livelihoods framework. This time, though, 
the characterisation of livelihoods is themed by categories that have been 
labelled Urbane, Traditional and Diversified Livelihoods.
In the District of Saylla as a whole, 91% oh houses are of mud brick or 
adobe and 65% are owned outright by their occupants. Rented housing account 
for 15% and another 15% is provided by employers or other institutions (INEI 
2005).
The heart of Saylla district sits on the site of three ayllus, or farming co­
operatives, that date back at least five hundred years. Cutting the district neatly 
in half on the valley floor, is the River Huatanay, wending its way towards the
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Amazon Basin, as well as the arterial Cusco-Urcos highway which connects the 
provincial capital to the high Andean plateau and eventually to Puno, Lake 
Titicaca and neighbouring Bolivia (Figure 37).
PHYSICAL
5.1 Angostura Pentagon Plots
The most obvious difference between Angostura’s asset pentagon and 
those of San Bias and Manco Capac is that it is skewed towards Natural Capital 
with landownership and agriculture playing a more prominent role (Figure 38). 
Interestingly, the households with high Human and Financial Capital are less 
well endowed with Social Capital as can be seen by the straight lines joining the 
highest points on the Human and Financial axes. The range of Financial Capital 
between the best and worst off in the settlement is not as exaggerated as in 
San Bias but the best off appear to be better off than their counterparts in 
Manco Capac.
Figure 40 Angostura Asset Pentagons____________________________________________
San Bias Angostura
HUMAN
Manco Capac
SOCIAL NATURAL
6.1.1 Urbane Livelihoods : strong connections to the c ity ’s institutions
Of the households sampled in Angostura, only two have been classified 
as “urbane”. We shall see that these households are different from each other 
but that they also stand out sufficiently in the case study group to merit attention. 
Worth noticing first of all, is the form of their asset pentagons: they both have 
strong human and financial capital. Household 1 appears better off in social
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than in physical terms while Household 6 is much better off in physical than in 
social capital.
Looking first at Household 1, this was a small family unit: parents in their 
forties and two primary school aged children. Both adults have completed a 
university education with the husband working as a professional for the 
municipality and the wife, a former paediatric nurse, running a grocery shop 
from their home. Their combined and stable monthly income is about 1,000 
soles (£170). The family has lived in the barrio for 22 years and they own their 
house: a tiled, adobe building with cement floors. Clocking up more than twenty 
years in the settlement is, in part, what has enhanced the social capital 
measure shown on the pentagon but -  and this cannot easily be quantified -  it 
became clear on my regular visits that the matronly shop-owner was regularly 
called upon by other local parents to watch over the neighbourhood children 
while the adults worked (Households 2 and 3). Natural capital appears low 
because there is no involvement in agriculture and household animals are kept 
only as pets or guard dogs.
During the interview with Household 6 , the wife emphasised that there 
was no "head of household” and that the couple took equal roles. The main 
similarity with Household 1 is the high level of education with husband and wife 
both holding university degrees and, of the five adult children still living in the 
family home, three had completed their university education and the two 
youngest were still enrolled. Two other relatives lived with the family, one 
university graduate and a primary school aged child.
In common with Household 1, the husband in Household 6 was a state 
employee but this time in a national government entity: a project of the Ministry 
of Agriculture. The wife was an economic consultant but, much more 
importantly, she was the president of the community committee and, following 
the municipal elections late in 2006, she had become a “regidora”, or 
alderwoman, of the municipal authority. Again, the household income was 
stable and high at 3,000 soles (£515) per month and, although the family was a 
recent arrival in Angostura -  they settled in 2000 -  the house had been paid for 
outright. It was one of the few concrete block buildings in the settlement and 
had tiled floors and indoor taps and bathrooms. Despite the higher absolute 
income, the household still reared guinea pigs and chickens to eat and kept 
dogs and cats for security and as pets.
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The following tables and figures give a graphical representation of the 
situation. Household 6 has a low sanitary risk score but thermotolerant coliforms 
showed up in samples from both households.
Table 21 Households and Taps In Urbane Group, Angostura_________________________
HH 1 HH 6
‘matronly figure’ ‘president and extended family’
4 people, 2 taps 9 people, 3 taps
Figure 41 Sanitary risk score in Urbane Group, Angostura
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What distinguishes these households was that their formal sector 
employment provided stable and relatively high monthly incomes compared to 
others in the group. Reporting monthly income is also easier when salaries are 
based on formal contracts and paid on a monthly basis -  rather than generated 
after every three month harvest as we shall see is the case for many 
households in Angostura.
These households also used gas for cooking and had high per capita 
electricity consumption which they both attributed to electric showers and, in the 
case of HH6, home computers. Households were not billed by volume and 
household water use estimates were unrealistically low given the service level
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with HH1 estimated 101/p/d and Household 6, which had multiple connections in 
the home including showers, kitchen sink, WCs, guessing 301/p/d.
Figure 42 Monthly income levels and u tility  expenditure per person in Urbane Group, 
Angostura
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Even these relatively privileged households did not command the same 
levels of income as the best off households in the establishment and 
entrepreneurial groupings in the San Bias sample, although incomes were 
stable. What is interesting is that the fixed, monthly water rate in the settlement 
does not even appear on the graphs of average bills per person -  the cost is 
negligible and significantly less than the corresponding energy bills. In 
Household 1, the electricity bill was regarded as high and the family explained 
that they had an electric water heater and an iron which is what pushed up the 
costs. In Household 6, a similar explanation was given: the family had an 
electric water heater (used by many more inhabitants) and several computers.
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These two households showed awareness of environmental issues in 
many of their responses but they do not have water meters and consequently 
have no idea of their overall water consumption".
Household 6 said that, in addition to domestic consumption, water was 
used for the animals and to water the garden but none of these activities could 
be described as commercial or essential to livelihoods.
Both households said that they boiled water for drinking and only 
Household 6 admitted that the children occasionally got ill as a result of the 
water:
The children; they get an upset stomach if they drink untreated HH6 
tap water
Households 1 and 6 reported that they would turn to the JASS for help if 
there were a problem with the system and no alternative sources of water were 
suggested by either household. The additional comment from the joint head of 
household 6 crosses over with questions of human capital and capacity 
because she points out that there are very few people able to maintain the 
system:
Where else can we get water from? We should be able to drink HH6 
the water we have with chlorination, in our house. There are only 
two repairmen in the JASS. We need to train other young 
people.
These livelihood profiles rely on stable, relatively high incomes from work 
in the public sector. Although both families reared small animals for home 
consumption, there was no direct link to agriculture.
Even when I moved to a concept of bucketfuls rather than litres as a measure, the estimates 
were low.
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6.1.2 Traditional Livelihoods: linked to the land
These households all owned land which they cultivated, sometimes 
alongside other formal and informal employment.
In Household 5100, the female head of household had not completed her 
primary education but the next generation was doing better with her son 
securing a tertiary technical qualification and daughter who had completed 
secondary education. The family said that they had always lived in Angostura 
but had been in their current house for 8 years. When it came to employment, 
the son was very vague describing himself as “independiente, tecnico”. It 
became clear when we discussed security of income that he worked as a 
mechanic on buses.
There is a lack of work in the rainy season, from December to HH5 
March everything goes down. In the school term, there is 
demand for mechanics for the buses...
He claimed his daily wage amounted to about 2,000 soles (£344) per 
month or 100 soles (£17) per day. My impression during the interview was that 
this was an exaggeration and in subsequent cross-checking it transpired that 
this would be three times what a university-educated school teacher would earn 
and does not tie up with comparable wages in the transport sector. This does 
raise an important point, though, that in this group, where employment is casual 
or based on the smallholding, it is harder to estimate cash income accurately.
Household 8 was demographically very similar to Household 5 with the 
head of household a single man of 45 with only a primary education who 
worked on the family’s smallholding or “chacra”. He lived with two adult children 
and a daughter-in-law, all of whom had completed secondary school and a 
grandchild of 3 years old. The two women worked in the home and the other 
adult son worked as a driver earning a daily wage which he did not specify but 
from other interviews was probably between 10 and 20 soles (£1.70-£3.40) per 
day. The income from the smallholding was estimated at about 500 soles (£86) 
every three months. This works out at something between 366 and 566 soles 
(£63-£97) per month. This family had been in Angostura for 23 years.
100 Although the family group agreed that the head of household was the 42 year old mother and 
housewife, most of the responses came from her 25 year old son. The 17 year old daughter, the 
second member of the household employed in the home and mother of the youngest inhabitant, 
remained completely silent despite my best efforts to address everybody.
1 8 8
The remaining households in this group all relied exclusively on 
agricultural earnings. The head of household 11 proved extremely elusive 
despite many attempts to conduct an interview at different times and on 
different days of the week101. The family was large and extended including the 
head of household, his wife and 6 children (the youngest of which was at 
secondary school) and 16 grandchildren. Only the head of household had 
completed secondary education with his wife having only primary school level. 
Everyone, including the children, worked on the smallholding but they did not 
know the seasonal income in monetary terms. This family had been in 
Angostura for 20 years.
The female head of household 12 had not completed primary school and 
had three children ranging in age from 10 to 14. The main source of income 
was from a smallholding and she estimated her daily income as about 6 soles 
(£1) per day. She was also the only person in the group not to own her house 
outright: she was still paying instalments. This household had also been 
established in Angostura for 20 years.
Household 15 again relied on agricultural income with neither adult 
having completed secondary school and 3 children ranging in age from 7 to 17. 
Income in this case came from selling produce at the market every 3 months 
and it worked out at 200 soles (£34), equivalent to 60 to 70 soles (£10-£12) per 
month. This family had been in the barrio for 15 years, slightly less time than 
most of the households in this group.
The dependence of these households (HH8, HH11, HH12, HH15) on 
agricultural income also came out in their comments about fluctuations in 
earnings.
It all depends on the rain HH8
May, July and August there is almost no harvest HH11
Household 10 was a smaller family unit with two primary school aged 
children and parents who had not completed secondary education. Like 
Household 8, the family had been in Angostura for 23 years. The head of 
household worked as a carpenter in a workshop in the home, earning around 20 
soles (£3.40) per day, and his wife alternated between running a shop at the
101 Twice during the day he was incoherently drunk!
189
front of the house, from which she estimated earnings of 50 soles (£8.60) per 
month, and working the family small-holding, yielding between 50 and 80 soles 
(£8.60-£13.70) every 3 months. This amounts to a monthly income of around 
550 soles (£95). The school term seems to have an impact on household 
budgets but for this family, whose income comes partly from a shop and whose 
children are not yet in higher education, the effect is reversed: families have to 
spend more money in the shop on school equipment:
January and February are the worst month because of the rain. HH10 
When the kids don’t have school [income] goes down. There is 
more in term time
Household 14 was slightly different from the others in the group in that 
the head of household had a permanent contract with PeruRail -  although there 
is a pattern here with employment in the transport sector. This family102 also 
worked a smallholding and they estimated their monthly income at 630 soles 
(£108). This household was the most recent arrival in this group with only 13 
years in the barrio. Although the parents only had a primary education, the 
eldest daughter was at university and this had an impact on the household 
budget which came out when I asked whether incomes varied at all:
It changes: sometimes we don’t have enough because the HH14
children are studying. The school term is worse because we
have to pay about 15 soles (£2.60) per day on transport
I have mentioned that the households in this group, with the exception of 
female-headed household HH12, owned their houses and had generally been 
living in Angostura for about 20 years. What they also had in common was 
ownership of land within the district but slightly further down the valley. All but 
Household 14 used water from the River Huatanay for irrigation. The crops
included tall-growing maize (all except HH10) and animal fodder but also low-
growing cabbage (HH10), potatoes (HH11, HH15), coriander (HH11), 
vegetables and carrots (HH15). Households 5 and 15 were also rearing 
chickens, sheep and guinea pigs to sell while everybody else reared chickens 
and other animals for domestic consumption: ducks (HH10), rabbits (HH10, 
HH12), guinea pigs (HH11, HH14, HH15) and cows (HH11).
102 parents in their forties and four children between 5 and 19
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The other feature of this livelihood package was the tendency to use 
firewood rather than bottled gas for cooking. Only Household 8 mentioned using 
gas occasionally. Everybody else gathered wood themselves from the forest or 
their smallholdings.
Lastly, all households in this group lived in buildings that were typical of 
the settlement: adobe with tiled roofs. Households 10, 14 and 15, these last two 
among the most recent arrivals, were the only families with sealed cement 
floors rather than earth indoors. Household 5, on the left bank of the river, had 
no pavements but the other households on the right bank, did have pavements 
some of which were being newly built as I conducted the second round of water 
sampling.
With the exception of Households 5 and 15, sanitary risk scores in this 
group were lower. Only HH15 had a standpipe and all the other households had 
cement basins connected to the drainage system.
Table 22 Households and Taps in Traditional Group, Angostura
HH 5 HH 8 HH 10 HH 11 HH 12 HH 14 HH 15
‘female ‘male farmer ‘farmer- ‘farmer and ‘female ‘farmers- ‘farmer-
farmer and and driver’ carpenter- 16 farmer- PeruRail children 7 to
driver son’ shop’ grandchildren’ young
kids
contract’ 17'
5 people, 2 5 people, 2 4 people, 4 13 people, 2 4 6 people, 2 5 people, 1
taps taps taps taps people, 
2 taps
taps tap
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Figure 43 Sanitary risk score in Traditional Group, Angostura
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Household 5 with the high income estimated by the bus mechanic son 
appears to have the highest, anomalous income in the group. Otherwise 
monthly incomes, where they could be estimated, were low and variable. 
Earnings depended on agricultural output only in HH11, 12 and 15. In HH5, 8 
and 14 the supplementary income came from the transport sector while in HH10 
the family had two home-based businesses to fall back on. Energy consumption 
per person was very low and most households used firewood rather than gas 
for cooking. Household estimates of water consumption ranged from less than 
5l/p/d (HH8, 10 and 14) to less than 10 (HH5, 11 and 15) and were 
unrealistically low.
Household 5 appears to have a much higher income than others in this 
group but this is probably deceptive given the experience during the interview 
which I mention earlier in this section. Again water bills are negligible.
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Figure 44 Monthly income levels and utility expenditure per person in Traditional Group, 
Angostura
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Several families used water for household animals (HH8, HH10, HH12 
and HH15), plants (HH12) and making adobe or mud bricks (HH8, 15):
[we do use water] for adobe but it’s for the house. Nothing HH8 
special
Although Household 15 was rearing animals to sell, water was not being 
used as part of any essential income generating activities.
In Angostura’s traditional livelihoods group, opinions about water quality 
and behaviour are mixed. Most households admitted to drinking both untreated 
tap water and boiled water customarily in the home. While Households 5 and 15 
only drank water direct from the tap. Household 15 had one of the worst 
installations of any of the sampled houses in Angostura. For a hint at its 
decrepit condition, see the photograph in Table 22:
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[we drink water] directly from the tap. When we come in from the HH15 
chacra, we are thirsty.
The action taken by families in the event of a problem with the water supply, 
also reveals some tendencies that were not in evidence in San Bias. 
Households 5, 8 and 11 all said they would contact the JASS or the fontanero 
but Households 10 and 14 were planning to go straight to the top and complain 
directly to the committee president. That households had any faith in their local 
representative taking action on their behalves, already marks this group out 
from others in Cusco.
The need to turn to alternative water sources was obviously reduced in 
Angostura by virtue of its reliable supply system. However, Household 5 -  the 
only household that reported occasionally running short of water at weekends 
because of its location in the simple water network -  did volunteer another 
option. The property had a small stream running through it (and on past 
Household 3 as we shall discover):
I use water from the stream for washing HH15
With all these households owning agricultural land, farming was an 
important livelihood activity, linked inevitably to the River Huatanay. 
Complementary activities included work in the transport sector and a home- 
based shop and carpentry workshop. Cash incomes were difficult for 
householders to estimate but they were seasonal and low.
6.1.3 Diversified Livelihoods: the go-betweens
This group has been labelled “diversified” but this does not necessarily 
imply a robust position of strength vis-a-vis livelihoods. By and large, these 
households are recent arrivals to the barrio and, even the couple that worked as 
“chacreros", or farmers, did not work their own land but worked on a casual 
basis for others. The jumble of household strategies arises out of necessity and 
a weak overall asset base. This is borne out by a look at the first household in 
this group, HH2, a couple with only a primary level education and three young 
children. The main source of income speaks volumes:
Sorting and crushing rubbish HH2
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The head of household works at this full-time for a monthly wage of 300 
soles (£52) and his wife does the same thing on a casual basis for about 50 
soles (£8.60) per month and when asked about the variation in the household 
budget it was less about cash coming in as expenses going out:
Yes it varies. In the school months it’s terrible because of the HH2 
fees, bus fares and note books
To make this cash income last, guinea pigs were being raised to sell and 
for their own consumption. This family had been living in Angostura for about 5 
years -  much less time than their counterparts in the previous section -  and the 
house was owned by a parent.
This family’s neighbours in Household 3 were in a curious situation, 
unique in the sample. Among the most recent arrivals with only 2 years in the 
settlement, this was a female-headed household with 5 children ranging in age 
from 3 to 16 years old. The mother had completed her secondary education but 
worked in a different province, in the rainforest town of Puerto Maldonado103. 
After repeated visits to the family and abortive attempts to sit down for an 
interview, I resorted to interviewing the 16 year old daughter since she was the 
acting head of household during their mother’s absence (the mother was 
apparently at home but refused to come out for a chat). The daughter estimated 
the daily income as about 30 to 50 soles (£5-£8.60) just described her mother’s 
employment as “a business”.
Sometimes there’s a lot, sometimes there is nothing. At this time HH3 
of year, there is practically nothing, it’s the fiesta season
Neighbours described these children as “casi abandonada” -  practically 
abandoned -  and whatever the story, it was apparently an unusual set-up. Just 
from my visual assessment, it was clear that the house and yard were in a 
derelict condition and chickens that were scurrying about were just for the 
family’s consumption.
In Household 4, I encountered one of the most vociferous interviewees. 
This mother of three children under fourteen described herself as a housewife.
103 this place came up in Chapter 4 as the regular place of work of Household 29
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Although she had completed her secondary education and her husband had not, 
he was still the main breadwinner and worked as a bus driver for which he 
brought in about 15 soles (£2.50) per day. This varied, however, between 8 and 
18 soles (£3) which meant a monthly income of between about 200 and 400 
soles (£34-£69). This family also had guinea pigs scuttling about but only for 
their own domestic consumption. They had only been in the area for 8 months, 
making them the newest settlers. They did not own their home outright but were 
paying for it in instalments, which they were quick to emphasise were nearly 
paid off.
As in Household 7, the head of household had a marginally lower 
education level than his spouse: she had completed primary school but he had 
not. This couple’s livelihood was agricultural but unlike in the previous
Traditional Livelihoods category, this family did not own their own land but
worked at a combined piece-rate of between 3 and 10 soles (50p - £1.70) per 
day. What’s more, they told me that:
When it rains, we don’t work HH7
This works out at an earning power during the harvests of about 280 
soles (£48) per month spread amongst four people, two of whom were under 6, 
and falling to more or less nothing during the worst periods of the rainy season. 
Unsurprisingly, this income was supplemented by rearing a sheep, chickens, 
ducks and guinea pigs in their yard for their own consumption and to sell. This 
household too had only been in Angostura for a short time; 4 years.
The story in Household 9 was slightly more hopeful. The head of
household with his incomplete secondary education worked as a labourer
earning about 400 soles (£69) per month. His wife was based in the home and 
ran a grocery store from the premises. Three of their four children were at 
secondary school and the fifth was enrolled in a technical university.
There are months when there is no work: January and February HH9 
are more “casual" (eventual)
The head of Household 13 had completed his secondary school 
education and worked as a taxi driver and artisan earning about 1000 soles 
(£171) per month. His wife commuted into the centre of Cusco to work as a
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photocopier in a photocopying shop earning between 15 and 20 soles (£2.60- 
£3.40) per day. The combined monthly income was between 1300 and 1500 
soles (£223-£258).
Of course [income varies]! Each year it goes down, it varies. For HH13 
example in January and February it drops because there is no 
tourism. There are no foreigners. From May onwards, there are 
[lots of foreigners].
The family reared chickens and pigs -  they had a large, shared yard -  
but these animals were primarily for their own consumption.
These last two households, HH9 and HH13, were both renting their 
homes. The shop owner-labourer couple had lived in Angostura for 8 years but 
only in the current house for a year. The taxi-photocopier couple had been in 
their rented house for 3 years but again had been in the barrio for a bit longer. 
These were also the only two households that did not have internal earth floors 
but more rugged cement surfaces.
Otherwise in terms of construction, this group was typical in having 
adobe buildings with tiled roofs, for the two rented homes and Household 7, and 
corrugated iron for everyone else.
The household installations varied from leaking standpipes over earth 
patios with no drainage in HH2 to a concrete sink, taps and hoses in HH13. The 
water supply was not chlorinated and thermotolerant coliforms were found in 
several samples.
All householders had low and seasonal incomes that they often found 
difficult to calculate in cash terms. Household 13 with a non-agricultural 
livelihood and daily cash income gave the highest household income estimate. 
Others supplemented cash income with home-production of food. Water bills 
per person per month were very low and electricity consumption was lower than 
in the other case studies. Household estimates of their own water consumption 
were very low at less than 101/p/d except in HH13 whose estimate was 121/p/d.
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Table 23 Households and Taps In Diversified Group, Angostura
HH 2 
‘waste 
sorters’
HH 3 
'casi 
abandonada’
HH 4
‘vociferous 
and bus 
driver’
HH 7 
‘tenant 
farmers’
HH 9 
‘shopowner- 
labourer’
HH 13 
‘taxi- 
photocopier’
5 people, 6 people, 1 tap 5 people, 4 people, 1 tap 6 people, 1 tap 4 people, 1 tap 
1 tap 1 tap
Figure 45 Sanitary risk score in Diversified Group, Angostura
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Figure 46 Monthly income levels and utility expenditure per person in Diversified Group, 
Angostura
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Household
With the exception of Household 13 whose livelihood was strongly linked 
to tourism and the centre of Cusco, incomes are low. Household 7 has access 
to agricultural land which gave them access to firewood for cooking. Household 
2 kept fuel costs low by using a mixture of firewood and charcoal and 
Household 3 explained:
Recently we’ve been using firewood because there’s loads of it HH13 
around. Sometimes we buy it, sometimes we get it from the 
hillside and sometimes my mother brings it from Puerto 
Maldonado
Again in this group, it is difficult to make a case for any household 
income derived from the water supply. Households 7 and 13 use the supply 
when they tend their animals, which in the case of Household 7, are sold on. 
Household 3 reported that the water supply was not used for anything other 
than occasionally watering plants. For making adobe, households mentioned 
using the “riachuelito” or trickle stream that ran past HH2, 3 and 4.
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The result that emerged when we discussed treating water in the home 
was that young children were more likely to drink water directly from the tap 
compounding their vulnerability (World Health Organization 1997): 1:
The children drink directly from the tap and the drum. The adults HH2 
drink boiled water
The adults boil water. The children want water that is cold and HH4 
fresh and if they are thirsty, they won’t wait for boiled water but 
drink straight from the tap or buckets.
Household 3 said that they boiled water because otherwise they got sick 
and Household 7 drank both tap water and boiled water. The remaining 
households in this group, HH9 and HH13, did not bother to boil drinking water. 
In Household 9, the head of household joked that the family was hardly ever ill, 
although when I probed I was told:
My youngest has had stomach infections but when the doctor HH9 
ran tests on him, there were no parasites. We all drink “agua 
cruda” [straight from the tap]
Otherwise the only other household to report illnesses was Household 4 
where the mother said she did not know whether they were linked to the water 
but the youngest children had had parasites and stomach pain.
In the face of brief stoppages, the strategy of Household 4, whose 
location in the network sometimes meant that her taps ran dry, was to use her 
social capital and occasionally borrow water from her neighbour. With longer 
breaks in service, the picture was similar across households, with HH2, HH13 
and HH4 saying that they would complain to the JASS:
The neighbours lower down, give us water and if it is cut off, we HH3
simply go to the JASS; this zone doesn’t have a service from 
SEDACusco
We would have to complain to the president of the JASS. W e’d HH4
go to his house. We need to work together so that there is water 
and the service is better
Household 3’s response was interesting. They are recently arrivals to this 
outlying barrio and made a favourable comparison with the city’s service from 
SEDACusco, emphasizing that it was simple to contact the provider in 
Angostura.
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I was told, and observed, the use of streams for various activities from 
brick making to, on one occasion, an aromatic, communal coriander washing 
session. Like Household 8 in the previous section, Household 9 referred to the 
water source at Silkinchani. There seemed to be awareness that this water fell 
under the national government’s remit rather than the local committee and 
indeed this is the case although it is the Ministry of Agriculture rather than a 
“Ministry of Water”:
If the tubes burst, the JASS fixes them, if not there’d be no water HH9 
and we’d have to go and collect it from somewhere else.
Opposite, from Silkinchani. If the quality was bad, we’d go to the 
ministry so that they’d sort it out
This group did not rely on agriculture and landownership. Apart from the 
tenant family, all the households had diversified into other activities including a 
shop in the community, waste processing nearby, transport services and 
photocopying in the city centre. Despite this variety, cash incomes were low and 
householders supplemented earnings with their own production.
6.2 Vulnerability Context
Since 1994, Saylla district has marketed itself locally as both a spa town 
and an “ecological district” and, more recently, as the “district of ecology, 
gastronomy and sport” (Municipalidad de Saylla 2002):43. This reflects its 
popularity as a weekend destination for Cusquenos. Its gastronomic fame is 
derived from the local speciality “c h ic h a rro n dishes served with a glistening 
slab of pork crackling. The chicharron restaurants line the main road through 
the district capital Saylla and the sector was reportedly worth 708,000 soles 
(£122,000) in 2001 (Municipalidad de Saylla 2002). This hints at a broader 
picture of livelihoods that are based on agriculture with 19.3% of the 
economically active involved directly in arable farming and livestock production 
and the remaining 80.7% in complementary activities, of which chicharron is but 
one.
Livestock farming in the area remains traditional but for arable activity, 
with its biannual harvest, the farming tends to be intensive and mechanised with 
maize, fodder and vegetables the most profitable crops. Of concern to this study 
is that an estimated 80% of agricultural land is irrigated using water from the
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River Huatanay. This and other pressures on agriculture are recognised in the 
area’s integrated development plan:
In the district of Saylla, agricultural and livestock production is stagnating 
because the population is unable to invest in new technologies and because of 
the use of contaminated water for irrigation and the permanent loss of land 
available for cultivation caused by urban growth.
(Municipalidad de Saylla 2002):64
These remarks on the quality of irrigation water are stark when we see 
Angostura’s position relative to Cusco’s main waste water treatment plant at 
San Jeronimo in Figure 51: the settlement is just a meander away from the 
plant’s discharge. The state of agriculture in the Saylla has also to be seen in 
relation to the rest of the River Huatanay’s catchment. SEDACusco’s annual 
report on the performance of their treatment plant and the River Huatanay 
(SedaCusco 2005) makes alarming reading. It describes the river basin as 
comprising two parts: an upper section that includes about 90% of the urban 
area and a lower section which is predominantly agricultural. According to this 
document, 90% of the river’s pollution comes from the urban zone in the form of 
untreated waste water, solid waste, detergents, hydrocarbons and oils.
The sewage effluent from the city of Cusco are treated by a conventional 
treatment plant which is currently functioning relatively well with primary and 
secondary treatment; domestic effluents receive a significant load from hospital 
sewage, car-washing, lubricants, light industry and a variety of workshops; the 
industrial wastes come mainly from the brewery and Coca-Cola, as well as the 
abattoirs in San Jeronimo, Santiago and K’ayra, these last two being the ones 
that cause a significant increase in the biological oxygen demand of the river 
because their effluents go straight into the river without a pre-treatment to 
remove all types of waste direct from the slaughtering of livestock (blood, 
entrails/innards)
(SedaCusco 2005)
This is all underlined with reference to Peru’s own national water quality 
standards, detailed in the document Decreto Supremo 007-83-SA: Re. This 
classifies waterways according to their use. Classification III is of interest here 
since it deals with “water for the irrigation of vegetables consumed raw and 
drinking water for animals” (Government of Peru 1983):1. A closer look at 
Figures 45 to 48 show four of the typical indicators recorded by SEDACusco in 
2005 at various points descending the Huatanay valley shown below their 
recommended limits is alarming. At Angostura just beyond the treatment plant, 
the annual averages exceed by orders of magnitude the limits:
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Figure 48 Thermotolerant coliforms
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Figure 49 Biological Oxygen Demand
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In terms of natural hazards, the flood plain is marshy and prone to 
flooding during the rainy season. A landslide risk has also been identified along 
the steep sides of the valley -  a risk which has been increased by deforestation.
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The inappropriate occupation of ravines and the banks of the River Huatanay 
with housing and agriculture, is a latent risk which exposes the inhabitants to 
the possibility of the river breaking its banks and of landslips from the 
Hatunwayqo mountain.
(Municipalidad de Saylla 2002):79
By 2005, the entire district of Saylla could boast a population of only 
2,635. What is of interest, perhaps, is not the absolute number but the rate of 
population growth experienced in recent years. Figure 49 shows a change in 
growth rate after 2002 but there are several factors contributing to this which will 
emerge as we focus in on Angostura, the second case study site.
Figure 51 Population growth in Saylla District
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According to the National Institute of Statistics the population can be 
classified into just under 80% urban and about 20% rural (INEI 2005). The 
urban areas include the district capital, Saylla -  the smallest district capital in 
the Cusco valley -  and Huasao, another consolidated settlement. New growth 
areas tend to be along the Cusco-Urcos highway and these are joining up into 
what is turning into a continuous urban settlement. There remain, though, 
“annexes” and campesino communities which are more ambiguous in their 
character.
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Angostura is one of these annexes. It was formed when the land was 
transferred to the current association in 1980 by the campesina community that 
had owned it (Angostura President Interview 2006). It is now a settlement of 
around a hundred and fifty families, of which about 10% are renting, and is 
described by a recent local publication as being one of:
[Angostura is amongst] the smallest rural population centres that are seeing a 
process of consolidation in the district of Saylla.
(Municipalidad de Saylla 2002):54
Angostura is also counted among the 72.75% of the district’s population 
with access to basic services such as water, drainage and electricity.
Figure 52 Angostura on the right bank of the River Huatanay
Figure 53 Aerial image of Angostura relative to the waste treatment plant at San 
Jeronimo
Figure 54 Map of Angostura settlement on either side of the River Huatanay
6.2.1 Natural Hazards
The main hazard identified in Angostura was the annual flooding. The 
interviews confirmed that the flooding tended to affect households on the left 
bank of the river (outside the meander) more than the right.
Of those on the left bank, Household 1 in the urbane group summed up 
the impact with Households 3 and 4 in the diversified category mentioning other 
actors in the flood response:
[the main natural hazard is] flooding of the river which affects the HH1 
water supply, the electricity, the telephone line and our 
properties. It comes right up to here [level of the patio]. The last 
one was on 6th March 2006 but they happen every year between 
January and March. The municipality give us sand bags, stones 
and machinery to protect the drainage system and clear up the 
river.
[The committee] calls meetings, for example, to do the gabion HH3 
wall in faenas
The wall has been built by the district council in Saylla and the HH4 
Municipality of San Jeronimo. The Civil Defence helps, we have 
faenas and they lend us a tractor
On the ‘safer’ right bank, Household 6, the committee president added 
that crops had been damaged in the most recent flood. Here, households in the
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Traditional Livelihoods group reported a major incident in the 1990s and the 
construction of flood defences (HH8) and the annual floods (HH11, HH15). All 
these households said that the community came together to bail each other out 
in faenas and claimed, unlike those in the urbane group, that no outside 
organisations helped out. Three more households in the Traditional Livelihoods 
category (HH10, 12 and 14) and three in the Diversified Livelihoods group (HH7, 
9 and 13) did not raise the flooding issue. They were located along the main 
highway -  as far from the river as it was possible to be in Angostura.
The last big flood was in 1994. The neighbours get together but HH2
no organisation helps
Since I’ve been here, there’s been nothing. HH13
Households in each livelihood category (urbane HH1, traditional HH5, 
diversified HH13) wanted better flood defences to mitigate this risk although 
Household 10 observed that this would be challenging:
A channel so that the river can be contained HH1
The other side is worse but there’s no way to control the river HH10
In Household 2, I thought at first that the adobe step into the kitchen was 
a flood defence but when I asked, I was told through laughter that it was 
actually to stop the guinea pigs escaping!
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Figure 55 Road bridge joining two sides of the Angostura settlement across the River 
Huatanay in the dry season
Figure 56 Road bridge during the wet season
6.3 Infrastructure and Services
In terms of urban services, the district capital has a health post, a police 
post, primary and secondary schools and a weekly waste collection, although 
this is strictly confined to the consolidated, central settlement of Saylla.
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Incidentally, the collected waste is transferred to an unregulated dump on the 
banks of the river from where it gradually seeps and tumbles into the torrent.
Saylla is a district with high levels of environmental pollution mainly because of 
the population of the city of Cusco and its surrounding districts; but also 
because of and inadequate system of solid waste collection and disposal in the 
district.
(Municipalidad de Saylla 2002):64
Run-off is drained through the sewerage system, leading to blockages with mud 
and sand. This then causes the backflow of waste water into people’s homes.
(Municipalidad de Saylla 2002):78
One of the most significant health problems, especially among children, is 
linked to the proliferation of sources of infection caused by the pollution of the 
River Huatanay and the build up of solid waste in different parts of the district.
(Municipalidad de Saylla 2002):78
Poor local education services mean that people choose better facilities in 
the city of Cusco -  the claim of this document is that this wears away local 
identity and renders the young people indifferent to the development of the 
valley. The lack of telecommunication infrastructure also impacts on education 
facilities:
The telephone service is inadequate and only has minimal coverage. In 
addition, it is impossible to access the internet despite its close proximity to the 
city of Cusco, 14.5 km away.
(Municipalidad de Saylla 2002):79
6.3.1 Solid Waste and the River
In Angostura, the shocking revelation is that there is no waste collection 
service. Across livelihood groups (urbane HH1, HH6, traditional HH 8 , 11, 12, 
14 and 15, diversified HH7, 9 and 13), householders were forced to dumped 
their waste into the river. Even those adopting strategies to burn, bury or 
compost parts of their waste (urbane HH1, traditional HH5 and HH10, 
diversified HH2, 3 and 4) admitted that most of it ended up in the river. Even for 
the well-placed committee president, there is little that can be done. Indeed, her 
attention to detail with respect to organic waste contrasted with the 
environmentally hazardous disposal of everything else highlights the futility of 
individual action:
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Well, the treatment of solid waste is like this: we separate HH6
organics for use as compost for plants and the inorganic 
component is thrown onto the river bank
We take it to the chacra to burn it HH10
I put some in the garden [the organic things] and the rest in the HH2 
river. It ends up in the river.
I put it in the river. I don’t know where it goes... the river. Some HH3
people collect bottles but only bottles. I want rubbish trucks!
I burn it on the patio. The soil [organics] I leave in the field. It HH4
ends up in the river. The cans, the recyclables go into the river 
because there is no rubbish truck. Everything goes into the river: 
a dog dies, it goes into the river. We are the only ones affected 
by our behaviour. There are mosquitoes and it’s dangerous for 
our children. My children have had hepatitis and the doctors said 
it was from eating something dirty - faecal - fruit or vegetables.
Again across all households, regardless of livelihood group, the main 
culprit in all this is the municipality. The community wanted a service and most 
households reported making repeated requests for collections from Saylla 
District. As Household 13 points out, however, the problem is bigger than 
Angostura:
The municipality has forgotten about us. There used to be a HH8 
tractor but it stopped coming
But what's the municipality going to do? When are they going to HH4 
clean up the river? But they don't do anything or send anyone)
It’s because of the mayor...we’ve asked...but the mayor’s office HH13 
doesn’t know where it can dispose of the rubbish either!
6.3.2 Waste water and the River
Angostura’s relationship with the river has several dimensions: first there 
is the stress of contamination from upriver identified in vulnerability context; next 
is the flooding shock; and closer to home the stress of their own contamination 
through discharge of their own waste water and dumping of solid waste.
Domestic waste water connections have gradually been installed over 
the last 5 years by the water committee with the support of the Centro Guaman 
Poma de Ayala. These convey waste water to two small primary treatment 
plants. Prior to this both urbane households had piped connections that 
discharged directly into the river (HH1, HH6). By contrast the Traditional (HH5, 
10, 12, 14 and 15) and Diversified Livelihood (HH2, HH7) groups reported going 
outside” or using a “dry toilet” or latrine before the service was installed.
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We’ve had a connection for 5 years. The JASS installed it. The HH2 
waste water goes to the treatment plant and then the river.
3 years ago Guaman Poma connected us and the work was HH7 
done by a faena. The waste goes down there to that thing like a 
reservoir
Urbane Households 1 and 6 were distinctly upbeat about the 
environmental benefits of this system. Households 5 and 14 in the Traditional 
Livelihoods group were aware of the treatment system but commented that the 
maintenance left something to be desired:
It’s good because we have treatment and we are not polluting HH6 
the river. It has been in the last two years that the families have 
got together in cleaning teams and they pay an extra sol each 
month. This contribution is to pay the “fontanero” [maintenance 
man]104
It’s improved because sewage goes to the plant instead of HH1
straight into the river. It works well but when the river overflows 
during the rainy season, it can scour away the pipes.
Yes [the plant] works well. Before we had no WC but it would be HH14
better if they took better care of the plant. It’s not clean and pigs 
graze there. The river: it infects the children, the sewage plant [in 
San Jeronimo] also smells really bad when it rains
By contrast, households in the Diversified Livelihoods group ((HH3, 4 
and 13) did not mention the new treatment plants and were still worried about 
environmental pollution. Household 4 pointed out that she still felt the effects of 
other settlements that did not have a system:
I don’t know about the connection but waste goes into the river. HH13 
Everything goes into the river. It’s polluted
Other settlements higher up [the mountain] don’t have HH4 
sewerage. There are no connections. They go outside and this 
attracts flies. Rubbish also washes down. I try to sort it out as 
much as possible, burning it and so on but we should have more 
workshops to raise awareness for the well-being of our kids.
They think “I’m ok so it doesn’t matter about anyone else!”
The effectiveness of local waste water treatment was influenced by the 
flooding hazard and nearby settlements without any services whose waste 
washed into Angostura.
104 Payment of the “fontanero” is a point which we will look at again in Chpater 7’s analysis of 
system configuration.
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6.3.3 Energy
According to the 2005 census, the dominant household energy for 
cooking in Saylla District is firewood with gas a distant second (INEI 2005).
Urbane Households 1 and 6 both said that they would call the electricity 
company in the event of a power c u t105. Most families with Traditional 
Livelihoods106 said that they just sit tight and wait when the power goes off. 
Household 10, the only household in the traditional group with two home-based 
livelihoods -  the grocery store and carpentry workshop -  in addition to their 
small-holding said that power cuts were a daily occurrence. In the Diversified 
Livelihoods group, the reaction to power failures was resigned with only 
Household 9 prepared to complain to the provider. HH9 was running a shop 
from their rented premises and so had an interest in lighting and power for their 
home-based livelihood activities.
Household 5, in the traditional group, and Household 4 in the diversified 
group, pointed out that the electricity company office was in Urcos -  a ninety 
minute and 3 soles (50p) bus journey out of town -  and that it would take the 
company a week to fix anything:
Electrosur have an office but it’s a bureaucracy HH5
We don’t complain because it’s too far away. When you HH4 
complain at the office you are told to wait. Either nobody is there 
or the person you need is busy... There is no point going. They 
don't give any information to people and if they know you are 
from a "pueblo joven" or if you don't wear a suit, they are rude.
Why go if they're just going to be rude? They are arrogant. The 
more educated, the more despotic! Professionals don’t explain 
anything to people. We are the worst affected but speak up the 
least. The company says the electricity is "a favour” because we 
are not organised. There is no public registration [of our 
settlement], we don’t have land titles. When they make the 
maps, our houses are not on them.
When Household 4 lets rip about the face of Peruvian bureaucracy, even 
its fury, it captures such a familiar refrain for anyone who has lived in Peru 
about the relationship between the excluded and the included. The reference to 
people from the “pueblos jovenes”, the new towns described in Chapter 3,
105 HH1 estimated 2 to 3 power cuts a year for up to 12 hours, attributing them to electrical 
storms in the rainy season, HH6 estimated 6/year for a couple of hours
106 Households 5, 8, 10, 14 and 15 all experienced an estimated 3 to 5 power cuts a year lasting 
from half an hour (only HH 8 and 15) to all day or all night
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introduces what, in this interviewees view, are tangible impacts on access to 
services107.
Again Household 15 differed slightly from other households in that their 
reaction was to sort the system out themselves.
I’d turn off the valve and fix the pipe HH15
6.3.4 Policing, transport and recreation
The stress generated by crime was much less significant here than in 
San Bias. Location rather than livelihood group was the determinant, however, 
with the households facing the main road more concerned than those set back 
from the road or on the opposite bank of the river. Household 13 mentioned that 
they’d had a child’s bike stolen: this is a far cry from the street robbery and 
violence in the centre of Cusco. As in San Bias, the response was to contract 
guards rather than rely on the police service:
The settlement is peaceful. Pets get lost sometimes... we are HH6 
discussing the presence of security guards at the moment 
because some people have asked for night-watchmen
Each house pays 1 sol per month for the security guard HH14
I have been burgled but the police didn’t do anything! My child’s HH13
bike was stolen but without a receipt, they can’t press charges
Other concerns were related to transport including poor roads, the 
dangerous road bridge connecting the right and left banks and the need for a 
proper bus shelter (traditional HH4, HH5 and HH8 and diversified HH2, HH4). 
Several households also mentioned the lack of community and recreational 
space108. Household 15 wanted a closer health post and Household 12 said that 
there was no electrification to small-holdings.
Improved streets and a pedestrian bridge -  the road crossing is HH4
dangerous. There is no street lighting so at night the main road 
in is dark. It's slippery and muddy.
Recreation facilities for the children and young people; there is HH9 
nowhere for the kids to play football. There’s a field at the school 
but the school closes. The women play too. In the kindergarten, 
the parents play. There are green spaces but they need to be 
looked after.
107 Street lighting was also mentioned.
108 Households wanted a community centre or church (Traditional: HH5, HH8, HH15, 
Diversified: HH7) a market (Traditional: HH5, HH15) a park or pitch (Traditional: HH5, 
Diversified: HH9)
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Informally, one householder also commented on household finances.
No one has a bank account, people need savings especially in HH9 
case of illness, everybody should put some money aside but 
nobody does. To raise cash in an emergency people sell 
products at market, sell off land and sell vehicles, that's the only 
way.
According to the president, the community is 80% towards HH4 
getting registered. The land was sold off 10-15 years ago but not 
having public registration means that the bank won’t lend the 
families money so even though they need to improve their 
houses, they can't.
While most of the residents interviewed named physical assets that they 
would like to see changed, the president of the settlement committee and one of 
the most recent arrivals talked about changing the people!
The people: the human factor, capacity building. There is HH1 
ignorance and a lack of information and basic needs like 
education, healthcare, housing and income from employment 
and projects. Development is not possible without working with 
people on ecological, gender and identity issues
6.3.5 Water
Looking across the District of Saylla, the census data suggests that 
Saylla has increased water and sanitation services dramatically over the last 
decade. By 2005 the percentage of households with a water connection in their 
demise had risen from 47% in 1993 to 73%. The percentage of households with 
a waste water connection in their demise increased from 16% to 44% over the 
same period.
For nearly all users regardless of livelihood group the service is 
continuous. The exceptions were the highest households in the settlement: 
Households 4 and 5. Household 4’s service cut out after the morning peak 
demand period had passed and, like Household 5, reported occasional 
weekend interruptions:
It goes off in the mornings. I don’t know why. And there isn’t any HH4 
on Saturday or Sunday. The pressure isn’t enough for the slope.
Everybody does their washing on Sundays HH5
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Table 24 Continuity of water service
Midnight
6am
Midday
6pm
Midnight
Though there was a twenty-four hour service, households experienced 
interruptions a few times a year there are occasional interruptions109. These 
seemed to be accepted by users who attributed them to regular maintenance 
(urbane HH1 and 6) or short-term technical problems (traditional HH5) and even 
explained that the system had improved (diversified HH7, HH9). For Household 
5, for example, there was none of the mystery or frustration associated with 
stoppages in San Bias and Manco Capac.
A pipe burst in August or September and we had to use the HH5
stream for a day
It’s improved. There isn’t a shortage now. Before we’d run short HH9
in the dry season but this year we haven’t suffered a shortage
Given the continuity of supply, views on service quality in these 
households centred on the lack of chlorination (urbane HH1, HH6, traditional
109 In the urbane group this number was estimated by HH1 at a day, twice a year and by HH6 at 
a few hours, four times yearly. In the traditional group, HH5 and HH10 reported a handful of 
interruptions and in Diversified Livelihoods there were no more than 5 short breaks, five times a 
year.
U rbane T  rad itional Diversified
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HH10 and HH14, diversified HH2) and the suspicion that the water was not 
potable (diversified HH3, HH4, HH13). For Household 4, uncertainty over water 
quality entailed additional household expenditure on boiling drinking water:
Chlorinated would be much better. The service has improved. HH1 
Before there wasn’t much water, now there are bigger pipes
Well, it still isn't potable: it is piped but it isn’t chlorinated. HH6
It’s ok but it would be better if it was ready to drink because it HH4 
costs us money to boil it
Household 10 harked back to the days of using the spring water and 
noted that for some houses this meant that there was no domestic connection:
In the past, there wasn’t any. We had the spring water but HH10 
further up the hill, the houses didn’t have any. The JASS said 
that they were going to chlorinate the water but there has been 
no news on that.
The continuity of service reduced the need for household storage in all 
livelihood groups. In Household 1, storage was not in response to a water 
shortage but to water quality: it was used as a rudimentary treatment method:
I store water to let particles settle out, especially in the wet HH1 
season. I store it in the evenings and let it stand overnight to use 
the next day.
Households 4 and 5 reported storing water in anticipation of high 
demand on laundry day (Sunday). Household 2, in the Diversified Livelihood 
category explained that:
We store water because the tap is outside and we have to bring HH2 
the water in.
Unique to Angostura was the attitude that paying for water was 
necessary and directly linked to maintaining and improving the system (urbane 
HH1, traditional HH5, HH8, 12, 14 and 15, diversified HH2, HH9) and regulating 
consumption (urbane HH6, diversified HH4). Household 1 thought that the price 
was reasonable since the service was “del pueblo”, provided by the inhabitants 
themselves.
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[The JASS] doesn’t provide us with a good service in terms of HH6 
the water quality, we ought to pay more. It only costs 2 soles 
(34p) and there are no meters so there is no awareness! The 
JASS loses out because they don’t have funds to comply with 
their procedures; new pipes, maintenance...The JASS needs an 
income. And water is wasted: there are leaks inside houses. The 
“junta directiva” which chairs the JASS does not monitor 
domestic installations but twice it has gone house to house 
assessing the installations and 80% of households have 
inadequate installations.
It’s ok but nobody pays. We need to pay to improve it. It has HH5 
improved. Before there was less water now it is more constant
Down below, they wash clothes and turn the tap on and leave it HH4 
on. They pay 2 soles (34p) per month so they don't care. In the 
centre of Cusco, where I used to live, they pay 10-14 soles 
(£1.70-£2.40) a month. People are inconsiderate! I don’t agree 
with the price we pay because -  although it’s good for our 
household budgets -  people take advantage. Here people use it 
on their chacras110...
It is necessary to maintain the water but it’s still not chlorinated. HH2 
It’s up to the village to pay and that’s ok. If we don’t pay they cut 
us off but how would we have the water system if we didn't pay?!
The objections to paying for water were comparatively mild (HH5, HH8 
and HH13). Household 8111 noted that in the past, there had been no need to 
pay for water. Household 5 objected on the grounds that the JASS was not 
doing anything with the money it collected;
We used to drink the water from Silkinchani [the archaeological HH8 
reserve opposite Angostura]. Six years ago we didn’t have to 
pay for water.
They charge us because there’s a reservoir. Everyone in the HH13 
association [settlement] works to clean it so I think it’s a bit 
expensive
Households 4, 10 and 14 thought that they would pay more with a water 
meter or if they lived closer to the centre:
It’s fine. If we had a meter, how much would we pay then?! HH 10
Installation of the piped water system and waste water connections were 
recent and still recognised as an improvement. There was no water storage and 
an attitude to cost related to good service and a knowledge of more expensive
110 This claim is not actually borne out in the accounts of irrigation given by the chacreros.
111 Household 8 settled in Angostura in the early 1980s and still relied on agriculture for about 
half of the family income.
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systems in the city. In terms of household experiences of water, the service 
ranked high on the WHO indicators for quantity, quality, affordability, continuity 
and accessibility.
6.4 Paths to Influence 
6.4.1 State: national, regional and local government
The settlement has its own primary school on the right bank of the river 
but for secondary schools and the nearest health post, inhabitants have to 
travel north to San Jeronimo or south to Saylla, both about 10-15 minutes by 
bus. The nearest bus stop is on no more than a block or 5 minutes walk from 
most dwellings.
6.4.2 Central and Regional Initiatives
One of the president’s comments identified environmental problems, 
such as the solid waste problem is issues could not be resolved at household 
level or in isolation from the rest of the municipality, or for that matter the river 
basin.
With anything to do with environmental problems, we need support from the 
provincial and regional bodies.
(Angostura President Interview 2006)
To this end, since 1996, Angostura, represented along with other 
communities by the District of Saylla, has been part of a wider group known as 
the Association of Municipalities for the Co-ordination of Inter-district 
Development in the Southern Valley of Cusco, or CID for short. The CID has 
been set up to improve living conditions in the Southern Valley and has started, 
with as much participation as possible, to draw up a Plan Integral de Desarrollo 
Estrategico y Sostenible (PIDES):
The Inter-district Development plan makes the population the main 
actor/protagonist. Strengthening local institutions to guarantee sustainability 
throughout the process.
(Municipalidad de Saylla 2002):3
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This has fed into a strengthening of local authorities and efforts to bring 
together a wide range of state and civil society actors112 with Saylla setting up a 
Department of Infrastructure and Environment and a Department for Basic 
Services in March 2006.
The Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala113, described its role in the 
development of the Southern Valley of Cusco as follows:
The Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala has played the role of facilitator in this 
process, promoting change from the grassroots. This means encouraging the 
direct participation of organized citizens in all the decisions that affect their 
future.
(Gonzales et al. 2003):2
6.4.3 Municipality of Saylla
All families also pay the autovalor, or local tax, to the municipality. One 
consequence of this is that the services the municipality is able to deliver are 
limited. As the committee president explained with respect to waste collection:
There’s no service and we are polluting the river. It has not been HH6 
considered in the municipal budget
There is a low opinion of municipal involvement which was limited to 
assistance with the flood response:
The authorities should take on their responsibilities for helping HH4 
us. They take us into account at election time but apart from 
that, nothing
Disappointingly, despite the participatory emphasis of the wider 
development initiatives in the southern valley, none of the households -  except 
the committee president -  mentioned this.
112 Campesino Organisations, Neighbourhood Organisations, Women’s Organisations, Youth 
Organisations (sport, culture, parish), producer organizations, political groups, institutions 
(church, university, NGOs). Actors from the state involved in the CID: District Municipalities, 
Public Institutions, Ministry of Health and Health Centres, Ministry of Agriculture: Water Boards, 
“Programa Especial de Titulaciones” PETT, National Institute for Natural Resources, Cusco 
Agricultural Agency, National Police and Ecological Police, District Governments, Ministry of 
Education: education centres, San Jeronimo Educational Development Area
113 The project funding comes from two further, external actors: Gobierno del Pais Vasco and 
the NGO International Solidarity.
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6.4.4 The Neighbourhood Committee
At a local level, Angostura has a community association114 which has 
been running since 2004. The board, or Junta Directiva, is constituted by law 
and it charges subscriptions -  collected by going house to house - which go 
towards its own administration.
Before 2004 the settlement had never been formally authorised and 
there had been no projects to provide basic services since 1990 (Angostura 
President Interview 2006). The process of authorizing the settlement, which 
includes compliance with regulations on the layout of plots and the observing 
the safety margin between dwellings and the river, is now underway at district 
level.
The Junta Directiva convenes community meetings (asambleas) and 
work days (faenas) and every household interviewed was involved. All 
households in the Urbane (HH1, 6) and Traditional Livelihoods (HH5, 8, 10, 11, 
15) groups participated in the association’s assemblies and elections and work 
days. The reasons for this high level of community involvement are the 
sanctions for non-participation (HH5 and HH11).
Sometimes I don’t have time but it’s useful. If you don’t go, there HH5 
is a 20 soles (£3.40) fine
Several households in the Diversified Livelihoods group did not vote. In 
the case of Household 4, she had not been in the barrio long enough to vote but 
HH9 and 13 could not vote because they were tenants -  this did not exempt 
them from participating in work days though:
I go to faenas but I don’t vote or go to meetings. The landlord HH9 
goes...
The JASS, or water committee, was overseen by the settlement 
committee and this meant that the high participation also applied to this 
organisation with HH1 and 6 reporting that taking part was obligatory. 
Households in the traditional group, said that it was also useful to participate
114 Strengths of the Junta were identified as: experience, transparency and management of their 
accounts, their ability to bring people together for meetings, technical support and planning. The 
president identified the main weakness as her being an outsider but also the fact that people 
drink during the faenas, lack awareness, leadership and administration skills, are still empirical -  
trying to sue former directors for embezzlement!
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(HH5) to make sure that water was properly treated (HH10). Again the tenant 
households could not vote.
Those families with young children were members of the vaso de leche 
programme regardless of livelihood group (urbane HH1, traditional HH12, 
diversified HH2, 3). This participation involved attendance at meetings (rather 
than voting or paying subscriptions) but for HH3 -  where the children were 
looking after themselves and perhaps needed the help most -  access was 
constrained:
I only go when [the vaso de leche organisers] are in the colegio HH9 
because since my mum isn’t here I have to look after my 
brother...
6.4.5 Civil Society: NGOs and CBOs
The four non-governmental organizations or projects by external actors 
that came up were Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala, Solaris Peru and Coredor 
Puno-Cusco (HH6, HH10)115.
Household 1 explained that the CGPdA had supported the installation of 
sewerage, treatment plants and pavements and Household 6 elaborated on this 
and the other organisations:
Guaman Poma’s support is centred more on the district of HH6
Saylla... World Vision provided toilets in the education centre
116and Coredor Puno-Cusco , a public sector organization gave 
courses on rearing small animals
For households in the Traditional Livelihoods group, there was legitimate 
confusion over whether outside actors were public, private or NGOs. The waste 
water installations were variously credited to Guaman Poma (HH5, HH12, 
HH14), the maintenance man (HH8, HH10, HH15) and the district council in 
Saylla (HH14). If the family had paid the full costs, Guaman Poma did not get a 
mention. Household 12 said that the system had been paid for through 
participation in the “faena”.
Those that were not aware of an assistance programme (or quite 
reasonably did not distinguish between private, public and civil society actors)
115 CGPdA facilitated the installation of drainage, pavements (HH10, HH9) and run workshops 
(charlas) (HH4). Solaris Peru showed a video about giving birth and the risks of doing it at home 
"muy bueno el que trajo eso" HH4, HH2, HH9.
116 This is a local development of the national development fund FONCODES (Guasch 2006)
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where predominantly in the Diversified Livelihoods group and tended to work in 
agriculture: HH3, HH7, HH8, HH12, HH13, HH15. The exception was HH13 
where both adults worked outside the home, in the centre of town and said that 
they were not sure about organisations assisting the settlement:
I work outside. In the centre and I don’t know when they have HH13 
faenas
The president of the council also mentioned a micro-finance style 
savings and lending organization that had 22 participants117. The idea was to 
encourage savings over a two year period at the end of which time, members 
could yield up to 200dollars.
6.4.6 Private Sector involvement
The fact that security is low on the list of concerns for residents of 
Angostura means that there is perhaps less reliance on state level services 
such as the national police. Private sector involvement in security seemed to be 
an option in the face of disinterested local police, particularly for those with 
properties and businesses facing the main road. Households got together to 
pay for a night-watchman:
[If there were security problems] we’d ask for some security HH4 
guards. The police?! They are never going to come here, they’ll 
say they have no staff
Two households (HH5 and HH14) said that Cervesur was helping to 
build the gabion wall flood defence with support from the mayor. Cervesur is the 
philanthropic arm of Cusco’s brewery.
Cervesur is building the [gabion] wall [the mother]. No that’s a HH5 
private company [son]
117 Angostura’s president described this as a “banquito communal” -  a little collective bank. 
According to a report on the institutional players in the Cusco Region: “The Arariwa Association 
is a not for profit non-governmental organization, that has been promoting Andean rural 
development in comunidades campesinas for 18 years...[this involves] incorporating into 
people’s daily tasks non agricultural activities, rural-urban co-ordination linked to the role of 
cities, a more regional and national vision of development, the promotion of micro-credit and the 
need to incorporate activities which promote the market as a strategic aspect of enabling rural 
development.”(Gomez Villasante 2003):25
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Private sector livelihood activity -  other than household agriculture -  was 
confined to the transport sector, home-based enterprises and some jobs in the 
city’s service sector.
6.5 Livelihood Vulnerability: diversity and complexity in Angostura
The livelihood themes began with Urbane Livelihoods the matronly figure 
(HH1) and the professional president and her extended family (HH6). These 
households were characterized by higher education, stable incomes and 
professional employment in the municipality or central government projects.
Next were the Traditional Livelihoods group with the bus mechanic and 
his farmer mother (HH5), the driver-farmers (HH8), farmer family with 16 
grandchildren (HH11), the female-headed farmer (HH12), the farming couple 
with three children (HH15), the shopkeeper and carpenter farmers (HH10) and 
the PeruRail farmers (HH14). This group was dominated by agricultural activity, 
albeit in parallel with other home-based activities, and seasonal income 
insecurity, and levels of education hovering around primary or secondary school 
for adults but higher tertiary qualifications for some offspring.
In the last group of Diversified Livelihoods there were stronger links back 
to the centre of Cusco and beyond with waste-sorters (HH2), the abandoned 
children (HH3), the driver and vociferous, churchgoing wife (HH4), the newly 
arrived tenant farmers (HH7), the shopowner-labourer couple (HH9) and the 
taxi-photocopying couple (HH13). Here, cash incomes were higher but still 
seasonal and natural capital was lower especially in terms of land ownership.
In the pentagon plots (Figure 55), separated by livelihood profile, the 
Urbane Livelihoods resemble the dominant pattern in San Bias of strong Human, 
Financial and Physical Capital. Traditional Livelihoods are dominated by 
agriculture and Natural Capital. The Diversified Livelihoods appear to have a 
smaller overall asset base with relatively strong Financial Capital from the cash 
incomes derived from non-agricultural livelihood activities. Social Capital is 
strong across groups because of participation in assemblies and work days.
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Figure 57 Disaggregated pentagon plots
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Access to services was constrained by the small size of the settlement 
and the need to travel in to, or further away, from the centre of town to find 
healthcare, secondary schools, police and the municipal or electricity company 
offices.
Angostura was not served by the provincial water company but ran its 
own system. As an annex of Saylla District it was also lacking solid waste 
disposal services. Across households, however, the recent improvements and 
the changes to the piped water and sewerage systems are still remembered. 
There is virtually no household water storage because the service is so reliable 
and there is a prevailing attitude, unique among the case studies, which 
recognises the need to pay for the service and the awareness that their system 
is comparatively good and cheap.
Distinguishing actors by their governance category was fairly irrelevant to 
the beneficiaries. NGO involvement did not seem to be highly co-ordinated and 
engagement with wider regional initiatives appeared to be limited to the 
committee president and perhaps the JASS president. However, participation at 
the community level was strong. What came out strongly from our discussions 
was that the village council imposed sanctions on households that failed to 
participate in meetings or work days.
This chapter contributes to an empirical response to the research 
question by comparing the diversity and complexity of livelihoods in Angostura 
and examining elements of vulnerability that affect inhabitants, in terms of 
household assets, infrastructure and governance. In Angostura vulnerability 
was dominated by environmental shocks, centred on the settlement’s 
relationship with the River Huatanay. This had several dimensions including
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contamination from upriver; annual flooding; and, closer to home, the 
acknowledgement of their own contamination through disposal of the 
settlement’s waste water and solid waste.
Livelihoods were linked upriver to the city in terms of urban employment 
in transport and tourism. Downriver livelihoods were dependent on agriculture 
which in turn was affected by the city upriver and its waste products. The 
interdependence of social capital and the value of high participation even 
amongst new arrivals (except tenants) was reflected in collective activities to 
maintain the water system and prevent flood damage.
Co-ordination of political or infrastructural activities across the settlement 
was well organised. This activity was linked to the municipality of Saylla through 
the settlement’s president. Saylla’s mayor was then linked in to regional level 
initiatives to orchestrate social development and integrate resource 
management. Although awareness of these larger scale activities seemed to be 
limited, formal governance structures were in place or emerging.
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Chapter 7 Manco Capac: ‘agua chocolatada’
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From Angostura we travel back up the River Huatanay. On its southern or 
right bank, overlooking Cusco’s main bus terminal and bustling bootleggers 
market, sits Manco Capac118, the third case study. This community is within a 
thirty minute walk of the city’s main plaza but is dependent on its own water 
supply, which falls outside the provincial SEDACusco system and is largely 
unsupported by civil society or local government actors.
Figure 58 Location o f Manco Capac
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The structure of this chapter follows the analytical categories set out in the 
Sustainable Livelihoods framework with livelihood profiles are themed as 
follows: Tenacious, Homebound and Landlord Livelihoods.
Manco Capac is now part of the District of Santiago, which lies to the 
North West of the city centre (Figure 56). Santiago was established as a parish 
between 1571 and 1572 under the Spanish viceroyalty, although, like San Bias 
it was predated by much older Inca barrios (Marco Cortez 1989). According to 
the municipal authorities, the district can be split into a rural area comprising ten
118 Sometimes spelled Manco Ccapac.
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campesina communities (3.9% of district population); marginal urban areas in 
four main zones totalling ninety-three settlements; and a central urban area of 
ten settlements. In 2003, the population across these areas was 85,831 
(Municipalidad de Santiago 2008). Manco Capac is one of the ninety-three 
settlements described as marginal. The 2005 census data shows that across 
the district the dominant housing type is mud brick, or adobe, construction with 
40% housing owner-occupied and 34% rented (INEl 2005).
7.1 Manco Capac Pentagon Plots
The Manco Capac pentagon plot is generally weaker in Human, 
Financial and Physical Capital than San Bias and weaker in Natural Capital 
than Angostura. Two or three households are well endowed with Social Capital 
but otherwise the Human, Physical and Financial assets are the important ones. 
The greatest spread in assets is on the Social Capital axis which reflects highly 
heterogeneous paths to influence.
Figure 59 Manco Capac Asset Pentagons
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7.1.1 Tenacious Livelihoods: making ends meet inside and outside the 
barrio
This group is bound by a broad range of activities based both inside and 
outside people’s homes and inside and outside Manco Capac. I deal first with 
the households that operate businesses from their premises and then with the 
households that generate their income in other parts of the city.
The interview with Household 35 was convoluted because the mother of 
the family was only able to lip read. The family relied on income from the head 
of household’s work as a taxi driver and his wife’s corner shop, which doubled 
as a chicheria, or local drinking-hole that was doing a roaring trade with 
customers reeling away at all hours of the day. Both parents said that they 
earned about 50 soles (£8.60) per day. Although this couple had not completed 
their secondary education, their daughter had graduated from high school and 
was working as a sales girl in the Molino Market for 280 soles (£48) per month. 
Her younger brother was still at school. The other members of the household 
were a distant relative and her baby. She was a single mother “with no means” 
who earned her keep as the family’s domestic help. The family said their 
income did vary but attributed this to higher outgoings during term time.
The couple had lived in the barrio since childhood and had bought land 
15-18 years ago but could not afford to build then, only able to start construction 
in 2000. Their house stood out in the group for its concrete construction but they 
had a yard large enough to rear chickens and guinea pigs and to park the head 
of household’s taxi. The family used both gas and firewood for cooking, 
although the firewood was bought from street vendors rather than gathered 
locally. As with most of Manco Capac their street was unsealed.
Similarly, Household 38 derived income from the head of household’s job 
as a driver, earning 400 soles (£69) per month, and his wife’s shop, run from 
their home, which generated about 15 soles (£2.50) per day. The driver had 
completed primary school but his spouse had not. All four of their children were 
under 16: three at secondary school and one infant. This was a tenant family 
paying 100 soles (£17) in monthly rent119. They were typical in Manco Capac 
when they described their situation vis-a-vis household income:
119 The other tenants were a younger couple with a two year old: they paid 50 soles a month.
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[incomes vary] because there is no work. The worst months are HH38 
January and February because of the rain.
The family had been in the barrio for 20 years but in this property for only 
6 months: it was the typical tiled adobe construction but with cement floors and 
patio. They raised chickens and guinea pigs to eat and kept a dog for security.
Household 44 was also renting120. The parents of the first tenant family 
worked at the Molino Market, neither had completed primary education and they 
earned about 20 soles (£3.40) per day and paid out a monthly rent of 150 soles 
(£26). Incomes varied depending on business but for this couple the worst 
months were November and October. The family had been in the adobe house 
and the barrio for 3 years and lived on the sealed main road that ran parallel to 
the River Huatanay at the bottom of the settlement. They kept a dog for security 
but no other animals.
The head of Household 40 had completed his secondary education and 
other household members had gone further, with tertiary and university 
qualifications. Household 40 included the extended family: a sister and her 
family of five, a brother and his family of four, another bachelor brother enrolled 
in tertiary education and elderly parents, described in the interview as illiterate. 
The head of household ran an internet cafe from the premises and his wife ran 
the neighbouring grocery shop where she cleared around 150 to 200 soles (£34) 
of produce each month. With other adults variously employed in the family shop, 
as causal labour, a chef and a trainee teacher, the household was bringing in 
between 15 and 20 soles (£2.50-£3.40) from each of the six economically active 
adults. Any variation in income was blamed on increased expenditure during the 
school term. This family had been in the barrio for 22 years and in their present 
adobe house for the last 14.
What was interesting about the initial visits was that the head of 
household was extremely cagey. His internet cafe had lace curtains which were 
firmly drawn and he actually admitted that he was wary because his business 
was unofficial and he feared the dreaded SUNAT -  the Peruvian taxation 
department.
The next three households drew most of their income from livelihoods 
based outside the barrio. The head of Household 36 was in his 60s and was
120 The second family in the demise ran the chicheria next door but was not interviewed.
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permanently employed at the hospital as a technician on a monthly salary of
470 soles (£81). His 30 year old son was also contracted at the hospital and
was on 350 soles (£60) -  although this was not considered by the others to be
part of the household income. His daughter worked from time to time at the
Molino Market and was not specific about earnings except to say that it “varied”.
The youngest sibling was still at high school and the only other family member
was the daughter’s 5 year old son. During the interview there were taps on the
shuttered window through which the family handed out bottles of beer in return
for a small fee. This sideline was not mentioned as a formal livelihood activity
but the main room was stacked with crates. On the issue of income security, the
head of household’s daughter had this to say:
[incomes vary] because there are little extra expenses... the HH38 
worst month is January because December is an expensive 
month and because of the rainy season. And there are 
outgoings for the students. The best month is June because of 
the bonuses in the month of fiestas patrias (celebrations of 
nationhood)
The family had been in the barrio for 40 years since its creation and lived 
in a typical tiled, adobe house with earth floors and patio.
Household 39’s head of household was retired and drew a monthly 
pension of 500 soles (£86) and had also been in the barrio since its creation. 
His wife ran a chicheria from the property and generated about 20 soles (£3.40) 
per day. His daughter worked as a teacher, matching her father’s pension with 
her monthly income. Her husband, with his secondary education, worked as a 
mobile phone salesman and earned 450 soles (£77) per month. Their 5 children 
were still in full time education. Household income did not vary much but, when 
it did, it depended on teaching contracts. The unusual feature of this household 
was that they still owned land in Saylla District -  home of Angostura -  where 
they cultivated maize irrigated, of course, by the waters of the River Huatanay. 
They also reared chickens in Manco Capac for domestic consumption.
The head of Household 43 was employed in a hotel in the centre for 
which he earned a monthly wage of 450 soles (£77). By coincidence his wife, 
with the same education level, worked as a cleaner for the Centro Guaman 
Poma de Ayala! From this she earned 324 soles (£56) per month which she 
supplement by running a shop from the house that she, her eldest son and her 
father all took turns to tend. This generated an additional 10 soles (£1.70) per
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day but she described this as “subsistence”. With the other child still at high 
school and the estimated monthly spend on the education fees and bus fares 
standing at 200 soles (£34), she also went to sell produce at the Molino Market.
The worst months are January and February because nothing HH43 
sells. We only get 5 soles (85p) a day from the shop. I’ve always 
sold things in the street and I go house to house to do cleaning.
The family arrived from the countryside in 1996 but their youngest 
daughter, only 3 at the time, contracted giardia. They owned their property, 
though, and returned to settle permanently in 2002. Their house was the typical 
adobe construction.
The summary table below (Table 24) shows the principal taps in each 
household and a sanitary risk chart based on sanitary risk scores and 
household sampling for thermotolerant conforms. Two households fall in to the 
very high risk category, one in to the low risk group and the rest into the 
intermediate to high risk range.
The graph in Figure 59 summarises data on household income 
presenting it alongside reported utility costs. All households in this group, 
except Household 39, had variable incomes. The highest monthly utility bills 
were for electricity with water costing less than one sol per person per month. 
Electricity bills were highest in Household 40’s internet cafe, followed by 
Household 39 where higher electricity consumption was perhaps linked to an 
expectation of stable incomes and formal employment.
Table 25 Household and Taps in Tenacious Group, Manco Capac_____________________
HH 35 HH 36 HH 38 HH 39 HH 40 HH 43 HH 44
‘taxi- ‘hospital ‘driver and ‘retiree, ‘internet ‘hotel and ‘molino 
chicheria’ and Molino’ shop’ teacher, and shop’ cleaner’ market’
mobile
sales’
7 people, 2 5 people, 2 9 people, 1 9 people, 16 people, 5 people, 1 12 people,
taps taps tap 1 tap 1 tap tap 1 tap
no photo no photo
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Figure 60 Sanitary risk score in Tenacious Group, Manco Capac
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Householders estimated their daily water consumption in litres or 
bucketfuls. The highest estimate in this group was 20 litres per person per day 
in Household 43, where the couple worked in a hotel and the local NGO Centro 
Guaman Poma de Ayala. Other households estimated less than 101/p/d and my 
estimates, based on questions around the volumes and periods of household 
water storage, also indicated very low daily water consumption between 10 and 
35l/p/d. The water company estimated potential supplies of 64l/p/d (based on 
reservoir capacity and supply flow rates) but an effective supply of only 30l/p/d 
because of the poor performing network (SedaCusco 2007b).
The use of water in livelihood activities had changed over time with 
Households 36, 43 and 44 using the water supply to make adobe bricks when 
their houses were first built. Only HH36 still used this home-made adobe for 
patching up the walls after the rains had wreaked their annual havoc. Other 
uses of water for livelihoods included the taxi radiator (HH35), tending animals 
(HH35, 38 and 39) and making chicha -  the local maize beer -  to sell (HH39).
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Figure 61 Monthly income levels and utility expenditure per person in Tenacious Group, 
Manco Capac
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In terms of Human Capital, household treatment of water and household 
illnesses related to water, boiling tap water was the rule, with only two families 
reporting anything different. These were also the two families reporting no 
water-related illnesses:
The children do drink water straight from the tap, yes. But the HH40 
adults boil it
Yes we drink water direct from the tap HH44
Those that reported illnesses mentioned intestinal (HH36, 39 and 43) 
and dermatological problems (HH35):
Parasites: one time my boy had spots all over his body which the HH35 
doctors said was because of the water. It happens all the time.
We have to boil the water
My sister went to hospital. She drank the tap water, there are HH36 
bugs, parasites and worms
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The interpretation of water-related Social Capital is based on where 
households turned when the water service failed. All the households in this 
group said that they would complain to the water provider (HH35, 36, 38, 40, 
43). Household 43 said that they would be ignored and Household 39 would go 
instead to the barrio committee. The tenants in Household 44 said they would 
sort it out themselves.
There hasn’t been any communication from [ASAPASC], They HH35 
said that a pipe had broken but 2 weeks to mend a pipe! What’s 
that? We go to the office to ask why there is no water when we 
pay on time.
For a [water] quality problem, I would take a glass of water to the HH36 
office. They refuse to admit it! In the rainy season, they don’t put 
chlorine in the water.
We complained this month. We can’t make soup or coffee. We HH43 
take it to the office in bottles
When supplies run short, households have a variety of strategies. The 
taxi driver turns to friends at a nearby petrol station while others buy water at 
nearby markets:
I just go to the petrol station and collect water. They give it away HH35 
to me because they know me
I get water from the market in Ttio [at the bottom of the hill]. It HH36 
costs 20 centimos per bucket, per 18litre container
From lower down. Neighbours from Molino. Molino is in the "plan HH39 
maestro", they have water from SEDACusco and they sell it for 
between 50 centavos for a 14 litre bucket and 1.5 soles (25p)
When we used to have a tin roof we used the rainwater HH43
If there isn’t any, we go somewhere else. To the house of friends HH44
Households 36 and 38 reported that the only people that help are “el 
pueblo”.
In summary, the households with Tenacious Livelihood profiles were 
involved in a diverse range of activities and linkages to markets beyond the 
neighbourhood were important. Outside the barrio these included employment 
in the transport sector and regional hospital, sales at a mobile phone shop and 
in the Molino Market, work in the education and tourism sectors, cleaning for an 
NGO and the cultivation of land in Saylla District. Within the neighbourhood, 
livelihood activities included home-based grocery shops, chicherias and an
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informal internet cafe. The only household reporting income stability relied on 
the public sector and a formal sector sales job. Overall, incomes per capita 
were low and fluctuating.
At less than 1 sol per person per month, the water tariff was low relative to 
average monthly income but several households made expensive trips to buy 
water from elsewhere and also reported boiling water before consumption -  an 
additional household fuel cost. Estimates of water use varied but were low. The 
relationship between these householders and their provider was fairly 
antagonistic.
7.1.2 Homebound Livelihoods: businesses inside the barrio
The three households in this group have livelihood activities that are 
confined to their homes and the neighbourhood: a shop, a bakery and a 
carpentry workshop.
Household 32 was female-headed. This 31 year old mother had not 
completed secondary education and had two children under 12 both still at 
primary school. She ran a home-based grocery shop from which she generated 
12 to 15 soles (£2-£2.60) per day. The house was owned by this woman’s 
father but she had lived in it for 8 years. Again, while others were struggling with 
higher spending on the household budget in term time, this shop-owner cleared 
more stock at their expense:
It’s ok during the school term but after that it goes down. January HH32 
is the worst month.
The next family in this group was slightly larger. The head of household 
33 lived with his wife, their three children and his sister-in-law. All the adults had 
finished secondary and, along with the oldest child (11), worked in the bakery 
attached to their house. This activity brought in 70 to 80 soles (£12-£13.70) per 
day which was split between household members. The pattern of income 
variation was similar to HH32’s.
[income varies] according to demand and according to the HH33 
season. It goes up during school time
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Unlike the other households in this group the family did not own their 
house outright but were paying for it in instalments after buying it the previous 
year.
Household 41 was also a small family unit. The head of household was a 
70 year old widowed housewife who told me that she was illiterate. She lived 
with two grown up children, one a student and the other a furniture maker. It 
was not possible in this case to pin down income because she was not sure 
how much money her son earned from selling his wares. She did, however, hint 
at the cash flow arrangements explaining that they borrowed money to buy the 
wood. Whatever the household income was, it was being supplemented by 
rearing chickens, rabbits and ducks, half of which were sold and the other kept 
for domestic consumption. Along with the others in this group, the fuel of choice 
was gas although kerosene and firewood were used as substitutes. She had 
been in the barrio for 40 years and told me that she and her husband had been 
among the first founding members.
All these households were on sealed roads which for HH33 and 41 was 
important for getting their goods to market (furniture is heavy and 80 soles’ 
(£13.70) worth of bread is bulky). The house construction in all three cases was 
concrete rather than adobe, with tiled floors in HH32, cement floors in HH33 
and an earth patio in HH41.
The graphical summary in Table 25 shows the clutter of water containers 
in Households 33 and 42. The household busy producing food for sale to the 
public was also the one with the highest risk classification: thermotolerant 
conforms were present in samples taken from the stored water (Figure 60).
Table 26 Households and Taps in Homebound Group, Manco Capac___________________
HH 32 HH 33 HH 41
‘single shopowner’ ‘bakery’ ‘carpenter’
3 people, 2 taps 6 people, 5 taps 3 people, 1 taps
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Figure 62 Sanitary risk score In Homebound Group, Manco Capac
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Incomes fluctuated during the year with the bakery generating the 
highest monthly income and spending the most on energy in this group. 
Householders’ estimates of water consumption were between 10 and 35l/p/d, 
corresponding to my estimates from stored volumes. Household 33 explained 
that the family used very little for themselves.
Figure 63 Monthly income levels and utility expenditure per person in Homebound Group, 
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Household 33 was using water in their main livelihood activity: the 
production of bread. Household 41 said that she used water to wash down the 
patio and the toilet and that in the past, water had been used to make adobe but 
was no longer needed.
On whether or not the water had made them ill, there was uncertainty:
I don’t know. It’s possible that it affects the “wawas” [quechua for HH32 
babies], that they get worms or bugs
No [we haven’t been ill]. People who get ill it’s because they HH41 
don't boil the water
As a precaution however, everyone boiled water. Household 32 also said 
that she used chlorine, adding drop of bleach (5.25% chlorine hypochlorite) per 
bucket to her buckets before refilling them (this showed in the water samples 
from her stored water). Households 32 and 41 collected water from Molino or 
Ttio markets, HH33 fetched water from another house with a SEDACusco 
connection:
We get water from elsewhere. I have another house. A little HH33 
house where there is potable water from SEDACusco. I pay to 
take it from there.
We get water from the neighbours. But some don’t give it. We HH41 
take our containers and go to Ttio. We pay 50 cents (9p) per 
bucket plus 3 soles (50p) for the taxi, 5 (86p) altogether. In the 
house, from the moment the tap comes on, we rinse the buckets 
and collect the water until it goes off again but it arrives turbid, 
dirty. We fill up as much water as we can in whatever there is so 
we can keep clean and cook.
Except in Household 41, homebound livelihoods were bolstered by 
access to markets outside the neighbourhood. In fact, Household 33 had 
deliberately relocated in order to open their bakery in Manco Capac. Incomes 
were low and fluctuating.
Water was a key component of Household 41’s livelihood but was less 
important for the others and the monthly cost of water per person was lowest in 
Household 41. It was the families with young children that resorted to getting 
water from elsewhere.
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7.1.3 Landlord Livelihoods: renting rooms
There are only two households in this category but they are unique in 
that the families own and occupy their homes but also let to others, as distinct 
from landlords able to live elsewhere. There are particular reasons for this that 
we will examine later but their label “landlords” -  perhaps provocative in its 
negative connotation -  must be seen in the context of what appear to be 
otherwise precarious livelihoods.
The first of these, Household 34, was the most interesting. The head of 
household had been the president of the barrio at the time the water system 
was built. This meant he had had a seminal role during the foundation of the 
Manco Capac settlement and still represented Manco Capac on the board of 
ASAPASC, the local water committee. He and his wife, 63 and 58, neither of 
whom had completed high school, lived with their daughter and son-in-law (both 
educated to secondary school level) and two grandchildren. Both adult men 
worked as casual labourers, with the head of household bringing in about 100 
soles (£17) per month. The head of household’s spouse worked in the home, 
tending the guinea pigs and chickens raised for family consumption, while their 
daughter worked as a casual employee of the municipality.
In addition, the family let rooms to 6 tenants: a couple and their three 
young children in one unit, paying 50 soles (£8.60), and a 20 year old single 
man in another unit, paying the same amount. The young family derived income 
from the father’s work as a casual labourer and the mother’s job as a street 
vendor. The young man was also a street vendor. The let rooms were in a small 
new block built at the far end of the patio and were one sign, along with the 
cement internal floors, that the family had gradually upgraded their property 
since arriving 33 years before.
Despite the fact that their employment and that of one of the tenants was 
described as “eventual”, the family said that incomes did not vary. The 
household income was low, however, and when I asked about fuel for cooking, I 
was told that gas was only used in emergencies and that firewood was used to 
limit expenditure to about 4 soles (69p) per week.
Household 37 was remarkably similar in its set up with the principle 
couple in their late fifties living with their daughter, her spouse and two young 
grandchildren. The head of household worked as a casual labourer, earning 
about 15 soles (£2.60) per day, and his wife described herself as a housewife
241
but also worked as a street vendor cooking and selling homemade food at an 
umbrella covered stand at the corner of their street. This generated about 5 
soles (86p) per day. The daughter described herself as a housewife and her 
spouse also worked as a casual labourer. Like their counterparts in other 
households, this family said that incomes varied:
They vary a lot! There’s no work in the rainy season HH37
Again, another source of income came from letting two rooms to a tenant 
in his late fifties and his elderly mother; he too worked as a labourer and paid 40 
soles (£6.90) per month in rent.
Chickens were scurrying around the patio and the main fuel source for 
cooking (in the home and at the corner of the street) was firewood. The floors 
were all unsealed.
Both households had high sanitary risk scores and some of the reasons 
for this can be seen in the photographs in Table 26: uncovered water storage, 
hoses for filling containers and the lack of drainage for the earth patios. 
Thermotolerant coliforms were found in the samples from both households.
Household incomes were low but described as stable by Household 34 
with his income from renting and other working adults (Figure 63). Household 
water estimates were low but even in these households with their twice daily 
water service, the additional inhabitants used up the water stored in assorted 
containers around the taps. Household 34 estimated their consumption at less 
than 51/p/d, probably over 101/p/d based on the stored volumes, and Household 
37 simply reported using what they stored, less than 101/p/d.
Table 27 Households and Taps in Landlord Group, Manco Capac
HH 34
‘ex-president’
12 people, 1 tap
HH 37
‘selling street food at the corner’ 
8 people, 1 tap
242
Figure 64 Sanitary risk score in Landlord Group, Manco Capac
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Uses of water in the house were closely linked to livelihoods with both 
households reporting water for making adobe and other construction materials 
for their own (expanded) properties. Household 37 also used the water for 
producing the food that was sold outside on the street corner.
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Neither reported illnesses from the water but were swift to say that water 
was always boiled:
No way raw water! HH34
When we talked about responding to problems with the system, naturally, 
the head of HH34 with his strong involvement in the water committee showed 
confidence in the ability of the administration to respond:
We have to complain to ASAPASC. When a pipe bursts, we HH34 
report it and they fix it. The administration is responsible for it
If it’s about changing the provider, I don’t agree with having HH37 
SEDACusco because there would be meters.
Both households said they didn’t use other sources of water but instead, 
in the case of HH34, were in a position to give water to neighbours when they 
needed it.
Livelihoods in these households were similar to others in Manco Capac 
with low, variable incomes and informal employment in seasonal construction. 
Their additional strategy was to let rooms in their owner-occupied dwellings. 
Both regarded their water supply as unfit for human consumption -  which it 
was -  but did not have to buy water from other sources. Household 37 
specifically mentioned their preference for an unmetered supply.
7.2 Vulnerability Context
Apart from its formal, administrative jurisdiction in Santiago, Manco 
Capac’s identity is closely associated with part of the city known as the Margen 
Derecha, or Right Bank, of the River Huatanay. The Right Bank actually covers 
areas of two adjacent administrative districts: Santiago and San Sebastian. It 
was first occupied in the late sixties and early seventies by twelve original 
asentamientos humanos121, human settlements whose definition is explained in
121 The recognition of each settlement also tells a story of Peru’s decentralization when one 
examines the officiating authority: Manco Capac founded in 1965, Tiobamba founded in 1968, 
Viva el Peru I and General Ollanta all recognised in 1971 and Chocco recognised in 1976 by 
the national Ministry of Housing and Construction: Barrio de Dios recognised in 1973 and 
Primero de Enero in 1976 by the South Eastern Regional Ministry of Housing and Construction; 
Wimpillay founded in 1974 and recognised in 1986, Araway in 1984, Viva el Peru II in 1985, 
Cesar Vallejo in 1989 and Villa Paraiso in the same year by the Provincial Municipality of 
Cusco.
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Chapters 2 and 3. These groups took possession of the land, some buying it 
from the legitimate owners, others invading and winning land rights 
retrospectively. This process goes some way to explaining the current form of 
this area. According to a 1998 report on an aborted water project for the Right 
Bank produced by the Ministry of the Presidency, this area developed 
haphazardly, driven predominantly by the efforts of the population:
Because of the illegal nature of occupation, [the zone] had neither technical 
advice nor surveys during its construction process. The sole objective was 
subdivision of the land. Nevertheless, once this aim had been consolidated, the 
inhabitants sought to improve their urban living conditions, trying to solve 
problems of linkages to the city, urban facilities, drinking water services, 
drainage, sewerage, electrification etc.
(Ministerio de la Presidencia 1998):2
The population of the Right Bank in 1998 was estimated at 13,800 in 
1998 (14.3p/ha) and by 2006 the municipal water company, SEDACusco was 
estimating this total at 16,208 people and projecting a 13% increase to 18,315 
by 2020 (SedaCusco 2007b). This growth has also spread into 4 new 
settlements bringing the total to 16 in 2006. For Manco Capac, this represents 
equivalent population increases from 2,677 in 1998 to 2,987 in 2006 (and 
potentially 3,375 in 2020).
The Manco Capac “asentamiento humano”, or human settlement, sits on 
the hillside between two natural gullies. It was founded on the 7th November 
1965 but not officially recognised by the Peruvian Ministry of Housing and 
Construction until 1971. By 1998, Manco Capac comprised 526 plots, covered 
an area of about 178,000m2 and had 471 water connections or 90% coverage.
Of all the settlements in the Right Bank in 1998, only Manco Capac had 
a sewerage system and none had any sort of rainwater drainage. This lack of 
rainwater drainage must be seen in light of the zone’s topography:
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The topography of the zone is rugged, presenting rocky zones, embankments 
with middling gradients, gullies with natural cuttings, gradients of up to 45 
degrees in the slopes of the foothills and with depressions up to 100m deep.
(Ministerio de la Presidencia 1998): 1
Road access is limited and pedestrian access made treacherous by a 
combination of steep gradients, a largely unsealed road network, limited 
rainwater drainage and heavy, seasonal rainfall. Manco Capac is also listed as 
one of several critical sectors at risk of landslides and floods (Municipalidad 
Provincial del Cusco 2006). Figure 64 shows a flight of steps into the barrio 
running up parallel to one of the gullies.
Figure 66 View up into Manco Capac from main thoroughfare with overambitious 
recycling bins for separating organic and inorganic waste in the foreground against a 
waste-filled gully in
In Santiago as a whole, the main economic activities in 2005 were 
agricultural including complementary activities such as restaurants, bars and 
bakeries; sales and manufacturing; or transport related (assembling, selling and 
renting vehicles) (Municipalidad Provincial del Cusco 2006). In 1998, incomes in 
the barrios of the Right Bank were primarily commercial and agricultural with 
supplementary incomes coming from artisanal trades, letting rooms or setting 
up guest houses (Ministerio de la Presidencia 1998). Nearly 50% of the
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economically active population described themselves as students with the next 
biggest percentage, at 6%, in sales and less than 3% in any other lines of work 
-either street sellers, teachers, mechanics, labourers, carpenters or drivers.
For anyone involved in construction or tourism, there is a seasonal 
impact on livelihoods with incomes dropping away dramatically during the rains.
The map in Figure 67 shows the location of Manco Capac on the steep 
sided right bank of the River Huatanay. The local employer, Molino Market, and 
the city’s main bus terminus sit between the settlement and the river. The 
market and the bus station are the last buildings served by SEDACusco’s water 
network on the southern side of the river.
Figure 67 Aerial view o f Manco Capac
Molino MarketBus Station ^  River Huatanay
®  Fly tipping site
The fly-tipping sites, gullies identified by Households 32, 33 and 41, run 
parallel to the steep steps up to the settlement and the waste water network 
discharges directly into the river.
The provincial plan shows both banks of the River Huatanay on its risk 
map as prone to powerful run-off and flooding, reproduced in Figure 66.
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Figure 68 Manco Capac risk map from Cusco Provincial planning document
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7.2.1 Natural Hazards
Vulnerability to hazards was location rather than livelihood specific. 
Households 35122 36 and 38 in the Tenacious Livelihoods category (mid-height 
in the settlement) and Households 33123, 32 and 41, in the Homebound 
Livelihoods category (living on sealed roads) did not report any rain or flood 
hazards.
Tenacious Households 39, 43 and 44 and landlord HH34 reported 
annual flooding with assistance coming first from neighbours and then the fire 
brigade. Household 44 was the lowest house in the sample, located on a road 
parallel to the River Huatanay and Household 43 was the highest in the sample, 
on a steep unsealed road almost at the upper limit of Manco Capac:
The houses flood. There is almost a lake further up at the ravine; HH43 
the rain comes down from the mountains in the rainy season.
We help in faenas. It overflows...there is no drainage. The fire 
brigade comes and uses motorised pumps.
Sometimes the River Huatanay floods. We just go to the dry HH44 
areas
Households in the Tenacious and Homebound groups wanted roads to 
be sealed (HH35, HH36, HH38, HH43) and pavements to be constructed (H33).
122 Although Household 35 mentioned that there was a risk of flooding lower down
123 HH33 mentioned the rain but only in the context of lightning, saying that the family stay 
indoors and that on one occasion the corrugate iron section of their roof had come off.
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7.2.2 Security and opportunity
For most households, regardless of livelihood group, inadequate policing 
(HH40, 44, 33, 37) and the high cost of private security guards (HH35, HH36, 
HH34) compounded their fear of crime. The need to protect property individually 
was mentioned in all categories (HH39, 41, HH43 HH37).
There is no security. We defend ourselves. We call the police HH39 
but they don’t come; they say there are no vehicles or no fuel...
There’s no security so each person has a dog. HH41
We would like security guards but some people won’t pay. We HH34 
lack organisation. The police do come once in a while
There is a gang here. HH37
A few households said that the police did come occasionally (HH38, 
HH39) and Household 32 in one of the best organized mini-committees said 
that there were no problems because they had contracted security guards.
Other issues were wrapped up in aspiration and opportunity with 
Household 33 bemoaning the lack of a high school, a church and a larger health 
centre. Household 40, a self-confessed sports fanatic, wanted sports facilities 
for children to keep them on the straight and narrow. In the same vein, 
Household 36 wanted to be able to finance a professional education for their 
children. The plea of the landlords in Household 37 was to:
Change the attitudes of people from outside the barrio HH37
Amazingly on two households mentioned the water system as priority for 
change.
The water service. Sometimes we start washing on Saturday HH32 
then the water stops because we never know when it will be on 
and we have to take the clothes to Molino to rinse them
The water system: we are making a deal with SEDACusco HH34
7.3 Infrastructure and Services
According to the census, in Santiago District as a whole, 87% of 
households had a water supply connection within their demise by 2005 
compared to 72% in 1993. In 1993, 64% of households had a waste water 
connection compared with 89% in 2005. This does not give any indication either 
of the quality of supplied water or the treatment of waste water (INEI 2005).
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The history of services in the Right Bank, however, is one of self-help 
with respect to house and road building and the water system which was 
installed by community faenas, or work teams, during their spare time at 
weekends and on public holidays over a five year period from 1985 to 1990. 
These days there exists something of a split between the 20% of Right Bank 
settlements in San Sebastian District and the others (World Vision Interview 
2006). Those in San Sebastian got together to negotiate the intervention of 
SEDACusco in their water system and now have a drinking and waste water 
service provided by the municipal company124. The others have hung on to their 
own parallel administration know as the Drinking Water and Drainage 
Association of Cusco’s Southern Zone (Asociacion de Servicios de Agua 
Potable y Alcantarillado de la Zona Sur Cusco) or ASAPASC, as I will refer to it. 
In Chapter 8 we will examine this organisation in more detail.
The nearest primary school was run by an NGO in the heart of Manco 
Capac. For those at the foot of the settlement there is a state-run school in Ttio. 
There is no secondary school in the settlement and households use the school 
15 to 20 minutes away in another settlement on the right bank: Viva el Peru. 
Manco Capac’s health post closed down late in 2006 leaving inhabitants to use 
the centre 20 minutes away in Ollanta, a neighbouring settlement. The bus 
connections are on the main road parallel to the River Huatanay. For the 
households high up the settlement, the trip to and from the bus stop is steep 
and muddy in the wet season.
7.3.1 Energy
In Manco Capac, gas dominates as the preferred household fuel for 
cooking and this reflects the District of Santiago’s census data with gas, 
firewood and kerosene at 22%, 72% and 2% respectively. Certainly, Manco 
Capac is on a site that has been cleared of any woodland that might once have 
covered it and is close to the city’s markets for gas to be the fuel of choice. 
Some households reported using firewood however and it was on sale in little 
shops along the main road between the settlement and the river. Although most 
households reported boiling tap water before consumption, the water board
124 Those now served by SEDACusco’s system negotiated a “social ta riff which works out at 
about 10 to 12 soles per month compared to the fixed 4 or 5 soles rate paid to ASAPASC.
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members of ASAPASC, said that people did not customarily boil water because 
of the cost of gas (ASAPASC Meeting 2006).
None of the households seemed perturbed by the handful of annual
power cuts -  although Household 41 with their Homebound Livelihood
emphasised the need to secure the home at these times. Only Tenacious
Households 36 and 40 said that they would complain about an interruption -
Household 40 ran an internet cafe so had a strong livelihood interest. Strangely, 
along with the septuagenarian in San Bias, the oldest interviewee chose this 
moment in the interview to express her paranoia about the state’s role in this:
There was a power cut on the day of the elections. So that the HH41 
votes couldn’t be counted right. This hides the signatures of 
whichever illiterate person. The lights were off until about 8 or 
9pm
7.3.2 Solid waste
The solid waste collection was fairly unpredictable with two households 
saying there was no service -  it came so rarely -  and the others reporting that
the municipality of Santiago provided an occasional collection. Those with
access to a container or close to a collection point -  usually lower down the 
settlement near the main roads like Household 32 and 44 -  left rubbish out for 
collection and reported much more regular collections. The consensus among 
others was thaf there was no fixed timetable and when the truck failed to come, 
they dumped their waste in the ravine (tenacious HH35, HH36, HH38, HH39, 
HH40, HH43, homebound HH33, 41, landlord HH34 and 37).
Sometimes they don’t come. It’s too far, they don’t want to come. HH35
Maybe they don’t have time. You can go to the municipality but 
they pay no attention. They speak to the management who 
speaks to the administrator who speaks to the mayor...
When they come, we put the rubbish out. When they don’t we HH38 
dump it in the ravine.
Totally inadequate. The truck is small, sometimes it doesn’t HH33
come and then the rubbish falls off while it’s going along
Only Households 35 and 36 in the Tenacious Livelihoods category 
tentatively suggested that there might be a municipal tip. Everyone else, 
regardless of livelihood, either said had no idea where their rubbish ended up
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(HH33, 41, HH34, 37) or suggested: “higher up” HH38; the River Huatanay 
HH39; the ravine HH40, HH32). Household 43 was the only household to 
openly despair at this, sighing: “we are polluting!”
7.3.3 Waste water
In terms of waste water connections, the responses suggested that
households connected themselves as and when they could afford it or felt the
need to. However, regardless of livelihood group, all households had waste
water connections and most had been installed by the families themselves125
(HH35, 39, 40, HH33). The two tenant households said that the landlord had
installed the connection. The two households in the landlord group had been
involved in the initial sanitation project. Household 37 had had a waste water
connection for 15 years and HH34 for 25:
The municipality and the population paid for the system. We HH34 
manage it and the municipality gave us the materials. The 
population runs it.
At the highest edge of Manco Capac, Household 43 had not been
connected to the Manco Capac system but had more recently been helped by
an NGO to connect to a neighbouring system:
The drainage is World Vision’s but it belongs to the new barrio HH43 
Virgen de Rosario126. Each family paid 200 soles (£34.40) to the 
barrio then we had faenas, we collaborated. Our own committee 
doesn't support us [Committee 8], Before we used to go to the 
ravine and the children went at school, so we were also 
polluting. Now we pollute the river. We pollute ourselves!
All households in the tenacious and landlord categories confirmed that
their waste water went into the network and then into the river. Only Household
36, the hospital employees, exclaimed that this was terrible! In the homebound
group, Households 32 and 41 did not make the link between their waste water
and the river but the baker in HH33 added that:
[waste] goes into the network and then into the river. There’s no HH33 
problem with the sewage system. But for rainwater there is no 
drainage and it runs in the streets127.
It would be better with cleaning. SEDACusco doesn’t take us HH35 
into account and sometimes it pollutes the streets. People throw
125 with the exception of Household 40 who said that before 2000 they just used the “woods” 
and HH36 who had contracted others to do the work
126 The barrio Virgen de Rosario is about 10 years old
127 Also mentioned by HH39 in the Tenacious category
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rubbish down the drains and they block.
In the future, we’re not going to be contaminating the river HH34 
anymore: there is a project by SEDACusco to stop us but we 
don’t know if we’ll get it. For now, what we have works ok.
This last comment was a reference to the famous “interceptor” drain 
designed to stop untreated waste from pouring into the river and conveying it 
instead to what will be a newly upgraded treatment plant at San Jeronimo. 
There are yet no plans to connect the Right Bank settlements to this collector 
(SEDACusco Interview 1 2006).
7.3.4 Water
Continuity of supply in Manco Capac is dramatically different from San 
Bias and Angostura. The picture is abysmal with water available only every 
other day and, even then, only for a couple of hours in the morning or evening.
What is interesting is that the two households in the Landlord Livelihoods 
category are distinguished by the fact that they have a daily water supply -  
albeit for only a couple of hours. The availability of water has enhanced their 
ability to let rooms and generate rental income. This is also the case for 
Household 38, a property occupied by tenants.
Distinguishing irregular interruptions from the daily variation was 
unhelpful since the view was that the service was completely unpredictable but 
households in the tenacious group did report a recent broken pipe and worse 
shortages in the dry season128.
This pattern goes some way to explaining the paraphernalia surrounding 
household taps. Families left their taps open permanently so that they would be 
alerted when the water supply began to gurgle through pipework and could then 
maximise the volume of water that they were able to collect and store. The 
close up of Household 35’s yard in Figure 68 tells the story in gruesome detail.
128 These interruptions happened from 10 to 15 times per year (HH35 and 44) up to 30 times a 
year (HH36). Apparently these interruptions lasted from a few days (HH36, HH38) to 2 or 3 
weeks (HH35, HH39).
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Figure 69 Continuity of water service in Manco Capac
Tenacious Homebound Landlord
35 | 36 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 43 | 44 35 | 35 | 39 34 | 37
Morning
Afternoon
Morning
Afternoon
Morning
Afternoon
Morning
Afternoon
Morning
Afternoon
Morning
Afternoon
Morning
Afternoon
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Explanations for the poor continuity and quality of water were shared 
across livelihood groups. Population growth, the small reservoir and having to 
share with neighbouring settlements (HH35, HH36, HH44, 38), the faulty 
distribution system (HH36) and the inadequate yield of the source (HH40, HH43, 
HH32, HH33, HH41) were all blamed.
The truth is that the reservoir isn’t enough for the whole HH35 
population. It’s bad. They need to improve and treat the water.
Sometimes there is no water for washing the kids. The kids 
suffer most.
There is a shortage because the water is also for irrigation. It’s HH43 
spring water and there is a community up there that uses it too.
It’s not potable. It’s totally awful. My son drinks soft drinks 
because he says the water smells “ahuano" [quechua for muddy 
water]. The water stinks.
They close it off so that other barrios can have it. It should be a HH38 
constant service. That’s what we need.
Explaining why Households 34, 37 and 38 all has a twice daily, 7 day 
service, the head of household explained that these houses sit over the main 
pipe that serves all the communities down the way. Even when supply is off in 
Manco Capac, it still has to run through the zone and this street can draw water.
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This is particularly interesting since the heads of household and absent landlord 
played a key role in the construction of the water system:
They distribute water to other pueblos. My home has water HH34 
every day because we are on the part of the network that goes 
past [to other areas]. We are privileged unlike other houses.
When they release the water to other barrios, I have water.
Households in the tenacious and homebound groups specifically 
mentioned transferring the system to SEDACusco (HH35, HH44, HH32, HH32, 
HH41):
We want to change to SEDACusco. This would mean a better HH35 
service but people are scared of water meters.
It’s a small organisation [ASAPASC] that can’t cope. The HH32 
president of Manco Capac put forward a motion about passing 
the system to SEDACusco. The majority of people don’t want 
anyone else [to supply water] so that they don’t have to pay for 
more water. The directors don’t want to let go of the 
responsibility. They make money from it. The management 
committee of ASAPASC doesn’t want [SEDA to come in].
I would prefer SEDACusco for the children. HH33
All households in Manco Capac have to store water regardless of 
livelihood group. The photograph below of Household 43’s yard shows a typical 
scene with water stored in buckets with and without lids, jerry cans, drums and 
tinas, made from recycled tyres. This is summed up by Household 43:
We have to store water at all costs, in everything we can find. HH43
Figure 71 1 containers made from recycled tyres
P l  ^ 11%
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Containers were filled using hoses which were often riddled with holes 
and draped when not in use over the muddy yards, in amongst livestock129. On 
upgrading to a purpose built water tank Household 41 noted that:
A water tank costs 350, 400, 500 soles (£60, £70, £85). We can't HH41 
afford one of them
Views on the price that families were paying for this service were mixed. 
Those that objected to the cost generally did so on grounds of quality and the 
lack of treatment (HH35, 35, 39, HH32, 33, 41). Households 40 and 43 said that 
they would pay more if the service were better:
I agree with the cost but I would prefer to pay more if we had HH43
water every day. Cars can’t get up so we get thirsty carrying 
things up. It costs 200 soles (£34.36) to get reconnected [if they 
cut you off]
The three households with a twice daily supply -  the tenants in HH38 
and the landlords in HH37 and HH38 - noted that the cost suited them because 
it was unmetered:
I agree with the cost because we don’t have a water meter HH38
The price is ok because we pay less than we would with a meter HH37
Really, it is cheap. We pay 5 soles (£8.60) and since I have HH34
water on a daily basis, I benefit from it
All the tenants in Household 44, however, each paid 4 soles (69p) on top 
of their rent which meant that their landlord generated 12 soles (£2) per month 
from which he was easily able to pay the fixed, 5 soles (85p) water bill:
The landlord pays the bill. We pay 4 soles (69p) on top of our HH44 
rent. We don’t have a house, so what’s going to happen if we 
don’t pay? He’ll kick us out onto the street!
On the WHO indicators for continuity, quality, quantity and accessibility, 
householders experience a poor level of service. Only in terms of affordability 
does the system offer any advantages but even here, for the householders that
129 A distinction was made by householders in 35 and 40 between water used for cooking and 
water not used for cooking. For example, Household 40 stored water for cooking for 2 days but 
other water for 3 or 4 days.
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have to buy and transport water from elsewhere affordability is compromised. 
The important livelihood link is with the seasonality of income
7.4 Paths to Influence
7.4.1 National Government
The settlement’s primary school is run by an NGO rather than 
government and attitudes to the police were dismissive. Otherwise the only 
interaction that any household mentioned with the state was the compulsory 
voting in general elections.
7.4.2 Municipality of Santiago
In geographic terms, the Municipality of Santiago is a long way from 
Manco Capac. Solid waste was the only service that people connected directly 
to the municipality and this was considered wholly inadequate.
We complain to the municipality and they say that sometimes HH39
the staff haven’t been paid or that the truck has broken down
We need something three times a week. But it changes every HH41
time: it comes twice a month. People throw their rubbish into the 
street. The mayor’s office....they are thieves. They don’t think of 
doing anything for the people. They have to collect the rubbish. I 
didn’t want to vote this year because he’s a rat.
Households 34 and 37 expressed radically different views about the 
potential for getting their voices heard in the municipality. For HH34, the 
minority view was that collective action was the answer to poor service delivery
and, for HH37 and most of the other households, there was no solution and the
reaction was complete apathy:
When there’s a problem, we would protest to the municipality, HH34 
barrio by barrio, this works because we optimise [our impact].
That’s the best way to do it.
We don’t do anything about it. We get bills from the HH37
municipality for environmental services but why would we pay?
For its part, the municipality reported that the Right Bank was in massive 
arrears on payment of auto-valor or local council tax.
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The relationship, or lack thereof, with SEDACusco was also a source of 
concern with some expressing a need for better water but others reluctant to be 
tied into a metered system.
7.4.3 The Neighbourhood Committees
According to the household and key informant interviews, the smallest 
unit of neighbourhood organisation is the committee which is made up of two 
residential blocks (with each block between 18 and 23 lots) (ASAPASC 
Interview 1 2006). In theory, these committees get together on Sunday 
mornings either to discuss projects or to carry them out in faenas, or work 
teams. The degree to which these organisations were functioning varied. 
Households on the southern edge of Manco Capac, like HH32, benefited from 
pavements, sealed roads and security guards that had been organised by the 
neighbourhood committee, while at the other edge of the settlement there was 
frustration at lack of coherence within the committees. On one of my visits, the 
Sunday morning meeting was being rather unsuccessfully convened by a 
whistle-blowing representative. The photograph in Figure 72 shows the 
preparation of materials for the annual road repairs.
Figure 72 Mounds of material piled up fo r road building by community faenas.
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In the past, Manco Capac had also had its own president and board of 
directors but this community administration was not active in 2006. Most 
households in the Tenacious and Homebound Livelihood groups did not 
participate in a neighbourhood organisation130. Those that gave a reason cited 
lack of time and information (HH36, 40) or an organisation that did not function 
(HH36) or suspicion of organisations131 (HH41).
There is a management committee for the community but it HH36 
doesn’t function
Tenacious Household 43 attended the work days but did not participate 
in elections and both households in the Landlord Livelihoods category (HH34, 
HH37) participated in their block committee and worked on the roads:
[we participate] just in the street to work on the road. We are HH34 
contributing money: 500 soles (£86) per member. We have to 
attend to work in the road.
ASAPASC is the community organisation charged with providing water to 
several barrios along the Right Bank. Voting on decisions affecting ASAPASC’s 
constituents is conducted at community assemblies. The right to vote is based 
on whether a person is a “soc/'o titulado” or “titled member” of the Human 
Settlement and this, according to the legal constitution of the settlement, is 
determined by their name appearing on the register of constituents. A 
representative from Manco Capac sits on the board but the following quote from 
an interview with an NGO active in the area, gives a flavour of the set up.
What happens here on the Right Bank is that there is a good percentage of the 
population that is renting. So, this population has neither a voice nor a vote at 
the assemblies of the APVs or AAHHs. Why? Because of their statutes, their 
internal rules. Only the members have access, like I said. We are talking about 
more or 30-40% of the population renting in the Right Bank, which is high. And 
they are maybe a large part of the population that wants SEDACusco to 
intervene.
11 minutes (World Vision Interview 2006)
130 Although Households 35 and 36 participated in the “vaso de leche" programme: “We have to 
go to meetings or you don’t get your ration and it gets shared out between the others”HH35, “I 
go to collect the milk but I don’t go to the meetings because I work in the day time” .
31 This was consistent with her slight paranoia about the authorities, the elderly head of 
Household 41 said that she never belonged to organisations.
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During the household interviews, on the head of household 34 in the 
Landlord Livelihoods category participated in ASAPASC.
All other households explained that elections were held only between the 
members of the board (HH38) and that ASPASC did not call meetings or inform 
people (HH35, HH37). The newest arrivals to the neighbourhood, Household 33, 
had paid a subscription to become a member of the association and this entitled 
them to a water connection. This amounted to a one-off payment of 180 soles 
(£31). One of the longest serving households, HH41, recalled that her husband 
had participated in the faenas which originally brought water to the Right Bank.
They vote amongst themselves HH38
We are not told about it HH37
7.4.4 NGOs and CBOs
World Vision (HH36, 39, 40, HH32) and Puririsu (HH37, 39, 40) were two 
NGOs named by householders132.
World Vision’s activity, however, is not centred on reforming ASAPASC 
since World Vision cannot intervene in the sensitive community decision to 
hand over their water systems to SEDACusco, their approach is rather to 
promote the “adequate consumption of water within the family”: using boiled 
water, regularly cleaned storage buckets with lids and chlorination of water in 
the home. World Vision’s other focus, providing school supplies, was obviously 
in response to the additional term time costs reported by so many households. 
Household 36 gave an angry response about World Vision, interesting more for 
the expectation that it implied than anything else.
It's fake. They take names of each family but don’t give us HH36 
anything. They give us paper and pens that are only worth 20 
centimos. On the child's birthday they send a letter - not clothes 
or toys, just a letter
7.4.5 Private sector actors
Again, a few block committees had contracted security guards. Others 
had tried to organise private security but had been unable to rouse households
132 HH33 thought the regional government might be doing something but the responses were 
uncertain.
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to pay for it. There was a desire for better security and the expectation that this 
would have to come from the community itself.
Household 38 mentioned the telephone company, Telefonica, explaining 
that this private company helped those on low incomes to buy school uniforms 
and stationary.
With the exception of the teachers and hospital workers, the formal and 
informal private sector was the main employer.
7.5 Livelihood Vulnerability: diversity and complexity in Manco Capac
Revisiting the livelihood profiles, the first label was Tenacious 
Livelihoods and included the taxi-chicheria couple (HH35), the hospital and 
Molino employees (HH36), the driver-shopowner tenants (HH38), the teachers 
and mobile phone salesman (HH39), the clandestine internet-shop pair (HH40), 
the hotel employee and CGPdA’s cleaner (HH43), the Molino employee-tenant 
(HH44). These livelihoods were linked to formal activities outside the 
neighbourhood in the transport, education and tourism sectors; the market; the 
regional hospital. They also connected back into more informal neighbourhood 
strategies through grocery shops, the chicheria and an internet cafe.
The three Homebound Livelihoods female-headed shopowner (HH32), 
bakery (HH33) and carpenter (HH41) operated production in Manco Capac but 
in two cases sold their products in the wider city. In the case of the bakery the 
family had relocated specifically to open their baking business. Transferring to 
SEDACusco was popular in the bakery which used water for production and 
had three young children in the household
In the Landlord Livelihoods group was the long-time local activist- 
manual labourer (HH34) and the street food sellers (HH37). These households 
were unique in the sample in that the families owned and occupy their 
dwellings but also let out rooms to others as distinct from absent landlords able 
to live elsewhere.
The pentagon plots, broken down by livelihood profile, reflect the low 
asset base of the Landlord Livelihoods group and the reliance on physical 
assets for home production in the Homebound Livelihoods category. The 
Tenacious Livelihoods profiles suggest higher social capital and reflect 
participation in local organisations and length of time in the zone. These
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households relied on a combination of small businesses in Manco Capac and 
activities outside the neighbourhood.
Figure 73 Disaggregated asset pentagons in Manco Capac
Tenacious Livelihoods Homebound Livelihoods Landlord Livelihoods
Strategies to deal with water scarcity primarily involved household 
storage in an assortment of containers. Some households opted to pay for tap 
water collected from other parts of the city served by the SEDACusco system. 
One family reported lending water and another was observed allowing 
neighbours to fill containers up at their taps while the system was turned on.
Livelihoods were interdependent where neighbourhood businesses were 
vulnerable to seasonal unemployment in the rest of the city and where dismay 
over local infrastructure had prompted street level action to seal roads and build 
pavements. Households in Manco Capac discharged untreated waste water 
and regularly dumped solid waste into the River Huatanay’s catchment but this 
was not an everyday matter of concern.
The attitudes to municipal government were negative and characterised 
by frustration with the lack of waste collection services on the part of the 
population and, from the municipality’s point of view, arrears in local taxation. 
Some households expressed cynicism about the effectiveness of external 
NGOs like World Vision but were more positive about the local organisation 
running the primary school and offering teacher training.
Household attitudes to the water organisation ranged from despondency 
to suspicion. Interestingly, in many cases water scarcity was blamed on 
population growth or the limited spring source in the hills but rarely on the 
system itself. The views on whether the infrastructure ought to be handed over 
to SEDACusco, the provincial water company, were divided between those that
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did not want their water to be metered and those that wanted a better service 
even at a higher cost.
As a response to the research question, this chapter examines the 
vulnerability of household livelihoods in terms of their diversity and complexity; 
their relationship with infrastructure and services; and the access of 
householders to institutions of governance.
Heavy rains, poor solid waste collection, unsealed roads, the absence of 
storm water drainage and the ad-hoc foul water drainage all conspired to make 
the zone treacherous in the rainy season. Households expressed concerns over 
security, lack of opportunity and outsider’s perception of the settlement. There 
was also annoyance at the annual mud bath and surface water run-off but little 
preoccupation with pollution of the gullies or river.
Incomes were low and seasonal. Many adopted livelihood strategies that 
involved home-based businesses in the neighbourhood with supplementary 
activities reaching beyond the neighbourhood into the city’s markets, transport 
and public sector. With many households focused on diverse livelihood 
activities outside the neighbourhood, participation over small areas -  the block 
level committees -  was variable. Where it was strong, the physical 
infrastructure was visibly better with roads and pavements built by the 
communities working together in their own time. Co-ordination of these activities 
at the Manco Capac settlement level was non-existent and attendance at 
settlement level assemblies and meetings was low.
Manco Capac was bypassed by the provincial water systems of Cusco 
and from the waste collection services of the municipality of Santiago. This was 
reinforced by distrust of the municipal institution and unwillingness to pay for 
municipal services. Manco Capac represented only one settlement served by a 
community system but much of the initial momentum that had driven 
construction of this system had ebbed away and collective action was splintered 
to an even finer scale: the level of housing blocks.
Co-ordination of political or infrastructural activities across anything larger 
than a housing block was limited. Governance of the water organisation was 
messy: users were alienated from it, communication between the provider and 
the users was poor and users were tolerating very poor levels of service.
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Chapter 8 Vulnerability and socio-technical systems: a
comparative summary of livelihoods and infrastructure in 
the case studies
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In this chapter I formulate the next part of my response to the research 
question by conceptualising the interaction between vulnerability and 
infrastructure in terms of socio-technical systems.
The first stage of the argument is a comparative summary of livelihoods in 
each case study. This is followed by a detailed comparison of the social and 
technical dimensions of the water and sanitation infrastructure serving each 
place. I use the World Health Organisation’s water service indicators to describe 
and differentiate system performance.
Through this analysis I argue that the different risks faced by households 
are mediated by differentiated levels of service. Then, by describing modes of 
organisation, governance of the provider, the number of users, the rate of 
drinking water production and, the spatial extent of the system, I argue that 
these differentiated levels of service are a function of the socio-technical 
configuration of infrastructure.
This forms the first half of my response to the research question and 
confirms, firstly, that vulnerability in this sample of households is mediated by 
socio-technical systems and, secondly, that these socio-technical systems are 
composites of the physical hardware and surrounding institutional software, not 
just of water and sanitation systems, but also other urban and environmental 
services.
In the following chapter, I bring this analysis to bear on the patterns of 
systems across the city and the connections and disconnections between 
hardware, institutions and households that allow risk to be shared. I also invoke 
the notion of splintering to explain how systems are shaped by processes of 
privilege, bypass, local resistance and networking between socio-technical 
scales.
8.1 Buffering risk I: assets and infrastructure
The sustainable livelihoods framework emerged from development 
studies as a tool for understanding how households face their vulnerability to 
environmental and economic change. It assumes that households are strategic 
in their behaviour, juggling a portfolio of different assets across five categories 
of natural, human, financial, social and physical capital.
Each case study told a different story of livelihoods, vulnerability, 
infrastructure and services and policies, institutions and processes. In the
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following sub-sections these are synthesised in terms of the differential access 
to assets and infrastructure that result.
8.1.1 Buffering risk through household assets
The pentagon plots that opened the chapters on San Bias, Angostura 
and Manco Capac showed differences in the asset bundles of households 
within and between the case studies.
The sampling method deliberately sought out the widest differences and, 
at a glance, these plots show that even in the same neighbourhoods, it was 
possible to identify vastly different household asset bundles. The weak asset 
base of the ‘excluded’ in San Bias coexisted alongside both the ‘establishment’ 
livelihoods group, with their assets concentrated on the human, physical and 
financial axes, and the ‘entrepreneurial’ households with their weaker but 
developing human capital and occasionally unreliable financial capital.
In Angostura, the ‘diversified’ group with their low household capitals 
shared the settlement with the ‘urbane’, strong in human, physical and financial 
assets, and those with ‘traditional’ livelihoods, strong on the natural, social and 
physical axes.
In Manco Capac, however, the differences between the three livelihood 
groups were not as marked. In addition, the patterns of assets, apart from 
negligible natural capital across the households, were less easily characterised 
by their particular strengths. The ‘tenacious’ group relied on a combination of 
small businesses in Manco Capac and formal and informal activities outside the 
neighbourhood. These linked them to the transport, education and tourism 
sectors; the bootleggers’ market; the regional hospital and back into Manco 
Capac through grocery shops, the chicheria and an internet cafe.
Meanwhile, for the ‘home based’ group, physical assets were used for 
home production, supplying the neighbourhood and wider urban markets. The 
landlord’ group also relied on physical assets, this time to let rooms, although 
on other axes their asset base was weak.
San Bias
Establishment Livelihoods Entrepreneurial Livelihoods Excluded Livelihoods
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Angostura 
Urbane Livelihoods Traditional Livelihoods Diversified Livelihoods
•OCML
Manco Capac 
Tenacious Livelihoods Homebound Livelihoods Landlord Livelihoods
The contrast in each household’s access to assets within the same case 
study and over very short distances echoes Richard Batley’s observation that in 
cities the dynamic and marginalised sectors of the economy coexist (Batley 
1997):339. He went on to observe, like Montgomery et al. and McAslan, that 
residential segregation -  zoning that would split the living places linked to each 
of these sectors -  could become something of a self-fulfilling prophecy where 
administrative boundaries locked in privilege by preventing cross-subsidy 
between municipalities. Montgomery et al. also suggested that localised 
segregation could enforce homogeneity in local networks of people and weak 
assets or resources, noting that ties to other sectors and actors in the urban 
economy were needed to mobilise additional resources (Montgomery et al. 
2004)43:47.
This possibility of isolation from the wider resources of the city is also 
mentioned by McAslan (McAslan 2002): 141. In Manco Capac, households with
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weak assets lived side by side, isolating the zone from direct access to tourists 
and, as we saw, NGOs and knowledge of contemporary neighbourhood and 
municipal initiatives elsewhere in the province. A weak and homogeneous asset 
base in Manco Capac fed into and was further undermined by a process of 
bypass in the configuration of infrastructure that will be examined more closely 
in Section 9.2.2. At the same time, the household response was to try to 
connect to other systems and resources in the city.
Livelihood assets and activities in the three case studies also bring out 
features of vulnerability that are common even across heterogeneous 
neighbourhoods. Heterogeneity in vulnerability, or the degree to which shocks 
and trends are felt asymmetrically, depends on a whole host of complex and 
interacting factors including the frequency of the shocks and trends, whether 
these cycles are local or global, how easily they can be anticipated and whether, 
anticipated or not, a particular set of household assets will be able to smooth 
their impact through diverse and complex livelihood strategies. The ability to 
anticipate, of course, is itself, as I argue in Section 2.5, a function of access to 
information, infrastructure and influence.
In San Bias, the main sources of vulnerability, other than seasonal 
income insecurity, were linked to tourism and ranged from increased crime, 
local inflation and the displacement of long-time residents to more traffic and 
noise. Environmental vulnerability to the heavy annual rains was exacerbated 
for those with weak physical assets -  poor quality or aged adobe houses -  and 
those with the lowest financial incomes for whom the expense of renovating 
colonial era houses was burdensome. Otherwise the effects of overflowing foul 
sewers and poor storm water drainage depended more on location than 
livelihood, with the impacts concentrated where gradients were steep and 
surfaces impermeable. In San Bias, vulnerability was less about environment, 
infrastructure and services and much more about householders’ links outside 
the settlement to international tourism and markets.
It was a completely different situation in Angostura where the major 
vulnerability, regardless of household assets, was linked to contamination of the 
river and the annual flooding. Connection of households to the environment was 
strong and there was unhappiness at the settlement’s own contribution to the 
contamination. Additionally, people mentioned danger from road traffic and poor 
roads. Crime was regarded as low although households closest to the road had
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clubbed together to pay for a night-watchman. Informally, interviewees talked 
about the lack of credit and human capacity. For Angostura, environment and 
vulnerability were closely connected and mitigating risk involved working 
together to draw in resources and labour to build flood defences or construct 
and contribute to collective water and sanitation infrastructure.
Manco Capac’s serious vulnerability was in the low, seasonal incomes of 
householders. People also felt insecure in terms of crime and many reported 
lack of opportunity and outsiders’ negative perceptions of the settlement. 
Environmental vulnerability was linked to heavy rains and the ensuing annual 
mud bath and filthy surface water run-off but there was little household 
preoccupation with pollution of the gullies or river with solid waste or untreated 
waste water. Manco Capac was experiencing a compound vulnerability 
associated with weak household assets, poor infrastructure and services, which 
exacerbated environmental hazards, and a lack of institutional support.
The patterns that emerge from the livelihood interviews have implications 
for vulnerability and the ability to buffer household risk. Firstly, where livelihoods 
were seasonal and local, based on labouring in construction or agriculture for 
example, incomes were low and unstable and human and physical capitals 
were weak.
The secondary effects of this were felt in Manco Capac and Angostura 
where private neighbourhood services like the grocery shops reported 
corresponding fluctuations in business.
Thirdly, there were also households with seasonal and global 
livelihoods that were strongly linked to tourism. Tourist numbers are seasonal 
with the Inca trail only advisable in the dry season and the annual adventure 
holiday market tracking the European and North American long vacations. Year 
to year, livelihoods linked to tourism are also likely to track the European and 
North American economic cycles. The sophistication of the service that 
households were offering to tourists also influenced their ability to capitalise 
along other axes. Street vendors hawking low value goods like local food or 
handicrafts had weaker asset bases. Landlords in San Bias who were able to let 
rooms to tourists could generate relatively high cash incomes but they had to be 
able to guarantee water services and personal safety. Similarly, the jeweller in 
San Bias was making high-end artisanal products for the international market 
which was more lucrative than employment in the public sector.
270
Fourthly, the livelihoods that could capitalise on their relatively strong 
human capital were much less seasonal and were linked to the provincial 
public and private service sectors: education, health and financial services. 
Urban public servants over longer cycles of change have not been immune from 
instability in Peru, however, with the crisis of the late eighties and early nineties 
showing just how vulnerable these sectors could be to inflation.
In terms of sustainable livelihoods, what is interesting about these urban 
vulnerabilities is that, although it is clear that those with seasonal, local 
livelihoods are the least able to build their resilience over time, there are two 
additional dimensions to differences in vulnerability. Firstly, different households 
in San Bias and Angostura are to some extent vulnerable to different risks at 
different times, while in Manco Capac the risks and vulnerabilities coincide. 
Secondly, an individual household is limited in the diversity of its risk buffering 
strategies because there are limits on the assets and actors and thus diversity 
and complexity in activities that a single household can contain.
The idea of spreading risk will come up again but the point to make here is 
that people-centred development gives primacy to the capabilities of individuals 
but a single individual probably cannot contain enough ‘diversity, complexity 
and redundancy’ to avert risks. A household may start to exhibit a range of skills, 
knowledge and assets so that its members can spread themselves across a 
variety of activities but as a household reaches the limits of what it can do on its 
own, its connection with other households, the environment, infrastructure and 
policies, institutions and processes becomes important. In fact, the extent to 
which risk is shared mutually may even affect the choices that individuals make 
about their capabilities and assets.
As we saw in Section 2.5.1, another perspective on collective vulnerability to 
risk comes from Debraj Ray’s orthodox economic models of insurance which 
look at the exposure of groups of people to risk where the best insurance 
groups are subject to risks that are independent of each other or “idiosyncratic”. 
Obviously, with a large enough group, all uncertainty is theoretically 
idiosyncratic and independent and smoothing can be achieved but the larger 
the group, the worse the flow and reliability of information about risk. By 
contrast, in a small, geographically close group, neighbours might have better 
information, a better system of social sanctions and better possibilities for
271
foresight, patience and confidence of the participants in the sustainability of the 
scheme (Ray 1998):601.
Reducing vulnerability and thus enhancing sustainability on this view is only 
possible by networking with other individuals who are subject to different 
idiosyncratic risks. And only by sharing information, perhaps across distances, 
could such a network be stabilised. The ability to do both of these things 
depends on the socio-technical configuration of infrastructure: modes of 
organisation, socio-technical scale and complexity and diversity in its 
connections.
8.1.2 Buffering risk through infrastructures: the lived experience of water 
and sanitation, differentiated services and differentiated 
vulnerability
Compounding the different risks mediated by household assets, the water 
systems in each place also present differentiated risks. This section examines 
different household access to infrastructure starting with water and sanitation 
and then comparing the more general experience of services and infrastructure.
The service levels delivered by each configuration of infrastructure are 
summarised with reference to the WHO’s five key indicators: continuity, 
accessibility, quantity, quality and affordability.
8.1.2.1 Continuity, Accessibility and Quantity
Table 27 compares the case studies. Households in San Bias had daily 
interruptions but at least an intermediate level of access in that they had 
improved supply within their boundary walls. This contributed to a higher 
quantity of daily water. Angostura’s system was almost continuous with 
households benefiting from at least one on-site connection. Manco Capac by 
contrast had poor continuity with households resorting to water from other, 
unimproved sources and lower overall consumption.
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Table 28 WHO service indicators
Case Study Continuity Accessibility Quantity
San Bias
Level 2. year-round service with 
frequent (daily or weekly) 
interruptions1 3
Intermediate access134
50 litres per capita per 
day (97 litres per per 
capita135)
Optimal access136 100-200litres per capita per day
Angostura
Level 1: year-round service from a 
reliable source with no interruption 
of flow at the tap or source;
Intermediate access 
Optimal access
50 litres per capita per 
day
100-200litres per capita 
per day
Basic access138
20 litres per capita per 
day (16.5 litres per 
capita per day1 9)
Manco
Capac
Level 4: compounded frequent and 
seasonal discontinuity137
Intermediate access
50 litres per capita per 
day (30, 49 to 56 litres 
per capita per day140
Optimal access
100-200litres per capita 
per day (30, 49 to 56 
litres per capita per
day14_j_.........
In San Bias, there was a perception that water use was rationed by the 
water company and that even within the SEDACusco system, differential levels 
of service applied such that those -  particularly businesses -  in the historic 
centre were given priority over peripheral, residential areas. Some households 
in San Bias perceived themselves as ‘central’ and felt that they benefited from 
this while others felt more marginalised and that the increased tourism close to 
them meant that they lost out on water resources.
SEDACusco’s CEO attributed discontinuity in San Bias to limited 
reservoir capacity, excessive demand and the practice of filling water tanks 
(SEDACusco Interview 3 2006). He did not distinguish between commercial 
users -  laundries and guest houses catering for tourists -  and residential users
133 Causes: peak demand exceeding the flow capacity of the transmission mains or the capacity 
of the reservoir; excessive leakage within the distribution systems;
134 Water provided on-plot through at least one tap (yard level), low public health risk
135 From SEDACusco’s published data. Household interviews showed a range of 49 to 108 litres 
per capita per day for those with intermediate access and 22 to 125 for those with optimal 
access.
136 Supply of water through multiple taps within the house, very low public health risk
137 peak demand exceeding the flow capacity of the transmission mains or the capacity of the 
reservoir; natural variation in source volume during the year; volume limitation because of 
competition with other uses such as irrigation; periods of high turbidity when the source water 
may be untreatable;
136 Within 1 km/within 30min round-trip, high public health risk
139 Estimate based on reports from household interviews: 5no. 18litre buckets per household 
with average household size 5.47 people from SEDACusco
140 Lowest estimate reported by SEDACusco in their survey report. Second range based on 
population, reservoir capacity and ASAPASC operating hours (ASAPASC 2005)
41 Lowest estimate reported by SEDACusco in their survey report. Second range based on 
population, reservoir capacity and ASAPASC operating hours (ASAPASC 2005)
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although he did recognize that storage was a response to the water company’s 
poor reliability record:
...In San Bias, I understand that we have already substantially improved the 
hours of service. Of course there are occasionally interruptions...this could be 
because of variations in the demand of the population. Sometimes, there is an 
excessive [demand] and the reservoirs empty... perhaps, it gets [cut] because in 
this sector . . we  are changing a pipe diameter in order to improve the flow 
capacity of the pipe... there are lots of people that fill up their cistern... but we 
also know that that it is linked to the reliability of the water company. If we give 
them confidence that they'll have water all day, guaranteed, they won’t use their 
cisterns. But to do that, hopefully, we are just waiting/hoping to finish a project. 
Hopefully, we’ll be able to put it in operation and we hope to improve the whole 
supply system and that will [in turn] change people’s habits a little bit.
(SEDACusco Interview 1 2006)
In Manco Capac, insufficient water at source meant that the water 
service was split between different sectors on different days. ASAPASC’s 
“Cronograma de Distribucion" is reproduced in Table 28 to give an idea of the 
level of intermittence experienced across the Right Bank (ASAPASC 2005):
Table 29 Water service schedule in the right bank
SECTOR MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRDAY SATURDAY SUNDAY
Manco Capac (1-3) 
Manco Capac (9) 
Manco Capac (all) '  .
~ T ~
'  .
T
'  .
I 1
1
Viva el Peru I (1-3) 
Viva el Peru 1 (4-8) 
Viva el Peru II r i ' r
Piimeto de  Enero 1 1 1  aChocco 1  1 1 I  1 1 1  1 1
Tiobamba (upper) 
Tiobamba (lower)
Virgen de Rosario (upper) 
Vitqen de Rosario (lower) 1 1 1
The situation has got progressively worse. In 1998, most settlements had 
water between 8am and 6pm everyday and only the highest settlements had a 
rationing schedule limiting water availability to 2 days per week and 4 hours per 
day (Ministerio de la Presidencia 1998):6. The distribution timetable was 
summed up by a member of the maintenance team during one of the site visits, 
when he said sadly:
It’s necessary. But it’s not fair.
(ASAPASC Interview 2 2006)
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8.1.2.2 Quality
In terms of quality, differential sanitary risk is also apparent in each 
supply system. Figure 74 shows Manco Capac’s surface source (MC2) with 
high thermotolerant coliform counts and the surface and spring (MC1) treatment 
systems with high risk scores. Angostura and San Bias both had low TTC 
counts and intermediate risk scores. Original results are shown in Appendix D.
Figure 74 Sanitary risk scores of all systems
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 >9
E MC2
D
Low risk, low action 
priority
Intermediate to high risk: 
higher action priority
Very high risk: urgent 
action
The box plots in Figures 73 and 74 show the results of household water 
sampling. Thermotolerant coliform counts and residual chlorine results are 
shown for each case study, disaggregated by season and by whether the 
sample was collected from running taps or stored water. Box plots are useful for 
displaying differences between the case studies given the typical, highly 
skewed distribution of TTC counts (shown in Appendix D). The construction of 
the central box is based on the first and third quartiles of the data set. The 
median is shown as a line through the box and outside the box the largest and 
smallest non-outliers are marked by bars. Mild outliers (greater than one and a 
half times the inter-quartile range) are shown as closed circles and extreme 
outliers (greater than three times the inter-quartile range) are shown as stars.
TTC counts in San Bias are low which is consistent with the carefully 
controlled treatment and disinfection at the Santa Ana Plant. The range of 
residual chlorine levels was wider in the wet season. This indicates the
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treatment plant’s response to much higher turbidity and production rates in the 
wet season and the technical difficulty of controlling this.
In Angostura, households tended not to store water so the “buckets” 
category is empty. There is also no treatment and no chlorination in this system. 
TTCs were recorded in several households and the counts were higher during 
the wet season when patios, waste connections and tap stands were frequently 
inundated.
In Manco Capac, poorly controlled but very high post-filtration 
chlorination had eliminated TTCs in the dry season. Tap water in the wet 
season had lower and less variable levels of residual chlorine and TTCs were 
recorded in several households. In stored household water samples, even 
though a few samples taken soon after collection still contained some residual 
chlorine, high TTC counts were recorded, again this problem was worse in the 
wet season. The residual chlorine outliers in stored water in Manco Capac are 
accounted for by one household where the family added a few drops of bleach 
to storage buckets as they filled them.
Figure 75 Box Plot showing thermotolerant coliform counts
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Figure 76 Box Plot showing residual chlorine readings
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8.1.2.3 Affordability
Of the three case studies, San Bias is the only location with metering and 
billing. In Angostura, the JASS treasurer collects payments by going house to 
house while in Manco Capac, users receive a monthly “boleto” showing their 
water fees. These are often allowed to accumulate and might be paid, for 
example, as a six monthly lump sum. There have been serious problems with 
billing in Manco Capac for at least a decade:
The connections are direct and the payment for consumption is minimal and 
symbolic at only 2.50 soles (43p)
(Ministerio de la Presidencia 1998):8
Some people haven't paid for 7 or 8 years - including the leaders - they are 
disconnected but they just reconnect themselves, ASAPASC is passive. This 
won't happen with SEDACusco.
Interview with former president of ASAPASC (HH34)
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Table 30Tariff comparison across case studies
Case Monthly Tariff m3/month Soles/m3 £J m3
San Bias Domestic Tariff-01214^ Oto 20 0.6302 0.1083
21 to 30 0.8950 0.1538
31 to 50 1.2101 0.2079
51 + 1.7521 0.3010
Angostura JASS Fixed Tariff: 2 
soles (34p) 12143 0.1581 0.0272
Manco Capac ASAPASC Fixed Tariff: 5 
soles (86p)
4.9144 1.0156 0.1745
9.2145 0.5441 0.0935
Molino vendors145 0.24 44.0000 7.5601
Ttio vendors14' 0.2417 63.0000 10.8247
SEDACusco’s 
Social Tariff
Oto 6 0.4034 0.0693
7 to 15 0.7437 0.1278
People in Manco Capac, already faced with poorer services and worse 
sanitary risks pay higher tariffs. The provincial water company’s social tariff 
allows users who do not exceed a monthly consumption of 6m3 to pay just 
0.4034 soles/m3 (7p/m3). For those that go over this amount the tariff rises to 
0.7437soles/m3 (13p/m3). Notice that even the higher of these figures is less 
than the estimated cost by volume paid by the ASAPASC users.
We also saw in the livelihoods chapters that cash incomes in Manco 
Capac and Angostura were highly seasonal and often insecure which amplifies 
the tariff effect. Affordability is not just a question of absolute tariff level but also 
a function of cost relative to income. This comparison demonstrates that the 
water systems in these three case studies, with their differential service levels, 
present different risks to their respective populations.
8.1.3 Household assets: the interaction of vulnerability and infrastructure
In San Bias, the water service was directly linked to home-based 
enterprises in only two cases: the jeweller who used a little in production and 
the landlady who let rooms to international visitors and used water in adobe and 
cement for the ongoing expansion of her building. In Angostura, water was used
142 This can be compared to the real cost of water production which is about 90centavos/m3 
(SEDACusco Interview 3 2006)
43 Based on 63m3 per day for 147 households
144 Based on 30 litres per person per day
145 Based on 56 litres per person per day
146 Based on 3 monthly trips, 5no. 16litre buckets and taxi ride at 2.50 soles and 20 cents per 
bucket
147 Based on 3 monthly trips, 5no. 16litre buckets and taxi ride at 2.50 soles and 50 cents per 
bucket
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for animals and gardens in all livelihood categories. Since the water service was 
continuous there was little need to resort to storage or alternative sources and 
when adobe making or other livelihood activities involving water (communal 
coriander washing) were observed, inhabitants were using brooks.
Water was linked to livelihoods in Manco Capac where it was used to 
patch up adobe houses, tend animals, top up taxi radiators, make chicha, street 
food and bread. With a water service that only operated on alternate days and 
for a few hours, households were resorting to water storage in just about any 
sort of container, buying water from the market, harvesting rainwater or 
borrowing it from neighbours, although this was not the case for the ‘landlord’ 
group where the households had a daily supply because they sat above a main 
water line.
Sanitary risk scores reflected household physical assets with the 
‘established’ group in San Bias exposed to no or low risk and intermediate risks 
in the ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘excluded’ groups, except where the Centro 
Guaman Poma de Ayala had intervened. In Angostura and Manco Capac, 
household sanitary risks were also low for those with the best physical assets.
All households in San Bias boiled water for drinking. In Angostura, 
although some households reported boiling water and reported water-related 
illnesses, households in the traditional and diversified groups used a mixture of 
boiled water and water direct from the tap. The adults said that children were 
especially likely to go straight to the taps. In the ‘diversified’ group, doubts over 
water quality were explicitly linked to the additional expense of having to boil it 
before consumption.
Manco Capac’s householders also boiled water with several 
householders reporting water-related illnesses and a few expressing horror at 
the idea of drinking water straight from the tap. One shopowner with young 
children was even chlorinating her stored buckets of water with drops of 
household bleach.
In terms of general service provision, there was the sense in San Bias 
that central and tourist areas were prioritised by service providers with, for 
example, the nearest health services in the district of Wanchaq. In Angostura, 
too, the nearest health, education and police services were either in San 
Jeronimo or the district capital, Saylla. In this case, the settlement’s small size 
constrained its access to decentralised government services. Infrastructure and
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services in Manco Capac were poor with unreliable solid waste collection, 
unsealed roads, no storm water drainage and ad-hoc foul water drainage.
One household in the San Bias ‘establishment’ group expressed dismay 
at the fact that waste water ended up in the river but otherwise few aspects of 
infrastructure linked households in San Bias to natural capital beyond the barrio. 
By contrast, Angostura’s vulnerability to flooding and contamination, the 
dependence on agriculture and the use of firewood as a fuel source all 
connected people to the environment. At the same time, there was no waste 
collection service at all, forcing inhabitants to dump their own rubbish into the 
river. Formally and informally the inhabitants were concerned about their own 
impact on the river and it was this community that had built a waste water 
treatment plant with the support of CGPdA. People were very aware of the plant 
and remembered a time before this infrastructure when their connections had 
discharged directly into the river or households had relied on latrines and open 
defecation.
This section describes the interaction of household vulnerability and 
infrastructure.
8.2 Buffering risk II: infrastructure and governance in the case studies
This section examines this interaction between infrastructure and 
governance, remembering that part of the participatory ideal promoted by the 
sustainable livelihoods framework has emerged in response to unequal access 
to influence and a failure to recognise of the needs of the least powerful. The 
challenge of participation is in engaging those for whom the access and 
aspiration to influence has been undermined by poverty (Ray 1998):252 
(Wratten 1995): 14 (World Bank 2006a):28.
To understand these relationships in Cusco, in this section, I use a socio- 
technical lens to look at the infrastructure systems serving the three case 
studies. Firstly, for each case study governance is broken down according to 
ownership and constitution of the provider, the social scale of the system 
(capacity of the provider to operate the system and engage users, strategies of 
users, external support) and technical scale (geographic reach, system 
components and production capacity, number of users and links to 
neighbouring systems and the environment). A summary table of the different 
provider organisations and their socio-technical scales is held in Appendix D5.
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Secondly, these configurations of infrastructure are related back to 
broader questions of access to influence in each case study. As we saw in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3 despite the high level, formalised performance of 
SEDACusco, the provincial water supplies do not cleave nicely into urban EPS 
provision and rural JASS provision: parallel administrations are still operating 
within the city and coexisting alongside breakaway municipalities that have 
pulled out of the provincial company.
Officially, the regulator SUNASS imposes sanctions on any registered 
EPS that fails to comply with its legal obligations. This means that the regulator 
does not play any role in overseeing parallel administrations or the JASS water 
committees which the Cusco SUNASS representative described as self­
regulating or “auto-regulador” (SUNASS Interview 1 2006). Instead, the 
regulator is the key player in tariff-setting148. Public health is a matter for the 
regional health agency, DIGESA, which monitors water quality but has no 
enforcement powers.
7.2.1 The EPS: SEDACusco in San Bias
SEDACusco is a typical Peruvian provincial water company constituted 
by law as an Entidad Prestadora de Servicios de Saneamiento or EPS. The 
governance model follows one of ownership by the province’s municipalities, 
each of which is a shareholder with shares divided according to the number of 
connections in each municipal jurisdiction. The elected mayors of each 
municipality sit on the board of the water company and act as the principal 
decision-makers. The industry regulator is the national watchdog SUNASS and 
public health monitoring is the responsibility of DIGESA, the regional health 
authority.
By law, the EPSs must self-finance and the emphasis is on cost-recovery 
through metering, charging and, where possible, private investment. Financial 
oversight remains centralized at the level of national government and for 
SEDACusco’s CEO this is problematic:
The Ministry for the Economy regulates us a lot in terms of administration and
also in terms of audit. We are overseen by the General Controleria of the
Republic and external auditors. In reality, the company works like a private
148 Interestingly when tariff increases were announced in 2006, it was SUNASS that gave the 
press releases about price hikes rather than the local EPS.
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company but it is regulated, it is overseen, like a public service. This is a big flaw 
that hampers the development of many things in the company. It causes great 
inconvenience, many additional costs and reduces the decision-making power of 
the company that would otherwise certainly allow us better to manage and 
operate the water. It is very controversial because, for example, generating 
information for the state requires many additional man-hours. I would say nearly 
30% of the year is taken up providing information to the state and we don’t know 
where it goes or what it’s for!
4mins (SEDACusco Interview 1 2006)
There is space in Peruvian legislation for private investment if the 
company can attract external finance. One current example is the phased, 
modular expansion of the waste water treatment plant at San Jeronimo. The 
feasibility study was conducted by a Japanese consulting firm and the project is 
to be funded by the Japanese Bank, JBIC (SEDACusco Interview 1 2006).
There is also engagement in the wider water community with 
SEDACusco providing and receiving training with other Peruvian EPSs, 
participating in IMA’s Vilcanota Basin Management Committee and CGPdA’s 
project for Integrated Water Resource Management, or GIHR.
San Bias counts itself in the north western sector of the city served by 
Lake Piuray. It is fed by the north main (Linea Norte de Aduccion) which is 
supplied from the Santa Ana treatment plant and reservoir. The satellite image 
in
Figure 77 shows San Bias outlined in yellow. It sits in the far eastern 
corner of the pressure zone allocated to it by SEDACusco, outlined in blue. The 
northern water main is shown in red tracing the contours of the valley’s northern 
slope back to the Santa Ana reservoir in the west.
Figure 77 Aerial image of SEDACusco pressure zones in San Bias
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Just over half of Cusco’s water supply comes from Lake Piuray, a 
surface source 22km away from the city. In SEDACusco’s simplified schematic 
in Figure 78, the lake, the treatment plant and the rough location of San Bias -  
between the northern main and the city’s central plaza -  have been highlighted 
simply to show their relative independence from other springs, reservoirs and 
boreholes.
Figure 78 A schematic produced by SEDACusco for the public (SEDACusco Interview 4 
2006)
Lake 
Piuray 
the Santa 
Ana Plant
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Treatment at the Santa Ana plant is in three classic stages: flocculation 
using aluminium sulphate in the rainy season and copper sulphate in the dry 
season; filtration through ten Degremot pressure filters149; disinfection with 
chloro gas to leave 1.2mg/l residual in the reservoir and 0.5mg/l in the network’s 
final tap150. The 6,000cubic metre Santa Ana reservoir dates from 1970 and 
supplies four zones which are isolated, macro-metered and controlled from the 
reservoir outlet.
The system is not without problems however. First is the issue of water 
production and meeting demand. The yield from the lake is insufficient and 
water has to be rationed (SEDACusco Interview 2 2007). In response to 
population growth and this dwindling yield, SEDACusco brought the Vilcanota 
Project into operation and reduced the area of influence of the Piuray with an
149 Filtration rate is 50-551/s through graded sand (0.7mm top, 5-6mm bottom). The filter medium 
is replaced every 2 to 3 months and backwashing is carried out very 24 to 40 hours or when an 
indicator pressure of 25lbs/inch2 is reached. The cleaning cycle is 10 minutes with air, 10 
minutes with water, 10 minutes with a mixture.
150 Gas added at about 2kg/hr, 50kg in 24hrs. Minimum acceptable residual chlorine is 0.3mg/l.
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emphasis on what their engineers call “sectorization” (SEDACusco Interview 4 
2006). This production deficit disproportionately impacts the higher parts of the 
city:
It’s necessary to restrict water in the higher areas. The lower zones are the
privileged ones.
(SEDACusco Interview 4 2006)
There are also rather shocking system losses, estimated by the company 
to be 43% of production. Lastly, the city is seeing a growth in new multi-storey 
buildings on prime, central land. This is described as “crecimiento vertical” by 
the water company and puts additional pressure on central infrastructure 
(SEDACusco Interview 4 2006).
SEDACusco’s system and procedures are sophisticated but on the basic 
criteria set out by the WHO, which are designed to highlight risk points for 
faecal contamination between the source and treatment plant in simple systems, 
the risk scores suggest an intermediate to high risk: SB1 in Figure 74. This is 
entirely due to the fact that Lake Piuray is a surface source in an inhabited, 
agricultural area. The sources feeding the lake are described as “showing a 
high level of bacterial contamination” (PRONAMACHCS & INRENA 2005)151. 
This result flags up the importance of a treatment plant that is carefully 
controlled, monitored and maintained. Figure 79 shows colour coded risk on the 
San Bias system inventory. Below is a reminder of the key.
151 66% of the samples from springs feeding the lake indicated low bacterial contamination: total 
coliforms between < 3 and 23 NMP/100 ml. and faecal coliforms between < 3 and 9 NMP/100 
ml. The remaining 34% of samples present bacterial indicators of the order: total coliforms 
between 240 and 1,100 NMP/100 ml. and faecal coliforms from < 3 to 460 NMP/100ml. 
(PRONAMACHCS & INRENA 2005).
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Table 31 Classification o f therm otolerant coliform  counts 
TTC count Colour Code
0 ______
to 10
10 to 100 C
100 to 1000 
>1000
TTC = Thermotolerant Coliform
Adapted from Table 5.2 (World Health Organization 2006):78
Table 32 Flow chart symbols
Symbol Definition o f Symbol
o Operation: operations resulting in an intentional change in water
□ Inspection: examination or test
V Storage: water is stored
|=> Transport: water is moved
Combined activity
Adapted from Table 3.1 Process flow diagram symbols and WHO Water Safety Plan 
documentation (Davison et al. 2005;Davison & Deere 2006)
A
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Figure 79 System inventory: San Bias
Catchment: Lake Piuray (supplies 56%  of Cusco’s), 22km  
from citv. floating pump draws 310-3501/s.
Treatm ent 1: flocculation with aluminium (wet season) or 
copper (drv season) sulphate (for turbidity > 30NTU 10% 
Treatment 2: pre-chlorination with chlorine gas. calcium 
hypochlorite (0.3-0 5ppm)
System: Santa Ana Plant, 10no. Horizontal Degremot© filters 
7 6m long by 0 2 .7 5 , 0.75m  depth quartz sand, graded 0  7mm 
Treatment 1: rapid sand filtration at 50-551/s. 13.6m bed 
length leading to 1.000 polyethylene nozzles 
Backwashlng: according to site engineer 24-40hours. 
according to SEDACusco literature every 48-72 hours, when 
Treatment 2: chlorine gas at 2 0-2 3kg/hour for flow rate 
3601/8 (1.0-1 2ppm)
Storage: Santa Ana reservoir. 6.500m ’ , residual chlorine at 
1.2mg/l. 12m high by 013 m , built in 1970 
Destination: direct to households and to reservoirs in Picchu, 
Puquin. Los Andenes. Zaguan del Cielo. Mariscal Gamarra.
volume
Row control: 4no. supply lines from valve chamber. 12" North 
Line supplies San Bias and others.
Rationing: based on macro-meters measuring flow rate from 
Santa Ana and controlling flow in valve chamber 
Residual Chlorine: designed for 0 .5-0  8ppm at last point in 
system. Minimum accepted 0  3ppm
Secondary Settlement: 2-8%  retention
Drying Beds: 7,000kg/year humus recovered, 90days to 
process in dry season
Discharge: Into River Huatanay BOO 50-70mg/l, TTCs 10E5 - 
10E6 (W H O  10E3), TSSs 250-300mg/l
maximum capacity 3951/s
Intake: estimates 420-4501/s and 6001/s. BOD 250mg/1- 
TSS 1600mg/ITTCs 10E8 
Screen: 1 5" platinum, floating debris goes to incinerator 
Desanders: 2no. X  15m. 15% slope to primary settlement
i  Settlement: 4000m3. 120-150minutes retention time. 
1 rev/hour to clear scum, tank is 3.5m cylinder on 1 9m  
Sludge: agitator/sludge pump clears 40m’ every 8 hours.
reduction to 8-10%  after drying in anaerobic digestor
3m deep, 050m . porous andesite medium, needs 
int hydralic pressure across filter to optimise 
3701/s
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7.2.2 The JASS: Angostura’s water committee
The JASS provider model is based on ownership by the community 
water committee or JASS, decision-making by the community at general 
assemblies, self-regulation by the community and the national regulator 
SUNASS, monitoring by the regional health agency and financing is by users 
through charges, the joining fee for new arrivals and any fines imposed on the 
community. External donors or financiers can also provide funds as long as the 
JASS is not profit-making.
The JASS has nominated a president, secretary, treasurer and 
technician and there is a rolling schedule of maintenance to ensure that all 
components are serviced twice a year. This work is carried out by faenas, or 
work teams formed by the community every three months.
The Angostura JASS has had support from the NGO, el Centro Guaman 
Poma de Ayala, to construct a drinking water reservoir over a three month 
period in 2001 and a waste water network and treatment plant over seven 
months in 2002.
Tariff collection is regarded as poor by the JASS with few people actually 
paying (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala 2006b). By contrast, as we saw in 
Chapter 5, the attendance at assemblies and work days, or faenas, is high. In 
the annual monitoring sheet completed by the president of the JASS at a 
session run by Guaman Poma, the turnout at meetings held every three months 
was estimated at 80% of the population. The system had been built and was 
still maintained through these work days and the failure of households to take 
part resulted in a fine imposed by the community committee. Individual 
households thus had a direct and collective relationship with the water 
committee and with the upkeep of the system.
Before 2001, 80 households in Angostura were connected to a single 
gravity-fed spring source yielding 2.2l/s. Guaman Poma facilitated a joint project 
between the municipality and the settlement and Angostura now takes water 
from five springs above the settlement with a combined yield of 51/s152 (Centro 
Guaman Poma de Ayala 2006b). These supply a reservoir with a capacity of 62 
cubic metres and then delivery water to 147 domestic connections. At the time 
of this research, the system still had no chlorination. It is the lack of disinfection
152 At this workshop, the president of the JASS and one of his fontaneros completed a Ficha 
Annual de Seguimiento a los Sistemas de Agua y Desague. These data are taken from this 
form.
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which pushes up the sanitary risk score although the thermotolerant coliform 
counts in the system -  before reaching individual households -  were negligible.
During one of the CGPdA workshops in 2006, the Angostura JASS 
identified several key problems including the lack of disinfection, old pipework 
and missing valves. The sanitary risk scores shown in Figure 74 place the 
system in the intermediate to high risk category and the presence of 
thermotolerant coliforms at different points in the system are colour coded onto 
the system inventory shown in Figure 83.
Figure 80 Angostura community session
Figure 81 Angostura community session: men participatin;
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Figure 82 Angostura community session: women participating from a distance
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Figure 83 System inventory: Angostura
Catchment: 5 spring sources in surrounding hills, total 5 I/s 
(before 2001 2.2V*)
Distribution: gravity feed
Primary Storage: 62m3, opened in July 2001 (before 2001 no 
reservoir), 3 months to construct and funded by the APV and 
the municipality.
Maintenance: work teams to maintain the system 4 times per 
year. Cleaning of components every 6 months
Distribution: gravity-fed through 3,000m erf pipes
Household service: 147 connections (before 2001 this was 
80 connections)
Plant: 180 household connections, 4,200m of pipework, 
opened in 2002, 7 months to construct and funded by Guaman 
Poma de Ayala and the Municipality (before 2002 no wastwater 
system)
Wastewater Treatment: primary settlement only, intake grill 
broken, sluice cannot be closed properly.
Maintenance: inadequate cleaning and maintenance, no 
personnel because they cannot be paid.
Discharge: River Huatanay
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7.2.3 The Hybrid: ASAPASC in Manco Capac ‘chocolatada’
Each man had to go with his shovel, his pick, sand, cement. That’s how it was.
We brought [water here] by making so many sacrifices.
Household 41, Manco Capac
This quote echoes many of the comments from people interviewed on 
the Right Bank when they describe the toil of bringing water to their settlements. 
The construction took place between 1985 and 1990 with inhabitants 
volunteering their time to build the infrastructure. These days, Manco Capac 
shares its water provider, ASAPASC, with sixteen other barrios on the Right 
Bank of the River Huatanay (SedaCusco 2007b).
The provider model -  according to the written constitution -  is a slightly 
expanded version of the JASS, described in the previous section with 
ownership by the committee, ASAPASC, decision-making by the community at 
General Assemblies, self-regulation, monitoring by DIGESA and health posts 
and financing by users and donations. Like the JASS, ASAPASC is funded from 
user fees, connection fees and fines and there has been NGO funding in the 
past.
The legal status of ASAPASC remains ambiguous, however, since the 
General Water Law tells us that if the JASS serves more than 2,000 
inhabitants153 and is not in a area that has been classified as rural, then urban 
rules apply. In other words, the association should be dissolved and the system 
subsumed into the appropriate EPS. With ASAPASC, the system falls outside 
both the rural and urban remit of SUNASS and thus has no formal regulation. 
The regional health authority still has monitoring responsibilities but this time it 
cannot call on SUNASS for legal sanctions.
In terms of system data, all that was available in the administration office 
was a poor reproduction of an undated and unauthored map. According to the 
administrator this plan was drawn up in 1992 but in the same interview it was 
explained:
...the maintenance team do not need to use a plan because they know the
system...
(ASAPASC Interview 1 2006)
153 Chapter 10, Article 47
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ASAPASC claim that there is a programme to monitor water quality with 
samples taken by the provider four times a year and processed at 
SEDACusco’s laboratories. The administrator was very vague about sampling: 
apparently samples are taken from within dwellings although ASAPASC does 
not guarantee quality once water has entered the domestic installations.
Originally, the system was supported by an external NGO. Now World 
Vision is wary of intervening while the community is torn over who should be 
managing their water. CGPdA is also reluctant to intervene because they do not 
want to deal with ASPASC.
ASAPASC’s constitution states 154 that any official member of the 
settlement -  where a member is one person nominated per connected 
household -  is not only obliged to vote in General Assemblies but should also 
be prepared to stand for office on the executive board or another committee 
(Notaria de los Rios Guzman 2001). However, according to the household 
interviews, members of ASAPASC’s board vote amongst themselves for 
executive positions. The executive members explained that each 
neighbourhood puts forward a representative to sit on the board (ASAPASC 
Meeting 2006).
There are two sources used by these communities. Both sources used 
by the sixteen settlements on the Right Bank lie 9km away in a campesina 
community called Collorpujio. The 6inch and 4inch mains have been plotted in a 
solid red line on the image below. The households which have managed to tap 
into the main water line and receive a twice daily service live parallel to this line. 
Two such households are in the Landlord Livelihood group described in Chapter 
6. Note also the gradient which is not immediately obvious from the satellite 
images: there is a 100m height difference between the main road and the 
Chocco Reservoir.
154 Chapter 2, Article 10.B
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Figure 84 Aerial image of Manco Capac distribution system
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Figure 85 View of the Right Bank from the reservoir towards the centre of Cusco
The collected settlements on the Right Bank have been granted a 
Ministry of Agriculture permit to use 25l/s (or 777,000m3) of water per year 
(Ministerio de la Presidencia 1998) but the Ministry of the Presidency noted in 
1998:
...because of excessive population growth this limited water resource cannot 
supply sufficient water.
(Ministerio de la Presidencia 1998):7
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According to ASAPASC the yield was 25 I/s in 1985. The Ministry of the 
Presidency reported 181/s in 1998 and ASAPASC report that it is now only 15 I/s 
and the former president explained that:
There isn’t enough water [at source]. We as users are not aware. In people's 
houses, the taps are broken and this affects the other users.
Former president of ASAPASC (HH34)
SEDACusco calculate an even lower yield this in their study, estimating 
an average annual figure of only 141/s (121/s in the dry season and 161/s in the 
wet season). In addition to this fall in yield, SEDACusco’s study found that none 
of the nine air valves along the 9km of line from source to plant were working. 
One important risk factor at the source is agricultural activity in the catchment:
Agreements need to be established with the community of Coyllorpujio, located 
above the source, to establish mechanisms for the management of water in 
terms of time periods, volumes and the rational use of chemicals higher up.
(SedaCusco 2007b)
Of the 8 purge valves, only 5 were working and all were judged to be in 
an “estado pesimo”, or a terrible condition (SedaCusco 2007b): 12. The 
ASAPASC committee admitted that maintenance and renovation of this 
pipework could now not be done by the community alone. The existing 
asbestos-cement pipes were originally donated by a foreign NGO and their 30 
year life design life is rapidly coming to an end.
In terms of treatment there is a filtration plant before the main Chocco 
Reservoir. On my first visit at the end of June 2006, both filter beds had been 
completely bypassed while they were emptied for maintenance. The supply was 
untreated and the maintenance team explained that this level of cleaning was 
done every two years although it was dependent on cash flow and no planned 
maintenance schedule existed. SEDACusco’s survey found that there was a 
fortnightly cleaning regime but the ASAPASC documentation to back this up 
could not be made available to me.
From here the supply destined for Manco Capac and subsequent barrios 
went to a 500 cubic metre reservoir above Chocco.
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Figure 86 View of the Right Bank from the reservoir towards the south and the airport
(runway in middle distance'
The ASAPASC administrator explained that July was the last month 
when the reservoir would be completely full until the rains began again in 
November and December. The reservoir was cleaned every 2 to 3 months but, 
again, there was no written record of this or plan for future maintenance. 
Chlorination is by chlorogas canisters, via an electric pump that the 
maintenance team operates manually. It is allowed to run for a couple of hours 
before the contents of the reservoir are released into the network at about 
5.30am. This was one of the few processes for which ASAPASC claimed there 
was documentation kept on site at the reservoir where the fontaneros recorded 
the results of a colour test. In fact, the team could not produce this. Residual 
chlorine in the system was variable and the ASAPASC administrator himself 
admitted that chlorination was unpredictable because the fontaneros were 
asleep or drunk!(ASAPASC Interview 1 2006).
Interviews with doctors at the health post in Manco Capac suggested that 
ASAPASC’s self-regulation, particularly in terms of water quality, was poor. The 
water samples taken by ASAPASC and sent to SEDACusco’s laboratory were 
often of unknown provenance. The despairing local doctor explained:
All the Ministry of Health can do is warn people that the water is poor quality...
(Centro de Salud Manco Capac 2006)
SEDACusco’s analysis confirms inadequate post-treatment disinfection, 
lack of network drawings and inadequate maintenance as major weaknesses in 
ASAPASC’s system. After modelling with WaterCAD, SEDACusco noted that:
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...the pressures in the system vary substantially because of the considerable 
difference in static pressure that exists in the nodes that make up the distribution 
system, as well as the lack of regulating valves, all of which results in the poor 
operation of the network
(SedaCusco 2007b)
SEDACusco’s engineers also flagged up the miserable condition of 
individual household connections and the absence of metering.
Sanitary risk scores have been assessed for both the spring (MC1) and 
surface (MC2) sources and are shown in Figure 74. The TTC counts are also 
incorporated into the flow chart in Figure 85 to illustrate contamination at 
different points in the system.
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Figure 87 System inventory Manco Capac
Catchment: river CoUorpujto. 121/s in dry season, (flow rate 
from SEDACusco measures. 14.171/s)
Desander: 47 5m5 (desarenador no functona optimamente)
Catchment: spring. Sipaspujio
Distribution: 6 5km line, gravity feed via 6" asbestos cement 
pipe, splits to feed Arahuay reservoir 2* PVC 
Destination: 16 APVs Cchoco. Tiobamba Oosqocahuanna. 
Manco Capac. Siete de Mayo. Manco Capac Viva el Peru 1, 
Viva el Peru 2. Primero de Enero. Virgen del Rosano. Alejandro 
Toledo. Paraiso de los Rosales. Ficos. Generacion 2000. 
Arahuay. Villa Arahuay. El Solar
Treatment 1: slow sand filter 230m3. built 1980-82. facility to 
add alum during the wet season but it is not used 
Maintenance: claim is that the filter Is cleaned every 15 days 
but I cbdn't see tins happening In August, the second filter bed 
had been emptied for cleaning
Primary Storage: 500m1 reservoir serving Chocco. 
.^ jT tio b a m b a . Manco Capac, Viva el Peru 1. Viva el Peru 2. 
- f f  [ Virgen del Rosario
Additional Storage: 1 Primero de Enero and Ficos. 2 
Alejandro Toledo. 3 GeneraciOn 2000. 4 Arahuay. Villa 
Arahuay Siete de Mayo Qosqocahurania. El Sola
Treatment 2: chlorine gas. delivered via an electnc pump but 
is manually operated
Oravity Distribution: asbestos cement Into PVC. 6* to 0 5". 
installed 1985
Household service: Manco Capac service on Mondays. 
Wednesdays. Fridays and Sundays for up to 2 hours at a time 
Rainwater harvesting in some households
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8.2.1 Socio-technical configuration: the interaction of infrastructure and
governance
Using the preceding socio-technical analysis and returning to the results 
of the livelihood surveys in each location, this section explores differences in 
access to influence between the case studies, beginning with the relationship 
between users and water providers and then moving on to look at broader 
governance.
In San Bias, interaction with the water company was through billing or 
the formal complaints procedure, although the ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘excluded’ 
regarded this latter as fruitless. By contrast, in Angostura, users communicated 
directly with individuals on the water committee, the maintenance person, the 
JASS president and even the settlement president. Their regular work days and 
assemblies were well attended, with fines imposed on those who failed to come. 
The water system in Manco Capac, which had taken the community five years 
to build in the late eighties, was managed by ASAPASC, widely regarded as 
opaque and unresponsive. One householder reported taking in glassfuls of their 
‘chocolatada’ water to demonstrate its murky turbidity to the administrator and 
being met with a helpless shrug. Others had given up complaining and had 
even stopped paying. Apart from the ‘landlords’, one of whom sat on the 
ASAPASC committee, households objected to the cost on grounds of quality 
and continuity.
In San Bias, when the supply failed, one of the ‘establishment’ 
households resorted to expensive bottled water while others used a public 
fountain or the brewery’s spring (although not for human consumption). Among 
the ‘entrepreneurs’, households reported recycling grey water, rainwater 
harvesting or collecting water from elsewhere in the city, while the ‘excluded’ 
borrowed from a neighbouring hostel or used the public fountain. Costs were 
regarded as high, either because households thought that meters were 
measuring air rushing through empty pipes when the system was off or because 
it was poor quality and known to be cheaper in nearby parallel administrations.
Rare interruptions in Angostura were attributed matter-of-factly by 
householders to maintenance events: users knew about these because they 
were involved in the repairs. Not only was the cost regarded as low in most
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cases but interviewees expressed the view that they were obliged to pay and 
work together to make the system better. The only objection came from a tenant 
who felt that the fact the community worked on the system should mean it was 
cheaper. Later it turned out that while tenants were expected to participate in 
the work, it was the landlords that held the voting power at the assemblies.
With water supplies more often off than on, residents in Manco Capac 
resorted to buying water from vendors with taps connected to the SEDACusco 
supply, harvesting rainwater and borrowing water from neighbours. Opinions 
were mixed on the entry of SEDACusco, the provincial water company with 
some fed up with the poor service and others afraid of a costly, metered supply. 
SEDACusco was negotiating adoption with ASAPASC on the assumption that 
this committee was the best representative of the community. This was not 
helping to build confidence or strong communication between the potential 
provider, SEDACusco, and users. Attitudes to ASAPASC ranged from 
despondency to suspicion, users were alienated from it and communication 
between the provider and the users was poor even though people were having 
to deal with very poor levels of service.
The formal and anonymous relationship with SEDACusco meant that 
individual households in San Bias were connected to this institution rather than 
engaging within the neighbourhood on water and sanitation. Instead San Bias’ 
institutions included the neighbourhood committee, regarded as a closed circle 
of privileged and longstanding residents, the external interventions of the NGO 
Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala (CGPdA) and home-grown community-based 
organisations. Residents had also resorted to private sector security to protect 
their property, although the ‘excluded’ had opted out of paying for this service.
CGPdA was upgrading household infrastructure connections and 
supporting repairs and improvements to older houses. They were also building 
capacity for collective action and promoting home-based enterprise, targeting 
households with the most precarious livelihoods by fully or partially subsidising 
the network connections for the ‘excluded’ and some ‘entrepreneurs’. CGPdA’s 
research and knowledge of the area as well as ongoing engagement with 
individual households meant that they were able to distinguish between 
household livelihoods and target accordingly.
The home-grown NGOs seemed to have been set up by householders 
that were either not beneficiaries of CGPdA or had expressed low expectations
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of the state. The focus was on enterprise development, dealing with a particular 
cause or sector (other than water infrastructure), for example rehabilitating the 
cultural centre or training artisans. These activities straddled governance 
categories of civil society and market and highlighted the fact that the priorities 
had moved on from collective infrastructure.
By contrast, much of Angostura’s neighbourhood interaction was based 
around the water infrastructure. The settlement committee had built strong 
engagement partly by imposing fines on households that failed to participate 
and collective activities to maintain the water system and prevent flood damage. 
At the level of the municipality, although people felt neglected by the lack of 
waste collection services, the municipality’s efforts in building flood defences 
and assisting after floods were recognised. The settlement committee in 
Angostura was also linked politically to the municipality through the settlement’s 
president, a new arrival to the area with a professional livelihood who had 
already secured election as a local alderwoman. The Mayor of Saylla District 
was then linked in to regional level initiatives to orchestrate social development 
and integrate resource management, facilitated by CGPdA. Admittedly, 
awareness of these larger scale activities among the population of Angostura 
seemed to be limited, even though formal governance structures were in place 
or emerging.
Apart from the important support of CGPdA in the construction of the 
reservoir, the waste water treatment plant and the networks for water and waste, 
NGO activity was not particularly co-ordinated (random training on homebirths 
and rearing small animals, and the installation of WCs in the school by one 
NGO).
In Manco Capac, what had been intense collective action on water 
provision had become a disillusioned relationship with the provider. Collective 
action had become confined to road repairs by housing block committees 
although even here participation was variable. Where it was strong the physical 
infrastructure was visibly better with roads and pavements built by the 
communities working together in their own time. Many households had 
livelihoods outside the neighbourhood and a lack of confidence in their local 
committees meant that co-ordination of activities at the Manco Capac 
settlement level was non-existent and attendance at settlement level 
assemblies and meetings was low. This atmosphere had also deterred the entry
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of NGOs. In addition, the perception was that the municipality was not serving 
Manco Capac, especially in terms of waste collection services. For its part, the 
municipality regarded Manco Capac as part of a zone in arrears on local 
taxation and this meant municipal engagement was weak and unstructured.
In summary, what we have across the case studies are different paths to 
influence, some more direct than others. It is useful here to look at these 
relationships in light of the World Bank’s triangle of governance.
Theoretically, across Cusco people are linked to central and municipal 
government as individuals compelled to vote in Peru’s elections. This 
constitutes part of the voice relationship between citizens and the state which 
can also be supplemented by other civil society activity.
In San Bias, municipal elections are relevant to water and sanitation 
because the provincial water authority is governed collectively by the mayors of 
each municipality. Households are then linked by ‘client power’ to the water 
provider through billing, according to consumption and the possibility of making 
individual complaints. Other paths to influence, for the ‘establishment’, are 
through the neighbourhood committee and, for the ‘excluded’, the NGO Centro 
Guaman Poma de Ayala.
Angostura’s situation is different in that access to influence over water is 
direct and via collective work days and assemblies. The community is also the 
provider, contributing labour and materials as well as voting on decisions. The 
community water committee is visible and accountable to the population and to 
the committee president. Fees are nominal and the same for all households but 
financial sanctions are imposed on those who do not participate. Voice directed 
to the state in between elections is more convoluted with the settlement 
president meeting the district’s mayor and the mayor meeting other mayors in
The state
Politicians Policymakers
Citizens/clients Public and private utilities 
and providers
Coalitions/Inclusion Management
Non poor Frontline Organizations
^arer. sanitation, other sew*1®4
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between elections. More importantly, for these small, outlying municipalities the 
‘compact’ relationship between the state and the provider is more ad hoc with 
small budgets limiting the reach of services.
In Manco Capac, the relationship between individual users and the 
provider committee has broken down and there is no relationship between 
individuals and SEDACusco the provincial water company. Collective action is 
also weak and although the mayor of Santiago is elected by people in Manco 
Capac, between elections it is the weak fiscal relationship rather than the 
individual electoral relationship that is influential in determining how services are 
delivered. Here all the connections in the triangle are dysfunctional.
Lastly, the World Bank considers coalitions between the poor and non­
poor to be part of voice and client power. This can also be seen in terms of 
urban heterogeneity, the contribution of which to buffering collective risks has 
been seen positively so far in this chapter. In the ideal triangle, civil society 
coalesces around particular issues and strives for the inclusion of all users. As 
we shall see in the next section, however, what seems to be happening to the 
triangle in this context is that these social coalitions do not reach outside the 
technical infrastructures which users share. For example, people outside the 
provincial system have no voice connection to the municipalities governing the 
system, no client power relationship with the provider, no formal dialogue with 
the provincial system’s users and yet must deal with the environmental 
consequences of the user’s waste water and the provider’s lax waste treatment.
8.3 Socio-technical systems mediating vulnerability in San Bias, 
Angostura and Manco Capac
The worst performing system in terms of quality, quantity, continuity and 
accessibility was Manco Capac’s, with San Bias and Angostura each with their 
own strengths and weaknesses in terms of these indicators.
The first observation to make on access to infrastructure is that quality, 
quantity, continuity and accessibility were ranked higher where those with weak 
assets shared this infrastructure with households with strong assets and, in San 
Bias, international tourists. In Manco Capac, homogeneity in vulnerability 
contributed to an inability to buffer collective risks like poor infrastructure and 
torrential run-off. The groups of households with the weakest asset bases were 
the least able to buffer the risks that their poor collective infrastructure threw at
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them. This links back to the residential segregation identified by Batley, 
Montgomery et al. and McAslan and, as we will see in Chapter 9, this can be 
seen as part of the tendency for investment to privilege or bypass certain 
groups, often based on perception of livelihoods. In this regard, Batley also 
made the point that urban economic winners act when the amenity value of the 
city deters investors or, in the case of San Bias, might deter tourists.
Secondly, poor water provision was amplifying the vulnerability of 
livelihoods. This is most obvious in Manco Capac where several households 
with poor sanitary risk scores and with the worst continuity of service were 
either using poor quality water or expensive supplementary sources for home- 
based enterprises like bread and food production, chicha and mixing 
construction materials. This echoes the comparison of affordability that shows 
the extra burden on household budgets of having to supplement inadequate 
water services. The assertion that those with the worst services pay a premium 
for their water, made so clearly in Independent Water Providers in Latin 
America (Solo 2003):5, also seems to hold in Manco Capac.
Thirdly, the observed vulnerability of these households to environmental 
risks reflects several of the comments cited in Chapter 2 that point out that the 
world’s poorest actually make the least impact on stocks of natural capital but 
are potentially the worst affected by its depletion (Newman 2006):280; (Hardoy 
et al. 2005):346; (McGranahan et al. 1999): 108. This is particularly true for 
Angostura, at the edge of the city, with its simultaneous dependence on 
agriculture and exposure to hazards. Although the population made collective 
efforts to reduce their own impact through hardware -  this settlement had its 
own waste water treatment plant -  and local institutions, in reality their 
environmental risks can only be mitigated through institutional links back to the 
centre of Cusco.
Finally, livelihood vulnerability is also amplified though the household 
experience of a range of other services, not just water and sanitation. In 
particular, this seems to apply to municipal provision of waste collection, works 
on pavements and sealing roads and policing or security. In San Bias, for 
example, the relative strength and heterogeneity of household assets coincided 
with better access to collective infrastructure like sealed roads, waste collection 
and predictable water services. Unfortunately for Angostura, these features also
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insulated households from exposure to environmental risks and awareness of 
their environmental impact.
This idea of differentiated service provision comes up in discussions over 
private sector provision of water in the work of Ana Hardoy, Marvin and Laurie 
and Bas van Vliet et al. For Hardoy, and to some extent Marvin and Laurie, 
faced with monolithic concessions that cannot accommodate the needs of low 
income urban settlements, a differentiated offering is appealing because it 
suggests that services can be tailored so that the worst off can choose a service 
package that suits their livelihood. In the work of van Vliet et al. differentiation is 
part of a highly sophisticated provision model that adapts networked services to 
the highly differentiated demands of users: in this case tailored to lifestyle. My 
research suggests, however, that differentiated services in Manco Capac, for 
example, serve to amplify vulnerability. The interaction of livelihoods and 
infrastructure has, therefore, to be carefully understood before differentiated 
services move from being the observation of a phenomenon to a policy 
prescription that builds configurations of infrastructure that entrench and 
undermine livelihoods.
Lastly, relating these configurations back to Robert Chambers’ vision of 
diversity and complexity in urban livelihoods, the situation in Cusco has three 
complicating factors. Firstly, diversity was not evenly distributed within 
households or across the city. It was also possible for the vulnerability of a 
single household to be more homogeneous in some cases, with all adults in a 
household vulnerable to similar shocks and stresses. In San Bias, however, 
where livelihoods were heterogeneous, collective water, sanitation and surface 
water infrastructure was better at buffering common risks. Notwithstanding a 
context of highly individualised relationships with service providers and 
government, it was also possible for ‘excluded’, vulnerable livelihoods in San 
Bias to exist alongside active neighbourhood committees which went on serving 
the ‘establishment’. This highlights the fine line between heterogeneity per se -  
which could also be read as development-constraining inequality of the sort 
described, for example, by the World Bank and Ellen Wratten -  and 
heterogeneity in vulnerability which sees diversity as positive because it means 
that not everyone will be knocked by the same problems at the same time.
Secondly, the success of diversity depends on households in the same 
neighbourhoods being exposed to risks which are idiosyncratic or independent
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of each other. In fact, seasonal, local and global vulnerabilities are interrelated. 
More crucial to this study, the risks presented by splintering configurations of 
water and sanitation infrastructure interact not only with household livelihoods 
but also with the other services and modes of governance often compounding 
vulnerability especially where it is already homogeneous. One result of this in 
Cusco is that the mechanisms that privilege investment in infrastructure are 
strongly linked to SEDACusco’s perception of the risks associated with dealing 
with certain sectors of the city: their livelihoods, existing configurations of 
infrastructure and potentially awkward activism.
On the basis of the empirical evidence from the case studies, I argue in 
this chapter that sanitary risks are differentiated by household -  those with 
weak physical assets, like poor patio drainage, are exposed to higher risks. I 
then explain, with reference to the WHO’s risk assessment framework and 
indicators of quality, quantity, continuity, accessibility, that differentiated 
services -  not just household assets -  are amplifying sanitary risks for those 
least able to buffer them. This, I argue, shows that household vulnerability is 
mediated by the socio-technical configuration of entire systems for water and 
sanitation. Finally, by returning to the livelihoods analysis that uncovered the 
household and collective relationship to the provision of other services, I begin 
the argument that these modes of organisation follow similar socio-technical 
patterns that differentiate between groups and households and mediate 
vulnerability. In the next chapter, I expand on this argument and look socio- 
technical systems as they stretch beyond the case studies to the rest of the city.
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Chapter 9 Socio-technical systems mediating between 
vulnerability and governance across Cusco
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9.1 Distilling the dynamics of mediation: privilege, bypass, resistance and 
networking
In this penultimate chapter, I turn the socio-technical lens to the broader 
context of governance in the case studies and in Cusco at large. This forms the 
final part of my response to the research question by looking at the relationship 
between governance and the mediating role of socio-technical systems in 
mitigating risk. I look at the origins of water governance in Peru and frame it in 
the broader context of global trends in water governance. I revisit the 
divergence between policy and needs based provision and make an analogy 
between this split and the mediation between governance and livelihoods that 
has given rise to the modes of organisation that are operating in Cusco. Then, 
by looking at the patterns of connection and disconnection across the city and 
invoking the notion of splintering, I argue that socio-technical systems conspire 
to shape the city through processes of privilege, bypass, local resistance, both 
staying out and breaking away from the provincial system, and networking 
between socio-technical scales.
Finally, I place the socio-technical systems in Cusco into the conceptual 
space developed in Chapter 2, bringing this chapter to a close with a review of 
this model in light of the empirical evidence from Cusco.
9.2 Messy modes of organisation: revisiting the roots of Peruvian water
governance
We saw in Chapter 2 that the decentralisation of Peruvian water 
provision paralleled the nation’s devolution of power to its regions and took 
place against a political backdrop that had for a long time maintained the 
coexistence of centralization and a popular brand of participation or 
authoritarianism and populism (Hordijk). Although this promoted the direct 
participation of beneficiaries in their own services on one hand (World Bank 
2006), it overlaid a history of central government interference in urban social 
movements and cultivated an adversarial relationship between community 
organisations and entrenched political interests in the regions.
Peru’s chosen model for urban water provision was then built within a 
framework of municipal ownership, central government regulation and 
commercialisation of operations that could accommodate private investment
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and public-private participation later on. The emergence of this model tracked 
the rhetoric of good governance and the World Bank’s early emphasis on 
private sector participation. As we saw in Chapter 2, this was part of a wave of 
reform in the early nineties that was driven internationally through Lima and 
which cemented three strands of governance in Peruvian legislation.
The first imperative was to commercialise water provision; a move 
designed to improve efficiency and cost recovery from users and to open the 
door to private investment. This had to satisfy the lending criteria of international 
financial markets as they sought out entities and locations to put their capital on 
the basis of risk and return: indicators which ratchet helically upwards as 
perceived risks nudge up required returns (Collier 2007):89.
The second element of governance was a municipal ownership structure, 
which in practice helped to consolidate the power of the best connected by 
apportioning shares according to the number of existing connections. At the 
same time, this has also created useful and important direct link to local 
structures of governance.
The final strand of the legislation was designed to convey the 
unsubsidised, ‘true’ economic cost of water to users through infrastructure as 
one way of communicating the finite nature of fresh water resources and 
sustaining natural capital. This fits into the story of global environmental 
governance and sustainable development.
Meanwhile, in Cusco, defying the nicely organised national framework 
that governs drinking water provision, we find coexisting models. With the 
election of Daniel Estrada in the mid-eighties, efforts began to improve basic 
services in Cusco. In the face of a deepening inflationary crisis, these efforts 
would never be enough to universalise provision and, even with the reforms of 
the early nineties, self-regulated, urban water systems persist until now and 
continue to fall between the provincial, regulated EPSs governance model and 
the rural JASS framework. In addition, a weak water sector regulator, SUNASS, 
and limited regional capacity for environmental and health monitoring in 
DIGESA, mean that services in Cusco are highly variable.
Alongside the provincial water company, in Cusco we find dysfunctional 
urban water committees, like Manco Capac’s ASAPASC. In the province’s 
outlying municipalities, which begin at Saylla, we find the newly formed 
Angostura JASS.
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In terms of provider governance, all these modes can be seen in the 
DPU’s wheel of peri-urban water governance. The first explicit addition would 
be SEDACusco’s EPS governance model which, as we have seen, organises 
public ownership according to municipal shareholdings and which spans the 
slices of passive private investment (private finance, for example from the 
Japanese), fully public (fragmented municipal ownership) and public community 
partnerships (negotiated social tariffs).
Figure 88 The DPU Circle: from a 2005 unpublished paper by Adriana Allen (Allen et al. 
2006):339
cP "  I
Community- 
/  based provision
,* Public community
/
!  £
partnerships 
Fully public
*
Passive private
investment
BOT and 
concession
Water
as a gift ^
Rainwater ^  v 
harvesting ^  *
Clandestine '
connections D  '
CO •
Public provision i
d istorted by bribery ^  I
Informal 
sector vendors
(e.g. pushcarts) &
•
Joint
venture
Water sold 
_ „ from pnvotcly F.u,,y owned wells 
private
t $
' r < T
V '  -  -
The second addition to the DPU wheel is a more detailed picture of 
community-based provision. As anticipated by Chapter 2, what became 
apparent in this research was the ambiguity of the term ‘community’. I argue, for 
example, that the momentum of community organisations tends to decay once 
the urgent collective action to meet basic needs has subsided. Indeed, this was 
one of the issues thrown up the slum dwellers federation in their attempts to 
institutionalise charismatic community leadership for sustainable management 
of their unorthodox models of co-provision in India.
The experience of civil society actors working closely with community 
organisations in Cusco suggests that the drivers for popular organisation and
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protest may start out as a basis for making claims but then become a platform 
for local power consolidation. This can mean that hierarchies in local 
committees eventually lose their capacity to engage or promote local 
participation, sometimes excluding the marginalised and leaving holes in 
accountability which, in Manco Capac, have allowed community assets to be 
run down or exploited. Diana Mitlin suggests as much, writing generally on civil 
society (Mitlin 2001): 157. In Manco Capac, this state of affairs fed back into and 
was compounded by weak household assets, homogeneous, simultaneous and 
highly interlinked, vulnerabilities, deteriorating infrastructure and dysfunctional 
paths to influence.
The Cusco case studies suggest that where collaboration between users, 
providers and government has been successful in Angostura, this has only 
been possible because participation has been supported by civil society in the 
guise of the NGO Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala. Similarly, Manco Capac, 
adrift from NGO intervention because of its own internal tensions, can probably 
best be described in Hardoy’s terms as a community that has “difficulty 
organising”.
More broadly, though, the absence of participation is partly explained by 
a lack of policies to support community-managed systems, as Bustamente et 
al.’s lamented in Chapter 2 (Bustamente et al. 2004). This policy gap is 
reinforced by the tendency to undervalue the “non-monetary contributions” that 
community users make to their systems and in fact this analysis matches very 
closely the experience of Manco Capac in terms of the pride and value that has 
been historically placed on the settlement’s infrastructure and the provincial 
provider’s disregard of this.
Despite the reservations of CGPdA about the capacity of communities, 
shared incidentally even more vehemently by the provincial water company 
SEDACusco, only CGPdA is providing any substantial support to community- 
managed systems. This support comes with the two important caveats that it is 
delivered at the point at which the community (committee and users) is ready to 
engage with their municipality and when there are systems are in place to 
strengthen municipal capacity.
This policy has manifested itself in the north-eastern zone as CGPdA 
helping to negotiate social tariffs, which SEDACusco adopted the community 
built infrastructure in the early nineties and continues today with advice and
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material support as the community finds itself having to maintain the water 
sources that are theoretically managed by SEDACusco.
In peri-urban Angostura, where there is no prospect of adoption by 
assistance from SEDACusco, CGPdA’s support includes facilitation of inter­
district institutions for integrated water management; training for JASS 
maintenance staff and municipal technicians; and the construction of drinking 
water and waste water infrastructure.
In San Bias, where residents are long-standing SEDACusco users, 
CGPdA’s sanitation upgrades targeted according to livelihood with subsidies to 
the most precarious and ‘excluded’ inhabitants, partial support to 
‘entrepreneurs’ and more secure, ‘establishment’ households given technical 
but no financial help.
What emerges from these three examples of successful civil society 
intervention is that addressing Bustamente et al.’s policy gap is a question of 
recognising paths to influence (north-eastern sector and Angostura), existing 
configurations of infrastructure (Angostura) and livelihoods (San Bias).
These successes need not be the exclusive domain of civil society, 
however, and, after Hardoy et al., the “sole actions” of any one player in the 
governance framework are unlikely to resolve the differentiated household 
experience of risk brought about by messy access to influence, splintered 
infrastructure and compound vulnerabilities. The capacity to deal with these 
three interacting issues has to be enhanced for all actors to improve the 
prospects for sustainable livelihoods that do not damage the livelihoods of 
others.
What the DPU circle exposes is that even the best laid plans for policy- 
driven water governance cannot necessarily deliver tidy, universalised systems 
for urban water provision. In fact, in the context of my hypothesis, I see the split 
between needs and policy driven provision as analogous to the concepts of 
livelihoods and governance that appear in my research question. My additional 
comments on the DPU wheel, which nuance the original categories, arise 
because, mediating between policy and needs, or rather, governance and 
livelihoods, are socio-technical systems. The configuration of these socio- 
technical systems mean that modes of urban provision straddle the DPU 
categories and tend to coexist with each other.
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I now look at the forms that this mediation takes, arguing for four 
dominant splintering mechanisms: privilege, bypass, resistance and networking.
I then bring these mechanisms into a final discussion of vulnerability and how 
these ideas fit into my model of socio-technical space developed in Chapter 2.
9.2.1 Privilege: Wanchaq, San Bias and rational prejudice
Returning to the case studies and placing them in the broader context of 
Cusco, it is possible to distil out the mechanism of privilege. Residents in San 
Bias expressed the view that certain zones were regarded by the provincial 
water company as more important than others. This issue was probed during an 
interview with the CEO of SEDACusco. He began by explaining that demand 
varied according to social behaviour and activity and then explained that tourist 
zones had to have priority. This also applied to the residential area in the 
Wanchaq District because, according to the CEO, they paid the most in fees.
In social terms, there is another complexity because demands are different in 
each sector. [Our studies show that in the north-eastern zone, the amount 
provided based on the estimated demand comes out at 100 or 110 litres per 
person per day. In other sectors we are talking about 250 to 300. Social 
behaviour is also a variable. In the zone where all the monuments are for 
example, it’s basically an area dedicated to tourism so that it mustn’t experience 
a water shortage. The residential zone to the south of it [Wanchaq] cannot have 
water shortages either because they are one of the main fee payers 
[contribuyentes].
34mins (SEDACusco Interview 1 2006)
This should be seen in the context of SEDACusco’s ownership model. 
Shares in the company are divided up between the municipal mayors and this 
then affects the mayoral voting power and decision-making weight on the board 
of directors. Although this distribution of shares is enshrined in law and is 
ostensibly based on the number of connections per district, the reality is more 
opaque and the shares per connection, estimated in the final column of Table 
30, show a wide variation in the number of shares allocated per connection. 
Wanchaq, the zone prioritised because users were reliable contributors, also 
has the highest ratio of shares to connections shown in Table 30.
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Table 33 SEDACusco share distribution
District Connections Shares168 Shares per Connection
Cusco (San Bias) 19,700 1,250 0.06
Santiago (Manco Capac) 4,500 966 0.21
Wanchaq 1,500 710 0.47
San Sebastian 2,300 404 0.18
San Jeronimo 1,700 188 0.11
Urubamba 1,733 143 0.08
Paucartambo 384 47 0.12
Huarocondo 517 26 0.05
Note: Connections taken from Provincial Plan (Municipalidad Provincial del Cusco 2006), 
number of shares from SEDACusco’s annual report (SedaCusco 2007a), Shares per connection 
are estimated by the author.
This allocation of shares not only reinforces the perception that zones 
were prioritised by SEDACusco but makes a practical difference at board level. 
By apportioning shares on the basis of existing network connections, decision­
making power is biased towards the zones that are already well-connected. The 
second order effect is that investment in these well-connected areas is also 
prioritised because users are contributing to the company and their municipality.
Confirming this, the CEO of SEDACusco nicely sums up his ambivalence 
to those not willing to make such contributions. Using a rather insidious parallel 
with the cost of beer, this engineer explains what drives his organisation to 
prioritise certain areas:
But in all the higher parts of the city, we have other problems: in some cases the 
population up there wants to belong to the water company and we don’t want 
them to be incorporated. When they belong to the company and we invest in 
them, there are complications. First is that sometimes the perception is that what 
they have to pay [SEDACusco] is expensive. In reality the water is pretty cheap, 
say 10 soles (£1.70), really good value. 8 or 10 soles (£1.40-1.70) and in 
exceptional cases 20 or 21 soles (£3.40-£3.60). But in general 8, 10, 14 soles 
(£1.40, £1.70, £2.40). Very easy for anyone to afford, right? I have always 
explained to people: they go on a Sunday and drink a beer and there you’ve paid 
what you pay for a month of water! In reality, it’s not expensive. But when we 
have problems supplying the water, for example, they come and protest and this 
reflects badly on the company. They pay the least yet giving them water is more 
difficult because they are in more complicated zones with need much higher 
investment and often they complain more.
34mins (SEDACusco Interview 1 2006)
The controversy over the allocation of shares has not gone unnoticed by 
other districts. The Mayor of Santiago, whose jurisdiction includes Manco 
Capac, was a firm advocate for Manco Capac’s integration into SEDACusco. A 
SEDACusco takeover would of course “increase the assets” of the Municipality 
of Santiago, giving the mayor “more weight on the board’. The mayor felt that
155 Each share is currently worth S./25.152.76 according to Law 28870 (SedaCusco 2007a)
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this advantage would balance out the backlog of unpaid council taxes and 
charges owed to the municipality by the inhabitants of the Right Bank 
(Municipality of Santiago 2007).
Meanwhile, in San Bias, commercial neighbours like hostels with links to 
international tourists have helped to attract SEDACusco’s upgrade projects to 
the area, although these projects are still not able to deliver a 24 hour supply, 
mainly because the system’s capacity has not kept up with rising demand. 
Household connections to sanitation -  more invisible to visitors -  have been 
upgraded by the NGO, the Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala.
SEDACusco’s perception of risks, then, continues to be influenced by its 
institutional view of livelihoods in different settlements. Although SEDACusco’s 
CEO was dismissive of the limits of household spending power, reasoning that 
his water was cheaper than beer, this missed the primary feature of needs- 
driven provision: affordability is not only a function of cost. In Cusco, the 
affordability of water was a function of cost relative to income and of billing 
periods relative to seasonal fluctuations in income. Integration for the 
inhabitants of the Manco Capac and the Right Bank meant water meters, billing 
and sanctions for late payment. These were worrisome risks for households that 
were just about able to buffer water affordability by deferring payment and using 
more expensive alternatives only when absolutely necessary. This insecurity 
meant that the reluctance to incorporate community systems came from 
potential users as well as providers. Consequently, what the CEO was most 
nervous about was not whether SEDACusco had the capacity to act or was the 
most appropriate provider to precarious livelihoods but rather the problems of 
cost recovery in the context of popular organisation and protest. This link 
between perceived risks and local governance must in part be fed by the 
context of popular organisation in Peru with its history, on one hand, of urban 
movements for social justice, and on the other, their manipulation by the centre 
to undermine Peru’s regions.
More particularly, much to the chagrin of SEDACusco, which is otherwise 
so focused on cost recovery, in the north-eastern sector of Cusco water 
customers are still paying the social tariff that they negotiated when their water 
infrastructure was adopted by SEDACusco.
In summary, then, the spread of SEDACusco’s investment and 
infrastructure across the city is not always homogenous or harmonious. In part,
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this is driven by the EPS ownership model determined by Peru’s national water 
legislation. The EPS framework also opens the way for global financial and 
technical links which help to strengthen capacity and investment. The 
frameworks for international capital prioritise returns, cost recovery and paying 
the true cost of water which means as little cross-subsidy as possible. 
Investment is prioritised in zones where cost recovery is anticipated and in 
municipalities which have sway at board level. It is also geared up to serve 
sectors considered strategically important for Cusco’s economy, namely tourism. 
The effect of this is that investment is consolidated in zones where livelihoods 
are already perceived to be strong.
This first aspect of splintering -  based on the division of the provincial 
water company’s shares -  results from a highly formalised and politicised 
allocation of power at board level. This entrenches existing differences in the 
access to influence in each municipality. Interestingly, what it has created 
internally within the municipalities is an incentive to integrate disconnected 
communities as a way to consolidate municipal power and representation at 
board level.
9.2.2 Bypassing the risky: Manco Capac
Despite its municipal ownership framework, SEDACusco has always and 
continues to operate in an environment where its systems weave around and 
between what the company’s engineers refer to as “parallel administrations’’. 
SEDACusco describes these parallel arrangements in their feasibility study of 
the Right Bank:
Parallel systems for managing drinking water bring with them problems with 
operating the network... The main causes are: poorly invested funds, a lack of 
technical training, inadequate billing, disorganised operation and maintenance of 
the system, a lack of logistics and the idiosyncrasies of the population. The lack 
of cadastral information is also a problem which affects the system.
(SedaCusco 2007b)
One such parallel administration that still coexists alongside the formal 
water company is the ASAPASC organisation in Manco Capac. As we have 
seen, this system that was built by the population between 1985 and 1990. Its 
operation and maintenance are now the responsibility of the ASAPASC 
committee but as we saw in the previous chapter, the system’s performance 
has deteriorated: yields from the water sources have declined, the population
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has increased and technical and financial capacity to maintain the system has 
fallen away.
One local official blamed these problems on the water committee’s 
dysfunctional management:
...the problem is ... the management. The economic resources or income that 
the board members have comes from charging for the water service. They don’t 
have another source of income .... Basically, there are economic interests, just 
as much on the part of the population as the directors. Because ASAPASC is 
quite closed in this respect. They manage their accounts and so on. It's their 
own management, they’re not very inclined to discuss things, they are not 
inclined to share information. Often they don’t provide monthly reports to the 
population. It’s quite difficult to get involved with them. Neither the Ministry of 
Health nor the Municipality of Santiago has got involved. They are very closed 
off.
Anonymous NGO Official
Indeed, on my first visit to the filtration plant, I asked about four free 
standing containers which looked as if they had been intended as pressure 
filters. They were rusted and not connected to anything. Their history was 
explained by the administrator:
One was bought by the municipality, one by World Vision and two by the 
population but the money to complete the project was mismanaged and went 
into the pockets of the local leaders. These representatives change every two 
years and once the fraud has been discovered it’s too late.
(ASAPASC Interview 2 2006)
Figure 89 Manco Capac rusting, unused filters
The consequences of these accounts for community engagement were 
extremely counter-productive. Although, in theory communication between the 
organisation and users was through assemblies and faenas, meetings held in 
the Manco Capac community centre, or salon communal were poorly attended
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(ASAPASC Interview 2 2006). ASAPASC’s president said that the executive 
board had lost credibility and blamed a general lack of confidence in the 
authorities (ASAPASC Meeting 2006). World Vision confirmed this:
[meetings] do not happen very often because the management committee or the 
directors elect themselves every two years... and sometimes only every three 
years.
23mins (World Vision Interview 2006)
My repeated attempts to organize a community meeting and to piggy­
back on other local assemblies as part of this research project also came to 
nothing and, in the end, the results of water testing were presented over the 
course of a day at a main junction in Manco Capac.
Figure 90 Manco Capac community session
These internal process in Manco Capac can also be framed as a 
continuation of splintering. The macro urban drivers of bypass and privilege are 
mirrored in the personal livelihood priorities of the water committee. Local 
resistance finds echoes in collective action confined to very small areas. In 
Manco Capac, institutional linkages which were so useful in Angostura, are 
characterised by mutual suspicion in relationships between householders, the 
municipality, the provincial provider and civil society actors.
The large technical extent of Manco Capac’s water system is contrasted 
with the small social reach of residual collective action at the level of housing 
blocks: mismatched social and technical scales. This was an issue for the 
CGPdA whose personnel saw distinct limits in the capacity of community 
organisations to operate their own infrastructure across the spectrum of the
technical (operations and maintenance) and social (user engagement and 
funding).
In spite of the apparent disconnect between the community and their 
water committee, it was with ASAPASC that SEDACusco, obliged by Peruvian 
legislation, recently began negotiations to take over the water infrastructure on 
the Right Bank. As part of this deal, SEDACusco is proposing new meters in 
order:
...to implement an effective control of water consumption among the inhabitants
through the installation of macro- and micro-meters.
(SedaCusco 2007b)
It is also determined to impose a normal tariff structure. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given what the company still sees as a bad experience with social 
tariffs in the north-eastern zone, which will be covered in the following section. 
When the company’s engineers were questioned about the social tariff idea 
their view was that the infrastructure for which the population would be 
compensated through the tariff was so decrepit that its value would be written 
off immediately (SEDACusco Interview 2 2007). When it was put to the team 
that the population had a very personal stake in their infrastructure156, their 
response was to make the analogy with owning a car:
If you run a car for 20 years and never do any maintenance on it, it is worth
nothing. The same holds for ASAPASC’s water system.
(SEDACusco Interview 2 2007)
SEDACusco’s proposal rests uneasily with the population on the Right 
Bank. Firstly, negotiations with SEDACusco are taking place through ASAPASC, 
the water committee. As we have seen, the relationship between the committee 
and the community is strained, although the former president of ASAPASC and 
a longstanding member of the board was vehement that “of course the 
population will be involved!” (Interview with former president of ASAPASC 
(HH34)). This optimism should be seen in the context of community 
engagement summed up by the local World Vision representative:
156 On whether SEDACusco had any sort of mechanism for engaging in negotiations directly 
with the population -  not just ASAPASC -  the answer was no, followed by a rather baleful 
“you?”.
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The population is divided! Because the average tariff that ... the ASPASC users 
pay is 4 soles (69p) per month, while the tariff that SEDACusco sets, which is a 
“social tariff, fluctuates between 10 and 12 soles (£1.70-£2) per month... There 
is a part of the population that wants to switch over [to SEDACusco] and another 
part of the population, generally the oldest inhabitants, that does not want to 
switch over. The discourse that they adopt is that they... have worked in the 
faenas to bring water from such a distance to the right bank that ... they can’t 
bring themselves to give it over so easily to SEDACusco. And the SEDACusco 
tariff is higher, right? And when the social tariff period has passed, SEDACusco 
will start to charge the real costs. The population that wants to switch over is the 
population that sees that the water service is inadequate. So, for health 
reasons ... they want to switch. But when the moment comes for them to get 
together in a general assembly and it comes to a vote those who don’t want to 
switch always win.
7mins (World Vision Interview June 2005)
Secondly, in addition to the health risks perceived by parts of the 
population as sufficient reason to opt for SEDACusco, other interviewees 
observed local economic interests as a factor. The ASAPASC maintenance 
team, for example, suggested that since the arrival of the main bus station, 
located at the foot of the Right Bank, several landlords had opened small hotels 
and they now wanted SEDACusco to adopt the infrastructure because their 
businesses depended on a reliable water supply. Meanwhile other landlords 
were renting out 4 or 5 rooms and charging each tenant for water services. 
They did not want SEDACusco to become the service provider because the 
higher cost of a metered service would eat in to their rental income (ASAPASC 
Interview 2 2006). These interviewees distinguished between landlords with 
“customers” expecting a certain level of service in a hostelry and landlords with 
“tenants” who would just have to lump it.
On this theme, the representative from the Centro Guaman Poma de 
Ayala commented on the circumstances in the Right Bank:
There are people there that are manipulated, so in an assembly they say “we are 
not going to get involved in the [SEDA] project”... [Their self-managed water 
company] has serious problems right now because... there are local leaders that 
have exploited the system...they don’t want SEDA to come in. There are sectors 
of the population that want the company to intervene but all the networks, the 
whole system is damaged. SEDACusco says to me: “how much is this going to 
cost me? If I intervene, the population is going to have to bear the cost! As soon 
as I go in, they’ll ask me for clean water!”... But still there are sectors of the 
population that are against [SEDA]... it isn’t only a question of lining their own 
pockets, because they charge [for the service over there], but there is also a 
political motive... to put themselves up for public office or to get into the 
municipality, to be visible, right?
30mins (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 2 2006)
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For the Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala, resolution of these conflicts and 
management problems is a matter of “sustainable institutions”. One aspect of 
this is the need to integrate projects across groups of settlements. Once water 
and sanitation is installed, a new, one-off management organisation at the level 
of a single barrio is hard to sustain because:
...in a barrio that already has water and sewerage, a new organization dies.
Everyone has their own thing going on.
33 mins(Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 2 2006)
The CGPdA also acknowledged that community based water 
organisations in the city can coexist with larger providers but that water 
provision at a local level is not sustainable since:
It needs specialization. It needs a management, a much more professional 
structure, more scientific. But [our community work] demonstrates...again and 
again that the social organization, the neighbourhood meetings, no matter how 
organized they are, have their limits. And one of these limits is in the 
management of this [water] resource. So [our work] has demonstrated that they 
can’t run [things]. It’s impossible. Each time we consider future projects, our 
institutional policy is that the project must be managed by an organization that 
knows how to do so. Because if not... the project is bound to fail. It will not be 
sustainable and eventually it will col lapse... our position has always been that we 
provide support from the point at which you take the decision to transfer [the 
system] to a new management, to SEDACusco...
25 minutes (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 2 2006)
Extending services into communities that are regarded by local 
government or the water company as financially risky or politically recalcitrant 
thus remains problematic. These perceived risks are linked back to livelihoods 
and governance.
Insecure incomes across this swathe of Santiago District also mean that 
Manco Capac is one of several barrios considered to be in arrears with local 
taxation. This contributes to the municipality’s fiscal inability and general 
reluctance to include the area in waste collection services and this, in turn, 
feeds the population’s antipathy towards the municipality.
Manco Capac faces an abysmal water service but it is also vulnerable to 
underinvestment in other infrastructure like roads and pavements and 
environmental hazards in the form of seasonal rainfall and flooding of gullies. 
There is frustration with waste collection services and the fact that waste is 
thrown into the neighbourhood ravines but, with little residual connection to 
agriculture in the southern valley and most of the settlement perched well above
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the flood plain, there is not a great deal of preoccupation with where waste 
water ends up.
In addition, in Manco Capac, priorities have shifted to livelihood activities 
in other locations in the city. Some community organisations are still active but 
are concentrating their efforts in small areas and slowly sealing roads or 
building pavements around single blocks of housing but the water system, 
which is geographically spread, has been allowed to fester.
What is clear from the different stories of past and imminent integration 
of water infrastructure is that there is no set framework for the adoption of 
community supplies. Each time this happens, the water company, the 
municipalities and the community have to renegotiate the value of the 
community infrastructure and haggle over suitable compensation. The 
Cusquena tradition of popular organisation to develop settlements and 
infrastructure may originally have succeeded in providing basic services but, 
when the immediate need has subsided, the initial leadership has not 
necessarily translated into sustainable management: Manco Capac’s water 
system is a committee-run system rather than a community-run system.
In addition, though the DPU’s work cited successful examples of 
relationships between provincial providers and communities like Water 
Forums157, what we find in Cusco, is a rather rueful and antagonistic 
relationship between the company and the communities whose supplies it has 
integrated. User participation, then, as a “new opportunity for cost recovery” 
(Mitlin 2001): 152 has not been welcomed as Diana Mitlin predicted. Instead, it is 
seen as an investment risk. Navigating an institutional response to the 
coexisting policy and needs driven provision is complex. Just like the private 
concessionaires from Ana Hardoy’s Buenos Aires study, the commercialised 
SEDACusco does not have the inclination at high level and consequently the 
capacity through the organisation’s different departments to work with 
communities in a participatory manner.
Although for many households, livelihoods would be substantially altered 
by a different provision arrangement, engagement in decision-making has given 
way to apathetic mistrust and the perception that while a few householders 
might be benefiting from the status quo, a new system with meters, fees and 
anonymity might disadvantage the worst off. The water committee, however, is
157 Built on the tenets of participative democracy laid down in the 1999 Constitution.
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still the chief negotiator with SEDACusco, further reducing the population’s 
access to influence and reinforcing the socio-technical isolation that is reducing 
the complexity and diversity of livelihoods and exposing households to 
vulnerability.
This splintering also applies to the isolation of the system and the 
committee from any international or municipal support. Apart from donations 
from an international NGO right at the start of the system’s history, ASAPASC 
has not manage to cultivate any financial or technical links into bigger socio- 
technical systems that might be able to support it.
9.2.3 Resistance: recalcitrant parallel administrations, social tariffs and
ambiguous risk sharing in the north-eastern zone
Other examples from Cusco suggest that bypass can be overcome. In 
fact, there is a history of attempts to integrate autonomous community systems 
into the SEDACusco system. One of the best documented examples is the 
Zona Noreste, the north eastern swathe of the city just along the mountainside 
from San Bias and characterised by a steep, clayey slope whose vegetation has 
all but disappeared over the last 40 years 158. Eleven of the zone’s 
neighbourhoods (APVs) were served, like San Bias, by SEDACusco’s Santa 
Ana reservoir but eleven others had their own, self-managed spring sources, 
distribution networks and reservoirs. These had been financed and installed by 
the population, working in teams at weekends. According to research in the 
early 1990s, the systems had hardly any technical input and as a result 
reservoirs and pipes were wrongly sized, materials were unsuitable and the 
yield rates did not meet demand, limiting hours of service. A further fourteen 
APVs, the most recently formed, had no service at all and were unable to 
finance anything because they were caught up in the financial crisis of the late 
1980s (Frias et al. 1992).
SEDACusco viewed these parallel installations as “private projects” and 
kept them very much at arm’s length until 1992 when the provincial company 
was finally obliged by its new EPS constitution to bring urban systems under
158 It is riddled with unstable gulleys and prone to landslips and erosion. Part of the zone covers 
archaeological reserves and because of a belief that evictions are more likely from heritage 
sites, the zone’s precarious inhabitants have ripped out the ancient terraces which traditionally 
stabilized the slopes. According to a 1992 study, the population of thirty-six APVs identified 
drinking water and drainage as their top development priorities.
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one umbrella (Frias et al. 1992):14. However, this move to draw in autonomous 
systems met resistance in four barrios that had become isolated during the 
zone’s transition to SEDACusco (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 2 
2006). According to a head of department at the CGPdA, the community 
leaders in these barrios insisted that they would manage their own systems and 
refused to hand over their infrastructure. This was in spite of a long term 
agreement with the water company that they would be charged “social tariffs”. 
The principle of this social tariff is explained by one of its proponents at CGPdA:
The social tariff is a payment, let’s say that it recognizes the work and the effort 
contributed by the population to achieve this project. This is a low, flat tariff, so 
they signed an agreement where commitments were given by the water 
company on one hand and by the population on the other. And of course several 
years have passed and the company has not invested much in the zone. The 
thing that they have respected is the social tariff. Each new company director 
that comes in says “we must cancel this contract”. But the unity and strength of 
the water committee has prevented this contract being forgotten.
(Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 2 2006)
Instead, these barrios continued to run their own system charging a 
nominal fee, which was either never collected or was embezzled, and only 
occasionally rallying the population to clean the reservoir. Their system 
deteriorated and it was only when the regional hospital began to notice higher 
incidences of gastrointestinal and skin infections in these areas that the 
community began an internal battle to allow SEDACusco to become their 
provider.
In some respects, this transition is still awkward fifteen years later as it 
faces population growth and is plagued by an ambiguous arrangement over the 
responsibility for planning and maintenance and a lack of investment -  this time 
on SEDACusco’s account:
...since [the north-eastern zone] has been transferred, [it] has grown a lot, 
mainly because it has water: only those that have water grow. But there’s no 
expansion plan. So, [SEDACusco] should have said “look, 5 or 10 years from 
now we will have to increase the [filtering] gallery to improve collection.”
The barrios working together with [the Centro Guaman Poma], supported by us, 
have carried out annual faenas for five or six years now to improve the artificial 
recharge of the [collection] ditches. This ought to be done by the water company 
but they have never done it. The most they have done is to provide a bus to take 
the users up so that they can carry out their faena. The neighbourhood does this 
each year. It's the responsibility of the company but the neighbourhood knows, 
they realize, that they have to do it otherwise the flow rate will fall. So it’s [an 
aspect of] a management that falls to the zone in the face of the company’s 
[inaction]
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26 minutes (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 2 2006)
This rather unsatisfactory relationship is still seen by SEDACusco as a 
thorn in its side because, as the CEO confirmed, it has committed to charging 
social tariffs and consequently cannot bring itself to invest in the system it has 
adopted:
This agreement [over a social tariff] cannot be left in place indefinitely. And it 
was a mistake not to have established fixed timescales for it. So, there is an 
agreement with the users, who at one time worked [on the system], because 
they demanded a preferential, social tariff. However, if there were originally a 
hundred people in the zone, there are now 200 and we have to charge those 
200 the social tariff: this is unmanageable. While it is very clear to us that [this 
arrangement] is not fair it is very difficult to make the [population] understand... it 
is very complicated for us, in fact, to make investments... we have made several 
improvements, most importantly in the hydraulic performance of all the networks 
but we cannot do anything more because we simply cannot justify the 
operational costs when seen against the income [from this zone]. It doesn’t stack 
up. Not even the current operating costs for the zone. It’s very complicated and it 
has brought with it many social conflicts: water is the rallying cry [bandera] for all 
those that want to go to this area.
47mins (SEDACusco Interview 1 2006)
When it came to parallel administrations that continue to operate in the 
city, the views of SEDACusco’s CEO were unsurprisingly echoed by the 
company’s operations team. The then head of operations explained that in 
peripheral areas of the city, in particular the Right Bank home to Manco Capac, 
low income families do not want meters. Unfortunately, these peripheral areas 
coincide with those that presented the worst technical problems, especially in 
terms of topography. They therefore required more investment and this would 
preclude the application of a social tariff (SEDACusco Interview 3 2006).
One view was that improvements to the network ought to be cross­
subsidized by commercial users but the engineer offering this option conceded 
that this could not be done to the degree needed to extend into marginal low 
income zones because tariff policies were set out in national legislation and 
tariff levels had to be approved by the national water regulator, SUNASS 
(SEDACusco Interview 3 2006).
This was a source of frustration for SEDACusco’s CEO and limited the 
company’s ability to invest. The CEO framed this as a problem of low tariffs 
rather than a difficulty associated with lack of cross-subsidy between 
commercial and residential users:
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Tariffs are proposed by [SEDACusco] and approved by SUNASS. We last 
proposed rates in 2000. But on this issue we have a lot of conflicts with SUNASS 
over the application of the tariff adjustment which has been frozen since 2000. 
Only in the last few months have we been able to make an adjustment for 
inflation. In 2000 we allowed for 3% inflation but it has actually been at times a 
little over 10%. So the company is losing out, in terms of the cost of water, we 
have lost this real value, 7%. This means we cannot make good investments, we 
cannot maintain our infrastructure to the required standard because we don’t 
have sufficient resources. Often the problem with SUNASS is simply procedural: 
it has the option to make the adjustment...and it just doesn’t deliver. It’s 
ridiculous.
36mins (SEDACusco Interview 1 2006)
Overall, though, it is clear that SEDACusco’s investment response at 
municipal and community level is highly sensitive to perceived cost recovery 
and political headaches and the ideal of integrated water provision gradually 
absorbing community systems and improving services can still be 
uncomfortable.
An additional reason for this awkwardness goes directly back to the 
ownership model of SEDACusco and the controversial and very recent history 
of its share allocation.
San Jeronimo159, the district sandwiched between the city centre and 
Angostura’s district of Saylla, withdrew as a shareholder in 2003 and took back 
most of their infrastructure from SEDACusco’s management. The politics of this 
separatism was explained by the local NGO, Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala 
and it tells a story of the geographic nature of the water company’s assets. 
Wanchaq as we have seen is a prosperous, central residential district with a 
large shareholding but no water company assets within its jurisdiction. San 
Jeronimo is a more deprived, outlying district with many of its own assets which 
predate the incorporation of San Jeronimo into the water company. San 
Jeronimo also hosts the city’s single, odorous waste water treatment plant:
... San Jeronimo, for example, has withdrawn from the company so that it can 
manage the system itself. It’s a problem... the mayor [of San Jeronimo], at the 
beginning of his administration... resigned from SEDACusco in part because the 
distribution of shares was [unfair], Wanchaq, for example, doesn’t have any 
water sources [within its jurisdiction] but wants to have the same weight as a 
shareholder. So, San Jeronimo said “wait a minute, I have reservoirs, networks, 
water sources and I have invested in these [assets]. Compare this to Wanchaq 
which has never had [these things] and has had everything provided for it! How 
can we have the same shareholding?” This [distribution of assets] was one of 
the pivotal issues [for San Jeronimo]. It is still not resolved. The company
159 In San Sebastian the SEDACusco still runs 80% of the system and the municipality runs 
20% while in San Jeronimo the municipality runs 70% of the system and SEDACusco runs only 
30% (SEDACusco Interview 5 2006)
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wanted [the distribution of assets] to stay the same but the [San Jeronimo] 
municipality did not agree. So how, for example, does [San Jeronimo] make its 
views felt? By charging the treatment plant council tax!
45mins (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 2 2006)
For the Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala, this movement to break away 
from the provincial EPS, SEDACusco is particularly concerning because it can 
provoke further disconnection of systems. CGPdA’s experiences working to 
improve the understanding and application of the constitutional concept of a 
Junta Administradora de Servicios de Saneamiento, or JASS, which dates back 
to 1994 in terms of legislation if not implementation, has made them wary that 
municipal level splintering can lead to a situation where services further 
fragment when municipalities are unable to maintain their district services 
(Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala 2006a):
We have always maintained that the JASS should only exist in [more isolated] 
communities because [there] the municipal institution does not have the 
resources to reach them. But this doesn’t apply to population centres at the foot 
of the valley. What has to be coordinated is the local government. But some 
authorities, some local governments, to detach themselves from these 
responsibilities, [like] the initial investment, they say “you want a JASS? Set one 
up yourselves then!” in order to wash their hands of it. They won’t take 
responsibility. But they don’t realize that further down the line it’s worse. On the 
other hand, there are citizens of the barrios that say: “Great! The municipality 
has handed over the water. Once they give it to us we’ll set up our JASS and 
we’ll run it ourselves." And the municipality says “Great! Bye!” [The community] 
says: “when we run things, we’ll pay 50 cents!” or “we’ll pay once a year!” So 
there is a financial interest. They strike deals, look for sources of finance, don’t 
tell anyone about it. But the problem is the water quality.
46 mins (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 2 2006)
With San Jeronimo breaking away from SEDACusco, further splintering 
within the municipality itself has been prevented by supporting the municipality 
to run its own system and by efforts to keep other districts tied back to the city, if 
not physically, then certainly institutionally, through socio-technical systems of 
water and governance.
9.2.4 Networking: linking autonomous systems to hubs
The other effect of San Jeronimo’s new independence has been to 
isolate the next district down the valley from SEDACusco’s support. This district 
is Saylla, home to Angostura.
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As we have already seen, livelihoods in Angostura are mixed with some 
inhabitants in stable, formal sector employment and others dependent on highly 
seasonal agriculture. Local agricultural livelihoods are often combined with 
small home-based enterprises and even diversified livelihoods tend to operate 
very close to the settlement. These livelihoods do not necessarily allow 
community investment but they do permit high levels of participation and the 
contribution of labour for construction of infrastructure.
Crucially, recognising that the incremental improvement of community 
infrastructure involves social and technological connection to larger institutions, 
CGPdA has begun helping individual settlements like Angostura to set up the 
JASS water committees.
The interlinked issues with Angostura’s JASS, however, are the usual 
suspects: lack of capacity, lack of funds and poor water quality. Firstly, there is 
little local capacity in terms of time, money and skills to monitor and document 
performance. Secondly, there is no regulatory agency to pick up, punish or 
address poor performance. Thirdly, the regional health authority -  which has no 
enforcement powers in any case -  is already stretched with its responsibility to 
monitor the large, formally regulated and occasionally politically controversial 
EPS. In spite of this and thanks to the support of CGPdA, the system is 
performing well against all the WHO indicators except quality, which was 
variable.
The Angostura JASS owes its successful performance in part to 
CGPdA’s broader environmental vision: the engagement of communities and 
municipalities in the regional water management initiative for integrated water 
resource management, known by its Spanish acronym, GIRH. One of CGPdA’s 
current efforts, for example, is to bring together all the fontaneros [maintenance 
staff] from the southern valley at workshops on running small water systems160 
and to encourage those leading the JASS committees to share their 
experiences of making each incremental technical improvements.
The importance of these initiatives was explained by the representative 
from CGPdA with reference to Cusco’s north-eastern zone. This NGO, having 
observed the difficulties of opting in or out of a municipal system at the peri­
urban interface, sees institutional support to municipalities as the key to
160 Including one female fontanera of whom CGPdA are very proud! The workshop included 
sessions on the design of gravity-fed systems, chlorination, monitoring and group planning 
exercises (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala 2006b)
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successful infrastructure provision and justifies this with a description of the 
barriers to bringing dispersed or peripheral infrastructure under municipal 
supervision:
More than the rest of the city, the north-eastern zone and the southern valley 
are linked to the urban as well as the rural...so at some point we said to them:
“should this community become part of the municipality or not?”... There are lots 
of political [preconditions involved...technical [preconditions. For example,
Saylla [Angostura’s host district] hardly has anything! It doesn’t have a single 
engineer. They have their fontanero [maintenance man], that they’ve trained. But 
the fontanero on his own cannot deal with the water issue and clean the streets 
and deliver the documentation to the mayor... This is municipal level policy. So 
there are situations that are a little complicated. It’s not straightforward.
26 minutes (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 2 2006)
In the north-eastern zone, municipal control of the inhabitants’ water 
meant being subsumed into SEDACusco’s nearby system. However, for 
settlements at the foot of the valley, like Angostura, CGPdA has had to come up 
with an alternative vision for municipalities like Saylla that are unlikely to ever 
become shareholders in SEDACusco.
CGPdA has a long term plan that these dispersed JASS committees will 
eventually be linked together under an administrative umbrella that is able to 
offer centralised technical and financial support. Their engineers see this as a 
10 to 15 year development project and accept that, as it unfolds, some 
settlements will have waste water treatment while others do not; some 
settlements will have chlorination while others do not; and some settlements will 
have meters while others do not. A sustainable system, on this view, is one in 
which human capacity keeps pace with technical sophistication, learning is 
shared and support networks stretch much further than the water network itself.
All these efforts downriver in Saylla, however, are dwarfed when they are 
tracked back to the inadequacy of SEDACusco’s sewer network and the direct 
discharge from communities both within and outside the SEDACusco system. In 
fact, the socio-technical mechanisms which mediate vulnerability are perhaps 
even more pronounced but much less visible in Cusco’s waste water 
infrastructure.
Although SEDACusco operates one waste water treatment plant for the 
city and charges all its users 42% of their water consumption to cover the cost 
of this treatment, according to an internal report (SedaCusco 2005), waste 
water from San Bias is actually discharged into the underground River Saphy -
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a tributary of the Huatanay -  and never arrives at the treatment plant. Similarly, 
Manco Capac and all its neighbours on the Right Bank rely on a network of 6-8” 
combined sewers161 for foul water and surface water. These discharge directly 
into the River Huatanay with no treatment at all.
The CEO of SEDACusco was keen to point out that although the 
company faced criticism for the state of the River Huatanay, it was not set up to 
deal with the problem of collecting waste water from informal settlements:
...another problem has arisen...for which the responsibility is not absolutely with 
the water company. We have pollution right now that is being generated in the 
River Huatanay...the company has already encountered [human] settlements on 
both sides of our river, left and right and they don’t have sewerage services. Or 
they already have a drainage service set up or built the by the people 
themselves and discharging straight into the river. This is an externality that 
comes back to the company and that, let’s say, in economic terms, we do not 
have the capacity to cope with. So, the relationship between the municipality, the 
community and the company ought to be a bit more formal... to avoid the 
development of these settlements in places that don’t have basic services. I 
know that everybody... the whole community, the newspapers, the specialist 
agencies say “no! the pollution is SEDACusco’s fault!” but how can we respond? 
Our view is that the reality is different: the company does not take on 
communities that go in and install themselves. On the Right Bank, those already 
living there come to the company and say “you have to connect me” and it 
doesn’t work like that. We work in sections according to our master plan of 
work... and if we are not scheduled to lay parts of the network over there, then 
realistically they shouldn’t be accepted [into the system]. And in the great 
majority of cases, I understand, they are what we call invasions, they’re informal. 
Only with time do they become formalized.
24min (SEDACusco Interview 1 2006)
Apart from all the waste water that is not contained by SEDACusco, the 
flow rate of waste water from the areas that are connected to SEDACusco 
sewerage is about 6001/s and -  with Cusco’s combined sewers -  during heavy 
rain this flow can be up to 16001/s but the San Jeronimo treatment plant has a 
maximum capacity of 3951/s, so anything over and above this in the rainy 
season is diverted into the river without treatment (SEDACusco Interview 5 
2006). Over the course of a year this works out at about 2 to 3 hours 
discharging directly to the river every day between December and April.
The monitoring of water discharged by large commercial and public 
sector users and the treatment plant is also completely dysfunctional. According 
to SEDACusco’s site engineers, there is no enforcement of the legislation on
161 In SEDACusco’s analysis using the rational method, the system capacity was shown to be 
wholly inadequate (SedaCusco 2007b)
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discharge from the plant162 because the relevant law, passed in 2005, has yet to 
be implemented by the “disorganized” regional health body, DIGESA. There 
was a feeling that for commercial users, there was a better chance of enforcing 
limits because of the water company’s power to sanction:
Each company must treat its own waste. The limit is 250mg/l BOD and if this is
exceeded, SEDA can block off their drains
(SEDACusco Interview 5 2006)
Although on alternatives such as the decentralization of residential waste 
water treatment, staff at San Jeronimo were dismissive:
We can’t decentralize because of lack of space and high population density!
(SEDACusco Interview 5 2006)
In contrast, right after the San Jeronimo plant, rounding the next 
meander we find Angostura and the concerted efforts of CGPdA and the 
municipality in Saylla to support decentralized waste water treatment plants for 
every settlement in the district. These primary treatment plants163 built mainly 
with contributions from the municipality and an external NGO are now between 
two and six years old and are operated by the community water committees 
(Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 3 2006).
Figure 91 Aerial image of San Jeronimo waste water treatment plant
162 Incoming DBO is 250mg/l, outgoing is 70mg/l. Incoming coliforms 10E8 and outgoing 
10E5or6. The relevant regulation says it should be 10e3 for irrigation water.
163 Each decentralized plant is designed for complete manual operation with no moving parts at 
a cost of S./150,000. The network cost is about S./90 per linear metre (Centro Guaman Poma 
de Ayala Interview 4 2006). The costs break down as 30,000soles from the Municipality of 
Saylla, 1,500 soles from users, nearly 60,000 soles from the organisation International Solidarity 
and 1,500 soles from Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala (Gonzales et al. 2003)
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As we saw in Chapter 6, the contamination of the River Huatanay has an 
impact on livelihoods, health, sustainable agriculture and the food chain beyond 
the provincial boundaries of Cusco yet, of the three case studies, only 
Angostura has any waste water treatment.
In response to some of these problems, the inter-district development 
initiative launched by CGPdA aims to assemble regional actors, strengthen 
municipal authorities and integrate the management of water resources across 
jurisdictions. So far this has allowed the development and long-term support of 
small JASS organizations and investment in decentralised waste water 
infrastructure. A series of forums has also helped to persuade the regional 
health body to extend their drinking water monitoring into the municipalities of 
the southern valley:
A year ago, DIGESA [the regional health body] started getting involved, following 
the [existing] legal framework. Before that there was no monitoring. The Ministry 
of Health was supposed to do it but who knows what they did! Now it happens 
more regularly. For example in the southern districts, the Ministry of Health runs 
monthly quality checks for residual chlorine at least. Before it was the 
responsibility of the municipality and the Ministry of Health came in if people 
were ill. But now with this framework, there has to be monitoring. Our 
institutional policy is to strengthen the local government institutions so that they
can manage [the systems]. So that there are stronger, professional 
municipalities with more developed human capital. Through the [inter-district 
development initiative] ‘PIDES’ the rates of diarrhoeal illnesses have fallen and 
the flow rates from water sources have been increased. We are also 
incorporating metering.
(Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala Interview 2 2006)
The disconnection of Angostura from the possibility of SEDACusco’s 
support and the need to engage the Municipality of Saylla in development 
across many districts has attracted the support of CGPdA in the design and 
funding of the water system. Angostura still sees the active involvement of 
users in maintenance and development of their infrastructure and in the water 
committee but the settlement’s community-built assets are networked to 
CGPdA's capacity and the burgeoning capacity of the municipality.
The CGPdA has recognised that participation is not a spontaneous fact 
of poverty either in terms of users participating in their provider organisations, 
citizens participating in their municipalities or those affected by hazards having 
access to those causing them. With this in mind, its initiatives focus on 
municipal capacity both to foster participation and to participate in forums that 
cross jurisdictions and integrate the basin of the Huatanay.
With a poorly functioning waste water treatment plant and disconnected 
informal settlements and municipalities that have opted out, this splintered 
urban provision has environmental impacts that reach beyond the province. 
This splintering is amplified by the asymmetric experience of environmental 
hazards with Angostura and other settlements by the river closer to the city 
centre vulnerable to flooding.
At the same time, the river, which links agriculture and amenity value 
back to urban livelihoods offers a glimmer of hope for collective action around 
environmental issues. Strengthening the municipalities means that the CGPdA’s 
intervention is designed to have a durable, incremental impact on human 
capacity and technical performance.
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9.3 Answering the research question: placing messy modes into socio- 
technical space
For Marvin and Graham, ‘bypass’ is a process whereby the 
strengthening of infrastructure connections between the most valued people 
and places, (i.e. those judged to be lucrative and profitable to the infrastructure 
service providers), leads to a weakening of the connections between the least 
valued users and places (Marvin and Graham):288. What is important here is 
that connections are self-reinforcing: the more that strong places are networked 
with each other, the more these networks are able to straddle the neglected, 
regardless.
In the same vein, Bruno Latour’s analysis conceived technological 
networks as “nets thrown over spaces” (Latour 1993):118 which simultaneously 
connect geographically distant people and places and exclude the locally 
disconnected. Latour uses this as a basis for explaining why ideals of universal 
service provision have little to say about contemporary infrastructure in Cusco 
or anywhere else. Building on Latour’s ideas, Marvin and Graham’s urban 
splinters are globally connected but locally isolated enclaves of privilege which 
coexist beside globally isolated or bypassed local infrastructures.
Splintering is useful for framing the processes of privilege and bypass 
which are prioritising infrastructure investment in zones where livelihoods are 
already strong and connected globally, like Wanchaq District and, to some 
extent, San Bias at the northern edge of the tourist centre, and bypassing the 
riskiest places and users.
SEDACusco’s risk aversion has played out as a 15 year interval between 
when the company was legally obliged to integrate Manco Capac into the 
provincial supply and its 2007 feasibility study for this adoption project. In the 
north-eastern zone, this means that users still do their own collective work to 
maintain yields from their sources otherwise neglected by an ambivalent 
SEDACusco focused on cost recovery and unhappy with a longstanding tariff 
arrangement in this part of the city.
Resisting this splintering, Marvin and Graham see the difficulty of totally 
isolating privileged enclaves from urban or regional services such as power and 
water. In Cusco this resistance has been provoked by two factors. Firstly,
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because Cusco’s people have not been completely passive in the face of 
bypass and privilege with the example of San Jeronimo’s disgruntled break 
away from the provincial system. At first the Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala 
had been nervous that San Jeronimo’s socio-technical separatism would cause 
further splintering through a continued process of bypass down the southern 
valley. Instead, the settlements like Angostura, which spill out and down from 
San Jeronimo, are building networks between local livelihoods and global 
knowhow, facilitated by CGPdA and supported by inter-district cooperation. 
These were starting to produce reliable water services.
At the same time, however, to suggest that some things are going well 
for Angostura should not detract from the fact that this settlement is not only 
bypassed by many of the city’s income generating activities but actually remains 
extremely vulnerable to environmental hazards that are exacerbated by activity 
up river. This active damage is a worse outcome than simple isolation from 
resources predicted by McAslan (McAslan 2002): 141.
Secondly, the spaces between Cusco’s water networks are not 
completely technologically vacant: they host interdependent livelihoods, 
committees and rivers. This tends to mean that not all spaces fall into the 
category of either privileged or bypassed: the networks themselves stretch, 
transition and interconnect across splinters. Looking back for a moment at the 
conclusions of Marvin and Laurie after their research in Cochabamba, Bolivia, 
we can see similarities between the interconnection of Cusco’s splinters and 
what these authors’ call the meshing of informal and formal water circuits. They 
present a picture of incorporation that rejects the monopoly of engineers and 
requires more complex social relationships between users and providers and 
smaller-scale technologies (Marvin & Laurie 1999):355.
Certainly, where the approach of SEDACusco scales up, monopolises 
and bypasses, there is room for new types of knowledge, or at least new 
holders of knowledge, for example, the municipalities, citizens and fontaneros. 
This does undoubtedly require more complex social relations with users, 
including participation, transparency, co-operation and, perhaps, patience since 
improvements are incremental. It is, though, in their final argument for smaller- 
scale technologies where the socio-technical configuration of infrastructure is 
particularly relevant. Small technology is not the complete response to the 
informal or bypassed. It is also necessary to scale up socially through links to
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knowledge, which may be internationalised or held by engineers, but may more 
often be local and revolve around those who have either seen through 
successful plans or made alarming mistakes: Manco Capac, for example, is 
very close geographically to the successful, incremental experiences of 
fontaneros in the southern valley but these groups do not yet have mechanisms 
through which they can share practice.
Montgomery et al. also conclude that “links are needed to the powerful” 
(Montgomery et al. 2004):47. This is a question of access to influence and 
relates back to governance, coalitions of poor and non-poor and heterogeneity 
of urban livelihoods. Where links can draw in different livelihoods and 
vulnerabilities, time horizons and institutional and geographic scales, bypass is 
more likely to be constrained.
This is an argument for socio-technical systems as risk sharing groups 
where different modes of organisation push providers and consumers towards 
certain configurations: some of which allow risk to be mutualised and some 
which do not. This is mapped on the framework below. Different providers are 
shown according to the direction that their model of provision is pushing 
towards.
The configuration and interconnection of these socio-technical systems 
can also be understood through van Vliet et al.’s framework of co-production 
that feeds into their thesis of sustainable consumption. Slotting some of Cusco’s 
coexisting modes of organisation into van Vliet et al.’s categories is an exercise 
that brings us almost immediately to their useful critique of scale, as shown in 
Table 31. These authors suggest that the technological scale of a system is not
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most powerful
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necessarily matched by the scale of social organisation managing it (van Vliet et 
al. 2005):64.
Table 34 van Vliet et al.’s modes of organisation
Mode Description Application to the case studies
Autonomous
Co-providers, localized 
resources, local stand-alone, 
self-managed and responsive 
grids
Angostura with its water committee, 
community participation and spring-fed 
network
Piecemeal
Customers and suppliers, 
patchwork of grids, unregulated, 
non-standard, designed for peak 
loads with idle spare capacity
Manco Capac with its unregulated and 
unreliable patchwork of grids. Originally 
designed for peak loads but now struggling 
to meet them.
Integrated
Consumers and promoters of 
diversified demand, semi­
integrated local and regional 
grids, designed for diverse loads 
to exploit spare capacity and 
smooth demand profiles
San Bias with its SEDACusco supply taking 
in surface, spring and ground water sources 
up and down the valley, buffering demand 
with distributed reservoir infrastructure and 
serving commercial and residential users.
Universal
Passive beneficiaries and public 
providers, uniform services, 
highly integrated national and 
regional super grids, demand not 
differentiated just met by 
extending networks
The Peruvian public ownership ideal which 
was in favour in the 60s, 70s and mid­
eighties, and out of favour in the early 80s 
and early 90s, never achieving universal 
provision but strong enough to maintain a 
public ownership model for urban drinking 
water and sanitation.
Marketed
Purchasers and promoters of 
differentiated products and 
services, partially fragmented 
grids matched to diverse, 
monitored and manipulated 
needs
In patches, SEDACusco, markets a macro 
and micro-metered service and operates 
several tariff models which differentiate its 
services and feed back into investment 
priorities.
Reproduced from Table 3.1 (van Vliet et al. 2005):33
The San Bias provider, EPS SEDACusco, is linked globally to sources of 
finance and nationally to the shared experiences of other Peruvian EPSs. It has 
a dedicated technical staff, it taps into geographically spread water sources and 
its treatment methods are sophisticated and imported with, for example, the 
French company Degremot designing the rapid pressure filters at the Santa Ana 
plant. Significantly, in many parts of the city, the system’s users are 
international or directly serving international tourists.
SEDACusco slips between an integrated mode, the vestiges of a 
universal ideal and the national framework that allows in private finance and 
drives more monitoring, differentiation and, what van Vliet et al. call, partially 
fragmented grids. In practice, this fragmentation is more subtle, with the 
company making investment judgements based on the livelihoods between and 
within the city’s municipalities, strengthening some fragments and neglecting 
others. This configuration reflects van Vliet et al.’s comments that a generally
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assumed trend away from a ‘universal’ mode of provision actually gives way to 
complex coexisting public and private priorities (van Vliet et al. 2005):38.
Meanwhile, Manco Capac which started life as a community-built 
autonomous system with a single, remote source, has shifted to a piecemeal 
mode of organisation which now taps another subterranean source, has added 
a slow sand filter and expanded its ad hoc connections. Its piecemeal operation, 
however, is without any spare capacity, still responsive to demand but only in 
the sense that it has to lock off different patches of the network on a rotating 
supply schedule just to make sure everyone gets something. It is isolated from 
global links to the knowhow of NGOs or international finance and it has become 
isolated from the limited capacities of local government. The provider committee 
itself, once tied strongly to the inhabitants of the zone, is isolated from users 
and can no longer count on community labour to maintain the system. The 
committee’s technical capacity is casual to the point of being slack. Users faced 
with this socio-technical isolation venture to other networks to purchase water 
marketed by entrepreneurs connected to the SEDACusco system.
Finally, the successful, autonomous system in Angostura is supported by 
the civil society NGO, Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala. This is an NGO with 
experience reaching from the city’s historic centre to agricultural settlements far 
down the southern valley. Moreover, the organisation’s main donors are based 
in van Vliet’s native Netherlands and in Spain. This has also meant that the 
NGO’s heads of department have attended training hundreds of miles away in 
Europe. The water infrastructure itself is highly localised with the community 
building the reservoir and laying the modest network of pipes.
Angostura, which is bypassed by SEDACusco, has succeeded in 
expanding its drinking water and waste water infrastructure for three reasons. 
Firstly, these formerly bypassed places have made their own global connections 
to skills and finance through the civil society actor CGPdA. So far these links 
have fed into funding at the level of local government right through to technical 
training for the maintenance people, or fontaneros, on the ground.
Secondly, this civil society support has set up connections between 
municipalities. This has focused on interlinked economic and environmental 
issues in which many jurisdictions have a stake, from improving the quality of 
local agriculture and enhancing the amenity value of the southern valley to the 
integrated management of water.
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Formal structures for responding to these issues at municipal level now 
exist and their momentum is maintained through planning and, the third element 
of CGPdA’s facilitation: citizen participation. This emphasis on local connections 
is a deliberate response to the experience of community organisations that have 
splintered internally by prioritising leaders and consolidating power. Although I 
have been reluctant to emphasise the benefits of community organisation to 
avoid lauding localism or assuming that such organisations always have the 
best interests of their constituency at heart, it is useful here to refer back to what 
Montgomery et al. call the community aspect of neighbourhood. For these 
authors, it only becomes important when ‘spatially proximate individuals’ are 
involved in ‘social learning’ and it is this that is being cultivated by CGPdA’s 
intervention.
Following on from this categorisation of the modes of provision in the 
case studies and with reference to Chapter 2 and the mapping of van Vliet et 
al.’s modes onto the socio-technical space, as shown in Figure 92, I argue that 
socio-technical systems mediate between governance and vulnerability by 
shifting the groups of consumers and providers through which risk is shared. 
These shifts are processes of privilege, bypass, local resistance and networking.
Figure 92 Socio-technical conceptual space revisited: plotting van Vliet’s modes of 
organisation (Crawford 2008)
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Van Vliet et al.’s modes of organisation, although they are derived from 
and apply more comfortably to European (energy) infrastructures, emphasise 
three interesting aspects of infrastructure which have emerged in this study: 
interconnection between technical and social scales, which I call ‘networking’ 
and which describe the concepts of complexity and diversity; coexistence, 
which allows for incomplete splintering, local resistance and networking; and all 
these relationships shaping the services experienced by users, understood in 
terms of risk buffering and vulnerability. These features are shown in the 
framework below:
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The configuration of socio-technical systems in this empirical study 
mediates vulnerability by stretching and connecting between socio-technical 
scales and by allowing coexisting arrangements to transition between different 
modes of organisation. The tendencies to stretch and transition are driven by 
models of governance that privilege and bypass on the basis of risks and 
returns, responding to the perceived vulnerability and livelihoods; local 
resistance to bypass responding to perceived heterogeneity in access to assets; 
and institutional arrangements which can network to the powerful creating 
socio-technical systems capable of linking households, committees or 
municipalities to useful sources of knowledge and funding that stretch much 
further than physical pipes and reservoirs.
I have argued that socio-technical systems mediate between governance 
and household vulnerability. My argument identifies three dominant
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mechanisms which configure socio-technical systems in ways that determine 
how risk is shared: processes of bypass and privilege which pick out livelihoods 
and groups of livelihoods on the basis of risk; people, patches of infrastructure 
or jurisdictions stirring up local resistance; and institutions which knit together a 
network of different socio-technical scales. Just as these factors found their 
reflection in the sub-splinters of Manco Capac, so they are mirrored nationally 
and globally.
In the final chapter, I look at the broader implications for this work and 
what it means for achieving sustainable livelihoods and mitigating the risks 
faced by the most vulnerable.
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Chapter 10 Socio-technical systems mediating between 
vulnerability and governance across Cusco
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10.1 Closing the thesis
This final chapter draws together the contributions that this thesis makes 
to theory, methodology and policy. It also addresses the potential for 
implementing my findings and outlines the next research challenge raised by 
my work.
I begin with a final reflection on the picture of vulnerability and governance 
that has emerged from this study and the ways in which household risks are 
mediated through socio-technical systems.
I then comment on my contribution and what might follow.
10.1.1 Risk begets risk
Half way through last century, the structuralists’, interpreted in Chapter 2 
by Martinussen, proposed that an economy is not just about capital 
accumulation, production and consumption but that these activities are 
mediated by “hard, specific pieces” of equipment and groups of people. Rather 
than a system which continually found perfect, short-term equilibrium, the 
theoretical landscape of economics moved to an acknowledgement of the social 
and technological artefacts which held or stabilised certain conditions.
These ideas have also left traces on a globalisation discourse in which 
Martinussen’s “hard, specific pieces” have morphed into the dynamic networks 
of Borja and Castells: networks which channel capital into a system of nodes at 
which investment is trapped for a while. For Borja and Castells, these networks 
tend to include the valued people and places all over the world while excluding 
what is devalued or undervalued and the networks persist as capital 
accumulates at city nodes and high-speed communication feeds these nodes 
with the information they need to stay ahead of the game and entrench 
themselves. Saskia Sassen sees, even within these prosperous nodes, a binary 
split between the high-end, financial sector and the low-wage services for which 
they create demand (Sassen 2001): 10. In between the nodes, outside the 
networks, as wealth creates demand for products that only the rich can supply, 
economic growth might push up demand for what unskilled labour can produce 
but, in the context of globalised access to cheap labour, wages for the unskilled 
at best stagnate and, at worst, fluctuate wildly around an already low mean.
This in turn finds resonance in the discourse of modes of organisation 
and splintering urbanism which recognise the inertia of physical assets and the
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patchy results of aspiring to universalise them on one hand and market them on 
the other. We saw examples in urban service provision of ambiguous and 
unorthodox co-production that persisted and continued to emerge despite 
efforts by the institutions of governance to standardise and modernise (Joshi & 
Moore 2004):44(Kaika & Swyngedouw 2000): 136. Another example 
extrapolated the model of marketed organisation to argue for decentralised but 
interconnected infrastructure that, like Robert Chambers’ complexity in 
livelihoods, would buffer the risk of system failures through self-organisation, 
local autonomy combined with far reaching interconnection to create 
redundancy in the system (van Timmeren et al. 2004):6.
Finally, the analogue for the sustainable livelihoods framework is the idea 
that shocks and stresses, like environmental hazards, inflation or recession, can 
be weathered by building up something fixed. Through a lens focused on the 
strategies of poor households, the hard pieces and skills are conceived as a 
portfolio of assets: financial, human, physical, natural and social. Indeed, the 
idea that a loose network might be pinned down into a household asset like 
social capital was summed up by Montgomery et al. when they distinguished a 
‘capital’ from a network by explaining that the former emphasises the “more 
durable features of networks” (Montgomery et al. 2004):41. The more stable 
the network, the more useful as an asset but the less easily reconfigured, even 
if it is unfair or exclusive.
These conceptions of economies, global cities, infrastructures and 
households all have systems coalescing, stabilising and reinventing themselves 
better to respond to change. The sustainable livelihoods framework, in 
particular when it is conceived by Robert Chambers, borrows from the language 
and theory of complex systems and financial models, talking about these 
changes in terms of buffering vulnerability. Risk is spread, on this view, through 
diversity of livelihood activities and complex interactions between livelihoods 
which build a certain shock-smoothing redundancy into systems of livelihoods.
As with Chambers’ positive ideas about diversity, the complex 
interactions that he thinks can combine to enhance livelihoods are also 
confounded by the reaction of service providers to riskiness in Cusco. Generally, 
where risk is not known it is prejudged, assumed and even estimated forward 
by financial markets and it is partly this aspect of private sector involvement in 
infrastructure that picks out safe or profitable nodes, sits behind Estache et al.’s
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“secondary distributional effects” (Estache et al. 2001): 1180 and shapes the 
economic, political and sociocultural processes of the World Bank which cause 
inequalities to “combine, interact’ and reproduce themselves (World Bank 
2006a):28.
However, investment in urban infrastructure is an interesting place for 
discrimination on the grounds of risk to unfold because, as Richard Batley 
observes, the dynamic and marginalised are juxtaposed (Batley 1997):339. In 
this context, the processes of privilege and bypass have two characteristics. 
Firstly, the injustice of these processes, with respect to damaging rather than 
enhancing the livelihoods of the bypassed, is often overt. There is optimism 
here about the possible collective reaction to risks that affect the livelihoods of 
the rich and the poor. Batley thinks that urban economic ‘winners’ will only be 
persuaded to petition change when they are facing critical political instability, 
environmental degradation or when the city becomes unattractive to investors 
(Batley 1997):345 a situation where risk is leaking into the privileged enclaves 
and coalitions of poor and non-poor are provoked.
Secondly, those affected by bypass and privilege in cities are both 
proximate and numerous. From here, Batley asserts that local agents can also 
drive change (Batley 1997):341. Certainly, in Cusco, bypassed for years by a 
national agenda devised in the capital, Lima, this local response is exemplified 
by the leadership of Daniel Estrada who made strident efforts to network 
globally by capturing tourist revenue in local coffers; reconfiguring the 
infrastructure of local markets; and buffering the livelihoods of the most 
vulnerable with programmes of direct assistance.
Similarly, Cusco’s contemporary, internal response is concentrated where 
environmental degradation and socio-technical separatism are strongest: in 
municipalities that sense overt bypass like San Jeronimo; and where 
contamination and flooding (Angostura) or overcrowding (San Bias) have drawn 
in the support of an internationally supported, local civil society actor.
In Manco Capac where the socio-technical separatism of the late eighties 
has given way to isolation, however, the local response is muted and this 
sounds a warning note for a solution to the provision of urban services that 
relies wholly on civil society actors.
The idealised and normative good governance model that has the state, 
civil society and markets working harmoniously, or at least cooperatively, makes,
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as we saw in Chapter 2, all sorts of assumptions about the motivations and 
capacities of each actor and, if we go back to Jenny Pearce’s assessment of 
NGOs in civil society, we also find a story of fragmentation. As Pearce sees it, 
only projects that are deemed technically efficient will attract funding and this 
drives NGO aversion to processes, including participation, that are risky, messy 
or time consuming, again mirroring the splintering process. This is pause for 
thought given that so much that has supported the bypassed settlements in 
Cusco has until now emerged from civil society and, in particular, an NGO 
which sees the timescale for change as at least a decade or more.
Robert Chambers sees this process more broadly as one through which 
development professionals from the private, public and civil society sectors, 
crave and hoard information better to standardise and coordinate matters from 
the world’s cores and hubs.
Meanwhile, with global markets responding by turns to sentiment, 
experience and shocks, their influence on governance can be volatile. The high­
speed telecommunications and capital accumulation that drive Borja and 
Castells’ global networks start by buffering this volatility but go on to embed a 
model of mitigation that actually reduces the possibility to mutualise risk over 
time: reinforcing Robert Tressel’s “great barriers and ramparts” by favouring the 
low risks and high returns offered by people and things that are already 
successfully buffering vulnerability.
By dint of their extent and exclusive configuration, then, these 
governance systems are not good at understanding local circumstances and 
are more likely to ratchet up estimates of risk and play safe where information is 
poor or the context is precarious.
All this confirms a tendency to drive governments and civil society into 
the bottom left quadrant of the vulnerability model where the market is already 
happily ensconced. As we saw in Chapter 9, governance of infrastructure 
follows a similar pattern and, recognising this tendency to centralise and 
connect preferentially to other well connected hubs, van Timmeren et al. 
propose a risk-buffering approach which strengthens weak connections and 
forges links between unwieldy, centralised infrastructure and more nimble, 
autonomous systems. This model is also reflected in Chambers’ plea for 
complexity and diversity in livelihoods and in the insurance analogy which
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argues that people can only buffer shocks by networking with others who are 
subject to different, idiosyncratic risks.
Governance as both a framework for analysis and a tripartite prescription 
for development must examine the patterns that interconnect and fortify the 
most powerful. This thesis argues that households face risks to their livelihoods 
that are differentiated by their access to assets, infrastructure and influence. 
Splintering configurations of water and sanitation infrastructure are a response 
to the governance imperatives of providers and their perceptions of livelihoods 
but they also tend to interact with household vulnerability to amplify risk for 
those least able to buffer it. The potential for urban households to mitigate risk 
in a sustainable way is undermined by socio-technical isolation, weak assets 
and homogeneity in vulnerability. This potential is enhanced where assets are 
strong or vulnerability is mixed but also where socio-technical infrastructures 
stretch and connect people to knowledge, environmental assets and networks 
of users and providers; citizens and governance structures; and contaminators 
and contaminated.
10.1.2 A Contribution to Knowledge
The theoretical contribution of this thesis has been to develop an 
enhanced understanding of the relationship between vulnerability, governance 
and the socio-technical infrastructures that mediate between them.
The sustainable livelihoods framework already conceptualises an 
important connection between infrastructure and vulnerability context but these 
links are usually understood in terms of livelihood assets, part of the bundle of 
capitals within the household, and access to services, the presence or absence 
of a connection.
Socio-technical systems offer a way of conceptualising the links between 
household assets, infrastructure and environmental systems beyond 
households. A socio-technical systems approach takes in the geographic and 
historic dimensions of infrastructure: this is critical since the location of water 
pipes with a shelf-life of 25 years will affect livelihoods for a generation.
Policies, institutions and processes also feature prominently in the 
livelihoods framework and I deal with this component of the framework through
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an analysis of national, local and water governance in Peru. The deliberate 
limitation of the governance framework is that it does not take account of the 
powerful embedded physical, institutional and environmental systems that 
mediate development. Even proponents of the framework recognise that the 
world’s biases and injustices just seem to repeat and reproduce themselves and 
resist policy: governance is not able to explain all development outcomes with 
recourse only to the actions of frustrated governments, imperfect markets and 
whimsical civil society.
Socio-technical systems offer a way of introducing infrastructure as an 
additional actor in development, an actor that may constrain or allow certain 
social and economic trajectories.
Finally, I develop a model of socio-technical space during the thesis, both 
through a critical examination of the literature and a detailed empirical study. My 
framework allows modes of infrastructure organisation to be seen both in terms 
of vulnerability and the actions of the powerful: the socio-technical system is the 
group through which risk is shared. Certain system configurations use 
knowledge of or assumptions about risk to discriminate further and further until 
risk is individualised, other modes force the vulnerable into systems which are 
unable to buffer aggregate risk and others, through political negotiation or 
ideological hangover, encourage risk sharing that is blind to the individual.
The theoretical contribution of this framework goes further than this study 
and can be applied to an analysis of financial services and sub-prime crises, 
utilities, supermarket loyalty schemes, pay-as-you-go mobile telephones or car 
insurance, health services or health insurance based on the genetic material of 
individuals. I will examine the policy implications of this in a moment.
The methodological approach of this thesis is to use the mixed qualitative, 
quantitative and triangulation techniques advocated by the sustainable 
livelihoods framework. This encourages the use of secondary sources, group 
meetings, household and key informant interviews to frame an analysis of 
livelihoods and governance.
In order better to understand the mediating role of infrastructure, I 
introduce into this set of tools the World Health Organisation’s methods for 
evaluating community drinking water systems. The presentation of the case 
studies then uses visual and graphical devices to express household assets as
347
pentagons; sanitary risks as colour coded charts; and the water systems as 
colour coded flow diagrams. The coding incorporates a visual inspection of risk 
and the results of a rigorous, laboratory based water sampling regime.
It is this combined methodology applied to an empirical study of Cusco 
that allows me to link household risks to assets, assets to infrastructure systems 
and infrastructure systems to governance.
In terms of a contribution to policy, the theoretical and methodological 
approaches of the thesis have served to articulate the tension between building 
up a highly refined and atomised understanding of urban vulnerability as a basis 
for apportioning costs or distributing infrastructure and using more blurred and 
prejudiced assumptions about the riskiness of whole groups that allow costs to 
be unwittingly shared, sometimes in virtuous cycle of privilege and sometimes in 
a downward spiral of bypass.
Understanding, individualising and quantifying risk, if that is what we 
should do, is only the first part of the picture. Persuading groups to share risk 
and give up information about themselves in a climate of splintering urbanism, 
individual responsibility and contingency is the challenge of governance. Socio- 
technical infrastructures are the entities through which risk is shared and their 
configurations can be embedded to enhance or damage livelihoods. Risk can 
only be shared when it is willingly and knowingly networked across institutional 
actors, across splinters of infrastructure and across livelihoods. This means 
building a better understanding of vulnerability in collaboration with the people 
at risk, such that it will not allow powerful systems to further discriminate.
My view is that we are all aware of the surprising and sometimes 
frustrating ways that these systems mediate between governance and our daily 
lives. In the UK, for example, there is a fairly constant public debate about 
identity cards and data protection. Both in the UK context and as a policy­
making tool for citizens and institutions in Cusco, this thesis offers a conceptual 
space for us to examine the way we provide and consume infrastructure and 
services. In using the model, we should ask where we are now, where we are 
going by default and where we would actually prefer to be.
Applied to urban services, for example, I would ask: is there an 
overarching legislative framework that is pushing us towards individualised risk; 
is this foreseen by our social contracts and constitutions; do we have systems in
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place to avoid discrimination and the processes of privilege and bypass that 
work to give discrimination an endogenous life of its own; how can we explore 
vulnerability and make collective decisions about its mitigation; how can we 
stretch and interconnect our socio-technical systems to make sure that the 
livelihoods of the powerful do not damage but enhance the livelihoods of others?
From an individual perspective, and turning the questions to my 
community and my family, I would then ask how I find myself connected to 
these systems and to the livelihoods of others; what this might mean for the 
risks that my children face; and how I might act to reconfigure these systems.
Faced with a changing climate and volatile economy that will reorder the 
geography and nature of risk, these are critical questions for mitigating 
vulnerability and making sure that our livelihoods are moving towards 
sustainable modes.
As far as implementation of these findings is concerned, my view is that 
the framework should be used to identify the different modes of provision in 
cities. By working out where the weakest systems operate, what they are 
connected to and who is running them, it is possible to intervene to bolster the 
capacity of socio-technical groups to buffer risk. In the abstract this involves 
stretching and connecting these groups to new sources of knowledge and 
finance, incremental improvements to hardware and better institutions. In 
practice, this mirrors the approach of the Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala in 
Cusco with their long time horizon and capacity building for municipalities and 
watersheds, not just communities.
More importantly, implementation means identifying the systems that are 
best at buffering risk and examining how these systems will fare in the face of 
new risks, including the risk of frustration and fury among those excluded from 
safe enclaves.
Ultimately, implementation means promoting a more savvy and 
participatory negotiation of how risk is mutualised through our societies.
The next research challenge is to test the usefulness of a model of socio- 
technical space across different disciplines and phenomena. So far I have had 
interest from educationalists in the UK government who want a platform for 
mediating discussions with their quantitative counterparts in the treasury when
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they analyse the implications of education policy. A colleague at UNDP has 
quizzed me on how it might apply to Yemeni water infrastructure where 
dominant mountain tribes are pumping water away from their valley dwelling 
rivals and the whole country is on the verge of extreme water scarcity. My 
examiners reflected on the socio-technical systems approach to a shift to a low 
carbon economy. An editor of the journal Revolutionary History has looked over 
it and taken a stab at placing various ideologies in the spaces. An academic 
from the US asked how the model would deal with an analysis of sub-prime, 
given that getting credit into the communities of the disconnected and bypassed 
seems to be desirable according to the framework but has ended in tears on the 
ground.
A second research challenge is a more sophisticated analysis of risk in the 
context of infrastructure distribution. Even if this quickly shows that what I have 
presented is merely a warped derivation of the risk modelling algorithms that 
underlie all our transactions, it should still expose the mechanisms for sharing 
risk which are configured around us. What the framework should do is take us 
further than labelling these arrangements as logical or natural or letting us lazily 
extrapolate all injustice from the inevitability o f ‘human nature’.
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Appendix A Water Sector Structure
Figure 93 Before 1970 Responsibility for the water sector was centralised in the Ministry 
of Public Works. In 1970 urban and rural responsibility was split between ministries but 
still centralised. Several cities held on to independent local systems.
Central
Ministry of Public 
Works
(investment, construction 
operation and 
maintenance)
MARKET
CIVIL
SOCIETY / 1 9 7 0
Ministry of Public 
Health 
DISABAR (Directorate 
for Basic Rural 
Sanitation) 
(investment and 
construction)
URBAN
Ministry of Housing 
and Construction 
DGOS (General 
Directorate of 
Sanitation Works)
(investment, construction 
operation and 
maintenance)
RURAL
MARKETMARKET
CIVIL
SOCIETY
Community-Based 
Organizations
(operation and 
maintenance)
City Authoritie 
in Lima, 
Arequipa and 
Trujillo
(investment, 
construction, O&M)
Local
MARKET
CIVIL
SOCIETY
351
Figure 94 In 1981 responsibility for urban water and sanitation merged into a centralised 
state-owned holding company but this time 200 cities retained autonomous 
arrangements.
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Figure 95 During the first half of 1990, the outgoing President Garcia attempts to hand urban 
responsibility for water to municipalities
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Figure 96 Second half of 1990: Incoming President Fujimori assumes centralised 
responsibility for water via the Ministry of the President
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Figure 97 By1994 the legislation had made provisions for a regulatory body, SUNASS, 
public health policy in the Ministry of Health. In 2000, the picture was much the same 
except that the sector’s governing body was not longer under direct presidential control.
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Figure 98 Rural governance
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Figure 99 Model of governance with private investment in Tumbes in 2005
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Figure 100 Idealised governance institutions
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Figure 100 shows how this governance story translates to the number of people 
with access to a household connection for water and waste water. Overall water 
connections outnumber waste water connections but both have been increasing 
steadily since 1990.
355
Figure 101 Peruvian water and sanitation connections
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Figure 102 GDP and number of privatisations between 1991 and 2004 (World Bank 2006b)
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Appendix B Key Informant Interview Format
B1 General Questions
1 What is the name of your organisation?
2 What is your organisation’s governing body?
3 How would you define the regulatory framework in which you are operating?
4 Could you describe your mission?
5 Could you describe your main functions?
6 What are your objectives?
7 What are you main sources of funding?
8 Could you point be towards documents and archives about the organisation’s history?
9 What do you think are the main strengths, weakness, opportunities and limitations of 
your organisation?
10 Do you have partners organisations form the health sector, the voluntary sector, civil 
society, government or other external agencies?
11
B2 Sp 
12
What is the organisation’s long term strategy?
ecific questions 
How would you define your geographic area of operation?
13 How do you work with independent water committees?
14 Do you have documentation on XXX projects?
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Appendix C Household Interview Format
C1 Spanish Version
HOGAR (REF. ) FECHA:
A1. para cada 
persona que 
relacidn de 
parentesco tiene 
con el jefe<a) del 
hogar? 
c
1 E^OMK*].'
3 vxnoM M O .
4 MMxa).
5 M a to  t Sutyoo.
*  0*o(a] panm t.
7 T rw i^ im r> j; m  nog*, 
t  rm m n m . 
t  o*o<»; no p M M t
AJ.sexo A3.edad A4.£cu6l es el 
ultimo nivel de 
estudios que 
aprobo?
D S ir ntv«1 EO jcjaon m a *
1 m u ttn c o n ip M
3 P m urt* conpca
4 GocurOjra n o o n e n
5 S ocurd jn i conptta
e Siponor no im v. ncornpnu
7 Sipertor no tm» coirpMla8 S ip tn a  unb. nurym a  
» Sooner m «. oonv«a
HORA:.
A10^.a que 
tipo de 
trabajo se
de<Bcan?.si 
im* uu ouca. a pngjna 12>}
O.otnrrt
IJMAl2cf*cm&a
dMtotmxmnnt Sjnu *  cau 
B^ RWon*
'•vCflfcal
A11. t,e«ta
persona
trabaja
fuerao
dentrodel
hogar?
A12^.sus
ingresos
son:
Odanoi?u r r jw ’l.nnuti?
tpcnaitti’
A13.i.mas o menos, 
cual es el ingreso 
diario, semanal, 
mensual o por 
cosec ha?
A5. £su vivienda es:
Alqulada
propia: pagandota a piazos
propta totalmente pagada o de herencia
propia por ocupaaon
AC. Sin contar bark), cocina, pasadizos 
i.cuintas habitaciones en total tiene la 
vivienda?
A7. tcuantos para dormir?
A8. .^desde cuando viven ustedes en este 
barrio?
AS. ^desde cuando viven ustedes en esta 
vivienda?
A14. «,estos ingresos cambtan mucho durante
el ano? ___________________________
A15. <j.c6mo?
A 10b. tienen tierras de cuttivo:
Alquladas
Propias
AtOc. idonde estan?
dentro del distrito
tuera del disthto
Otro
AlOd. ique producen?
A16. £crian ustedes anlmales en la casa? 
A17. <.para qua?
para comer
para vender
para la seguridad
como mascotas
para erradfcar ratones
Ofro:
A10e. tcomo rtega la tierra?
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A G U A _____________
B1. el abestecimiento de agua en su vivienda procede de: 
tred pubica. dentro de la vivienda?
6red publca.fuera de la vivienda, pero dentro del
edificio? ________
totro? (especiHque)
BlO. ^existen inter rupcianes irregulares en el servicio de 
agua potable?
B11. fccuandoftie la uWrwa? tw n
B12. ten el transcurso del ano cuantas
interrupdones haterida?(vc«*porWK))________________
B13. En promedk>. /.de cuanta diraaon?_______________
B14. tQue hideron ustedes?
B2. tQuien brinda el servicio de agua?
Bj . ^cuintos carios tiene?
B4. ^cuAntos pierden agua?
iquten se ocupa de la reparacidn de las instalaciones?
B5. ^cuantas horas al dia tiene agua?
B6. .^cuantos dias a la semana?
B7. Para usted, ^por que cree que no tiene agua el resto del
tiempo?
B8. abastece de otras fuentes a parte de
su propio caAo?
B9. icuiies?
015. tQue organizaciones les ayudaron?
B16. para usted, <.que opina sobre el servicio de agua 
potable que tiene?
B17. justed o su famiUa ha tenido una
enfermedad reladonada con el agua?________ I
B18. ique tipo de enfermedad y cuAndo y con quA 
frecuencia?
B19. en (os 5 ultimos ados, ^el servicio de" 
aoua potable ha camblado?WicSno? ------------------
HAB ITO S
B21. tpara que acthndades usa el agua a parte de las 
siguientes: para bebar, cocinar, lavarse, la limpieza y la 
lavanderia familiar?
lavanderia (de a luera de la vivienda)
Animates
cocinar (restairante)
production de otra camida
production de adobe
producctdn de otras materiales para la 
construe don
otra:
B22. ^almacena agua en la casa? |
B23. £en que?
cilindro(con tapas)
dlindro (sin tapas)
baldes (can tapas)
baldes (sin tapas)
bidones pequefos ‘cuadrados*
jarras (con tapas)
jarras (sin tapas)
olias (con tapas)
ollas (sin tapas)
tanque dise/tado para el almacenamiento del agua
otro:
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| B24. ccada recipiente es llenado todos k>s dias?
B25. icom o  lena usted los bidones?
Directamente del cano
usando otro recpiente
usando una manguera
Otro:
B26. tcuantos bidones usan ustedes?
Numero de aSndros y capacidad aproximada
num£ro de baldes y capaddad aproximada
num&o de bidones pequftos ‘cuadrados’ y 
capaddad aproximada
numero de otos y capacidad aproximada
num&o de olros recipientes y capacidad 
aproximada
B27. ipor cuinto tiempo almacena el agua, 
mas o ib m k h? ____
B2L £toma e< agua:
Directamente del cano?
Directamente del bidon?
hervida?
Clorada en ca&a? (pregunta XX)
B29. (.cuando clorar el agua?
B30. icom o  ctorarlo?
pastillas
gotas
Otro
b31. £muestreme?
B32. d. tiene medidor para el agua?
B33. £cu&ntos litros de agua cree usted que 
use cada dia, mas o menos?
B34. icu into  cobra el servicio de agua por 
mes?
B35. £esti de acuerdo?
B36. opor qu6?
B37. ique pasaria si no pages?
B3S. u>odria ver la uttana factura?
No tenemeos tacturas escritas
Mes
volumen
tanfa
Total
Uso antenor
B39. Si tuviera un problems con el agua potable, i  que 
baria?
A G U A S  SER VID A S___________________
C1. ie l patio tiene drenaje de agua para la 
lluvia?___________________________
C2. el servicio higtentco que tiene su vivienda esti 
conectado a:
tred pubica, dentro de la vivienda?
6red pObica,Itiera de la vivienda.pero dentro del 
ediflcio?
tpozo sdptico. pozo ciego o negro / letrina?
iotro? (espeafique)
C3. £desde cuando tuvo un servicio higienico 
conectado asi?
C4. i.qui^ n lo hizo la instalacidn?
C5. &quien ha pagado?
C6. para usted *su desagtie desemboca:
En el interceptor de SEDA
En otro lugar. (espedflque)
C7. para usted, qua opina sobre el servicio de 
alcantarillado que tiene?
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C8. En k»  5 ultimo* anos, <.el servicio de
alcantarillado ha cambiado?___________
C9. ccomo?
ENERGIA
E1. £cual es el combustible que mas se utiliza en el hogar 
para cocinar sus alimentos:
Eiectriddad?
Gas?
Otro?
E2. iquien le distribuye el gas (o otro)?
E3. icuantos balones de gas usan por mes?
E4. i.cuinto cuesta un baton de gas (tamano - 
6kg)?
E5. ctiene medidor para la electricidad?
E6. .^cuanto ha pagado el mes pasado?
E7. Si tuviera un problems con la corriente, ^que haria?
D1. itiene un servicio para la recoleccidn de 
basuras?
D2. cP<>r quien?
D3. tddnde deja usted su basura?
D4. para usted £cual es el desbno final de su basura?
D5. icmkrtdo es la recoleccton? (dia, hora)
D6. ^los caros de b as in  pasan por esta calle?
D7. «.el servicio es adecuado?
D8. ipor que?
D9. Si tuviera un problem* con la recoiecclon de basura, 
<i.qu4 haria?
F1. idonde esta la escueia primaria mas
pTOXima? (lugar y tiempo para ir)
F2. £d6nde esta la escueia secundaria mas
prdxima? (lu g ir y tiempo para ir)
F3. idonde esta el puesto de salud mas
prOXifTK)? (luear y tiempo para ir)
F4. £donde esta el paradero de colectivo mas 
proximo? {Kjger y tiempo para ir)
F5. iq u i ONG estan trabajando en esta zona?
F6. icomo son7
F7. iparticipan en una organizacton comunal o 
del bento?
F8. £cdmo se llama la organizacton?
F9. iparticipa en las elecciones?
F10. <Lpaga una cuota?
F11. ^cuinto paga?
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~F12. ^van ustedes a las reuniones? 
F13. tp o f que?
E14. ^ha participado en las elecciones de la
JASS/ASAPASC?_____________________
F15. ip o r  qu6?
F16. Si tuviera un problem * con la segundad, <>que haria?
RIESGOS______
G1. ^que fenomenos naturales se presen tan en su zona?
G2. pcuando fue el ultimo? irw « i 
G3 ccon que frecuencia? ivece* por *noi
G4 6Que hicieron ustedes^
G5. <,que orgamzaciooes les ayudaron?
G6. te n  este lugar, hay apagones?
G7. 6cuando fue el ultimo? (imM»
Gfl. 6en el transcurso del afio cuintos apagones 
ha tenido? i w «  por afoj
en promedio, 6de cuanta duracion?
G9. oQue hicieron ustedes?
G10. t que organizadones les ayudaron?
O B S E R V A C IO N E S
ic u a l es la superficie de la calle?
asfattada
adoquinada
tierra
otra:
r  hav pavim entos?
te s  peatonal?
El m aterial predom inante en: los techos es:
concrete armado
Madera
Tejos
ptaochas de caiamina
cafia. estera. pa'a
El m aterial predom inante en: las paredes exteriores es:
ladnllo o btoque de cemento
ptedra o sillar con cat o cemento
adobe o tap a
piedra oon barro
Quirdia. madera esters.
El m aterial predom inante en: los p isos es
parquet o madera pufida
laminas asfalticas. vinilksos
losetas. terazos
Cemento
Tierra
evaluacion de los riesgos sanitarios:
El m aterial predom inante en: el patio es:
Cemento sin desaoue
Cemento con desaaue
Tierra sin desague
Tierra con desague
Otra:
El cano principal descarga en:
Lavabo de concrete
Lavabo de piedra
El patio
Otra:
El cano principal es:
Encastrado en el muro
Una columna de alimentaacn
Otra .
El estado del cano principal es:
Muy ben | Bien | Razonable | Poore | mato
El estado de la m anguera es:
Muy bien | Bien | Razonable | Pobre | mad
O tras observaciones:
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C2 English Version 
GENERAL
A1. Starting with the head of household, what relationship does this 
person have to the head of household?
0. Head, 1. husband/wife/partners 2. child, 3. son/daughter-in-law, 4. grandchild, 5. parent/parent-in-law, 6. other 
relative, 7. working in house, 8. lodger, 9. other not related
A2. sex 
A3, age
A4. what is your highest educational qualification?
0. sin nivel, 1. primaria completa, 2. secundaria completa, 3. superior tecnologico, 4. superior universitario
A5. is your house:
rented?, owned: paying mortgage? owned: no mortgage/mortgage paid? owned following invasion?
A6. Not counting the bathroom, kitchen and passages, how many rooms 
does it have?
A7. How many are for sleeping?
A8. How long have you lived in this house?
A9. How long have you lived in this neighbourhood?
A10. What does this person do for a living?
A10b do you have farmland?
do you own it, or rent it
A10c where is it?
Inside the district, outside the district, other
A10d what do you produce?
A10e how do you irrigate your land?
A11. Does this person work inside or outside the household?
A12. This person’s income is:
0. daily, 1. weekly, 2. monthly, 3. by harvest
A13. approximately what is this income?
A14. do these earning change much during the year?
A15. how?
A16. do you rear animals in your house?
A17. what for?
to eat, to sell, for security, as pets, to control pests, other
WATER
B1. what kind of potable water connection do you have?
public network, connection inside house, public network, connection outside house but within building, Other:
B2. who provides your water service?
B3. How many taps do you have?
B4. Who does repairs on the installations?
B5. How many hours per day do you have water?
B6. How many days per week?
B7. Why do you think you don’t have water the rest of the time?
B8. Do you use any other sources of water apart from your own tap?
B9. What sources?
B10. Are there irregular interruptions in the water service?
B11. When was the last one?
B12. During the year, how many interruptions are there?
B13. On average, how long do they last?
B14. What do you do?
B15. Do any organisations help you?
B16. What do you think of your water service?
B17 Have you or your family ever been sick from drinking the water? 
B18. What type of illness?
B19. Has the water situation changed in the last 5 years?
B20. How?
B21. What is water used for apart from drinking, cooking and washing 
(family's clothes)?
washing (clothes for others), cleaning, animals, cooking (restaurant), production of other foodstuffs, production of adobe, 
production of other construction, materials, other:
B22. Do you store water in the house?
B23. In what? (note number and volume)
drums (covered), drums (uncovered), buckets (covered), buckets (uncovered), jerry cans, cooking pots (covered), 
cooking pots (uncovered), purpose built, storage tank, other:
B24. How many times a day do you fill your containers?
B25. How do you fill vessels?
directly from tap, using another container, using a hose, other:
B26. How many containers do you use?
no. drums (approx vol), no. buckets (approx vol), no. jerry cans (approx vol), no. cooking pots (approx vol), approx vol of 
storage tank, approx vol of other containers
B27. How long do you store water for? (hours)
B28. Do you drink water directly:
from the tap? from the storage container? boiled? chlorinated in your house?
B29. Do you chlorinate your water?
B30. How?
Tablets, Drops, Other
B31. Can you show me?
B32. Do you have a water meter?
B33. How much water do you think you use per day?
B34. How much is your monthly bill?
B35. Do you agree with the cost?
B36. Why?
B37. What happens if you don’t pay?
B38. Could I see your last bill?
No printed bills, Month, Volume, Tariff, Total, Previous Use
B39. If you have a problem with the water supply, what do you do? 
WASTE WATER
C1. Is there patio drainage for rainwater?
C2. what is your WC connected to?
public network connection inside house, public network connection outside house but within building 
septic tank, latrine, other:
C3. How long has your WC had this sort of connection?
C4. Who installed the WC connection?
C5. who paid?
C6. Where does the waste water go?
Main drain (SEDA):, Somewhere else:
C7. What do you think of the waste water service?
C8. Has the waste water situation changed in the last 5 years?
C9. How?
ENERGY
E1. what is your main fuel source for cooking:
Electricity?, Gas?, Other?
E2. Who distributes this fuel?
E3. How many bottles of gas do you think you use per month?
E4. How much does gas cost (6kg bottle)?
E5. Do you have an electricity meter?
E6. How much do you pay for electricity?
E7. If you have a problem with electricity what do you do?
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WASTE
D1. Do you have a waste collection service?
D2. Who provides this service?
D3. Where do you leave your waste?
D4. Where does your rubbish end up?
D5. When is the collection (day, hour)?
D6. can rubbish trucks come up this road>
D7. Is the service adequate?
D8. Why not?
D9. If you had a problem with the service, what would you do?
OTROS SERVICIOS
F1. Where is the nearest primary school? (place and time to get there)
F2. Where is the nearest secondary school? (place and time to get there)
F3. Where is the nearest health centre? (place and time to get there)
F4. Where is the nearest bus stop? (place and time to get there)
F5. Which NGOs are working in this are?
F6. What are they like?
F7. Do you belong to a community organisation?
F8. What’s it called?
F9. Do you take part in the elections 
F10. do you pay fees?
F11. how much do you pay?
F12. Do you go to the meetings?
F13 Why?
F14. Will you vote in ASAPASC/JASS elections?
F15. Why?
F16. If you have a problem with security what do you do?
RISKS
G1. what natural disasters affect you here?
G2. when was the last? (months)
G3. how often? (times per year)
G4. what did you do?
G5. what organisations help you helps you?
G6. Do you experience power cuts?
G7. when was the last? (months)
G8. how often? (times per year)
G9. what did you do?
G10. what organisations help you helps you?
MY OBSERVATIONS:
What is the road surface?
Sealed, Cobbled, Unsealed, other:
Are there pavements?
Is it pedestrianised?
Dominant material in roof:
Reinforced concrete, Wood, Tiles, CGI sheets, Thatch, reeds, Other
Dominant material in walls:
Brick or cement block, Stone with lime or cement, Mud brick, Stone with mud mortar, Wattle and dawb, wood, reeds
Dominant material in floors:
parquet or polished wood, tiles, vinyl, flagstones, cement, earth
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Dominant material in patio:
Cement without drainage, Cement with drainage, Earth without drainage, Earth with drainage, Other
Main tap discharges in:
Concrete sink, Stone sink. Patio, Other
Main tap is:
Built in, Free standing tap, Other
Hose:
Very good, good, reasonable, poor, bad
Main tap:
Very good, good, reasonable, poor, bad
Appendix D Sanitation Checklists and Additional Results
D1 Water Systems
Table 35 Risk classification o f sanitary scores
Sanitary risk score Risk* C lassification
0 No observed risk
1 to 3 Low risk
4 to 6 Intermediate risk
7 to 10 High risk
Table 36 Classification o f thermotolerant coliform  counts
TTC count Colour Code SB1*** A1 MC1 MC2
0 m i m m a m
1 to 10 B <3 to 9 (66%) 2*
10 to 100 C
100 to 1000 D <3 to 460 (34%)
>1000 
nr* a ~- ____T" to
**MC2 in dry season, highest TTC count: 9 
***TTC samples from rivers feeding Lake Piuray: 
NMP/100ml (PRONAMACHCS & INRENA 2005)
66% <3 to 9 NMP/100ml, 34% <3 to 460
Checklist fo r a protected spring source (Angostura and Manco Capac)
A1 MC1
1 Is the spring source unprotected by masonry or concrete wall or spring 
box and therefore open to surface contamination?
N N
2 Is the masonry protecting the spring source faulty? N N
3 If there is a spring box, is there an unsanitary inspection cover in the 
masonry?
N N
4 Is the area around the spring unfenced? Y Y
5 Can animals have access to within 10 m of the spring source? Y Y
6 Are there any latrines uphill of the spring? N Y
7 Is spring water combined with surface sources before treatment? N Y
8 If there is a filter, is it functioning badly? N Y
9 Is the flow uncontrolled? Y Y
10 Is chlorination unavailable or unreliable? Y
4
Y
7
Checklist fo r a surface source and community supply (Manco Capac) MC2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
Is there any human habitation upstream, polluting the source?
Are there any farm animals upstream, polluting the source?
Is there any crop production or industrial pollution upstream?
Is there a risk of landslide or mudflow (causing deforestation) in the catchment 
area?
Is the intake installation unfenced?
Is the intake unscreened?
Does the system require a sand or gravel filter?
If there is a filter, is it functioning badly?
Is the flow uncontrolled?
Is chlorination unavailable or unreliable?
MC2
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y 
7
Checklist fo r a surface source and municipal supply (San Bias)
Is there any human habitation upstream, polluting the source?
Are there any farm animals upstream, polluting the source?
Is there any crop production or industrial pollution upstream?
Is there a risk of landslide or mudflow (causing deforestation) in the catchment 
area?
Is the intake installation unfenced?
SB1
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
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6 Is the intake unscreened? N
7 If the system requires pre-treatment, is it functioning badly? N
8 If the system requires a treatment plant: is the plant functioning badly? N
9 Is the flow uncontrolled? N
10 Is chlorination unavailable or unreliable? N
4
Figure 103 Sanitary risk scores o f all systems
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  >9
Intermediate to high 
risk: higher action 
priority
Low risk: low action 
priority
Very high risk: urgent 
action
369
D2 Household Connections
Location Household Max TTC count Risk score
16 3
17 3
18 1 4
19 1 4
V)
n
22 1 0
23 1 4
m
c 24 3co
</> 25 0
26 1 4
27 0
28 2 4
29 4
30 4 4
San Bias 16 17 18 19 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
1 Is supply intermittent? 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
2 Does tap discharge onto an 
undrained patio?
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
3 Is the only tap outside the 
house (but within the 
property)?
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 Is the tap freestanding rather 
than built in to the wall?
1 1 1 1
5 Is the tap in a poor condition? 
(leaking, cracked/eroded 
plinth, unsupported 
standpipe)
6 Is water stored or collected? 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
7 Can contaminants (e.g. soil 
on the inside of the lid) enter 
the tank or container during 
filling?
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
8 Does the tank or container 
lack a cover?
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
9 Is there stagnant water 
around the storage tank or 
container?
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
10 Is the container is left 
uncleaned and undisinfected 
between fills?
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
Household Risk Score 3 3 4 4 0 4 3 0 4 0 4 4 4
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Location Household Max TTC count Risk score
1 1 3
2 68 5
3 0
4 4
5 5 4
re 6 1 0
3  7 0
8 8 0
g  9 142 0
<  10 1 0
11 1 0
12 5 0
13 255 0
14 0
15 5
Angostura 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Is supply intermittent? 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Does tap discharge onto an 
undrained patio?
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 Is the only tap outside the 
house (but within the 
property)?
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 Is the tap freestanding 
rather than built in to the 
wall?
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 Is the tap in a poor 
condition? (leaking, 
cracked/eroded plinth, 
unsupported standpipe)
1 1 1 1 1 1
6 Is water stored or collected? 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 Can contaminants (e.g. soil 
on the inside of the lid) enter 
the tank or container during 
filling?
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
8 Does the tank or container 
lack a cover?
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
9 Is there stagnant water 
around the storage tank or 
container?
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
10 Is the container is left 
uncleaned and 
undisinfected between fills?
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Household Risk Score 3 5 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
371
Location Household Max TTC count Risk score
40
43
44
275
103
556
438
158
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
1 Is supply intermittent? 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 Does tap discharge onto an 
undrained patio?
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
3 Is the only tap outside the 
house (but within the 
property)?
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 Is the tap freestanding rather 
than built in to the wall?
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 Is the tap in a poor 
condition? (leaking, 
cracked/eroded plinth, 
unsupported standpipe)
1 1 1
6 Is water stored or collected? 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 Can contaminants (e.g. soil 
on the inside of the lid) enter 
the tank or container during 
filling?
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 Does the tank or container 
lack a cover?
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
9 Is there stagnant water 
around the storage tank or 
container?
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
10 Is the container is left 
uncleaned and undisinfected 
between fills?
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Household Risk Score 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 4
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D3 Water Testing Methods
Thermotolerant coliforms per 100ml (TTCs) and residual chlorine are the key 
indicators for human health. The presence of TTCs indicates possible faecal 
contamination and the associated public health risk to humans. A residual level 
of chlorine at the last point in a distribution system is one indicator that 
disinfection is still effective.
Total Hardness (H) and pH, in the ranges measured in this fieldwork, are not 
implicated in human health but pH is important in water treatment since longer 
contact times for chlorination are required with higher pH levels.
The WHO offers no health based limit for Total Hardness but hardness above 
200mg/l is known to cause furring in pipework. Hardness can affect the taste of 
drinking water, it does not rinse away soap as easily as softer water and it will 
also leave deposits on pots and pans. All these factors mean that public 
acceptability of hardness can vary.
TTCs, residual chlorine and pH were all determined using the standard methods 
and equipment provided with the Delagua water testing kit.
1. Thermotolerant coliforms: this method is taken from Section 5.4.4 of the 
Oxfam-Delagua Field Manual (Oxfam-Delagua 2004). Petri dishes were 
prepared by placing sterile absorbent pads in each dish and pouring in the pre­
prepared, sterile sodium lauryl sulphate culture medium. The filtration apparatus 
was set up and sterile tweezers were used to place a sterile filter membrane 
onto the bronze disc filter of the apparatus. The filter funnel and collar were 
replaced and screwed down tightly then 100ml of sampled water were poured 
into the filter funnel. The plastic vacuum pump was connected to the filtration 
base and pumped in order to draw the water sample through the membrane. 
After removing the filter funnel, sterile tweezers were used to transfer the 
membrane to a pre-prepared Petri dish. The filtration apparatus was re- 
sterilized and the process repeated. After the final sample of the day a 
resuscitation period of 60minutes was scheduled before all the samples were 
placed in the incubator for 16hours at 44degreesC.
2. Residual chlorine and pH: this method is taken from Section 5.2 of the 
Oxfam-Delagua Kit Field Manual (Oxfam-Delagua 2004). Residual chlorine was 
measured using the colour comparators and adding DPD No 1 to read off levels 
of free chlorine residual and then adding DPD No 3 to this solution to read off 
total chlorine residual. pH was also measured using the colour comparator but 
this time with the standard indicator Phenol Red.
3. Total Hardness was measured using the standard complexometric titration 
method with EDTA as the titrant. Complexometric methods produce a colour 
change once titration is completed.
All these tests were carried out at the Coviduc laboratory by two lab assistants 
and me, when I was not in the field.
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D4 Data Analysis and Descriptive Statistics
The data set was coded according the following convention and it was imported 
into SPSS.
Season s 1=dry season, 2=wet season
Location I 1=Angostura, 2=Manco Capac , 3=San Bias
Date d 31st July 2006 to 6,n February 2007
Day Number day 1 to 39
Household h 1 to 45
Time of Day tod 1=morning, 2=midday, 3=afternoon
Origin of Sample b 0=tap, 1=bucket
Sample Number i 1=first, 2=second, 3=third, 4=fourth, 5=fifth
This appendix presents two data summaries: box plots for thermotolerant 
coliforms (TTCs), residual chlorine (RC), pH and hardness (H); and distribution 
histograms for the same indicators, disaggregated by location and whether the 
sample was direct from the tap or from stored water.
Box plots are useful to display differences between the case studies without 
making assumptions about underlying statistical distribution. The construction of 
the plot is as follows:
__________   Extrem e outl i er (> 3 ti m es the
A »      inter-quartile range)
Largest non-outlier
Third quartile
Median
First quartile
Smallest non-outlier
Mild outlier (>1.5 times the inter­
quartile range)
-►
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The frequency distributions below are presented to demonstrate the usefulness 
of box plots in describing the results. TTCs and RC are the key indicators. The 
distribution of TTC counts is highly positively skewed compared to pH and total 
hardness. pH and total hardness can be disaggregated by location to show the 
distributions in San Bias, Angostura and Manco Capac.
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D5 Data Analysis and Descriptive Statistics
San Bias Angostura Manco Capac
Provider SEDACusco JASS ASAPASC
Ownership District
municipalities are 
shareholders
community water 
committee or JASS
ASAPASC
Decision­
making
board of elected 
mayors
General assemblies 
of the population
Board members (elected by each 
other)
in theory a General Assembly
Regulation SUNASS community and in 
theory by SUNASS
In theory self-regulation, lawyer 
and accountant hired by 
committee
Health
monitoring
DIGESA, 
SEDACusco: 8 
samples/day for 
microbial analysis 
(SEDACusco 
Interview 3 2006)
In theory by 
DIGESA
in theory by DIGESA via health 
posts
Funding Self-financing, cost 
recovery, metering 
and billing, private 
finance
user fees, joining 
fees, fines but not 
for profit, CGPdA 
materials via 
external donors, 
tariff collection is by 
JASS
user fees, connection fees and
fines
NGOs
Tariff setting SUNASS Community Committee
Financial
oversight
Central
government
Community Committee
Annual
budget
18,411,903 soles 
(£3,162,589)
3,528 soles 
(£606)
177,780 soles 
(£30,546)
Internal
capacity
Internal technical 
staff
president, secretary, 
treasurer and 
technician, rolling 
schedule for 
twice yearly 
servicing by 
quarterly faenas 
(work teams)
Administrator, 6 casual 
maintenance staff, 
contracted lawyer and accountant 
for “advice on transparency” 
(ASAPASC Meeting 2006)
External
support
Private finance, 
providing and 
receiving training 
with other Peruvian 
EPSs
CGPdA supports 
design and 
community executes 
construction,
CGPdA workshops 
for fontaneros
Occasional consultancy, Material 
donations by NGOs
Engagement 
of users
Performance 
indicators and 
benchmarks 
Adverts to promote 
water saving
assemblies, faenas, 
f aci I itation/prom oti on 
by NGOs
Poorly attended general 
assemblies
Number of 
connections
56,049 147 2,963
Jurisdiction Provincial Settlement 16 settlements
Geographic
reach
Lake 22km 
away-> flocculation, 
pressure filters, 
disinfection, 
storage, 
distribution via 
north
main-> pressure
5 springs, 62m3 
reservoir, no 
treatment
Surface and spring source 9km 
away, filtration plant, reservoir 
500m3, unpredictable manually 
operated chlorination
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zone San Bias
System
performance
7031/s (3351/s 
Piuray System) 
insufficient yield, 
population growth, 
production deficit 
disproportionately 
impacts the higher 
parts of the city, 
system losses, 
“crecimiento 
vertical”
51/s
lack of capacity, lack 
of funds, poor water 
quality, lack of 
monitoring, lack of 
regulation, lack of 
disinfection, old 
pipework, missing 
valves.
rolling schedule for 
twice yearly 
servicing
141/s
Falling yield, agricultural activity in 
the catchment, pipes reaching 
end of 30 year life design life, 
uncontrolled post-treatment 
disinfection, fluctuating pressure, 
poor household connections, no 
maintenance schedule, 2 years: 
rehab of sand filters (depending 
on cash flow),
2 weeks: ad-hoc cleaning, 2-3 
months: reservoir maintenance, 
lack of network drawings
Sanitary risk Intermediate to 
high
Intermediate to high Very high risk
Metering Yes No No
Environmental
linkages
Waste water 
system and 
discharge to River 
Saphy
(underground 
tributary of 
Huatanay)
Waste water 
system, primary 
treatment and 
discharge to River 
Huatanay
Waste water system, no 
treatment, discharge to River 
Huatanay
institutional
linkages
Vilcanota Basin 
Mgmt Committee 
(IMA), GIHR 
(CPGdA)
Inter-district and 
GIHR
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Appendix E Glossary
El Spanish Terms
Ayllu Incan farming cooperative
Campesino Peasant (with connotations of poverty)
Chicha Local maize beer
Chicharron Pork scratchings
Comedores Populares. Collective kitchens set up as part of 
nutrition programme
Comunidad Campesina Peasant collective
Cusqueho/a A person from Cusco
El municipio Municipal territory
Faena Community work daysAeams
Frente de Defensa Local political organisations created 
during the eighties to unite and solve 
the problems of the settlements
Hacendados Landed or landowning class
Hacienda Farm estate
Junta directiva Board of directors
La municipalidad Municipal government
Los cabildos town councils
Sendero luminoso Shining Path, Peruvian guerilla 
movement
Tambos Comunales: Subsidised shops to deliver cheap 
basic foodstuffs
Vaso de Leche Glass of milk government nutrition 
programme
E2 Acronyms
AAHH Asentamientos Humanos Human settlements
APV Asociaciones Pro Viviendas Housing cooperative
ASAPASC Asociacion de Servicios de 
Agua Potable y Alcantarillado 
de la Zona Sur Cusco
Drinking Water and Drainage 
Association of Cusco’s 
Southern Zone
CID Comite Inter distrital de 
Desarrollo
Inter-district committee for 
development
DIGESA Direccion General de Salud 
Ambiental
Environmental health board
EPS Entidad Prestadora de 
Servicios de Saneamiento
Water and sanitation company 
(provincial level)
GIRH Gestion Integral de Recursos 
Hldricos
Integrated Water Resource 
Management
IMA Instituto de Manejo de Agua y 
Medio Ambiente
Water and Environmental 
Management Institute
ING Instituto Nacional Geografico National Geographic Instititute
JASS Junta Administradora de 
Servicios de Saneamiento
Administrative committee for 
water and sanitation
PIDES Plan Integral de Desarrollo 
Estrategico y Sostenible
Integrated plan for strategic and 
sustainable development
PPJJ Pueblos Jovenes Young towns
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S./or sol. Nuevo Soles Peruvian currency £1 = S./5.82 
as at 28/09/06
SEDA Servicio de Agua Water service
SERLIMP Servicio Limpieza Street cleaning service
SINAMOS Sistema Nacional de 
Movilizacion Social
National system for social 
mobilisation
SUNASS Superintendencia Nacional de 
Servicios de Saneamiento
Water and sanitation sector 
watchdog
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